DOE G 151.1-4, Response Elements

NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Response Elements Emergency Management Guide [This Guide describes suggested nonmandatory approaches for meeting requirements. Guides are not requirements documents and are not to be construed as requirements in any audit or appraisal for compliance with the parent Policy, Order, Notice, or Manual.] U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY: www.directives.doe.gov National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Emergency Management i DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 DOE G 151.1-4 - Response Elements Table of Contents 1. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION............................................................. 1-1 1.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................1-1 1.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................1-2 1.3 ERO Structure..................................................................................................................1-3 1.3.1 Emergency Director (ED) ....................................................................................1-3 1.3.2 ERO Functions.....................................................................................................1-3 1.3.3 ERO Positions ......................................................................................................1-7 1.4 Staffing the ERO..............................................................................................................1-9 1.4.1 Initial Staffing ......................................................................................................1-9 1.4.2 Staff Augmentation ............................................................................................1-10 1.5 Operational Aspects of the ERO....................................................................................1-11 1.5.1 Activation...........................................................................................................1-11 1.5.2 Operations ..........................................................................................................1-11 1.6 Maintenance of the ERO................................................................................................1-14 1.7 Special Response Function/Positions ............................................................................1-14 1.7.1 Incident Command.............................................................................................1-14 1.7.2 Hazardous Material Survey, Sampling, and Sample Analysis Teams ...............1-17 1.7.3 Security Staff......................................................................................................1-18 1.7.4 Fire and Rescue..................................................................................................1-18 1.7.5 Repair and Maintenance.....................................................................................1-19 2. OFFSITE RESPONSE INTERFACES ............................................................................ 2-1 2.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................2-1 2.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................2-1

2.3 Offsite Agencies and Organizations ................................................................................2-2 2.4 Support Agreements ........................................................................................................2-4 2.5 Interface Information and Issues to Address....................................................................2-5 2.6 Interfaces during Response ..............................................................................................2-7 3. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ........................................................ 3-1 3.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................3-1 3.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................3-1 3.3 Role of the EPHA ............................................................................................................3-2 3.4 Emergency Facilities........................................................................................................3-4 3.4.1 Command Center .................................................................................................3-4 3.4.2 Alternate Command Center..................................................................................3-6 3.4.3 Joint Information Center (JIC) .............................................................................3-7 3.4.4 Other Emergency Facilities..................................................................................3-7 3.5 Emergency Equipment.....................................................................................................3-8 3.5.1 Equipment Support for Response Functions........................................................3-8 3.5.2 Command, Control, and Communications Equipment ......................................3-10 3.5.3 Consequence Assessment Equipment ................................................................3-11 3.5.4 Protective Equipment .........................................................................................3-11 3.5.5 Medical Equipment ............................................................................................3-12 3.5.6 Public Information Equipment ...........................................................................3-13 3.5.7 Additional Support Equipment ..........................................................................3-13 ii DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 3.6 Maintenance of Facilities and Equipment......................................................................3-14 4. EMERGENCY CATEGORIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION ................................ 4-1 4.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................4-1 4.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................4-2 4.3 Operational Emergency Definition ..................................................................................4-3 4.4 Categorization of Operational Emergencies ....................................................................4-4 4.4.1 Direct Health and Safety Impacts ........................................................................4-5 4.4.2 Environmental Impacts ......................................................................................4-10

4.4.3 Safeguards and Security Events or Conditions with Direct Health and Safety or Environmental Impacts .................................................................4-11 4.4.4 Offsite DOE Transportation Events or Conditions ............................................4-12 4.4.5 Release of (or Loss of Control Over) Hazardous Materials...............................4-14 4.5 Classification of Hazardous Material Operational Emergencies ...................................4-15 4.5.1 Principles of Event Classification ......................................................................4-15 4.5.2 Event Classification and Protective Action Criteria ..........................................4-17 4.5.3 Emergency Class and Severity Level.................................................................4-18 4.5.4 Integration of Event Classification with Normal Operations.............................4-18 4.6 Development of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) ......................................................4-19 4.6.1 Role of the Facility EPHA .................................................................................4-19 4.6.2 Symptom-Based and Event-Based EALs...........................................................4-20 4.6.3 Barrier Approach to EAL Development ............................................................4-21 4.6.4 Site-wide EALs ..................................................................................................4-24 4.6.5 Discretionary EALs............................................................................................4-25 4.6.6 Equipment Availability ......................................................................................4-25 4.6.7 Facility Operational Modes................................................................................4-25 4.6.8 Method of EAL Presentation .............................................................................4-26 4.6.9 Event Termination Criteria ................................................................................4-26 4.7 Testing Categorization Criteria and EALs.....................................................................4-27 4.7.1 Operational Emergencies Not Requiring Classification ....................................4-27 4.7.2 Operational Emergencies Requiring Classification ...........................................4-27 APPENDIX A. Integration of Event Categorization/Classification APPENDIX B. Methods and Examples for Implementation of Event with Normal Operations ............................................... A-1 Categorization and Classification..................................B-1 5. NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS ............................................................ 5-1 5.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................5-1 5.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................5-1 5.3 Notifications.....................................................................................................................5-2 5.3.1 Notification System..............................................................................................5-3 5.3.2 External Notification Requirements.....................................................................5-4 5.3.3 Onsite Notifications .............................................................................................5-5

5.3.4 Initial Offsite Notifications and Emergency Status Updates................................5-5 5.4 Communications ..............................................................................................................5-7 5.4.1 Communications Equipment................................................................................5-7 5.4.2 Effective Responder Communications.................................................................5-9 5.5 Documentation and Reports...........................................................................................5-10 5.5.1 Response Documentation...................................................................................5-10 5.5.2 Final Emergency Report ....................................................................................5-10 5.5.3 Recovery Reports and Records ..........................................................................5-11 iii DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 APPENDIX C. Emergency Notification Form.......................................C-1 APPENDIX D. Emergency Status Updates ........................................... D-1 6. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT.................................................................................... 6-1 6.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................6-1 6.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................6-1 6.3 Decision-Making in an Emergency Environment............................................................6-2 6.4 General Consequence Assessment Process .....................................................................6-4 6.5 Initial Event Recognition, Categorization/Classification, and Protective Actions ..........6-7 6.6 Timely Initial Assessment (TIA) .....................................................................................6-8 6.6.1 Identify and Collect Data/Information .................................................................6-9 6.6.2 Analyze and Calculate........................................................................................6-11 6.6.3 Assess and Estimate Consequences ...................................................................6-12 6.6.4 Communicate .....................................................................................................6-12 6.6.5 Interface ...........................................................................................................6-12 6.7 Continuous Ongoing Assessment ..................................................................................6-13 6.7.1 Identify and Collect Data/Information ...............................................................6-14 6.7.2 Analyze and Calculate........................................................................................6-21 6.7.3 Assess and Estimate Consequences ...................................................................6-24 6.7.4 Communicate .....................................................................................................6-25 6.7.5 Interface ...........................................................................................................6-27 6.8 Documentation...............................................................................................................6-27 6.9 Quality Assurance..........................................................................................................6-28

APPENDIX E. Ingestion Pathway Calculations for Radioactive Releases .........................................................................E-1 APPENDIX F. Field Monitoring............................................................F-1 7. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND REENTRY .................................................................. 7-1 7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................7-1 7.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................7-1 7.3 Protective Actions............................................................................................................7-3 7.3.1 General Concepts .................................................................................................7-3 7.3.2 Protective Action Initiation ..................................................................................7-4 7.3.3 Determination of Affected Area...........................................................................7-6 7.3.4 Evacuation and Sheltering of Workers ................................................................7-7 7.3.5 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) ........................................7-12 7.3.6 The Decision Environment ................................................................................7-13 7.3.7 Development of EAL-Specific Pre-Planned Initial Protective Actions .............7-15 7.3.8 Accountability ....................................................................................................7-16 7.3.9 Decontamination ................................................................................................7-17 7.3.10 Other Protective Actions ....................................................................................7-18 7.4 Reentry...........................................................................................................................7-21 7.4.1 Reentry Planning................................................................................................7-21 7.4.2 Protection of Response Personnel during Reentry Activities ............................7-21 7.4.3 Reentry for “Rescue and Recovery” ..................................................................7-25 7.4.4 Management of Personnel Exposures ................................................................7-27 8. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT............................................................................ 8-1 8.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................8-1 8.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................8-1 8.3 Site Emergency Medical Support ....................................................................................8-2 8.3.1 DOE/NNSA Requirements and Related Standards..............................................8-2 iv DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 8.3.2 Medical Support for DOE/NNSA Operational Emergency Hazardous Material Programs .............................................................................................8-4 8.3.3 Resources for the Emergency Medical Program..................................................8-6 8.4 Interfaces and Coordination.............................................................................................8-7

8.4.1 Interfaces with Onsite Resources .........................................................................8-7 8.4.2 Interfaces with Offsite Resources ........................................................................8-8 8.5 Medical Records and Treatment History .......................................................................8-10 8.6 Emergency Medical Response Preparedness Activities ................................................8-10 8.6.1 Training and Drills .............................................................................................8-10 8.6.2 Exercises ...........................................................................................................8-11 8.7 Federal Medical Assistance ...........................................................................................8-11 8.7.1 Radiological Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) ............8-11 8.7.2 Other Federal Medical Response Resources......................................................8-12 9. EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION..................................................................... 9-1 9.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................9-1 9.2 General Approach ............................................................................................................9-1 9.3 EPI Functions and Staffing ..............................................................................................9-2 9.4 EPI Response ...................................................................................................................9-4 9.4.1 Commensurate Response .....................................................................................9-4 9.4.2 Initial EPI Organization .......................................................................................9-5 9.4.3 Transition to a Full EPI Organization - JIC Activation .......................................9-7 9.4.4 Full EPI Organization - JIC..................................................................................9-8 9.4.5 EPI Role in the Incident Command System.........................................................9-9 9.5 Media Relations .............................................................................................................9-10 9.5.1 Guidelines ..........................................................................................................9-10 9.5.2 News Releases....................................................................................................9-11 9.5.3 News Conferences..............................................................................................9-12 9.6 EPI/JIC Facilities and Equipment..................................................................................9-12 9.7 EPI Preparedness Activities...........................................................................................9-14 9.7.1 Training and Drills .............................................................................................9-14 9.7.2 Exercises ...........................................................................................................9-15 9.7.3 Offsite Interfaces................................................................................................9-16 9.7.4 Public and Media Education ..............................................................................9-16

10. TERMINATION AND RECOVERY ............................................................................. 10-1 10.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................10-1 10.2 General Approach ..........................................................................................................10-1 10.3 Termination....................................................................................................................10-2 10.3.1 Operational Emergencies - Not Requiring Classification ..................................10-3 10.3.2 Operational Emergencies – Requiring Classification ........................................10-4 10.4 Recovery ........................................................................................................................10-6 10.4.1 Recovery Organization.......................................................................................10-6 10.4.2 Recovery Plan ....................................................................................................10-8 10.4.3 Recovery Planning and Scheduling ...................................................................10-9 10.4.4 Accident Assessment and Investigation.............................................................10-9 10.4.5 Repair and Restoration Activities ....................................................................10-10 10.5 Resumption of Normal Operations ..............................................................................10-11 DOE G 151.1-4 v (and vi) 7-11-07 List of Figures Figure 6-1. Basic Functions in the Timely Initial Assessment Process ..................................................6-10 Figure 6-2. Basic Functions in the Continuous Ongoing Assessment ....................................................6-14 List of Tables Table 4-1. Summaries of Emergency Classes.........................................................................................4-18 Table 4-2. Examples of Event-Based and Symptom-Based EAL Statements for the Same Condition .....................................................................................................................4-22 Table 4-3. Example Symptom-Based EALs for Different Severity Levels for the Same Initiating Condition ...............................................................................................................................4-23 Table 4-4. Example Event-Based EALs for Different Severity Levels for the Same Initiating Condition ...............................................................................................................................4-24 Table 9-1. Typical Contents of an Emergency Public Information Plan ..................................................9-4 1-1DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 1. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION 1.1 Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assist Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) field elements in complying with the DOE O 151.1C requirement to establish and maintain an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) for each facility/site or activity and to ensure that DOE/NNSA EROs are compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The ERO is a structured organization with overall responsibility for initial and ongoing emergency response to an Operational Emergency (OE) and for mitigation of the consequences. The ERO establishes effective control of response capabilities at the scene of an event/incident and integrates ERO activities with those of local agencies and organizations that provide onsite response services. An adequate number of experienced and trained personnel, including designated alternates, should be available on demand for timely and effective performance of ERO functions.

This chapter is designed primarily for facilities/sites and activities that are required to implement an Operational Emergency Hazardous Materials Program and is directed at operations and emergency management staff at Field Elements and operating contractor organizations responsible for DOE and NNSA facilities/sites and activities. This guide cancels and supersedes the following • DOE G 151.1-1, V-1, Emergency Response Organization, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-2, Offsite Response Interfaces, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-3, Categorization and Classifications of Operational Emergencies, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-4, Notifications and Communications, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-1, Consequence Assessment, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-2, Protective Actions and Reentry, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-3, Emergency Medical Support, dated 8-21-97 • ·DOE G 151.1-1, V-4, Emergency Public Information, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-5, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, dated 8-21-97 • DOE G 151.1-1, V-6, Termination and Recovery, dated 8-21-97 1-2 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 1.2 General Approach Emergency response in the DOE/NNSA Comprehensive Emergency Management System consists of a three-tiered organizational structure. The primary capability for responding to an OE resides with site prime Management and Operating (M&O) contractors because of their responsibility for directing appropriate emergency response actions within the area under their control and at the scene of the emergency. Facility/site and activity emergency response capability is based on comprehensive and integrated plans and procedures. DOE/NNSA field elements, the second tier, oversee and support emergency management activities for responding to an OE at facilities/sites or activities under their cognizance. DOE/NNSA headquarters organizations, the third tier, oversee and support the emergency management activities of the field element by monitoring the field and contractor response, providing support as needed, assisting with issue resolution, and coordinating interagency, congressional, and public information activities at the national level. Headquarters provides strategic direction to the DOE/NNSA field response and evaluates the impact of the emergency on DOE/NNSA operations, missions, and functions. At each tier the DOE/NNSA Comprehensive Emergency Management System requires a structured organization, an ERO, to ensure a prompt, effective, and efficient response to a wide variety of emergency events and conditions so that appropriate response measures are taken to protect workers, the public, the environment, and national security. The guidance in this chapter addresses the establishment and maintenance of an ERO at the facility-level, site-level or activity-level on an ongoing basis during normal operations and the on-demand staffing of the ERO in response to an OE. Each facility on a multi- facility site should have a facility-level ERO that may interface with and join the site- level ERO in emergency events. However, the functional response needs and results of the Hazards Survey and Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA) will be the predominant factors affecting the ERO organizational structure; the availability and location of individual emergency response facilities may also affect the configuration and allocation of ERO personnel and response capabilities.

The guidance focuses on the structure and functions to be implemented by facilities/sites and activities and will assist in defining an ERO that is capable of responding to the spectrum of potential emergencies affecting a site, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the organization. A description of a typical onsite emergency organization, including a method for determining functions to be performed and its interfaces with offsite services and agencies, is provided. The ongoing activities that are required to maintain the readiness of the ERO during normal operations are addressed. Finally, the activation of the ERO organization and subsequent operational aspects during a response are discussed. The Incident Command System (ICS), which manages response operations at the event scene, should be developed and implemented according to the ICS consistent with the National Response Plan (NRP) and required by the NIMS. 1-3 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 1.3 ERO Structure The organizational structure of the ERO should be based on the results of the facility/site or activity Hazards Surveys and EPHA, the relationships between the site and facility response capabilities, and the relationships between the onsite and offsite emergency response organizations. Characteristics of the spectrum of scenarios that constitute the technical planning basis for a facility determine the functions that will be required to respond to emergency events. Specific functions activated in a response will depend on the requirements of the particular emergency. The distribution of the emergency functions among facility- and site-levels will be determined primarily by the locations of response facilities and organizations that provide response assets. For a specific site or facility, some emergency response functions can best be organized and performed at the facility-level while others may be better served by a site-wide organization. Facility- level functions may include control of process operations and implementation of local protective actions (e.g., building evacuations or sheltering, ventilation manipulation). Functions that are more likely to be common for a site include firefighting, medical response, and environmental monitoring. In contrast, some response functions, such as firefighting or Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) response, may be performed utilizing offsite support services. The terms “Emergency Response Organization” and “Emergency Management Team” are not synonymous. ALL personnel who may be needed to perform duties, beyond those specified by 29 CFR 1910.120 for the first responder awareness level, during a response to any of a broad range of emergencies defined in the Hazards Survey or EPHA are members of the ERO. In general, the ERO component formed to manage the response actions during emergencies is the Emergency Management Team (EMT). At each response tier (e.g., facility, Field element, Headquarters), the EMT provides for overall management, direction, and control of the emergency response and normally operates from a command center or Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 1.3.1 Emergency Director (ED)

One position in the facility/site M&O contractor ERO, the Emergency Director (ED) or similar title, should have unilateral authority and responsibility to implement the facility/site emergency plan and employ overall emergency management responsibility during response to an OE. Full authority and responsibility implies that this individual should either initially perform, or oversee, the following minimum functions: detect or assess, categorize and classify (as necessary) the emergency event or conditions; carry out initial notifications; implement protective actions onsite; issue offsite protective action recommendations; and initiate response by appropriate emergency resources (such as fire, medical, security and HAZMAT personnel). The position may be transferred to more senior officials once the ERO is fully staffed. 1.3.2 ERO Functions This section provides guidance on determining basic/core and support functions necessary for the facility/site to fulfill its responsibilities and respond to the needs of 1-4 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 outside agencies during an emergency. The ERO configuration should be contingent on the severity of the emergency (emergency category and classification) and the required functions determined by analysis. The Hazards Survey and EPHA should be used as the basis document for determining required functions. Identified emergency conditions from the Hazards Survey and analyzed scenarios of the EPHA are particularly useful in determining what response functions should be fulfilled and, ultimately, what response tasks need to be performed. The ERO staffing should be documented based upon an analysis performed of potential emergency conditions. Although the functional response needs and results of the Hazards Survey and EPHA should be the predominant factors affecting the ERO structure, the availability and location of existing emergency response facilities may affect the allocation of ERO personnel. The structure of the facility/site ERO should take into account locations of emergency facilities and how these locations may influence the effectiveness of emergency response functions. For example, damage control and repair teams are best dispatched from an area close to maintenance shops, tool cribs, and storage areas for personnel protection equipment. Additional information is presented in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 3. The emergency plan should address the scope and responsibility of the support functions and the equipment and facilities required for performance of the function. Implementing procedures should assign personnel to the various functions required and provide directives and checklists for the performance of those duties. The extent to which support functions are implemented is dependent upon the nature and severity of potential emergencies at a facility/site. Some support functions may not be required at all, while some may be required dependent on the type or classification of emergency. While most generally conform to the NIMS management structure, several functions are unique to DOE/NNSA emergency management programs and are not explicitly encompassed within the NIMS functions. The following representative support functions should be considered during analysis to ensure the ERO is capable of successfully responding to an emergency: • Operations Support. Operational support in the form of a coordinated work force and equipment for performance of assessment or damage control, maintenance/ repair, or implementation of mitigative actions should be considered for most operational events.

• Technical Support. Technical personnel are available to advise emergency and operations management on the present status of the facility/site and to forecast future operational impacts. Technical personnel should advise management on actions to bring the facility to a stable condition or safe shutdown. • Notifications. Notification methods should be established to support emergency management. Equipment, personnel, and procedures should be made available to ensure the facility/site fulfills all responsibilities of notifying workers, response organizations, and other agencies. Facility/site personnel and organizations and 1-5 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 offsite authorities and response organizations should be notified in a timely manner of changes in event status or emergency condition. • Consequence Assessment. This support function should assist emergency assessment teams and protective actions personnel in estimating and measuring onsite and offsite consequences. This function may include directing environmental sampling and analysis teams, meteorological data monitors, etc. • Communications. Communications support should be provided to all functions to maintain control of the emergency organization and provide effective communications among key ERO members. Support may be required to maintain continuous communications within elements of the ERO (e.g., technical support for communication equipment/systems, and maintenance of status boards and logs). • Health and Safety Support. Radiological, chemical, biological, and occupational safety support may be required for exposure and dose control, or environmental contamination assessments. • Administration and Logistics, Data Distribution, Documentation. Emergency management should be provided with sufficient resources required to mitigate the emergency, including unexpected additional resource and asset requirements. Facility/site data and status should be promptly distributed to all functional groups to permit overall management of the response effort. Documentation of key events, including actions taken, decisions made, etc., necessary to reconstruct the event should be maintained. • Public and Media Information. Public and media information support should be available to perform such tasks as interfacing with the media; updating the public, including facility/site personnel not directly involved with the response; providing rumor control, etc. • Medical. Medical support should be provided for all injured and/or potentially contaminated or infected personnel, including emergency responders. Medical advice should also be provided to emergency management when there is a potential for significant injuries or casualties from an event. Interfaces with offsite medical support organizations are within the responsibilities of the site medical staff. • Hazardous Material Survey, Sampling and Sample Analysis Support. Hazardous Material Survey, Sampling and Sample Analysis Teams should be designated to evaluate the occupational, radiological, and environmental health hazard at or near an accident scene. These teams should be equipped with adequate monitoring equipment and personnel. Teams should possess knowledge on the use of protective gear, monitoring equipment, and communication equipment and should be equipped and trained to accomplish field monitoring and plume tracking, when appropriate, within and beyond the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). 1-6 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07

• Security. Security support will be required to interface with emergency management personnel in several different response activities (e.g., control of an incident scene, direction of evacuation efforts, control of classified material, protection of nuclear, biological, toxicological, or other sensitive assets, and preservation of the accident/incident scene). Organizational and operational interfaces between these traditional emergency response functions and security organizations should be clearly defined in emergency plans and procedures to ensure timely decision-making, coordination of actions, field communications, Headquarters communications, and recovery. Expected interfaces with offsite security and law enforcement organizations should be defined and covered in emergency plans. • Fire and Rescue. Fire and rescue support should be capable responding to the scene of the emergency safely. Response units should possess the proper amount and type of specialized equipment. Search and rescue operations should be capable of being conducted in an efficient and effective manner. Depending on the situation, Fire and Rescue operations should include monitoring for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) acceptability by industrial hygiene and Health Physics personnel. Fire and Rescue support is determined by the baseline needs assessment performed in accordance with DOE O 420.1B, using the Hazards Survey and EPHA. • Repair and Maintenance. Repair and maintenance support should be available for carrying out repair and maintenance activities during an emergency in a timely and efficient manner. Repair and maintenance teams should possess the proper tools and the capabilities to procure replacement parts if needed. Repair and maintenance activities should include personnel protection and monitoring as well as coordination with other support groups, such as Health Physics and Chemistry personnel. The above functions are not intended to represent an all-inclusive list. A “needs” analysis can be used to identify ERO functions to be performed in implementing an effective emergency response based on the results of the Hazards Survey and EPHA, ultimately developing a list of functions similar to those indicated above. Organizations and personnel who are not part of the normal site operations, but are a part of the ERO, may perform some facility/site ERO functions. It may be more cost effective to rely on offsite providers of specialized services, such as medical support or explosive disposal, than to develop those capabilities onsite. These offsite capabilities should be clearly defined in current Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs), Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), or Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs). Several of the functional areas mentioned above (e.g., consequence assessment) may include several individual tasks. For example, in the case of a high hazard facility, a review and/or analysis of the EPHA and applicable guidance documents will be required to identify all tasks that could be necessary in response to the spectrum of emergencies analyzed. When tasks have been identified and the ongoing or intermittent characteristics of their performance during the response determined, performance-time requirements can be estimated and the process of determining positions and staffing may proceed. Once this is completed, the assignment of specific staff members may be accomplished by 1-7 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07

aligning the normal operating organization to the ERO. Personnel whose day-to-day duties most closely align with required emergency functions and tasks should be assigned to the equivalent ERO position in order to maximize organizational effectiveness and minimize training and additional qualification requirements. Once functional areas have been determined and individual tasks within each area are identified, it will be apparent that many functions have direct counterparts in offsite organizations. One task not uniformly described in each of the above functions is related to working level interfaces with offsite organizations. An example is the liaison function necessary between the consequence assessment team and a State's Department of Hygiene for events with offsite consequences. Several example tasks were also mentioned above in the Public and Media function. The needs analysis concept described above is also applicable to determining where elements of the ERO are located and what equipment is required to support staff efforts. Utilization of the Hazards Survey and EPHA for deriving required facilities and equipment is presented in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 3, as well as chapters devoted to specific response functions, such as consequence assessment. 1.3.3 ERO Positions A one-for-one correspondence between ERO positions and emergency response functions is not always necessary. For example, small, low-hazard facilities might have one position serve several functions, whereas other facilities might need several persons to carry out a single function (such as a high hazard facility consequence assessment function for several different potential emergency scenarios). The following is a list of positions of specific responsibilities and/or authorities for a generic ERO structure: • Duty officer is the individual assigned initial decision-making responsibility with the requisite authority to categorize the OE, make initial classification and protective action determination, and activate the ERO. A separate Duty Officer position is not necessary; for example, the Duty Officer may be the Fire or Security Officer who becomes the Incident Commander (IC) in event of emergency. • Incident Commander (IC) maintains operational control of the response at the incident scene and transmits information to the command center or EOC. • Emergency Director (ED) maintains overall command and control of the emergency response. • Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES&H) manager oversees and monitors the operations of the occupational safety organization, the medical, and consequence assessment (including hazardous materials monitoring, modeling, and meteorological) response teams, and the activities of health physicists and industrials hygienists. 1-8 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • EOC manager oversees, monitors, and directs the EOC response operations, offsite communications, notification process and administrative operations of the EOC. • Operations manager ensures communications with incident command; manages overall impact of the event on operations; supplies needed information about facilities and processes, and monitors personnel status and accountability. • Logistics manager ensures logistical requests are met for response support equipment, supplies, and communications. • Public affairs manager ensures emergency public information is communicated effectively and accurately.

• Security manager ensures safeguards and security response efforts and needed liaison. The security manager coordinates security operations with offsite security liaisons [Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), local law agencies, etc.] Provisions should exist for interface between other agency response personnel and the facility/site and Cognizant Field Element EROs, with clearly defined positions or points- of-contact. Interfaces that require coordination, liaison exchange, or integration, that will also influence the structure of the ERO during an emergency, may include but are not limited to: • Tenant and visiting national laboratories (for special projects) • Potential Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Department of State (DOS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI presence • Offsite organizations including local law enforcement; fire, medical, American Red Cross, local, state, Tribal, and regional Federal agencies; and joint public information groups • Radiological emergency response assets, such as the Accident Response Group (ARG), Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), Aerial Measuring System (AMS), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) • Organizations under the NRP, such as the Joint Field Office (JFO) or the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) organizations • Organizations under National Interagency Fire Center for wild land fires These interfaces should be preplanned and described in the emergency plan where applicable. Additional information concerning the interface with offsite emergency response organizations is provided in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 2. 1-9 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 1.4 Staffing the ERO 1.4.1 Initial Staffing Upon declaration of an OE, on-shift personnel should initially fill key ERO positions and perform time-urgent emergency functions until designated ERO personnel arrive and assume their assigned positions. Wherever possible, functions of the ERO should be performed by shift personnel until full staffing has been achieved. Assigned ERO personnel will eventually staff the ERO positions associated with the specific OE conditions. If normal site operations are managed by a site prime M&O contractor, then that contractor should staff the primary positions in the ERO. The ERO may consist of personnel from several different contractors or subcontractors that provide specific services or expertise to the site (such as fire protection or security). Personnel needed to perform emergency-related duties and activities during a response to any of a broad range of OEs are considered members of the ERO. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties should be developed for each position in the ERO, documented in the emergency plan, and implemented by Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Minimum qualifications for each position should be well defined. Control of operations, monitoring, and repair teams should be clearly defined and associated with a single ERO position or the teams should each be associated with a separate position. The system used for performing the initial call-out of the ERO should ensure that the ERO positions are functionally staffed and activated in a timely manner. The following aspects of an initial activation should be considered in developing the call-out system:

• Response time objectives for primary and alternate responders and the minimum staffing levels necessary to achieve different levels of emergency response capability • Authentication of responder notification, such as use of code words, call-backs, or restricted access communication networks • Effects of seasonal weather, concurrent emergencies at more than one facility on a site, and local equipment/phone exchange limitations • Security clearances and credentials that may be needed for site as well as offsite responders to gain entry to facilities and participate in response, especially in response to security driven events. A person trained and qualified to fill the ED position should be onsite at all times. For facilities where there is no operating shift outside of the normal work day, there should be either an individual qualified to fill the ED position on the back-shift or arrangements should be made to fill the position with a qualified person from an adjacent facility, the site organization, or with an Incident Commander (IC) from an organization such as the fire department. When an individual from outside the specific facility fills the position of ED, a qualified person from the facility staff should be on-call to assume the ED position as soon as possible. 1-10 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Fully trained and qualified personnel should be available at all times to perform each of the emergency response functions. Primary and backup personnel may be assigned (by name, title, or position in the operating organization) to each position in the ERO (both facility- and site-level) to enhance planning and response. Availability of staff to perform these ERO functions may be achieved by having three or more persons qualified to fill each position, with at least three of them being on call at all times. An adequate number of experienced and trained personnel should be assigned to each functional area for initial and ongoing response. For some operations or processes and locations, offsite personnel may also staff ERO positions. All persons assigned to ERO positions should demonstrate their proficiency in their assigned position through periodic participation in an exercise, an evaluated drill, or an actual response; all primary and alternate personnel can accomplish this participation on a rotating basis. 1.4.2 Staff Augmentation The emergency plan should provide for a modular organization, which enables the ERO to expand or contract to meet the needs of the incident. The ERO evolves as a top-down organizational structure for any incident. As the incident warrants, the ED activates other functional areas, as needed. Thus, the ERO can consist of several layers with additional resources (personnel and equipment) to ensure performance of required basic and support functions. Procedures should include specific methods and information (e.g., rosters of qualified ERO personnel, telephone numbers, and paging procedures) necessary for timely recall of response personnel. The following additional items should be considered during development and review of the ERO activation procedures to facilitate staff augmentation: • Rapid recall of alternates if primary (on-call) responders cannot be contacted • Recall procedures should be easily implemented by on-shift personnel and not adversely affected by an event occurring during normal working hours, off-hours, or holidays • Round-the-clock staffing of the ERO for long-duration emergencies

• Site and facility access by responders during augmentation of the ERO and the potential for interference between non-essential personnel being evacuated and the augmentation staff being recalled The lines of succession for key emergency response positions should be established and documented. For example, positions authorized to assume ED duties should be specified, including positions in the normal operating organization (normally the senior on-shift position at a facility) and the non-shift management positions in the corporate structure. Basic qualifications of senior on-shift personnel should include those for ED, while non- shift management personnel in the line of succession will require individual (by name) qualifications for the ED position. This approach should be applied to other key ERO positions. If an individual is unavailable to assume the duties of the key position, a qualified alternate should be readily available for that position. DOE G 151.1-4 1-11 7-11-07 Procedures and checklists should be available to provide for orderly assumption and transfer of emergency management and coordination functions during the time when augmentation staff is assuming their ERO duties at the facility/site, Field Cognizant Element, and DOE Headquarters (HQ) levels. 1.5 Operational Aspects of the ERO ERO operations, both activation and ongoing response activities, will depend on the actual or potential emergency conditions. Procedures and the management structure of the ERO should provide for the efficient collection and dissemination of accurate data, setting priorities, assigning work to functional groups, and keeping key emergency response staff abreast of emergency conditions and response status. In this section, the activation of the ERO is discussed and features of the operation of an ERO during a response are presented. 1.5.1 Activation The normal operating organization should transition to an ERO immediately after an OE is declared. The defined authorities, responsibilities, tasks, and lines of communication of the ERO should supersede those of the normal operating organization for the duration of the emergency. On-shift operations staff should perform initial response functions [e.g., categorization/classification of the event or condition, notifications and activation of the ERO, initial phase of consequence assessment (i.e., Timely Initial Assessment)]. The ERO should incorporate the capabilities of the normal operating organization, augmenting them as needed to meet the functional and operational requirements of the emergency response facilities, defined for the specific OE, normally within an hour after the declaration of the emergency. Once activated, the facility/site or activity ERO should remain operational until a formal decision is made to terminate the emergency and enter recovery. The staffing of ERO positions in emergency response facilities (e.g., EOC) should be orderly, controlled, and verifiable. Personnel who are assigned to ERO positions should gain access to the facility and their respective stations without impediment. In contrast, non-ERO personnel should be deliberately excluded from emergency response work areas. Sign-in procedures at access points will accomplish both. In addition, ERO staff should readily identify personnel who assume key response positions/functions (e.g., using status boards or badges). 1.5.2 Operations

The ED has the authority and lead responsibility for all aspects of the emergency response at the facility/site or activity. As such, the ED should have practical knowledge of the effected facility and its operations, the emergency response team and its mission, and the available tools and resources necessary to affect an appropriate response and mitigate the emergency. The ED has the authority and responsibility to perform the required functions, including initial activation of onsite response assets, notification of offsite authorities, and requests for offsite assistance. The DOE system requires that an 1-12 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 IC have responsibility for the tactical response to the event at the incident scene. When the ED functions are initially performed by the IC, a clearly defined transfer of ED responsibilities should occur that allows the IC to focus on tactical aspects of the response. It is imperative that the division of authority and responsibility between the IC and the ED position be clearly established and maintained. In general, all members of the ERO should: perform in their roles, functions, and interfaces and in their use of emergency equipment, facilities, and resources in an timely, effective and efficient manner; clearly acknowledge and understand authorities and responsibilities in functional areas; and identify and access available response resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, consumables, and replacement parts), and, as appropriate, take account of both specific capabilities and resource limitations. The following represent specific activities that should characterize the efficient and effective operation of the ERO staff within an emergency facility (e.g., EOC): • Transfer of a command and control function to another emergency facility, within an emergency facility, or to a command external to the ERO or ICS (e.g., another Federal agency, such as DOJ/FBI) is completed in an orderly and formal manner and ERO personnel are informed of the transfer. • A fully staffed ERO will establish effective internal and external interfaces with other agencies and organizations; such external interfaces may include: Federal, Tribal, State, and local agencies and non-governmental groups such as concerned citizens and the media. • Responsible ERO operations and technical support staff will determine and implement a reasonable, well-planned course of action based on their current knowledge of the situation. • Specialty groups (e.g., consequence assessment, maintenance, operations, technical staff) provide timely information to the decision-making process. • When priority actions are identified, tasking is clearly made to emergency response staff, and the actions are followed through to completion. • Adequate data on the emergency situation are obtained and analyzed by the ERO to support the operations staff in assessing and mitigating the emergency events. • Information is accurately and efficiently transmitted in an orderly and documented manner throughout the chain of command and between/within emergency facilities. • In order to ensure that the ERO staff is kept up to date on the emergency situation, periodic briefings should be provided on the status of the emergency and significant current response priorities and activities. • Communications between the site ERO and the DOE HQ EMT are maintained, and information about the emergency situation is provided to the EMT on a regular basis.

DOE G 151.1-4 1-13 7-11-07 • ERO management effectively coordinates State and DOE site requests for use of assets, such as the RAP. An essential aspect of effective communication is the requirement that the use of acronyms, code words, convention and/or technical terminology causes no misunderstandings related to the response and associated data. Security and ERO teams/ groups may use differing terminology during an emergency response. This could impact the effectiveness of communications and decision-making in an emergency. It is important that these response groups have an advance understanding of terminology differences or if possible, resolve these differences in advance. This is just one example of the need for integrated emergency response exercises involving these varied organizations. Several ERO activities require specific attention and assigned responsibilities: • Liaison responsibilities for coordinating with offsite agencies to ensure that effective communications are initiated and maintained during an emergency • Liaison responsibilities with personnel representing DOE or NNSA assets (e.g., NARAC, FRMAC, AMS, RAP, REAC/TS, ARG, and/or NEST) involved in the response, to coordinate logistics, ensure that effective communications are initiated and maintained, and ensure that data is exchanged using consistent units of measure • An individual trained to recognize, categorize, and classify events and to conduct appropriate notifications should be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This individual’s authority is unambiguous and clearly communicated throughout the ERO. The activities of reentry and rescue teams should follow specific protocols: • ERO teams should be provided with adequate briefings concerning safety, operations, communications, and hazards before being deployed. • ERO teams should be debriefed upon return from their assigned missions. • The accomplishments, failures, exposures, and status information of ERO teams should be recorded and made available to other teams and emergency facilities. • If necessary, the responsible ERO individual authorizes ERO personnel to receive exposures in excess of site administrative limits (or other Federal criteria) for carrying out lifesaving or other emergency activities. 1-14 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 1.6 Maintenance of the ERO To ensure that ERO personnel are available on demand for timely and effective performance of ERO functions, the ongoing, maintenance or standby staffing of ERO emergency facility positions and response teams is effectively accomplished by: • Using a technique, such as duty-cycle or static roster, to ensure that qualified personnel are available on-demand and properly assigned. • Ensuring that sufficient trained personnel for initial and ongoing response, including designated alternates, are candidates for call-up in each functional area. • Periodically reviewing ERO rosters to verify individual qualifications for specified positions, current qualification dates, required numbers of primary and alternate personnel for all positions, correct work and home phone numbers, pager numbers, addresses, commute time from home to assigned response facility, and other contact information. • Periodically reviewing and updating ERO personnel qualifications. In addition to maintaining ERO staffing, the communication systems used to activate both on shift and off shift emergency response personnel should be periodically tested to ensure their adequacy and reliability.

1.7 Special Response Function/Positions Several special response functions or positions are addressed in this section in the context of both their interactions within the ERO structure and the specific accommodations that are required of each function because of the potential hazardous environment within which they need to perform. 1.7.1 Incident Command An IC should be designated to manage and control all response activity at the event scene. The IC typically coordinates the activities of multiple response elements at the scene (e.g., fire, rescue, medical, spill containment, mutual aid) and makes on-the-spot decisions. The IC will utilize the ICS to manage response operations at the event scene, in accordance with the NRP and the NIMS/ICS. The NIMS/ICS is ideally tailored to deal with command, control, and coordination issues in advance. Some of these issues are: command on-scene, transfer of command, authority to request offsite mutual aid, authority to declare the situation under control, integration of field response functions, and assignment of response activities. The facility/site ICS should be compatible and integrated with offsite agency ICS systems. This is important to the inter-relationship of the site ERO and offsite agencies when utilizing the NIMS/ICS structure. DOE G 151.1-4 1-15 7-11-07 The basic attributes of a NIMS/ICS are: • Common terminology • Modular organization • Management by objectives • Reliance on Incident Action Plan (IAP) • Manageable span-of-control • Pre-designated incident locations and facilities • Comprehensive resource management • Integrated communications • Establishment and transfer of command • Chain of command and unity of command • Single command IC and/or Unified Command (UC) • Accountability • Deployment • Information and intelligence management When both the EMT and ICS are used, close cooperation and coordination between the facility/site EMT and the ICS are required, along with pre-arranged division of responsibility and authority. This division should be specified in the emergency plan and associated implementing procedures. The emergency plan and implementing procedures should clearly state whether the IC or EMT is able to invoke any or all-mutual aid agreements with state, Tribal, and local emergency response agencies or the conditions for shifting such responsibilities. An IC may lead the EMT until an on-call senior manager is available to assume that role. When an IC is employed in the site ERO, the EMT in the EOC should focus on broader issues such as: offsite notifications, communications with offsite entities, broad-spectrum protective action issues, and marshaling additional resources (e.g., personnel and equipment). When an incident involves more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents crossover political jurisdictions, an application of the ICS, known as Unified Command (UC), should be used. UC provides guidelines to enable agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively. Agencies work as a team to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, as well as a single IAP. An Area Command is established to oversee management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by a separate ICS organization or to oversee the management of a very large or complex incident that engages multiple incident management teams. Area Command is generally used when there are a number of incidents in the same area and of the same type, which tend to compete for the same resources, such as public health emergencies. If the incidents under the authority of the Area Command span multiple jurisdictions, a Unified Area Command should be established.

1-16 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Additional guidance on the ICS, UC, and Area Command can be found in the NIMS, available electronically on the website http://www.nimsonline.com/. This website also contains additional guidance on the ICS. For DOE/NNSA facilities/sites or activities, there should be a predictable, coordinated, effective and acceptable response to OEs of all types. UC allows the varied response organizations to join in a seamless response effort. However, the concept can be complicated during security events, especially if there are competing priorities between security, rescue, medical and operations teams. It is critical that there be ongoing discussions between all response organizations, to achieve agreement on the concepts and procedures for UC. Additionally, this needs to be studied and exercised repeatedly until all concerns are addressed and resolved by all organizations involved. Procedures for UC should be in place to support transition from security command to traditional emergency response (i.e., fire department) command. Additionally, the ICS and procedures used for security emergencies should mirror the system and procedures used for other OEs. ICS response to an OE on a DOE/NNSA site is characterized by the basic generic attributes of an ICS, which are generally reflected in specific response activities, including: • The incident is assessed and response priorities are established; in the order of highest to lowest, the priorities are: lifesaving, safety, incident stabilization, and property conservation. • Incident command sets clear strategic goals and tactical objectives and a flexible IAP is implemented. • Incident command staff continually assesses the situation, develops a mitigation strategy, and requests additional assets, as needed. • Incident command coordinates internal and external response assets in an efficient and effective manner. • An ICS command post is established in a safe area away from the event scene, in order for the command and control functions to be performed safely and effectively. • The habitability of the command post is periodically assessed, and the command post is moved, as necessary, when a hazardous environment challenges the safety of the staff. • Incident command staff ensures that the response personnel take necessary precautions for personal safety and contamination control, as follows: – Incident command staff establishes a staging area where arriving asset personnel are briefed, communications are checked, special equipment is issued, and the assets are deployed upon request. http:http://www.nimsonline.com DOE G 151.1-4 1-17 7-11-07 – Asset personnel being released are debriefed, personnel are accounted for, personnel and equipment are surveyed for contamination and decontaminated as necessary, and issued equipment is returned. 1.7.2 Hazardous Material Survey, Sampling, and Sample Analysis Teams Teams implement survey and sampling procedures in a timely manner. Adequate monitoring equipment and personnel protective equipment should be available to the field teams in order to accomplish field monitoring and plume tracking within and beyond the EPZ. The teams should receive sufficient training to correctly use protective equipment, such as protective clothing and respirators, filter masks, and dosimetry. Required equipment for their tasks should be adequate, accessible, functional, and calibrated. In carrying out the required surveys or sampling activities, the teams should be capable of making effective use of maps or general arrangement drawings showing pre-determined and potential monitoring points.

Emergency response management is expected to control field teams effectively. This can be accomplished by establishing a position of survey team coordinator. Prior to deployment, the survey team coordinator develops a Survey Plan and obtains management approval of the plan. The survey team coordinator ensures that the teams are briefed on facility and meteorological conditions, and exposure control procedures; teams should be notified when changes occur. During survey operations, the survey team coordinator: • Provides directions to survey specific areas. • Provides directions to minimize hazardous material exposure by exiting high airborne and whole body dose areas (i.e., for radiological materials), or high concentration areas (i.e., for toxic non-radiological materials), when not actively engaged in sample and survey activities. • Sets exposure limits for survey and tracking teams, and solicits and records survey results. • Allows the teams the time necessary to complete the surveys. Effective communications with their coordinator should be established to ensure that transmissions of readings and results are accurate and received in a timely manner. The survey teams should utilize proper survey equipment and keep accurate logs of results. Responsibilities of sampling teams include: • Collecting samples, bagging and marking them, and logging the results accurately and efficiently. 1-18 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Receiving and properly packaging and labeling with information such as sample time and date, sample location, volumetric data, sample media, and sample or survey collection person's name. • Using analysis procedures and equipment to support processing of samples received, and either analyzing the samples in the field or transporting them to a laboratory. • Communicating analysis results promptly and accurately to emergency response facilities, in particular, the consequence assessment team. 1.7.3 Security Staff The security staff and other components of the ERO should develop a mutual understanding of authorities and responsibilities, response plans, utilization of command and control facilities, and terminology that enables site security to effectively coordinate and correlate response activities during an OE. The responsibilities and procedures of the site security forces should be efficiently and effectively implemented during response and be characterized by effective command and control. Many of the responsibilities of the protective forces involve the protection of onsite personnel, which requires that they be performed promptly and safely, to include: • Timely and proper maintenance of access and egress control for the facility/site, facility/site areas, impacted areas (i.e., safe perimeters), and emergency response facilities. • Implementation of effective security practices that facilitate timely movement and access of facility/site operating and response personnel (including offsite personnel) to required areas during emergencies. The security forces implement the NIMS/ICS for security emergencies. Under emergency conditions, material accountability and protection for Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and other critical DOE assets are handled in a timely and effective manner. When local law enforcement provides backup to the onsite security force common, pre­ planned protocols are used (e.g., use of deadly force, weapons employment, tactics, code words, radio frequencies, etc.)

1.7.4 Fire and Rescue Fire/rescue personnel and equipment are assembled and deployed to the scene of the emergency in a safe and timely manner. Personnel take necessary precautions for contamination, exposure, heat, and personal safety. Both onsite and offsite fire personnel are outfitted with the appropriate specialized equipment and supplies specific to the onsite hazards. When fire/rescue teams carry out search and rescue operations, their efforts are coordinated with medical, industrial hygiene, and health physics personnel. DOE G 151.1-4 1-19 (and 1-20) 7-11-07 Injured personnel are properly extricated, immobilized, and moved during search and rescue operations. 1.7.5 Repair and Maintenance When facility and field repair and maintenance teams are dispatched, it is essential that their activities be carried out in a timely and efficient manner. They should have access to the proper tools for repair and maintenance activities and the procurement of replacement parts is expedited. Their activities include personnel protection equipment and monitoring as well as coordination with support groups, such as health physics, industrial hygiene, and chemistry personnel. Emergency work order procedures are used and emergency tagging (e.g., lockout/tag out or clearance) is implemented. 2-1 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 2. OFFSITE RESPONSE INTERFACES 2.1 Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assist DOE and NNSA field elements in complying with the DOE O 151.1C requirement that effective interfaces be established and maintained to ensure that emergency response activities are integrated and coordinated with the Federal, Tribal, State, and local agencies and organizations responsible for emergency response and protection of the workers, public, and environment. Interfaces with offsite response entities should be in accordance with the requirements of the National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS). This chapter is designed primarily for facilities/sites and activities that are required to implement an Operational Emergency Hazardous Materials Program and is directed at operations and emergency management staff at Field Elements and operating contractor organizations responsible for DOE and NNSA facilities/sites and activities. 2.2 General Approach Interfaces with offsite response authorities and organizations are an integral part of the DOE and NNSA Comprehensive Emergency Management Program. In the context of the DOE/NNSA emergency management system, interfaces represent interactions with offsite response authorities and organizations both during an emergency in supporting onsite response and on a continuing basis by engaging in frequent dialog and interactions to establish and discuss emergency response roles, responsibilities, capabilities, notification procedures, and information needs. Interfaces can be effectively maintained through a designated point-of-contact within organizations. DOE and NNSA have committed to comply with Federal, Tribal, State and local regulations that focus on protecting workers and the public in the event of an emergency. Many of these regulations have provisions that require the establishment of interfaces between organizations having responsibility for emergency response. Results of the Hazards Surveys and Emergency Planning Hazards Assessments (EPHAs) are used to help identify agencies and organizations necessary to support a comprehensive and integrated response. Appropriate interfaces should be established, documented, and tested with each agency and organization.

Under Federal environmental regulations, each state is required to establish a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC). The SERC is charged with designating emergency planning districts, appointing Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) for each district, and coordinating their activities. The LEPCs are charged specifically with integrating and coordinating community emergency planning. These requirements are further defined in 40 CFR 300, Subparts B and C. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986 Title III, Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), provides regulations on offsite interface regarding hazardous materials. 2-2 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 To establish and maintain offsite interfaces, regular facility/site meetings with offsite officials should be held to discuss areas of concern and changes to emergency response plans and procedures. These meetings can also be used to develop emergency public information and outreach programs. SERC/LEPC meetings could be used as a forum for these discussions. The guidance in this chapter focuses on the establishment of interfaces through documented arrangements with offsite response agencies and organizations that may augment site resources in response to an onsite emergency, and also Tribal, State and local agencies and organizations responsible for protecting the public and environment within the vicinity of the facility/site; these arrangements are discussed in terms of the types of agreements and their generic content. The second part of the guidance addresses information and issues that should be addressed by DOE/NNSA sites and offsite agencies and support organizations in order to ensure that notifications, communications, information exchange, and operational integration necessary to establish effective response interfaces during an emergency onsite are accomplished. Activities and functions necessary for activating and maintaining effective interfaces during an emergency are presented in the last section. 2.3 Offsite Agencies and Organizations Hazards Survey and EPHA results should be used to develop a list of emergency services, which may be needed to respond to potential accident conditions. Examples of required services include hospitals, fire departments, law enforcement, accident investigation, analytical laboratory services, ambulance services, coroners, materials suppliers, contractors, specialists and others. Offsite response agencies and organizations responsible for augmenting site response resources and State, local, and Tribal agencies responsible for protecting the public and environment within the vicinity of the facility/site should be identified. These agencies and organizations should be contacted to determine and/or establish authorities, responsibilities, resources, notification procedures, and information necessary in the event of an emergency at a DOE/NNSA facility/site. Candidate offsite organizations can include: • Local Emergency Responders. Local municipal and county fire departments, law enforcement personnel, hazardous material (HAZMAT) teams, and emergency medical and ambulance services will be among the first to respond to a request for support. For incidents involving public transportation (e.g., airlines, mass transit, railroads,) near or on a facility/site, workers and officials from these transportation organizations may be among the first responders. In the event of fatalities, the county coroner could also be a responder.

• State Emergency Responders. State Emergency Management Organizations (SEMOs) are responsible for coordinating activities necessary to protect communities from natural and technological disasters and other emergencies. SEMOs coordinate the response of state agencies ensuring the most appropriate resources are dispatched 2-3 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 to the impacted area. SEMOs work with local governments, volunteer organizations and the private sector. In many states, State Police play a key leadership role in response and may have a significant planning role as well. • State and Local Public Health Authorities. State laws grant state and local public health authorities emergency powers to combat communicable diseases. Emergency powers available and the procedures for enforcement vary from state to state. Typical powers include the isolation or quarantine of persons and places and obligatory vaccinations and other preventive measures, such as wearing of masks. In some states, these measures may be taken whenever there is a threat of communicable disease; in other states, the powers apply only to one or more specific, named diseases. State health departments often have the responsibility for decision-making associated with public protection in the event of emergencies involving radiological material release. • Medical Service Providers. Hospitals generally perform emergency planning both to protect their own facilities and patients and to respond to disasters in the community. State licensing and accreditation standards require hospitals to meet certain criteria for emergency preparedness, which often includes participation in local or regional medical planning for disasters. Hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) should be prepared for a variety of disaster scenarios, including facilities for biological, radioactive, or chemical isolation and decontamination where appropriate. • LEPCs, SERCs, and Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs). These entities are established under SARA Title III, and the implementing regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). LEPCs develop and maintain local hazardous material emergency plans and receive notifications of releases of hazardous substances. SERCs and TERCs supervise the operation of the LEPCs and administer the community right-to-know provisions of SARA Title III, including collection and distribution of information about facility inventories of hazardous substances, chemicals and toxins. LEPCs will have detailed information about industrial chemicals and emergency response capabilities within the community. • Federal Emergency Responders. Depending on the emergency scenario, the Federal Government may respond to provide assistance. These departments and agencies may include the following but are not limited to: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense (DOD), EPA, Department of Agriculture (USDA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which includes the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). DOE/NNSA radiological emergency response assets are available to support offsite officials in the event of a radiological incident. Facilities/sites should coordinate with offsite officials to provide information on the availability and capabilities of DOE/NNSA

2-4 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 radiological emergency response assets and how to access and utilize these Federal Assets. One or more of the following organizations not usually included in emergency planning should be considered and liaison established, as appropriate, depending on the particular emergency scenario: • Local Business Community. Local business might have resources to help support recovery from an emergency. • Colleges and Universities. Colleges and Universities may provide temporary large facilities such as field houses, gyms, etc. Faculty members may have expertise (e.g., civil engineering, health physics, public health, agriculture, chemical weapons, infectious diseases) that can be used to assist with the emergency response or even as an independent expert to support public understanding of hazards. • American Red Cross. This service organization provides disaster relief services for emergency workers and victims. • Federal Executive Board. Federal Executive Board (FEB) is a network of councils located in 28 cities across the country. The boards are comprised of top managers from agencies having offices in those cities. The FEB plays a role in notifying agencies in the field when there is a major attack or threat of attack anywhere in the country. Local Boards have developed emergency plans for their respective areas and are sometimes the first point of contact for emergencies that impact large municipalities. 2.4 Support Agreements An interface should be established with each entity from which support will be needed and appropriate agreements prepared. For multiple-facility sites, the contractor and Cognizant Field Element with site-wide responsibility should provide centralized point of coordination. Arrangements with State and local governments should be documented. All agreements [e.g., Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs), Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs), Agreements in Principle, and State Oversight Agreements] with emergency management/response provisions should be consistent and contain provisions for periodic review to ensure continued applicability. These agreements should be accessible in the facility/site emergency plans. Generally, an agreement should contain, at a minimum, the following information: • The specific service and/or resources to be provided • The agency, organization, or jurisdiction to which it applies • Onsite individuals authorized to request aid from the offsite agency, organization, or jurisdiction 2-5 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Offsite individuals authorized to implement the arrangement, points-of-contact, and information required for implementation, such as names and telephone numbers • Specific responsibilities, authorities, and command structure • Any constraints/conditions that might preclude the agency, organization, or jurisdiction from meeting its obligation or support its refusal • Public information release protocols • Financial arrangements, including commitments by the facility or site to provide training, equipment, and facilities to the entity providing the service, and indemnification for injury to persons for loss and damage to property • Specified periodic re-examination of the provisions and a renewal or termination date • Signature of authorized individuals representing the site organizations and the offsite agency, organization, or jurisdiction

If a facility/site is to provide support to an offsite agency under the “good neighbor” policy or through MAAs, those support interfaces should be documented. Facility/site plans should describe integrated support from offsite response organizations responding to emergencies. The organizations may include groups from outside the facility/site Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) that respond under provisions of the NRP, Nuclear/Radiological Incident annex, for nuclear/radiological emergencies; the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), for oil and non- radiological hazardous material emergencies; or the NRP, if the situation is declared an emergency or major disaster by the President. 2.5 Interface Information and Issues to Address Individuals with the appropriate authority, knowledge, and training should be responsible for establishing and maintaining ongoing and effective interfaces with offsite political, technical, law enforcement, and emergency services officials. Such interfaces will ensure that necessary information and issues are addressed prior to an emergency, to facilitate the activation and establishment of effective interfaces during an emergency. Areas that should be addressed and resolved include: • Identification and responsibilities of all parties and participants, including the method for coordination and control of an emergency, in accordance with the requirements of the NIMS/Incident Command System (ICS) procedures. Clarify details of incident command including communication points and methods, facilities designated for command post and terminology. 2-6 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Identification of emergency points of contact, a description of information in notifications and follow-on activities, and a method to validate emergency notification messages [cf. DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 5]. • Descriptions of actions by the parties for each type of Operational Emergency (OE), both classified (i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) and not classified. EPZs and Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for Operational Emergency Hazardous Materials Programs should be described and include criteria for protective action recommendations to permit a clear and full understanding among parties. • Agreement for liaisons and corresponding allocation of space in the Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) of site and offsite parties. • Communication interfaces/protocols for notification points and ongoing communications between EOCs, responders, monitoring teams, and other entities involved in the emergency response. Personnel to resolve offsite agency inquiries and concerns should also be designated. • Methods of communication between the site and offsite responders and agencies should be described, along with agreed-upon procedures for periodic testing of the communication system. These methods of communication may include commercial telephone, Internet, radios, and/or dedicated lines. Details should address assurances of compatibility between systems used by different agencies and organizations. • Public warning methods (e.g., sirens, tone alert radios) should be described. • Descriptions of public information activities, including facility/site press release protocols and the name or position of personnel authorized to speak for each organization during an emergency. Agreement should be reached with offsite agencies on the location and management of the Joint Information Center (JIC). Also, the information on emergency plans and protective actions to be provided to the public prior to an emergency should be addressed with key offsite agencies.

• Description of operational interfaces between EOCs, including an organization chart depicting points-of-interface among parties. • Descriptions of training activities, including beyond-the-basic emergency response training required for response to site-specific layout, conditions, and hazards. Additional training needs should be identified and arranged. For example, training for hospital emergency room personnel in handling radiological contaminated and injured individuals [cf. DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 8] and training in Joint Information Center operations. • Each DOE/NNSA facility/site is required to offer offsite response organizations the opportunity to participate in an exercise every three years. This section of the site emergency plan or procedures should discuss formulation of exercise objectives and 2-7 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 exercise scenarios to accommodate these objectives. Agreed-upon schedules for development of exercise milestones should also be addressed. • Details of separate MOUs, MOAs, MAAs, or agreements with fire services, hospitals, ambulance services, life flight helicopter service and other organizations supporting the facility and the public. • Monitoring and consequence assessment plans and methods of the site and offsite response agencies should be clearly identified. This may include description of methods to coordinate activities and data of onsite and offsite monitoring teams, and coordination with regard to understanding differences in modeling methods and engineering units used in consequence assessment. • Assumptions made by the facility as a basis for public protection planning should be clearly identified. Actions anticipated by each interface agency should be stated and information required to respond effectively should be identified. Potential protective action recommendations (sheltering, evacuation, relocation, food control, etc.) should be described, as should evacuation routes for site personnel and offsite public. Geographic areas for protective action, special needs populations and other locations of significance with regard to hazardous material releases should be clearly identified. In some cases, primary responsibility for establishing and maintaining emergency management interfaces for the site may reside in other organizations, such as site security, who may facilitate coordination of emergency management activities with local, State, Tribal, and Federal law enforcement organizations (e.g., Sheriff, State Police, FBI). Onsite fire department representatives may provide interfaces with the local fire response assets. 2.6 Interfaces during Response The identification of offsite response assets, the documentation of agreements, and the resolution of issues prior to an emergency are intended to ensure that facility/site response activities are integrated and coordinated with offsite supporting capabilities during an emergency. In addition, the following are essential for ensuring effective interfaces during an emergency: • Organizations which may be needed in a supporting role and/or for long-term support have been identified and pre-designated offsite points-of-contact, including organization, names, and telephone numbers are readily available to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) • Methods of communications and communication protocols are in place, identified, and operable • Offsite officials are briefed upon activation of their facilities 2-8 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07

• Offsite agencies and organizations are provided initial and ongoing information sufficient to perform their respective functions • Timely, clear, accurate, and effective information exchange occurs between the ERO and offsite personnel • Incoming offsite agency/organization inquiries and concerns are directed to the appropriate site personnel for resolution • Effective working relationships exist between the offsite officials and their ERO counterparts • Coordination and integration of response activities with offsite agencies and organizations follow established, pre-arranged and documented plans and protocols, including responsibilities and authorities, coordination of response, notifications, facility activations, communications, EOC interfaces, public information activities, and logistic protocols (e.g., working space and site access). 3-1 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 3. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 3.1 Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assist DOE and NNSA field elements in complying with the DOE O 151.1C requirement that emergency facilities and equipment, adequate to support emergency response, are available, operable, and maintained. At a minimum, facilities should include an adequate and viable command center. Emergency equipment includes, but is not limited to, Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE), detectors, and decontamination equipment. Responsible administrators of emergency management programs should use this guidance and that of other chapters in this Emergency Management Guide (EMG), DOE G 151.1-series, to identify the emergency facilities and equipment necessary to support emergency response at the facility/site or activity, in order to ensure that emergency response activities are commensurate with facility hazards and provide a timely and effective emergency response. However, it is not the intent of this chapter to support the purchase of new equipment, the construction of new emergency facilities, or the designation of additional emergency facilities, if the current situation adequately supports the activities of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), commensurate with the hazards. This chapter is designed primarily for facilities/sites and activities that are required to implement an Operational Emergency Hazardous Materials Program and is directed at operations and emergency management staff at Field Elements and operating contractor organizations responsible for DOE and NNSA facilities/sites and activities. 3.2 General Approach The nature of the hazardous material releases analyzed in the Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA) should dictate many of the specifications for facilities and equipment. Overall diversity, complexity, and magnitude of the hazardous material situation at the facility/site will help define general response needs, such as communications equipment and command center capability, while the specific hazards will indicate the need for specialized equipment, such as protective clothing, portable monitoring instruments, decontamination supplies, consequence assessment models, response vehicles and supplies, and facility data acquisition systems.

For all DOE/NNSA facilities/sites, DOE O 151.1C requires that emergency facilities and equipment, including supplies, be available and maintained for use in an emergency response. These requirements mandate the ability of a facility/site to properly notify (both onsite and offsite), implement protective actions (e.g., evacuate or shelter), and perform accountability for affected onsite personnel in the event of an emergency. Specific equipment that may be needed during a response to an Operational Emergency (OE) includes: current reference materials (e.g., maps, facility drawings); decisional aids (including computers); area and process monitors; public address system; PPE; portable 3-2 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 monitoring instruments and personnel monitoring devices; siren and alarm systems; decontamination equipment; and communication equipment. The actual functions and operating characteristics of the specific equipment should function as intended to provide adequate support during a response. Additional DOE O 151.1C requirements for Hazardous Materials Programs include: an onsite facility to serve as a command center; a facility to serve as an alternate command center in the event the primary is not available; and, the availability of adequate emergency equipment and supplies to meet the needs determined by the results of the EPHA. Depending upon these results, additional emergency facilities and capabilities may be necessary, such as technical support, security, personnel assembly/control, decontamination, medical services, process control, and chemical/biological/radiological analytic laboratories. Emergency equipment and response facilities located throughout each site may be under different administrative or programmatic organizations but should be integrated to provide an overall, site-wide response capability. This chapter provides guidance in determining emergency facility and equipment needs based on the Hazards Survey and EPHA results. General design and siting considerations are provided for each type of response facility and suggestions are given for identifying equipment to support response functions. 3.3 Role of the EPHA The results of the EPHA are used to identify emergency facilities and equipment that may be needed during the response to a hazardous material release from a DOE/NNSA facility/site or activity. The specific technical information useful in making this determination includes the following: • Hazardous material types, forms, quantities, and locations • Release modes and analyzed events/scenarios • Severity of consequences at various receptors (e.g., concentration, dose) • Emergency classifications (i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) of analyzed events • Time to consequence at receptors • Persistence of released material in the environment • Initial protective actions and protective action recommendations • Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) 3-3 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Demographics of potentially affected areas • Onsite and offsite entities and environments potentially affected by materials released • Impact of hazardous material releases on positions in facilities or associated with activities that require occupancy for safe operation, security, or monitoring Additional EPHA results that may influence the acquisition and tailoring of emergency facility and equipment needs include the following:

• Estimated duration of hazardous material releases. Determine emergency facility and equipment features such as: automated and sophisticated notification systems; command center/Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system filtration capability; equipment for field monitoring teams; and plans for extended occupancy of emergency facilities. • Potential for successful mitigation. Determine the emergency facility and equipment features such as: facilities, equipment, and staffing plans for mitigation- oriented functions involving technical support and operations support; coordination capabilities of onsite and offsite firefighting and medical assets; and the degree to which emergency facilities are equipped with analytical tools (e.g., drawings, computers, and work-space for problem-solving teams). • Field measurement or consequence assessment methods that are applicable for the material and release types. Determine emergency facility and equipment features such as: use of manual-versus-computerized consequence assessment methods; adequacy of installed monitoring and detection instrumentation; specific field team instruments; and the level of sophistication of meteorological instruments and ability to access forecast information. • Hazardous material events involving security considerations. Determine emergency facility and equipment features such as: secure communications between emergency facilities; processing, storing, and discussing classified information within emergency facilities, thus establishing the level of physical security to be provided at these emergency facilities; respiratory protection equipment for security personnel; and hazardous materials monitoring equipment for security personnel and vehicles. The EPHA results can be used to help identify potential locations and habitability requirements for both primary and alternate emergency facilities. Consequence estimates will identify areas potentially affected by hazardous materials releases. The analysis of EPHA consequence calculations determines the habitability requirements for a command center/EOC located within a potentially affected area for a new or existing structure and also determines a suitable location for the alternate. Staging facilities/areas could also be identified for such diverse emergency needs as personnel evacuation and accountability, decontamination sites, and casualty management locations through this process. 3-4 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Comparison of emergency facility and equipment needs identified using the results of the EPHA with existing facilities and equipment can help eliminate duplication and redundancy. Selected equipment, such as radiation or hazardous material detection instruments, Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), and emergency repair materials may be used for emergencies, as necessary. Existing facilities and equipment should be used to meet these needs whenever possible. The need for additional types of emergency facilities and equipment should be determined based on the extent they can help to lessen the onsite and offsite consequences of an incident or accident. For example, establishing sophisticated emergency facilities and equipment (e.g., technical support center, operations support center) to support mitigation activities may not be appropriate, if the likely duration of hazardous material releases is shorter than the time needed to activate and bring emergency response resources on line. Mitigation-oriented facilities may not be necessary if the majority of the more severe analyzed accidents are massive puff releases. In contrast, if some portions of the severe accidents involve prolonged releases, complex process systems, or conditions that deteriorate over time (e.g., a fire spreading throughout a facility containing multiple hazard sources), then mitigation-oriented facilities and equipment may be warranted.

Examples of enhanced mitigation activities include augmenting firefighting capabilities; improving the ability to rapidly modify or create impromptu operations and maintenance procedures; increasing the pre-designation of staging areas for tools, supplies, and personnel; and arranging for the equipping of command and control infrastructures necessary to carry out mitigation activities. Assessment of the potential magnitude and duration of consequences will help develop logistical contingencies to support all response activities through emergency termination and into recovery. These include adequate housing, vehicles, food services, and general services and consumables (e.g., office supplies and equipment, construction materials, and minor repairs to computer equipment). 3.4 Emergency Facilities In this section, characteristics of emergency facilities will be discussed. Specifically, attributes of an emergency command center and its alternate are described in terms of general functional requirements and those imposed by the facility-/site-specific hazards. The special case of a habitable command center, the EOC, is also introduced. Finally, the Joint Information Center (JIC) and other possible emergency facilities are discussed. 3.4.1 Command Center During emergency response, a dedicated facility should be available for use as a command center by the Emergency Director (ED), the Emergency Management Team (EMT) component of the ERO, and other supporting members of the ERO. The command center is the primary onsite emergency facility designed to allow the EMT to fulfill its emergency response functions and responsibilities, based on an analysis of 3-5 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 emergency response needs. Characteristics of this command center should reliably support the designated response functions and assignments. Facility systems and installed equipment (e.g., HVAC, sanitation, lighting, radiation monitors, computer systems, communications, and visual displays) should be adequate to support the functions and expected level of staffing. The command center should have the capability to access alternate power supplies in the event of a loss of power. If the primary command center becomes unavailable, then provisions should be in place to use an alternative location considering habitability, accessibility, and security, as well as access to power and communications. Controlled access procedures should maintain security and accountability within the command center. Sufficient space and equipment should be provided to permit the EMT to perform its functions effectively and efficiently using its operations procedures, especially round-the-clock command, control, and communications. The command center should promote the active support of on-scene responders versus simply providing an incident-tracking capability. A resource area with current electronic and hard-copy reference materials, such as operating procedures, technical safety requirements, emergency plans and procedures, safety analyses, offsite demographic data, evacuation plans, and environmental monitoring records, should be designated and maintained to allow for ready accessibility and use by the EMT. If the command center is a dual-use facility, then plans and procedures should be in place and tested regularly to ensure that the facility can be rapidly converted into a command center, staff are knowledgeable in carrying out this transition, and facility resources and equipment are adequately maintained to ensure timely conversion, activation, and availability to support an emergency response.

At a minimum, a command center should have the capability to effectively integrate the following five functional elements: • Command • Operations • Planning • Logistics • Finance/Administration This configuration meets the intent of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and describes the basic functional make-up of a NIMS Incident Command System (ICS). However, depending upon the actual emergency, these elements and their sub-elements should be tailored to needs dictated by the event, not by an automatic, one-size-fits-all configuration. A command center needs to flexibly support management of the facility/site emergency response while coordinating and meeting its Federal, Tribal, State, and local obligations. 3-6 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 The EOC is a primary onsite emergency response command center designed to allow the EMT component of the ERO to fulfill its emergency response functions and responsibilities with consideration given to habitability and human interface requirements. To be considered habitable, the EOC should be capable of remaining operational and life- supporting for an extended period of time under accident conditions and maintaining its structural integrity under various design basis events, including natural phenomena (Cf. DOE G 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for Nuclear Facilities and Non Nuclear Facilities). A habitable EOC should satisfy the following criteria: • Breathable atmosphere. The HVAC system should be designed to maintain safe oxygen levels, provide for air contaminant removal and filtration to prevent intake of contaminated outside air (including smoke), and establish a positive pressure to prevent the infiltration of radiologically, chemically, and/or biologically contaminated air. Equipment should be available to confirm that the atmosphere in the EOC remains uncontaminated. • Shielding/Protection. Sufficient shielding and protection from radioactive and other hazardous materials should be provided to permit continued occupancy of the EOC by the EMT for its maximum expected activation time without exceeding recommended exposure levels. • Back-up emergency power. Loss of normal electrical power should not preclude the EOC from performing its functions. The design of the EOC should also follow human-factor principles for sleeping, food preparation comfort, noise reduction, lighting, and work-group interfaces. 3.4.2 Alternate Command Center An alternate command center needs to be available if the primary command center becomes uninhabitable. The alternate does not have to duplicate every design feature and piece of equipment found in the primary command center, as long as it allows the EMT to perform its necessary functions effectively. The following points should be considered in the design of new or the designation of an existing facility to operate as an alternate command center: • The alternate command center should be located where the likelihood of both the primary command center and the alternate being rendered uninhabitable by the same event is minimized. Consideration should be given to placing the alternate outside the EPZ or 180 degrees opposite (i.e., upwind from the prevailing wind direction) the primary command center. Monitoring equipment should be available to confirm the habitability of the alternate. 3-7 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Accessibility, security, and the ability to provide controlled access and secure communications should be considered in selecting the alternate location.

• Communications and information processing systems for the alternate command center should meet the same capability and interoperability specifications as for the primary. Back-up communications, such as cellular and/or satellite phones and radios, should be made available to maintain command and control. • Reference material, including up-to-date plans, procedures, and maps, should be available in the alternate command center or provisions made to obtain them from other emergency facilities as needed. • Transfer and activation procedures should be prepared, training conducted, and the process validated during exercises and drills for shifting responsibilities from the primary command center to the alternate during an emergency. 3.4.3 Joint Information Center (JIC) DOE O 151.1C requires that each facility/site provide accurate, candid, and timely information about emergencies to workers and the public. The Hazardous Materials Program facility/site is expected to “ensure that an adequate public information program is established and maintained, commensurate with site hazards,” where an “adequate emergency public information program includes a JIC to provide resources to comply with the integrated, comprehensive Emergency Management System, commensurate with hazards, during an emergency.” This program should “provide support in media services, public inquiry, media inquiry, JIC management and administrative activities, and media monitoring.” To accomplish this, a facility should be designated as a JIC and located where controlled access by the media and public is facilitated. A consolidated JIC, with local, State, Tribal, and other Federal officials, is encouraged to present a coordinated response to the public. DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 9, details further considerations for JIC facilities and equipment requirements. 3.4.4 Other Emergency Facilities In addition to the primary command center (or EOC), alternate command center, and the JIC, a variety of other emergency facilities may be necessary to accommodate the response activities as determined by the Hazards Survey and EPHA. Variations in the physical arrangement of other augmenting emergency facilities depend on size, nature, and organization of the facility/site ERO. These other facilities may include the following: • Manned operations area. Facility operations and processes are controlled or monitored. An emergency could possibly be detected and reported, and initial mitigative actions implemented from this area. 3-8 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Technical support center. Detailed technical support and assistance is provided to the ERO. Activities such as technical assessments and engineering support could be coordinated from this center. • Operations support center. Activities involving maintenance, health physics, industrial hygiene, and operations resource personnel could be coordinated and directed from this location. This center is typically the dispatching point for field monitoring teams, search and rescue teams, damage control and equipment repair teams, and emergency equipment operators. Other facilities, used on a routine basis to support facility/site response activities during an OE, should also be considered emergency facilities during an emergency event. Examples include security patrol headquarters, notification centers, medical stations, decontamination stations, assembly points, and central alarm stations.

An analysis of the functional requirements of the command center may suggest that similar functions be combined in a single emergency facility. Examples of potential emergency facility arrangements include the following: • Combining all emergency response control and coordination functions in a command center, with separate specialty functions in rooms or partitioned areas • Combining the technical support center and command center • Combining the technical support center and operations support center • Establishing individual facility technical support centers and operational support centers, along with a common command center for the entire site • Dividing operations support center functions among multiple emergency facilities (e.g., repair, monitoring, and operations staff staged in separate locations) 3.5 Emergency Equipment The purpose of this section is to introduce emergency equipment by first discussing how specific equipment supports essential aspects of the emergency response. This is followed by a more detailed characterization of several categories of emergency equipment, such as communication, consequence assessment, protective action, medical, public information, and miscellaneous equipment. 3.5.1 Equipment Support for Response Functions Response functions that are supported by specific, specialized emergency equipment include the following: • Notifications and Communications. The facility/site should have the ability to notify all affected onsite individuals of an emergency condition in a timely manner 3-9 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 and to provide directions to them. This notification/communication capability is usually made by a public address system and/or through alarm sirens, horn blasts, etc. Notifications to emergency responders (e.g. fire, medical, police departments) are usually made over a radio/telephone, hard line/battery-type redundant system to reasonably ensure that communication is maintained regardless of the nature of the emergency and its impacts on facility/site systems. This same system can also serve to notify other appropriate Federal, Tribal, State, and local organizations, as well as additional offsite Departmental entities. Many Departmental facilities and sites have designated radio frequencies and dedicated telephone lines to be used only for emergency notification and communication purposes. Provisions are also established to ensure operational compatibility between facility response capabilities and DOE or NNSA assets. If the resources of offsite response organizations are to be integrated into the overall facility/site response, their communications capabilities need to be compatible and procedures/terminology consistent with onsite communications. MOUs with appropriate agencies should provide communication protocols and a workable integration process. Individual facilities or the site may need to provide mobile, compatible links to these organizations or establish other means of communications, such as exchanging liaisons.

• Protective Actions. Depending on type and duration of emergencies that could occur at or impact a facility/site, effective sheltering or transporting of onsite personnel for evacuation purposes may be desirable or even necessary. Pre-designation of the locations for these potential shelters and rally points for evacuation is critical in order to support onsite direction and coordination actions (e.g. temporary billeting, transportation) and for obtaining accurate accountability of all potentially affected personnel. Understanding the peak, onsite number of personnel which could potentially be affected by the emergency will help determine the size/type of sheltering facility, numbers/types of vehicles needed to support their evacuation, and the optimum personnel accountability system to be used. Selected shelters should include a communications capability to and from the command center. [Cf. DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 7 for other protective actions that might be taken.] • Accountability Processing. The capability to determine the whereabouts and status of onsite personnel, including visitors and subcontractors, during an emergency requires that the facility/site maintain a personnel accountability system. Some method of communication (except radio) is necessary to communicate the names of personnel unaccounted for or missing to the command center. The complexity of the system might be no more than a “roll call,” if it serves to determine accountability after evacuation. Whatever system is used, from simple “roll calls” to fully automated badge-reader systems, consideration needs to be given to the variety of personnel that may be on the facility/site, optimum placement of accountability systems, system usage capabilities/ limitations/needs, and mobility requirements. For emergencies that could force the evacuation of most of a site and even the surrounding populations, some method for recalling onsite personnel who may not be 3-10 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 accessible at their normal/permanent residences should be identified. The capability to determine the whereabouts and status of onsite personnel, including visitors and subcontractors, is essential. 3.5.2 Command, Control, and Communications Equipment Command, control, and communications are the most important functions of the ERO. Primary and back-up emergency equipment, supplies, and alternative emergency response functions (to include redundant manual systems) need to be considered to ensure the continuous functioning of command, control, and communication capabilities. Recording capability of all radio and phone line communications is highly desirable. Decision aids and information displays to support the command and control functions of the ERO in their emergency facility should be provided and regularly tested during drills and exercises. Equipment to be considered includes the following: • Status boards/displays should provide a synopsis of the emergency and the response. Key information should be presented on the status boards/displays, including facility and system parameters; effluent releases; environmental monitoring and measurements; consequence assessments; protective actions; initial and follow-up notifications; accountability; and search and rescue. Status boards/displays offer information to the ERO at a glance, confirming reports that response actions have been made and that future actions have been identified.

• Data from installed instrumentation (e.g., meteorological and source term) critical to command and control (i.e., protective actions, classification, etc.,) should be available to appropriate ERO personnel. • Primary and back-up communications systems should be provided to ensure effective communications critical to command and control of emergency response activities. • Consideration should also be given to compatible communications systems to pass notification and activation reports to both on-shift and off-shift emergency response personnel, and to communicate such reports and other information to Departmental entities offsite and to other Federal, Tribal, State, and local government agencies. The systems designed to perform these functions should be tested and maintained regularly. Standard procedures and forms also should be developed to ensure that information could be passed quickly and accurately during an emergency. • Secure communications equipment necessary for transmitting classified and sensitive information should be considered and be available during an emergency response if needed. Additional guidance impacting the design and employment of communications systems used for notifications and reports can be found in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 2 and Section 5. DOE G 151.1-4 3-11 7-11-07 Primary and back-up communication links for mobile personnel, such as field teams and Incident Commanders (ICs), should be provided, tested, and maintained. If offsite response forces will be integrated into the overall facility or site response, communications should be compatible. The facility and/or site may be required to provide mobile, compatible communications links to these offsite organizations. Communications networks used to support daily operations at a facility or site should be compatible with the networks established to exercise command and control of emergency response. For example, fire departments and brigades, security patrols, and craft departments often have established radio networks to communicate with central dispatch facilities. Equipment within the command center may be needed to ensure that the direction provided by the ED or the IC is accurately and quickly transmitted to all emergency response elements. 3.5.3 Consequence Assessment Equipment The level of sophistication required for consequence assessment capabilities, such as meteorological data acquisition, calculation models, accident range instrumentation, data entry, and field monitoring capabilities, should be determined based on the results of the EPHA. DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 6 provides recommended methods based on maximum event classification at the facility. Adequate equipment should be staged and readily available to provide hazard characterizations to site personnel and the public and to permit prompt protective action implementation or recommendations. This equipment should be inventoried regularly and their locations identified. In accordance with manufacturer’s instructions or industry standards, all such equipment and supplies should also be periodically inspected, calibrated, operationally checked, tested, and maintained. Installed monitoring systems needed for accident characterization should have back-up power to ensure continued operability in an accident.

Field monitoring equipment should be capable of measuring concentrations or exposures of interest during the emergency response. If plans include provisions for the deployment of joint DOE/State/local monitoring teams, then standardized or compatible monitoring and communication equipment should be used. Instruments suitable for determining occupational exposures during normal operations may not be capable of recording accident event concentrations. (Regardless of the choice of instrument types, consequence assessment data/results should be compatible in terms of engineering units, conversion factors, and the severity thresholds.) 3.5.4 Protective Equipment EPHA results concerning the nature of potential hazards and affected areas, the types of consequences, and the population affected are useful for determining requirements for emergency equipment, materials, and facilities needed for protective action implementation. Detailed guidance is provided in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 7. 3-12 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Respiratory protection and protective clothing may be necessary to protect workers in a contaminated environment, to allow for their escape, and to protect emergency workers during reentry to a contaminated facility. The type of respiratory protection and protective clothing should be based on the EPHA and consequence calculations. The possibility of inhalation and absorption through the skin should be considered in determining the type and quantity of protective clothing available. Additional discussion of requirements for maintaining PPE can be found in Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Responses (HAZWOPER) standards; Appendix B, 29 CFR 1910.120; 29 CFR 1910.132 through 1910.140; and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards 1991, 1992, and 1999. Some type of decontamination facility, either mobile or fixed, is suggested to provide decontamination for emergency responders and possibly victims. Specific locations within the facility, such as security posts or operations control rooms, are critical and may have to be continuously manned. The EPHA should be used to determine requirements for protective equipment that should be available at these locations. Consideration should be given to standardization and interoperability of emergency equipment needed for implementing protective actions across a facility/site. This would enable routine operating supplies maintained by organizations, such as the fire department and the hazardous materials response group, to be pooled with any dedicated emergency equipment inventory and periodic inspections/calibrations/operational checks/testing conducted. Standardization of equipment allows for increased interoperability by response organizations, ease of maintenance, and greater flexibility during response. Transportation equipment should be provided, or identified as readily available by means of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), for use in evacuating nonessential personnel onsite to a safe location following an evacuation order. Determination of suitable modes of transportation should consider disabled workers. Transportation equipment could include automobiles, buses, vans, ambulances, and cargo vehicles. This equipment can be either owned and maintained by the facility/site or available from Tribal, State, local, or private organizations via a contract or MOAs. 3.5.5 Medical Equipment

Sufficient medical equipment should be available to treat both workers and responders who may be injured during an emergency. Emergency planners should coordinate closely with medical professionals to ensure that appropriate treatment is available for analyzed accident scenarios, the types and nature of injuries that need to be treated, the kinds of contamination that can be expected, the number of personnel that could become casualties, and the time-frames during which treatment needs to be provided to be effective. Planning and evaluation should include types and amounts of medical equipment needed to respond to a mass casualty event. This should include medical supplies to treat exposure to toxic chemicals and/or biological agents. DOE G 151.1-4 3-13 7-11-07 10 CFR 851 and DOE O 440.1A and its supporting guidance document provide further information on requirements for onsite and offsite medical equipment. In addition, DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 8 should be consulted. 3.5.6 Public Information Equipment Audio-visual and data processing equipment dedicated to communications with the media and the public should be available. While some equipment may be dedicated to public information activities as part of normal operations, these assets may need to be upgraded to accommodate the substantially greater demands for public information dissemination during an emergency. TV monitors are necessary for monitoring local news broadcasts regarding the event. While members of the media will have some equipment needed to execute assignments, greater demand for onsite support interfaces (e.g., phone lines, power supplies) should be anticipated. Detailed guidance is provided in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 9. 3.5.7 Additional Support Equipment Access control equipment and procedures for the command center and any other emergency facility are essential to ensure that the ERO functions without interruption or disruption. Equipment may be necessary to ensure that access to temporarily sensitive security areas or potentially contaminated areas is restricted. If an atmospheric release may affect areas beyond facility and site boundaries, coordination should occur with offsite authorities regarding the equipment and procedures necessary to extend a perimeter beyond the traditional facility or site boundary for access control purposes. The security force is usually tasked to carry out access control activities. Fire departments normally make up a substantial portion of the emergency response force at a facility/site. DOE O 420.1B requires that a “Baseline Needs Assessment” establish the minimum required capabilities of site fire fighting forces. Once determined, these capabilities are to be reflected in the site emergency plan. Emergency planners should coordinate with counterparts in the fire protection organization to ensure that all hazards noted in the EPHA are incorporated. Spill containment equipment and supplies should be available for immediate use following declaration of an emergency, if necessary. This includes containment equipment (e.g., booms and berm-making equipment) to minimize the environmental impacts of runoff (such as from a tank failure or firefighting efforts). Other equipment needs might include heavy construction equipment, portable power supplies, temporary sanitation equipment, specialized tools, and replacement parts. Additional supplies that might be required include PPE, dosimeters, medical supplies, office supplies, fire fighting expendables, and construction supplies. As with fire, medical, and hazardous material equipment, consideration should be given to arranging for the availability and compatibility of these resources with offsite organizations. The availability of such offsite resources, including names of equipment operators, should be documented in MOAs.

3-14 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Emergency response personnel should have at their disposal the necessary equipment for reentry and recovery activities. Although maintaining onsite inventory of all equipment possibly required for reentry and recovery efforts is not practical, a resource list for short- notice procurement should be available. Logistic support can be arranged through elements of the ERO or from other Federal, state, tribal, local, or private sources. Commitments to have these resources available immediately as necessary can be ensured through MOAs. Examples of facilities and services that could be needed include hazardous materials response, bomb removal, hostage negotiations, medical/morgue services, critical incident stress teams, analytical laboratory services, aerial survey support, personnel transportation, food services, contaminated laundry service, and dosimetry support. Planners should consider the potential impact of resources from offsite organizations not being available in the event of a disaster that affects a large area. Additional information on establishing interfaces with offsite response groups is provided in DOE G 151.1-4, Chapter 2. Administrative support, such as document and clerical services, may be required during emergencies. Facility maintenance and upkeep records and management of information from an incident require personnel and a record keeping system. 3.6 Maintenance of Facilities and Equipment Emergency facilities and equipment should be periodically inspected and checked during normal conditions to ensure availability and reliability during an emergency. Designated response facilities, especially multi-use facilities, should be adequately maintained to ensure timely activation and availability to support an emergency response. Inventories of all emergency equipment and supplies should be maintained and the location of equipment identified. Periodic inspections, facility walk-downs, operational checks, calibration, preventive maintenance and testing of equipment and supplies should be carried out in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry standards. Of particular importance are the communications systems and equipment. Communication systems with DOE Headquarters, DOE field elements and offsite organizations should be periodically tested. Also, communication systems used onsite to activate both on-shift and off-shift emergency response personnel should be tested and maintained regularly. 4-1 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 4. EMERGENCY CATEGORIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION 4.1 Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assist Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) field elements in complying with the DOE O 151.1C requirement that major unplanned or non-routine abnormal events or conditions involving or affecting DOE or NNSA facilities/sites or activities be recognized promptly and categorized as Operational Emergencies (OEs). The requirement applies to events or conditions that cause or have the potential to cause: • Serious health and safety impacts onsite or offsite to workers or the public; • Serious detrimental effects on the environment; • Direct harm to people or the environment as a result of degradation of safeguards or security conditions; and • Release of (or loss of control over) hazardous materials.

In addition to being categorized as OEs, events involving the actual or potential airborne release of (or loss of control over) hazardous materials from an onsite facility or activity also require prompt and accurate classification as an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, based on the measured or predicted radiation dose or hazardous material concentration at specific locations (e.g., facility and site boundaries). Conservative preplanned initial onsite protective actions and offsite protective action recommendations should be associated with the classification of these OEs. This chapter describes the basic principles of event categorization and classification of OEs. First, event categorization is discussed with special emphasis on OEs that do not require classification and the development of criteria for determining quickly if an event is an OE. Next OEs that require classification and the relative severity (i.e., the consequences and the extent of the area impacted) associated with each emergency class are discussed. The use of Protective Action Criteria (PAC) for radiological and non- radiological releases to establish hazardous material emergency classification is also addressed. Guidance is provided for developing Emergency Action Levels (EALs), the criteria used to detect and recognize onsite hazardous material release events and assign the appropriate emergency class. Appendix A provides guidance for integrating event categorization and classification with normal operating procedures; Appendix B provides examples for the implementation of event categorization and classification. This chapter is designed primarily for facilities/sites and activities that are required to implement an Operational Emergency Hazardous Materials Program and is directed at 4-2 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 operations and emergency management staff at Field Elements and operating contractor organizations responsible for DOE and NNSA facilities/sites and activities. 4.2 General Approach Effective emergency response depends upon early recognition of emergency events and conditions, coupled with rapid implementation of emergency actions. Categorizing events as OEs was created to ensure this rapid recognition and timely response. Response to OEs requires notification of offsite authorities and may require the commitment of significant resources. Categorization of events or conditions as OEs is intended to: ensure the rapid dissemination of event facts outward and upward; activate response activities beyond the local event scene; and meet the time-sensitive information needs of strategic decision-making in areas of national security. The DOE O 151.1C requires that an OE event or condition must be categorized as promptly as possible, but no later than 15 minutes after event recognition/identification/discovery. In addition to ensuring rapid communications, the process of classifying selected OEs that involve hazardous materials was created to initiate preplanned local response and to protect the local site and offsite populations. For OEs that do not require classification, local emergency response activities may be unaffected by the categorization process with the exception of more timely recognition and notifications. Classified emergencies (i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) are a subset of the OE category. Therefore, when an event is classified, it is (by definition) also categorized as an OE at the same time. As a result, an OE event or condition requiring classification needs to be categorized AND classified, as promptly as possible, but no later than 15 minutes after event recognition/identification/discovery.

The emergency categorization/classification system includes a set of pre-approved decisions, agreed to by senior management and Tribal, State, and local officials, which allow onsite supervisory personnel to make rapid decisions affecting personnel, facilities, and resources in response to an emergency. Authority to initiate emergency communications and commit resources often rests with upper management. During the onset of an emergency, adherence to the normal management approval processes may delay the initiation of response actions and mobilization of resources. For the system to be effective, responsibility and authority for initial event categorization and classification should be vested in on-duty supervisory personnel who are close to the problem and who are familiar with the facility. Every DOE/NNSA facility/site and activity is required to produce a Hazards Survey to identify the types of emergency events and conditions to be addressed by the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. This survey can be used to define events and conditions that should be categorized as OEs. Facilities/sites and activities are required to identify these OEs and develop criteria for categorizing them quickly, as specified in the Order. OEs involving the release of (or loss of control over) hazardous materials on or from DOE sites or facilities are classified according to their severity for the purpose of rapidly implementing planned response activities and notifications that are commensurate with the degree of hazard presented by the event. 4-3 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 4.3 Operational Emergency Definition DOE O 151.1C provides the following definition for an Operational Emergency: “Operational Emergencies are major unplanned or nonroutine abnormal events or conditions that: involve or affect DOE/NNSA facilities and activities by causing or having the potential to cause serious health and safety or environmental impacts; require resources from outside the immediate/affected area or local event scene to supplement the initial response; and, require time- urgent notifications to initiate response activities at locations beyond the local event scene.” The Order provides a number of examples of abnormal events and conditions that are to be categorized as OEs. The examples alone, however, may not fully convey the qualities (i.e., the seriousness and the required response efforts) that distinguish them as OEs in the DOE emergency management system. The basic characteristics of an OE, as spelled out in the Order definition, need to be considered along with the specific examples to determine whether a particular abnormal event is an OE. The following discussion provides guidance for interpreting the OE definition given in the Order. • Operational Emergencies are “ . . . major unplanned or nonroutine abnormal events or conditions . . .” They are major events or conditions that are expected to require the attention of senior level DOE management, possibly attract inquiries from the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Government, State and local governments, and Tribal authorities, and/or possibly attract highly visible media coverage and public attention. OEs do not include planned events (e.g., releases of hazardous materials in quantities below statutory limits) or routine and expected anomalies.

• Operational Emergencies “ . . . involve or affect DOE or NNSA facilities and activities . . ” The events can involve (originate from) DOE or NNSA facilities/sites and activities. Likewise, events can originate from an external (non-DOE) location/source, but affect DOE or NNSA facilities/sites and activities. • Operational Emergencies “ . . . cause or have the potential to cause serious health and safety or environmental impacts . . .” The events or conditions may cause, or have the potential to cause: – Serious health and safety impacts to workers or the public – Serious detrimental effects on the environment – Direct harm to people or the environment as a result of degradation of safeguards or security conditions – Release of a hazardous material from an offsite DOE shipment 4-4 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 – Release of onsite hazardous materials to the environment (i.e., outside of a structure or enclosure); or, damage to or loss of control of nuclear weapons, components, or test devices Events or conditions that cause economic loss or result in a degradation of safeguards or security conditions, but have no actual or potential health and safety or environmental impacts, are NOT OEs. • Operational Emergencies “ . . . require resources from outside the immediate/ affected area or local event scene to supplement the initial response . . .” In an OE, the initial response efforts by personnel normally assigned to the immediate vicinity of the incident are not expected to be sufficient to mitigate all the health, safety or environmental impacts. As a minimum, emergency management assets [Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff, information resources and communications capabilities] will be needed to control and coordinate the response activities. In addition, supplemental emergency response functional elements (e.g., firefighters, spill containment teams, security officers) may be needed to mitigate the event and its impacts effectively. The recognized need for different capabilities or resources than are deployed as part of the standard, planned response to events of a certain nature and magnitude (e.g., basic spill response capability) may also indicate that a specific occurrence is extraordinary in some way and should therefore be placed in the OE category. The fact that the normal, planned initial response for a particular kind of event comes from outside the “immediate/affected area or local event scene” (e.g., a site asset versus a facility asset) does not put the event into the category of OE, nor does precautionary repositioning of supplementary response resources closer to the event scene. • Operational Emergencies “ . . . require time-urgent notifications to initiate response activities at locations beyond the local event scene.” In an OE, time-urgent notifications to entities beyond the local event scene (and typically, beyond the site) are needed. External organizations notified may include: DOE/NNSA Headquarters, DOE/NNSA Cognizant Field Offices; Tribal, State, and local response organizations; and/or, other Federal regulatory authorities. These notifications are not simply informational, but are necessary to initiate and/or promote response actions beyond the local event scene that will have the effect of mitigating impacts to health, safety or environment. The notifications may activate interfaces with local planning partners, recommend protective actions and/or initiate planned response activities to mitigate impacts in areas beyond the immediate event scene. These notifications can also initiate strategic attention and decision-making at national levels particularly when the OE impacts areas of national security.

4.4 Categorization of Operational Emergencies Although it is not intended that facilities develop detailed and quantitative categorization criteria for each type of OE described in the Order, some planning and preparation will be needed to ensure that events meeting the Order descriptions are promptly recognized and categorized. For some types of OEs, facilities and sites may choose to develop facility­ 4-5 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 /site-specific criteria to aid in decision-making. For others, the guidance presented in this chapter may be useful in interpreting observed conditions directly against the Order descriptions. In either case, the decision to categorize a given occurrence as an OE should be based on the extent of the required response and the potential health, safety and/or environmental impacts discussed in the previous chapter, as well as and the nature of the event as conveyed in the Order examples. In addition to satisfying criteria based on the Order descriptions, the event or condition should also exhibit the more subjective characteristics that define the OE, as discussed in Section 4.3. The process of OE categorization involves judgments on a number of subjective issues, including: • Perceptions of the magnitude of the event • Unique circumstances of the specific event • General need for emergency “management” (i.e., multiple skills, additional resources, etc.) • A sense of what DOE/NNSA Headquarters needs to be informed of promptly in order to interface with other Federal agencies at the highest levels • The site’s political situation and its relationship with its neighbors These considerations together with the interpretation of observed event conditions against criteria based on the Order descriptions of OEs describe the process of categorization. In summary, there are few absolutes in categorizing emergency events or conditions. The categorization process involves a qualitative and quantitative assessment of unique events or conditions. The categorization decision needs to consider the OE definition in its entirety, with no one aspect of the definition dominating the decision process. The subjective nature of the process makes it essential that responsible personnel are trained to recognize events or conditions that require rapid assessment and categorization decisions. The following sections describe how the examples of OE events or conditions given in the Order should be used to develop facility- and site-specific criteria to support recognition and categorization of emergency events or conditions. A variety of techniques may be used to integrate this recognition/decision process with existing operations, management, emergency response, and reporting activities (e.g., existing occurrence reporting and hazardous materials recognition/classification procedures) 4.4.1 Direct Health and Safety Impacts Events or conditions that represent, cause, or have the potential to cause serious health and safety impacts to workers or members of the public and exhibit the general characteristics contained in the definition given in Section 4.3 are OEs. 4-6 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 (1) Discovery of radioactive or other hazardous material contamination from past DOE/NNSA operations that may have caused, is causing, or may reasonably be expected to cause uncontrolled personnel exposures exceeding protective action criteria.

Discussion. This example applies to the discovery of contamination that: 1) may have caused past, unrecognized exposures of about the same magnitude as would currently require protective actions when dealing with environmental release of hazardous materials, and/or 2) may pose a future threat of similar exposures. An OE of this type has two defining characteristics. First, if it is possible that people were exposed unknowingly in the past, effort may be needed to identify the exposed individuals, assess their exposure, determine if any of them exhibit health effects that could be linked to the exposure, and provide them with necessary medical follow-up. Second, without prompt and effective action, it is likely that people will continue to be exposed to the contamination. In either case, the acute dose or exposure to individuals who come in contact with the contamination will be at or above the level at which protective actions are currently planned when dealing with environmental release of hazardous materials. The example applies to any newly discovered onsite or offsite contamination area that was not under access control at some time in the past, or for which access control was not immediately established upon discovery and personnel may thereby have continued to gain access without DOE/contractor knowledge while the magnitude and extent of the contamination was being characterized. Minimum severity thresholds for this condition may have one of several bases, as follows: • For radioactive material in general, a multiple of the Significance Category 2 Occurrence Reporting criterion for offsite radioactive contamination (Cf. DOE M 231.1-2 under Subgroup 6 B) may be used. • For gamma emitters, dose conversion factors can be used to determine the contamination level that would result in a dose of 1 rem Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) to a person exposed to the contaminated area for a short period of time (for example, a week or less). • For radionuclides that pose an inhalation hazard, inhalation dose factors and an assumed average resuspension factor can be used to estimate the surface contamination level that corresponds to a 1 rem dose commitment Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) for a short period (i.e., a week or less) of exposure to the contaminated area. • For nonradioactive hazardous materials, an assumed average resuspension factor can be used to estimate the surface contamination level that corresponds to an Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL)-1 (or equivalent) concentration in air above the contaminated area. Methods. Using bases such as those cited above, facilities that store or process significant quantities of hazardous materials (or have done so in the past) may select a 4-7 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 “contamination” criterion on which they will declare an OE. Facilities that have potential for contamination with several hazardous materials may develop simple conversion factors, formulae, or tables to permit rapid evaluation of measured contamination values against protective action criteria. Any discovery of high levels of contamination will typically result in technical assessments and internal notifications preliminary to initiation of the Occurrence Report required by DOE M 231.1-2. Therefore, internal procedures and training related to radiation protection and industrial hygiene (e.g., directions for handling of unusual survey results) and Occurrence Reporting can be used to alert safety/health and Occurrence Reporting personnel to the requirement for an OE declaration and prompt notifications if contamination exceeds certain levels well above the Occurrence Reporting values.

(2) An offsite hazardous material event not associated with DOE/NNSA operations that is observed to have or is predicted to have an impact on a DOE site such that protective actions are required for onsite DOE workers. Discussion. This example applies to any release of hazardous material from an external source that requires onsite personnel to evacuate or take shelter. Such releases may originate from fixed facilities or transportation activities outside the site boundaries, from non-DOE transportation accidents on roads, railroads, or rivers that traverse the site, or from private industrial activity being conducted on the DOE site. However, if hazardous materials from the offsite event could lead to loss of control over onsite DOE hazardous materials, then the event should be classified on the basis of the potential onsite release. (See Section 4.5) The need for onsite protective actions may be based on measurements or consequence projections by site personnel or on a recommendation from the on-scene Incident Commander (IC), offsite emergency management authorities, or the responsible carrier. Any significant concentration of DOE and/or contractor personnel should be considered “onsite” for purposes of this example, even if they occupy a leased offsite building or facility. Such offsite buildings should be considered if the occupants have principal site operations and management responsibilities. Offsite subcontractor offices, hotels/motels, company picnics, and conference facilities need not be included. Methods. Because hazardous material releases may originate from any transportation artery and many industrial facilities, this condition applies to every site and facility occupied by DOE or prime contractor staff. Local area, site, and building emergency procedures, and associated building emergency warden training, may be used to help ensure recognition of this situation as an OE requiring prompt reporting. Although DOE M 231.1-2 does not explicitly identify offsite hazardous materials events impacting DOE sites/workers as reportable occurrences, local Occurrence Reporting procedures, guidelines, and training of Occurrence Reporting personnel can be used to help ensure recognition. Because events involving onsite releases of hazardous material are classified in accordance with Section 4.5 of this guidance, emergency classification (EAL) procedures, which are likely to be consulted for any 4-8 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 hazardous material event with impact on people, can be used to identify this condition as an OE not requiring classification. (3) An occurrence (e.g., earthquake, tornado, aircraft crash, fire, explosion) that causes or can reasonably be expected to cause significant structural damage to DOE/NNSA facilities, with confirmed or suspected personnel injury or death. Discussion. This example applies to events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, fires, explosions, and vehicle accidents that cause significant structural damage to DOE or contractor facilities, such that death or injury to personnel might reasonably be expected. Damage to the structure does not need to be total or exceed any particular cost threshold, nor does death or injury need to be confirmed. The threat to personnel safety in conjunction with significant structural damage is the key to this example. Accordingly, a fire that destroys a building that is abandoned (or is thought to be unoccupied) is not an OE, whereas the collapse of the roof of a normally occupied building during working hours is an OE, even if no death or injury of the occupants is initially evident.

Methods. Any facility that is routinely occupied by personnel could be subject to such events. Because initial response to an event of this nature is likely to be carried out by local fire and rescue organizations, building emergency/fire plans, management notification lists, and incident command training (e.g., regarding the initiation of additional alarms or calls for backup units as OE recognition factors) can be used effectively to ensure recognition. Local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training of Occurrence Reporting personnel may also prompt a review of the site- specific criteria for categorizing a building evacuation as an OE. (4) Any facility evacuation in response to an actual occurrence that requires time- urgent response by specialist personnel, such as hazardous material responders or mutual aid groups not normally assigned to the affected facility. Discussion. This example applies to any normally occupied DOE or contractor facility. The event or condition that requires evacuation and time-urgent response by specialist personnel may be a fire, hazardous material (HAZMAT) spill, or safeguards/security incident. However, a precautionary evacuation and response by specialist personnel that does not involve any significant threat to health, safety, or security (such as a HAZMAT team investigating a report of an unusual odor or firefighters responding to a reported smell of smoke without any other indication of fire) is not an OE. Neither is an event that is managed successfully by specialist personnel assigned to the affected facility or by site assets that serve as the primary specialist responders to the facility. However, if the primary responders find a condition that requires supplemental response of the same type (e.g., fire, HAZMAT) or a different type of specialized assistance, the condition should be categorized as an OE. If an airborne release of significant quantities of hazardous material to the environment occurs or is likely to occur, such events are OEs requiring classification, as described in Section 4.5. 4-9 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Methods. Because the additional response assets from outside the immediate affected area/local event scene may be by fire/rescue, HAZMAT, security, or other specialist personnel, the procedures for those responses can be used to help ensure that the condition is recognized and categorized as an OE. Local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training of Occurrence Reporting personnel may be used to prompt review of the site-specific criteria for categorizing a “facility evacuation” OE. (5) An unplanned nuclear criticality. Discussion. Any unplanned nuclear criticality is an OE because it represents major failures of safety systems and practices and has the potential to cause facility damage and release of radioactive material. Criticality events that result in an airborne release of significant quantities of radioactive material to the environment are OEs requiring classification, as described in Section 4.5. Methods. Only facilities dealing with fissionable materials in quantities approaching a minimum critical mass need to consider this potential condition. Local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training of Occurrence Reporting personnel could be used to help ensure timely recognition and categorization of criticality events. Because most inadvertent criticalities will be classified as Alert or higher due to actual or potential radioactive releases, emergency classification (EAL) procedures and emergency response procedures should identify the specific conditions under which a criticality is to be categorized as an OE not requiring classification.

(6) Any mass casualty event. Discussion. This example applies to events that result in numbers of deaths or injuries that significantly exceed an occurrence reporting Subgroup 2A, Significance Category 1 threshold for occupational illness/injuries. A number and severity of casualties that exceed the readily available treatment capability defines the term “mass casualty.” Indicators of this level of casualties include the need to exercise triage at the event scene, request ambulances and medical personnel from offsite, or dispatch victims to multiple medical facilities to ensure adequate and timely treatment. Methods. Emergency planners for facilities and sites may elect to establish a local definition for “mass casualty” based on such factors as available emergency medical resources and distance to treatment centers. Emergency medical responder and incident command training and procedures can use that definition to ensure timely recognition and categorization of an OE. Since any event that has the potential to be a “mass casualty” will almost certainly be recognized as a potentially reportable occurrence, local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training materials for Occurrence Reporting personnel can be annotated with the local definition for “mass casualty.” 4-10 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 4.4.2 Environmental Impacts Events or conditions that represent, cause, or have the potential to cause serious detrimental effects on the environment and exhibit the general characteristics contained in the definition given in Section 4.3 are OEs. (1) Any actual or potential release of hazardous material or regulated pollutant to the environment, in a quantity greater than five times the Reportable Quantity (RQ) specified for such material in 40 CFR 302, that could result in significant offsite consequences, such as major wildlife kills, wetland degradation, aquifer contamination, or the need to secure downstream water supply intakes. Discussion. The specified release of hazardous material or regulated pollutant to the environment is an OE if it results in actual or potential offsite consequences of the type and magnitude specified in the example. Although the Order refers to “offsite consequences,” many DOE sites contain sensitive and valued “onsite” environments. Examples include wetlands, streams, rivers, lakes, aquifers, and endangered species of wildlife. Such sensitive areas should be considered if contamination would generate response and interest equivalent to similar contamination of offsite areas. To facilitate recognition and categorization, sites and facilities should identify material storage and potential release locations, including locations on transportation routes, which could produce impacts such as those described in the example. This will allow releases to be categorized on the basis of the material, quantity, and release location rather than on field/in situ measurements of the impact, which may require days or weeks to quantify. Specific material release scenarios that, in addition to causing environmental degradation, have the potential to cause acute airborne exposure hazards to people are OEs requiring classification, as discussed in Section 4.5.

Methods. This condition applies to facilities/sites for which the Hazards Survey has identified quantities of hazardous materials or regulated pollutants that could cause significant damage to the environment. Plans, procedures, and training related to environmental spill response and reporting can be used to ensure recognition of the need to categorize specific releases as OEs. Local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training of hazardous waste management and Occurrence Reporting personnel can also be used to prompt a review of the site-specific criteria for categorizing such releases as an OE. (2) Any release of greater than 1,000 gallons (24 barrels) of oil to inland waters; greater than 10,000 gallons (238 barrels) of oil to coastal waters; or a quantity of oil that could result in significant offsite consequences (e.g., need to relocate people, major wildlife kills, wetland degradation, aquifer contamination, need to secure downstream water supply intakes, etc.) [Oil as defined by the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1321) means any kind of oil and includes petroleum.]. Discussion. Any release of oil exceeding the stated quantities or any smaller release that produces or is likely to produce offsite consequences of the type and magnitude DOE G 151.1-4 4-11 7-11-07 specified is to be categorized as an OE. To facilitate categorization, sites and facilities should identify oil storage and potential release locations, including locations on transportation routes that could produce impacts such as those described in the example. Methods. This condition applies to facilities/sites for which the Hazards Survey has identified the potential for release of more than 1,000 gallons to inland waters, 10,000 gallons to coastal waters, or any release that could result in significant offsite consequences. Plans, procedures, and training related to environmental spill response and reporting can be used to ensure recognition of the need to categorize specific releases as OEs. Local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training of Occurrence Reporting can prompt a review of the site-specific criteria for categorizing oil/petroleum releases as OEs. 4.4.3 Safeguards and Security Events or Conditions with Direct Health and Safety or Environmental Impacts Events or conditions that represent, cause, or have the potential to cause degradation of safeguards or security conditions with actual or potential direct harm to people or the environment and exhibit the general characteristics contained in the definition given in Section 4.3 are OEs. (1) Actual unplanned detonation of an explosive device or a credible threat of detonation resulting from the location of a confirmed or suspicious explosive device. Discussion. Detonation or discovery of an explosive device at any DOE or contractor facility should be categorized as an OE. However, in some cases, the location of the explosive device and its size may need to be considered. For example, a common firecracker or rifle cartridge should not be considered an “explosive device” unless the conditions under which it is found or exploded suggest deliberate placement and destructive intent. Discovery or credible threat of any explosive device in a location where it clearly threatens DOE property or site personnel is an OE. Placement or detonation of a device that causes or threatens a release of hazardous material with the potential for acute airborne exposure hazards to people is an OE requiring classification, as discussed in Section 4.5.

Methods. All DOE and prime contractor facilities and sites are subject to this type of malevolent act. Security plans and security response procedures may be used to identify criteria for declaration of an OE in terms of safeguards/security status or response level triggered by an event meeting these descriptions. Local Occurrence Reporting guidelines and training of Occurrence Reporting personnel can prompt a review of site-specific criteria for categorizing explosive device events as OEs. (2) An actual terrorist attack or sabotage event involving a DOE/NNSA facility/site or operation. 4-12 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Discussion. An armed assault involving a DOE site, facility, or operation might be directed at an individual DOE or contractor employee, at gaining access to valuable property or classified material, or at causing damage to the DOE property. Therefore, the term “terrorist attack” should be interpreted broadly; any armed assault that takes place at a DOE or contractor facility should be categorized as an OE because the motivation for and objectives of the assault are not likely to be known until long after the fact. Exceptions to this generalization might include violent confrontations between individuals or simple acts of vandalism that take place incidentally on DOE or contractor premises. Any confirmed attempt to sabotage facilities or equipment should be categorized as an OE, even if it initially appears to be unsuccessful, because of uncertainty concerning other undiscovered, but related potentially destructive acts. If these destructive acts impact control over or result in the release of significant quantities of hazardous materials, they are OEs requiring classification, as discussed in Section 4.5. Methods. All DOE and prime contractor facilities and sites are subject to this type of malevolent act. Local security plans, response procedures, and guidelines for reporting events of security concern may be used to identify criteria for declaration of an OE in terms of safeguards/security status or response level triggered by an event meeting these descriptions. (3) Kidnapping or the taking of hostage(s) involving a DOE/NNSA facility/site or operation. Discussion. Kidnapping of a DOE site employee or family member or taking of hostages may be undertaken to extort money, materials, or concessions from the DOE or its contractor. DOE, its contractors, and their employees may come under great pressure to meet a perpetrator's demands, some of which might have safety, health, or environmental implications. Such occurrences should not be categorized as OEs if kidnapping or hostage taking occurs off the DOE site and motivation for the crime is not believed to involve DOE interests (e.g., the “kidnapping” of children involved in a custody dispute). Methods. All DOE and prime contractor facilities and sites are subject to this type of malevolent act. Local security plans, response procedures and guidelines for reporting events of security concern may be used to identify criteria for declaration of an OE in terms of safeguards/security status or response level triggered by an event meeting these descriptions. 4.4.4 Offsite DOE Transportation Events or Conditions Events or conditions that represent an actual or potential release of radiological or non- radiological hazardous materials from a DOE shipment outside a DOE site and exhibit the general characteristics contained in the definition given in Section 4.3 are OEs.

DOE G 151.1-4 4-13 7-11-07 (1) Any accident/incident involving an offsite DOE/NNSA shipment containing hazardous materials that causes the initial responders to initiate protective actions at locations beyond the immediate/affected area. Discussion. Initial on-scene response to any accident/incident involving offsite transportation of DOE-owned hazardous materials will be carried out by State and local emergency services groups (e.g., police, fire, and HAZMAT) responsible for the accident locale. In many cases, the vehicle driver will have no detailed knowledge of the potential hazard and no control over the actions of the local responders. If local responders determine that protective actions are necessary beyond the immediate event scene, the event is to be categorized as an OE by the DOE entity responsible for the shipment (usually the shipper). Thus, only two facts from the scene are needed to support an OE declaration: • On-scene responders (the responsible local authorities) have implemented either evacuation or shelter as protective actions in response to the accident/incident • The area within which protective actions have been implemented extends more than about 100 meters in any direction from the vehicle or spill location. Even if no hazardous material release occurs, implementation of protective actions is likely to cause intense public awareness and media interest in the DOE shipments. It will also require the shipper and other DOE entities to support local authorities in assessing any hazard. Finally, any of several different DOE technical capabilities may need to be deployed to the scene to determine the status of the shipment, arrange for repackaging, conduct decontamination, and oversee disposal of waste. Methods. Responsibility for recognizing, categorizing, and reporting OEs associated with offsite transportation activities rests with the DOE entity that has direct operational control of the shipment (usually the shipper). Transportation plans, procedures, and personnel training for specific types of materials may incorporate information and criteria needed to ensure that conditions requiring an OE declaration are promptly recognized and reported to the office or individual responsible for categorization. (2) Failures in safety systems threaten the integrity of a nuclear weapon, component, or test device. Discussion. This example applies to systems that prevent unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, components, or test devices during transport, and to the systems that prevent or minimize the likelihood of damage to or detonation of the weapon, component, or device. Significant failures of either type should be categorized as OEs if they require the deployment of technical support to assist transportation personnel in restoring the shipment to the required envelope of safety and/or security conditions. 4-14 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 Methods. For transportation events involving nuclear weapons, devices, or components, OE declaration may be keyed to the initiation of response procedures or reporting conditions that are unique to nuclear explosive safety events. As an example, events occurring offsite and categorized using Department of Defense (DOD) terminology, such as a “Bent Spear” or “Broken Arrow,” would both be OEs. Some Broken Arrow events would clearly be classified as Alert or higher if occurring on a DOE site, depending on the potential for release of radioactive material to the atmosphere.

(3) A transportation accident results in damage to a nuclear explosive, nuclear explosive-like assembly, or Category I/II quantity of Special Nuclear Materials. Discussion. Offsite transportation accidents that cause actual or likely damage to devices or materials specified in this example should be categorized as OEs. Based on analyses conducted in accordance with DOE G 151.1-2, Chapter 2 observable indications of possible damage to the weapon, device, or material (such as fire or breach of shipping container) should be determined. If these indications are observed, the condition should be categorized as an OE. [A planned document in the DOE G 151.1-series will specifically address the EPHA associated with Office of Secure Transportation (OST) shipments]. Methods. For transportation events involving nuclear weapons, devices, or components, OE declaration may be keyed to the initiation of response procedures or reporting conditions that are unique to nuclear explosive safety events. 4.4.5 Release of (or Loss of Control Over) Hazardous Materials Events or conditions that involve actual or potential release of significant quantities of hazardous (radioactive or non-radioactive) materials to the environment and exhibit general characteristics contained in the definition given in Section 4.3 are OEs that require classification. The following characteristics distinguish these hazardous material OEs. • The hazardous material is, or is likely to be, released to the environment (i.e., outside of a structure or enclosure). • The material immediately threatens those who are in close proximity and has the potential for dispersal beyond the immediate vicinity in quantities or concentrations that threaten the health and safety of onsite personnel or the public. • The material has a rate of transport and dispersion in the environment that requires time-urgent response to implement protective actions. Essentially all of these hazardous material OEs involve airborne releases because the air pathway represents the most time-urgent situation, requiring rapid, coordinated emergency response on the part of the facility, collocated facilities, and surrounding jurisdictions to protect workers, the public, and the environment. DOE G 151.1-4 4-15 7-11-07 A hazardous material OE is to be classified as either an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency based on the projected or measured hazardous material impact. Classified emergencies are a subset of the OE category. Therefore, when an event is classified, it is (by definition) also categorized as an OE at the same time. The categorization that is implicit in the classification of a hazardous material emergency does not require any notifications or actions beyond those otherwise specified for classified emergencies. 4.5 Classification of Hazardous Material Operational Emergencies Event classification is the process of assessing hazardous materials OEs to determine if they fall into one of the three emergency classes. Classification provides further definition to this subset of OEs beyond the categorization of “Operational Emergency.” 4.5.1 Principles of Event Classification During the development of an event classification system, the following basic principles governing the purpose, expected results, and event classification methods should be taken into consideration. The purpose of a standard event classification system is to:

• Initiate a set of pre-planned response actions appropriate to all events of a given class or severity (e.g., notification, mobilization of resources, and protective actions) • Activate necessary analytical and decision-making capabilities to make sound determinations of the need for other actions • Enhance the likelihood that mitigative action will be taken to prevent conditions from becoming more severe Accurate event classification is the key to achieving a graded response. A graded response is the mobilization of personnel and resources in proportion to the severity of events or conditions. An underlying purpose of event classification is to minimize the impact of the consequences of an event by quickly bringing technical resources to bear on the problem. The implementation of the event classification process should provide for the following. • Prompt notification of minor events to prevent escalation to more serious consequences • Mobilization of resources to provide better management of the event or to arrest degradation of safety • Sufficient lead-time to activate facilities and prepare for protective actions 4-16 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 • Protection of the public and employees at some distance from the event site in case of a release of hazardous material • Prompt and accurate flow of information Event classification methods should have the following characteristics. • Timely: If possible, classification of a degrading safety condition should occur early enough in the progression of events that effective use of emergency response resources could arrest degradation or reduce consequences. • Reliable: Classification should be based upon indications that are consistently associated with the event/condition and, whenever possible, have a direct correlation to the severity of the event. • Internally consistent: Different events of a similar severity should result in the same classification. Different indications of the same event/condition should lead to the same classification decision. • Anticipatory: Classification should be based on the most likely progression and future consequences of an event or condition, not just the situation as it exists at the time it is recognized. • Redundant: Whenever possible, there should be several different indicators and criteria for recognizing and classifying an emergency. • Complete: The event classification system should provide for recognition and classification of all the emergency events and conditions that are identified in the Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA). • Conservative: Where detailed or quantitative information is lacking, events should be classified on the basis of conservative estimates of conditions and consequences. • Usable: Event classification methods should incorporate sound human engineering principles (e.g., express EALs in units consistent with instrument readings and standard terminology, use consistent and familiar format, place all necessary information and references in one location, use color coding or other pointers). • Integrated: Event recognition and classification should be integrated with normal and off-normal operations practices. Entry points into the event classification procedure should be identified in procedures. Instrument readings, checklists, safety notes and precautionary statements in procedures, and other operational practices that support emergency recognition/classification should be identified.

DOE G 151.1-4 4-17 7-11-07 4.5.2 Event Classification and Protective Action Criteria For emergency events/conditions involving the actual or potential release of hazardous materials, each emergency class is defined in terms of health impact or risk to the general public or facility/site workers. If the impact or risk approaches or exceeds some predetermined level, then steps to protect the public and workers should be taken. These predetermined levels are expressed in terms of doses, exposures, or concentrations and are termed “protective action criteria.” The Order states that the specific Protective Action Criteria (PACs) to be used in emergency planning for radioactive materials are the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). For toxic chemicals, the Order specifies one of three sources of PAC values. In order of preference they are AEGLs promulgated by the EPA, Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) published by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) and Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs) developed by DOE. These PACs are discussed in detail in DOE G 151.1-2, Appendix F. The threshold between emergency classes can be defined in terms of the actual or potential consequences from a release of hazardous material resulting in a dose or exposure that exceeds a PAC at the predetermined receptor location (e.g., 30 meters, facility boundary, and site boundary). At the Alert level, emergency event consequences exceed a site-specific criterion corresponding to 10% of the PAC at or beyond the facility boundary. Alternatively, the Alert may be defined in terms of consequences exceeding the PAC could be expected outside the facility at or beyond 30 meters from the point of release, but not beyond the facility boundary. A facility/site should choose one of these definitions and use it consistently. Facilities/sites are discouraged from developing EAL sets based on both Alert definitions. At the Site Area Emergency level, consequences exceeding the PAC would exist onsite at or beyond the facility boundary, but not offsite or in onsite areas where the general public has unescorted access. A General Emergency exists when consequences exceed the PAC at or beyond the site boundary or in onsite areas where the general public has unescorted access. For purposes of this guidance, unescorted access correlates to the site boundary definition contained within DOE G 151.1-2, which states: If the general public can gain unescorted access to areas of the DOE site, such as public highways or visitor centers, those areas should be considered as offsite for purposes of emergency class definition, unless it is assured that those areas can be evacuated and access control established within about one (1) hour of any emergency declaration. Note that it is not the intent of the guidance related to classification to suggest that wind- direction-dependent initial classification criteria (EALs) be developed. In general, the use of real-time meteorological conditions as a factor in determining initial event classification (and initial protective actions) is not encouraged. Doing so requires a sophisticated understanding of the local atmospheric transport/dispersion environment, 4-18 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07

accurate information on current meteorological conditions, and a high degree of confidence in the forecast. It also complicates, and potentially lengthens, the decision processes. The need for reliable real-time weather information and on-call meteorological expertise, together with the added complexity of the decision process, make such an approach unsuitable for reaching timely, conservative and anticipatory classification (and protective action) decisions as required by DOE emergency management policy. Finally, results of the EPHA are used to identify specific indications (i.e., alarms, monitor readings, sample results, observed conditions) that correspond to actual or potential consequences that equal or exceed a PAC at the receptor of interest. These indications become the criteria (EALs) by which events are classified as Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. 4.5.3 Emergency Class and Severity Level The severity of each of the three OE classes and the general extent (area) of impact intended is summarized in Table 4-1. 4.5.4 Integration of Event Classification with Normal Operations Monitoring of various indications and recognition of abnormalities and their safety significance are routine functions of a facility’s operations staff. The transition to emergency operations begins with recognition of specific indications or symptoms of an emergency event or condition. To the extent possible, methods to enhance detection and recognition of emergencies and transition to emergency operations should be integrated with routine operating practices. Detailed guidance is presented in Appendix A. Table 4-1. Summaries of Emergency Classes Emergency Class Facility Weapons/Devices/Components Alert Substantial actual/potential degradation of level of safety. Hazardous material releases are not expected to exceed PAC levels at or beyond facility boundary. Substantial actual/potential degradation of level of safety. No immediate threat to workers or general public. Site Area Actual/potential major failures of functions Actual/potential system failures that Emergency needed for protection of workers and public. Hazardous material releases are expected to exceed PAC levels beyond facility boundary, but not offsite. threaten the integrity of the device. May adversely impact health and safety of workers in immediate vicinity, but not the general public. General Actual/imminent catastrophic reduction of safety Actual/likely catastrophic failures of Emergency systems with potential or actual loss of hazardous material. Hazardous material releases are expected to exceed PAC levels offsite. safety or secondary systems threatening the integrity of the device. May adversely impact health and safety of both workers and public. DOE G 151.1-4 4-19 7-11-07 4.6 Development of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) 4.6.1 Role of the Facility EPHA The EPHA constitutes the technical basis for a facility's hazardous material emergency management system. The EPHA identifies and characterizes the facility hazards, postulates a range of events and conditions that could lead to releases, and quantifies the potential consequences of each release. For each release scenario, the EPHA identifies likely initiating conditions and contributing events (such as fire, equipment failure or loss of power) and methods by which either the initiating condition or the release might be detected and recognized. Examples of detection/recognition methods include alarms, instrument readings, equipment status indicators (e.g., on/off, open/shut), field or laboratory measurements, or direct observations of conditions or phenomena (such as fire or high winds).

The EPHA provides a quantitative estimate of the consequences of each release at specific locations, expressed in terms of radiation dose or peak concentration of toxic chemicals. This information determines the emergency class associated with the release. For detection and recognition methods that correlate directly with consequences, the EPHA provides a basis for calculating specific values or conditions that correspond to each emergency class. Specific values or conditions (instrument readings, sample analysis results, equipment status, etc.) indicating that a PAC has been or will be reached at the facility or site boundary should be identified as EALs. For example, if a particular release of radioactive material through the facility's stack would produce consequences exceeding the PAC at the site boundary, and one means of detection is the installed stack monitor, then instrument readings corresponding to the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications should be calculated and defined as EALs. In some accident situations, it may not be possible to confirm or quantify the hazardous material release. However, if a readily recognizable event or occurrence (e.g., a structure fire) is determined to have the potential to cause release of hazardous material but the actual release would be impossible to confirm or quantify in a timely manner, then recognition of the event itself (i.e., the fire) becomes the EAL, and classification is based upon the maximum consequences determined in the EPHA. In many cases involving non-radioactive hazardous material in outdoor storage areas, there is no installed instrumentation to detect or quantify a release. As a result, EALs for this type of hazardous material storage are usually stated in terms of the initiating event (such as a vehicle crash or explosion) or the observed release condition (spray from pressurized piping, spilling of liquid), and the resulting event classification is based on the consequences of releasing the maximum quantity of material known to be present. The correlation of EPHA information and data leading to the creation of EALs is briefly discussed in DOE G 151.1-2, Section 2.6.3. 4-20 DOE G 151.1-4 7-11-07 4.6.2 Symptom-Based and Event-Based EALs By custom and usage, EALs that are stated in terms of specific symptoms (or combinations of symptoms) of a degraded safety condition are termed “symptom-based” or “symptomatic.” EALs that are expressed in terms of the occurrence of an event or condition that is generally recognized by the sum of its features and characteristics are described as “event-based.” The distinction is not absolute and some EALs may actually exhibit both qualities. Symptom-based (symptomatic) EALs define the emergency condition in terms of one or more facts or observations, such as instrument readings or alarms. By definition, existence of the “symptom” is sufficient basis for declaring an emergency and the emergency needs to be declared if the symptom is observed. It is not necessary for the person making the classification decision to know anything about the underlying cause or the sequence of events that produced the symptom. In general, symptom-based EALs are most applicable to well-instrumented and more complex process facilities. The “symptoms” may indicate actual release of hazardous material or the actual or impending failure of barriers or controls that keep such materials in a safe condition. Using symptomatic EALs, the classification decision can be reached by simply comparing the observed “symptom” (e.g., alarm, instrument reading, and equipment status) to the EAL. No additional interpretation or understanding of the underlying cause or sequence of events is required. Event-based EALs are stated in terms of events or conditions that are recognized by the sum of their features, indications and characteristics (e.g., a “major earthquake” or “ventilation system upset”). To apply such an EAL, the user should assess all the observed facts/indications in the context of a written definition or common understanding (the “institutional knowledge”) of the event addressed by the EAL. The user needs to decide if the “event,” as represented by the sum of its indications, corresponds to the intent of the EAL. For event-based EALs, the degree to which the “event” is expected to degrade the safety of hazardous materials will determine the emergency class. Safety degradation may result from the ev