DOE O 420.1C Chg 2 (MinChg), Facility Safety
Functional areas: Facility Safety, Requires Crosswalk When Revised, Safety, Security
The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. This Page Change is limited in scope to changes necessary to invoke DOE-STD-1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, and revised DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis as required methods. Supersedes DOE O 420.1C Chg1 (PgChg).
Version history and related documents
Superseded by
A newer version replaces this document.
- DOE O 420.1C Chg 3 (LtdChg)Facility Safety (Nov 14, 2019)
Supersedes
Earlier documents this one replaced.
- DOE O 420.1C Chg 1 (PgChg)Facility Safety (Jul 26, 2018)
Document text
Text extracted from the attached file. Refer to the original document for the authoritative version.
Section 1
U.S. Department of Energy MINOR CHANGE
Washington, DC
Approved: 12-4-2012
Chg 2 (MinChg): 7-26-2018
SUBJECT: MINOR CHANGE TO DOE O 420.1C, FACILITY SAFETY
1. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES. This Order change updates required implementation
methods, in the form of invoked DOE technical standards: (1) DOE-STD-1189-2016,
Integration of Safety into the Design Process; (2) DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and
Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents; (3)
DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for
DOE Facilities; and (4) DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations
at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities
In addition, this change updates the Order to be consistent with DOE O 251.1D,
Departmental Directives Program, dated 01-17-17, and adds a summary of invoked
standards. This change also clarifies relief provisions for invoked and applicable
technical standards, and makes other clarifications and updates based on user feedback to
improve implementation effectiveness.
2. LOCATIONS OF CHANGES:
Page Paragraph Changed To
Gen References to DOE-STD-1189-
2008
DOE-STD-1189-2016
Gen References to DOE-STD-1104-
2014
DOE-STD-1104-2016
Gen References to DOE-STD-1020-
2012
DOE-STD-1020-2016
Gen References to DOE-STD-3007-
2007
DOE-STD-3007-2017
Gen References to DOE-STD-1066-
2012
DOE-STD-1066-2016
Gen References to DOE-STD-1073-
2003
DOE-STD-1073-2016
Gen 6 Added. Section 6. INVOKED STANDARDS
Gen 7 Added. Section 7 APPLICABLE
STANDARDS
Gen Organizational Titles Reflect their current version.
Gen References Reflect their current version.
Gen Miscellaneous edits for clarification.
DOE O 420.1C
Page Paragraph Changed To
1 3.a. Departmental Applicability. This
Order applies to all DOE elements
with responsibility for design,
construction, management,
operation, decontamination,
decommissioning, or demolition of
government-owned or
government-leased facilities and
onsite contractor-leased facilities
used for DOE mission purposes.
Departmental Applicability. This Order
applies to all DOE elements with
responsibility for design, construction,
management, operation,
decontamination, decommissioning, or
demolition of government-owned or
government-leased facilities and
contractor-leased facilities used for
DOE mission purposes.
2 3.b. Added. For leased facilities that are not nuclear
hazard category 1, 2, or 3 facilities, the
requirements of the CRD apply to the
extent determined by the DOE Head of
Field Element.
Page Paragraph Changed To
2 3.c.(1) Requests for equivalencies and
exemptions to the requirements of
this Order are processed in
accordance with DOE O 251.1C,
Departmental Directives Program,
dated 01-15-09. Central Technical
Authority (or designee)
concurrence is required for both
exemptions and equivalencies to
this Order for nuclear facilities.
(Note: This includes exemptions to
DOE technical standards and
industry codes, and standards
required by this Order.)
Section 2
Requests for equivalencies and
exemptions to the requirements of this
Order are processed in accordance with
DOE O 251.1D, Departmental
Directives Program. Central
Technical Authority (or designee)
concurrence is required for both
exemptions and equivalencies to the
requirements of this Order for nuclear
facilities. Because this Order affects
nuclear safety, requests for advice from
the Office of Primary Interest (i.e.,
Office of Nuclear Safety) on proposed
equivalencies and exemptions for
nuclear facilities should allow 45 days,
in accordance with DOE O 251.1D.
(Note: This paragraph applies to
requirements of this Order related to
DOE technical standards and industry
codes and standards that are invoked as
required methods by this Order. If
such invoked technical standards and
industry codes include provisions for
relief, those provisions govern.
Authority to review and approve
exemptions and equivalencies may be
delegated in accordance with DOE O
450.2, Integrated Safety Management,
Appendix A, “Delegations of
Authority to Perform Safety
Management Functions;” such
delegations are encouraged whenever
the field element has sufficient staff
and expertise to oversee the subject
matter.)
Page Paragraph Changed To
4 4.g. Direct its contractors, as
applicable, to use DOE-STD-3009-
2014, Preparation of Nonreactor
Nuclear Facility Documented
Safety Analysis, for preparing
documented safety analyses, when
the DOE-STD-3009 method is
used to satisfy 10 Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 830,
Nuclear Safety Management,
requirements for new DOE non-
reactor nuclear facilities and major
modifications to existing DOE
non-reactor nuclear facilities [note:
for such major modifications to
existing non-reactor nuclear
facilities, the appropriate
Secretarial Officer, with
concurrence by the applicable
Central Technical Authority, may
approve use of DOE-STD-3009-
94];
Direct its contractors, as applicable, to
use DOE-STD-3009-2014,
Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear
Facility Documented Safety Analysis,
for preparing documented safety
analyses (DSAs), when the DOE-STD-
3009 method is used to satisfy 10 Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830,
Nuclear Safety Management,
requirements for new DOE non-reactor
nuclear facilities and major
modifications to existing DOE non-
reactor nuclear facilities. The
appropriate Head of Departmental
Element, or designee, with concurrence
by the applicable Central Technical
Authority, may approve use of DOE-
STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for
U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety
Analyses, Chg. Notice 3, for major
modifications to existing non-reactor
nuclear facilities, with the condition
that the approach to chemical safety
and worker safety is consistent with
that described in Appendices B and C
of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration
of Safety into the Design Process.
4 4.h. Direct its contractors, as
applicable, to use DOE-STD-3009-
2014, for reviewing and revising
applicable documented safety
analyses, when the DOE-STD-
3009 method is used to satisfy 10
C.F.R. Part 830 requirements for
existing DOE non-reactor nuclear
facilities that have mitigated off-
site dose estimates greater than 25
rem;
Direct its contractors, as applicable, to
carry out the analysis prescribed in
Section 3.3.1 of DOE-STD-3009-2014
pertaining to “Existing Facilities with
Mitigated Offsite Consequence
Estimates over the EG,” and include
the results of this analysis in applicable
DSAs for existing DOE nuclear
facilities and activities, whenever the
safety analysis concludes that the
mitigated off-site dose consequences
for one or more accident scenarios
exceed the Evaluation Guideline of 25
rem.
Section 3
Att. 1
Pg. 1
Att. 1, 1.c. Added. For leased facilities that are not nuclear
hazard category 1, 2, or 3 facilities, the
requirements of this paragraph apply to
the extent determined by the DOE
Head of Field Element.
Page Paragraph Changed To
Att. 1
Pg. 2
Att. 1, 1.f. DOE-STD-3009-2014 must be
used for existing DOE non-reactor
nuclear facilities that use the DOE-
STD-3009 method to satisfy 10
C.F.R. 830 requirements when
those facilities have mitigated off-
site dose estimates greater than 25
rem.
Contractors must carry out the analysis
prescribed in Section 3.3.1 of DOE-
STD-3009-2014 and include the results
of this analysis in applicable DSAs for
existing DOE nuclear facilities and
activities whenever the safety analysis
concludes that the mitigated off-site
dose consequences for one or more
accident scenarios exceed the
Evaluation Guideline of 25 rem.
Att. 1
Pg. 2
Att. 1, 2.a. Requests for equivalencies and
exemptions to the requirements of
this attachment are processed in
accordance with DOE O 251.1C,
Departmental Directives Program,
dated 01-15-09. For such
equivalencies and exemptions,
DOE O 251.1C requires approval,
in consultation with the Office of
Primary Interest, by the program
secretarial officer or designee, or
in the case of NNSA, by the
administrator or designee.
Requests for equivalencies and
exemptions must be provided to
the responsible contracting officer
for further processing. This
includes exemptions to applicable
requirements in DOE technical
standards and industry codes and
standards required by DOE O
420.1C.
Requests for equivalencies and
exemptions to the requirements of this
attachment are processed in accordance
with DOE O 251.1D, Departmental
Directives Program. For such
equivalencies and exemptions, DOE O
251.1D requires approval, in
consultation with the Office of Primary
Interest, by the responsible Head of
Departmental Element or designee, or
in the case of NNSA, by the
Administrator or designee. Because
this Order affects nuclear safety,
requests for advice from the Office of
Primary Interest (i.e., Office of Nuclear
Safety) on proposed equivalencies and
exemptions for nuclear facilities should
allow 45 days, in accordance with DOE
O 251.1D. Requests for equivalencies
and exemptions to the requirements of
this attachment must be provided to the
responsible contracting officer to
facilitate DOE review. (Note: The
requirements in this paragraph also
address the requirements of this
attachment, and those in Attachments 2
and 3, that relate to DOE technical
standards and industry codes and
standards that are invoked as required
methods.)
Att. 2
Pg I-3
Att. 2, Ch.
I,
3.b.(3)(c)
Alternate confinement approaches
may be acceptable if a technical
evaluation demonstrates that the
alternate confinement approach
results in very high assurance of
the confinement of radioactive
materials.
Alternate confinement approaches may
be acceptable if a technical evaluation
demonstrates either that the alternate
confinement approach results in very
high assurance of the confinement of
radioactive materials or that an active
confinement system provides no
benefits.
Page Paragraph Changed To
Att. 2
Pg I-3
Att. 2, Ch.
I,
3.b.(3)(c)
Added. Some facilities where the only
radioactive hazard/material is tritium
have determined there is no benefit
from an active confinement ventilation
system.
Att. 2
Pg. I-
5
Att. 2, Ch.
I, 3.b.(9)
Section 4
New DOE nuclear reactors must
comply with the requirements of
this attachment, as well as the
design requirements of DOE O
5480.30 Chg 1, Nuclear Reactor
Safety Design Criteria, dated 01-
19-93.
Deleted.
Att. 2
Pg. I-
5
Att. 2, Ch.
I, 3.b.(9)
(10) Critical experiments facilities
must be designed and operated in
accordance with American
National Standards Institute
(ANSI) and the American Nuclear
Society (ANS) standards,
ANSI/ANS-1-2000, Conduct of
Critical Experiments, or
ANSI/ANS-14.1-2004, Operation
of Fast Pulse Reactors.
(9) Critical experiments facilities must
be designed and operated in
accordance with applicable American
National Standards Institute (ANSI)
and the American Nuclear Society
(ANS) standards. ANSI/ANS-1-2000
(R2012), Conduct of Critical
Experiments, and
ANSI/ANS-14.1-2004 (R2014),
Operation of Fast Pulse Reactors, are
two such standards that may be
applicable.
Att. 2
Pg.
II-1
Att. 2, Ch.
II, 2.
This chapter applies to
organizations that have
responsibility for the design,
construction, maintenance, or
operation of government-owned or
government-leased facilities and
on-site contractor-leased facilities
used for DOE mission purposes.
For leased facilities that are not
nuclear hazard category 1, 2, or 3
facilities, the design requirements
of Section 3.c of this chapter apply
to the extent determined by the
field element.
This chapter applies to organizations
that have responsibility for the design,
construction, maintenance, or operation
of government-owned or
government-leased facilities and
contractor-leased facilities used for
DOE mission purposes. For leased
facilities that are not nuclear hazard
category 1, 2, or 3 facilities, the
requirements of this chapter apply to
the extent determined by the DOE
Head of Field Element.
Page Paragraph Changed To
Att. 2
Pg.
II-1
Att. 2, Ch.
II, 3.a.(2)
The applicable building code and
National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) codes and
standards must be identified in the
fire protection and emergency
response programs. (Note: see
Attachment 1, Section 2 for
obtaining equivalencies and
exemptions to the applicable codes
and standards).
The codes and standards determined to
be applicable, including DOE technical
standards, the building code, National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
codes and standards, and other industry
codes and standards, must be identified
in the fire protection and emergency
response programs. The fire protection
and emergency response programs may
specify provisions for relief
(exemptions and equivalencies) from
identified, applicable fire protection
codes and standards; otherwise, see
Attachment 1, Section 2 for relief
provisions.
Att. 2
Pg.
II-2
Att. 2, Ch.
II, 3.b.(2)
Added. Fire Protection Methods. Fire
Protection Programs must describe the
methods used to implement the
requirements of this chapter.
DOE-STD-1066-2016 is the applicable
fire protection standard for use at DOE
facilities. [Note: Relief provisions for
applicable fire protection standards are
described in Section 3.a.(2) above.]
Att. 2
Pg.
II-7
Att. 2, Ch.
II, 3.h.
Specific Fire Protection Program
Criteria. DOE-STD-1066-2012
provides acceptable methods for
implementing the requirements in
DOE O 420.1C; other methods
may be acceptable. Any alternate
approach must provide an
equivalent level of safety.
Deleted; see 3.b.(2)
Att. 2
Ch. II
Att. 2, Ch.
II, Gen.
Fire Protection Thresholds in 2012
Dollars
Fire Protection Thresholds in 2018
Dollars
Att. 2
Pg
Section 5
IV-2
Att. 2, Ch.
IV, 2.
Added. For leased facilities that are not nuclear
hazard category 1, 2, or 3 facilities, the
requirements of this chapter apply to
the extent determined by the DOE
Head of Field Element.
Page Paragraph Changed To
Att. 2
Pg
IV-2
Att. 2, Ch.
IV, 3.d.(1)
Existing facility or site NPH
assessments must be reviewed at
least every 10 years for any
significant changes in data,
criteria, and assessment methods
that would warrant updating the
assessments. Sections 9.0 and 9.2
of DOE-STD-1020-2012 contain
criteria and guidance for
performing these reviews. The
review results, along with any
recommended update actions, must
be submitted to the head of the
field element for approval. If no
update is necessary, this result
must be documented following the
review.
Existing facility or site NPH
assessments must be reviewed at least
once every ten years and whenever
significant changes in NPH data,
criteria, and assessment methods
warrant updating the assessments.
Section 9.2 of DOE-STD-1020-2016
contains criteria and guidance for
performing these reviews. The review
results, along with any recommended
update actions, must be submitted to
the DOE Head of Field Element for
approval. If no update is necessary,
this result must be documented
following the review.
Att.2
Pg V-
3
Att. 2, Ch.
V,
3.c.(1)(e)
…obsolescence. …aging degradation and technical
obsolescence.
Att. 3
Pg. 2
Att. 3,
3.a.(2)(a)
The single failure criterion,
requirements, and design analysis
identified in Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
standard (Std) 379-2000, IEEE
Standard Application of the Single-
Failure Criterion to Nuclear
Power Generating Station Safety
Systems, must be applied to safety-
class SSCs during the design
process as the primary method of
achieving reliability. American
National Standards Institute
(ANSI)/American Nuclear Society
(ANS) 58.9, Single Failure
Criteria for Light Water Reactor
Safety-Related Fluid Systems, may
be used in defining the scope of
active safety-class mechanical
SSCs.
The single failure criterion,
requirements, and design analysis
identified in Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
379-2014, IEEE Standard for
Application of the Single-Failure
Criterion to Nuclear Power
Generating Station Safety Systems,
must be applied to safety class SSCs
during the design process as the
primary method of achieving
reliability, unless another applicable
standard is approved by DOE in
accordance with the process for
obtaining DOE review and approval of
the applicability of codes and standards
as described in DOE-Standard (STD)-
1189-2016. ANSI/ANS 58.9-2002
(R2015), Single Failure Criteria for
LWR Safety-Related Fluid Systems,
may be used in defining the scope of
active safety class mechanical SSCs.
Page Paragraph Changed To
Att. 3
Pg. 2
Att. 3,
3.a.(3)(a)
The requirements of IEEE Std 323-
2003, IEEE Standard Criteria for
Qualifying Class IE Equipment for
Nuclear Power Generating
Stations, or other applicable
standards, must be used to ensure
environmental qualifications of
safety-class SSCs.
The requirements of IEEE 323-2003
(R2008), IEEE Standard for
Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for
Nuclear Power Generating Stations,
must be used to ensure environmental
qualifications of safety class SSCs,
unless another applicable standard is
approved by DOE in accordance with
the process for obtaining DOE review
and approval of the applicability of
codes and standards as described in
DOE-STD-1189-2016.
Section 6
Att. 3
Pg. 3
Att. 3,
3.a.(5)(b)
IEEE Std 384-2008, IEEE
Standard Criteria for
Independence of Class IE
Equipment and Circuits, or other
applicable standards must be used
for physical and electrical
separation methods including the
use of separation distance, barriers,
electrical isolation devices, or any
combination thereof.
IEEE 384-2008, IEEE Standard
Criteria for Independence of Class IE
Equipment and Circuits, must be used
for physical and electrical separation
methods, including the use of
separation distance, barriers, electrical
isolation devices, or any combination
thereof, unless another applicable
standard is approved by DOE in
accordance with the process for
obtaining DOE review and approval of
the applicability of codes and standards
as described in DOE-STD-1189-2016.
Page Paragraph Changed To
Att. 3
Pg. 4
Att. 3, 3.b.
Before using these codes and
standards, their application to
specific DOE design(s) must be
reviewed. Once a code or standard
is identified as applicable, the
applicable requirements (i.e.,
mandatory statements) must be
applied in the design. The process
for obtaining relief (i.e.,
equivalencies or exemptions) from
applicable requirements in
applicable DOE technical
standards and industry codes and
standards is described in
Attachment 1 of DOE O 420.1C.
(Note: Relief is not necessary for
requirements within an applicable
industry code or standard where
the requirements are not relevant to
the design or construction.)
Before using these codes and
standards, their application to specific
DOE design(s) must be reviewed.
Once a code or standard is identified as
applicable, the applicable requirements
(i.e., mandatory statements) must be
applied in the design. The process for
obtaining DOE review and approval of
the applicability of codes and standards
is described in DOE-STD-1189-2016.
The Safety Design Strategy developed
in accordance with DOE-STD-1189-
2016 may be used to specify provisions
for relief (exemptions and
equivalencies) from identified,
applicable design and construction
codes and standards. If the Safety
Design Strategy is not used to specify
relief provisions, the process for
obtaining relief (i.e., equivalencies or
exemptions) from applicable
requirements in applicable DOE
technical standards and industry codes
and standards is described in
Attachment 1 of DOE O 420.1C.
(Note: Relief is not necessary for
requirements within an applicable
industry code or standard where the
requirements are not relevant to the
design or construction. Relief from
Order 420.1C requirements, including
requirements to follow invoked
standards, would still be required to
follow Attachment 1, Section 2.a,
unless the requirements specifically
relate to satisfying DOE technical
standards and industry codes and
standards that have been identified as
applicable.)
U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C. DOE O 420.1C
Approved: 12-4-2012
Chg 1 (PgChg): 2-27-2015
Chg 2 (MinChg): 7-26-2018
SUBJECT: FACILITY SAFETY
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish facility and programmatic safety requirements for the
Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), for:
a. Nuclear safety design criteria;
b. Fire protection;
c. Criticality safety;
d. Natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation; and,
e. Cognizant system engineer (CSE) program.
Facility safety requirements for explosive, chemical, and industrial hazards are contained
in other DOE rules and directives.
Section 7
2. CANCELLATIONS. This Order (O) cancels: DOE O 420.1B, Chg. 1, Facility Safety;
DOE Guide (G) 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for
DOE Nuclear Facilities and Nonnuclear Facilities; and, DOE G 420.1-3, Implementation
Guide for DOE Fire Protection and Emergency Services Programs for Use with
DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety. Cancellation of a directive does not, by itself, modify, or
otherwise affect any contractual or regulatory obligation to comply with the directive.
Contractor Requirements Documents (CRDs) that have been incorporated into a contract
remain in effect throughout the term of the contract unless, and until, the contract or
regulatory commitment is modified to either eliminate requirements that are no longer
applicable or to substitute a new set of requirements.
3. APPLICABILITY.
a. Departmental Applicability. This Order applies to all DOE elements with
responsibility for design, construction, management, operation, decontamination,
decommissioning, or demolition of government-owned or government-leased
facilities and contractor-leased facilities used for DOE mission purposes.
The NNSA Administrator will ensure that NNSA employees comply with their
respective responsibilities under this directive. Nothing in this Order will be
construed to interfere with the NNSA Administrator’s authority under section
3212(d) of Public Law (Pub. L.) 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, to establish Administration-specific policies, unless
disapproved by the Secretary.
AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY:
www.directives.doe.gov Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security
http://www.directives.doe.gov/
2 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
b. DOE Contractors. Except for the equivalencies and exemptions in Section 3.c,
the CRD (see Attachment 1 of this Order) sets forth requirements of this
Order that will apply to contracts that include the CRD. The CRD, or its
requirements, must be inserted into all contracts that require design,
construction, management, operation, decontamination, decommissioning, or
demolition of government-owned and government-leased facilities. For leased
facilities that are not nuclear hazard category 1, 2, or 3 facilities, the
requirements of the CRD apply to the extent determined by the DOE Head of
Field Element.
c. Equivalencies and Exemptions.
(1) Requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the requirements of this
Order are processed in accordance with DOE O 251.1D, Departmental
Directives Program. Central Technical Authority (or designee)
concurrence is required for both exemptions and equivalencies to the
requirements of this Order for nuclear facilities. Because this Order
affects nuclear safety, requests for advice from the Office of Primary
Interest (i.e., Office of Nuclear Safety) on proposed equivalencies and
exemptions for nuclear facilities should allow 45 days, in accordance
with DOE O 251.1D. (Note: This paragraph applies to requirements of
this Order related to DOE technical standards and industry codes and
standards that are invoked as required methods by this Order. If such
invoked technical standards and industry codes include provisions for
relief, those provisions govern. Authority to review and approve
exemptions and equivalencies may be delegated in accordance with
DOE O 450.2, Integrated Safety Management, Appendix A,
“Delegations of Authority to Perform Safety Management Functions;”
such delegations are encouraged whenever the field element has
sufficient staff and expertise to oversee the subject matter.)
Section 8
(2) Equivalencies to DOE technical standards, as well as industry codes,
and standards, determined to be applicable to the facility design or
operations must demonstrate an equivalent level of safety (i.e., meets
or exceeds the level of protection) and must be approved by the DOE
Head of Field Element. The DOE Head of Field Element must follow
provisions for relief if specified in DOE technical standards and
industry codes and standards. (Note: Different codes and standards
may use different terminology for relief; e.g., for building code
applications, the terms ‘modification’ or ‘alternative’ may be
substituted for ‘equivalency’.)
(3) Equivalency. In accordance with the responsibilities and authorities
assigned by Executive Order (E.O.) 12344, Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program, codified in 50 United States Code (U.S.C.) sections 2406
3 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
and 2511, and to ensure consistency through the joint Navy/DOE
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, the Deputy Administrator for
Naval Reactors (Director) will implement and oversee requirements
and practices pertaining to this Directive for activities under the
Director’s cognizance, as deemed appropriate.
(4) Exemption. This Order does not apply to activities that are regulated
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or a state under an
agreement with the NRC, including activities certified by the NRC
under Section 1701 of Pub. L. 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended. DOE orders, regulations, technical standards, and/or
guidelines will apply to activities where the NRC does not exercise
regulatory authority or by agreement with NRC.
(5) Exemption. This Order does not apply to transportation activities that
are regulated by the Department of Transportation.
(6) Exemption. The following portions of this Order do not apply to
accelerator facilities that are covered by DOE O 420.2C, Safety of
Accelerator Facilities: (1) nuclear safety design requirements, and (2)
system engineer program requirements.
(7) Exemption. Specific, individual requirements of this Order do not apply to
Nuclear Explosive and Weapons Surety Program activities, including
transportation activities, for the prevention of nuclear detonations if
application of such specific requirements would compromise the safety
and effectiveness of these activities. In the event of such conflicts between
specific requirements of this Order and those of DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear
Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, or DOE O 452.2E, Nuclear
Explosive Safety, the related requirements of these latter weapons and
explosives safety directives take precedence.
(8) Exemption. This Order does not apply to the Bonneville Power
Administration, in accordance with Secretarial Delegation Order Number
00-033.00C to the Bonneville Power Administrator and Chief Executive
Officer.
(9) Exemption. The design requirements in this Order do not apply to projects
that have reached a high level of design maturity, as determined by the
appropriate Head of Departmental Element. Examples of projects that
have reached a high level of design maturity include projects that have
completed the Critical Decision (CD)-2 milestone or those projects that
have completed the CD-1 milestone with a high level of design maturity.
This exemption is provided to control project costs; new design
requirements in this Order may be considered for inclusion where they
provide significant benefits and/or net cost savings.
4 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
Section 9
(10) Exemption. This Order does not apply to off-site office facilities that are
owned or leased by the General Services Administration.
d. Government-Owned, Government-Operated Facilities. The CRD (see Attachment
1 of this Order) sets forth requirements that must also be applied to DOE
government-owned, government-operated facilities. Government operators must
comply with the requirements in the CRD, as set forth in Attachment 1 of this
Order.
4. REQUIREMENTS. DOE Elements must:
a. Approve and oversee contractor programs, as specified in Section 5 of this Order.
b. Implement the requirements in Attachment 1 of this Order for government-owned
government-operated facilities.
c. Provide oversight of the contractor CSE program and the operability of safety
systems under the purview of the CSE program.
d. Document any operational responsibilities that are assigned to the contractor
regarding the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) for matters involving fire
protection as defined by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes.
e. Document any authorities associated with the building code official, as defined
in DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection, that are assigned to the contractor.
f. Establish an integrated site-wide wildland fire management plan, consistent with
the relevant portions of the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy.
g. Direct its contractors, as applicable, to use DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation
of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis, for preparing
documented safety analyses (DSAs), when the DOE-STD-3009 method is used
to satisfy 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety
Management, requirements for new DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities and
major modifications1 to existing DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities. The
appropriate Head of Departmental Element, or designee, with concurrence by the
applicable Central Technical Authority, may approve use of DOE-STD-3009-94,
Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility
Documented Safety Analyses, Chg. Notice 3, for major modifications to existing
non-reactor nuclear facilities, with the condition that the approach to chemical
1 10 CFR 830.3 defines major modification as follows: “Major modification means a modification to a DOE nuclear
facility that is completed on or after April 9, 2001 that substantially changes the existing safety basis for the
facility.” DOE-STD-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, provides a process to use to identify
major modifications and examples of major modifications.
5 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
safety and worker safety is consistent with that described in Appendices B and C
of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.
h. Direct its contractors, as applicable, to carry out the analysis prescribed in
Section 3.3.1 of DOE-STD-3009-2014 pertaining to “Existing Facilities with
Mitigated Offsite Consequence Estimates over the EG,” and include the results
of this analysis in applicable DSAs for existing DOE nuclear facilities and
activities, whenever the safety analysis concludes that the mitigated off-site dose
consequences for one or more accident scenarios exceed the Evaluation
Guideline of 25 rem.
i. Review and approve safety basis and safety design basis documents in
accordance with DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear
Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES.
Section 10
a. Heads of Departmental Elements, and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration.
(1) Ensure that the requirements of this Order and the CRD are implemented
for facilities, activities, or programs under their cognizance. Review and,
where justified, approve requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the
requirements of this Order, processed in accordance with
DOE O 251.1D.
(2) In accordance with Section 3.c.(1) of this Order, approve the basis for not
including multiple physical barriers to prevent or mitigate the unintended
release of radioactive materials to the environment, as part of the hazard
category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility designs, where justified by sound
technical basis.
(3) Review and approve safety basis and safety design basis documents in
accordance with DOE-STD-1104-2016.
b. Associate Under Secretary, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security.
(1) Develops and maintains policy, requirements, guidance, and technical
standards relating to this Order and the CRD.
(2) Provides technical advice and assistance on the implementation of policy,
requirements, guidance, and technical standards related to this Order and
the CRD.
(3) Provides comments on requests for exemptions from requirements of this
Order.
6 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
c. Director, Office of Enterprise Assessments.
Plans and conducts independent oversight reviews of implementation of the
requirements of this Order and the CRD (see DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of
Department of Energy Oversight Policy, and DOE O 227.1A, Independent
Oversight Program, for details).
d. Heads of Field Elements.
(1) Ensure that the facilities, activities, and programs under their purview
operate in compliance with the requirements of this Order and the CRD.
(2) Identify contracts to which the CRD applies and notify contracting officers
when contracts are affected by this Order.
(3) Review and, where justified, approve equivalencies to DOE technical
standards and industry codes and standards determined to be applicable to
the facility design or operations.
(4) Approve contractor emergency services organization baseline needs
assessments (BNAs) that meet the requirements in Attachment 2, Chapter
II, Section 3.e.(1) of this Order.
(5) Approve contractor fire protection programs (this may be accomplished in
conjunction with 10 CFR Part 851, Worker Health and Safety Program)
and Wildland Fire Management Plans.
(6) Fulfill the roles and responsibilities for the AHJ for matters involving fire
protection, as defined by the NFPA, including documentation of any
delegation or assignment of related responsibilities (See Section 5.2.4 of
DOE-STD-1066-2016, for further discussion of delegations).
(7) Fulfill the roles and responsibilities for the building code official, as
defined in DOE-STD-1066-2016, including documentation of any
delegation or assignment of related responsibilities.
(8) Perform responsibilities of ‘owner,’ or other equivalent term in the
application of DOE technical standards or industry codes and standards,
including documentation of any delegation or assignment of related
responsibilities.
(9) Approve contractor’s criticality safety program documentation, ensure that
it meets requirements in Chapter III of Attachment 2 of this Order. (This
may be accomplished through the safety basis documentation approval
process.)
7 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
(10) Approve periodic NPH assessment evaluations, any recommended update
actions, and any recommended upgrade plans, in accordance with Chapter
IV of Attachment 2 of this Order.
Section 11
(11) Provide oversight for contractor CSE programs and the operability of
associated safety systems.
(12) Consistent with DOE O 226.1B, establish and implement an appropriate
self-assessment and oversight program for the elements of this Order.
(13) When delegated, review and approve safety basis and safety design basis
documents in accordance with DOE-STD-1104-2016.
e. Contracting Officers.
Incorporate the CRD, or its requirements, into affected contracts and procurement
requests in a timely manner when notified.
f. Central Technical Authorities.
(1) Review and, where justified, concur on requests for equivalencies and
exemptions to the requirements of this Order, processed in accordance
with DOE O 251.1D.
(2) Provide support, as requested by the DOE Heads of Field Element, on
review of equivalencies to DOE technical standards and industry codes
and standards determined to be applicable to the facility design or
operations.
6. INVOKED STANDARDS. The following DOE technical standards and industry
standards are invoked as required methods in this Order in accordance with the
applicability and conditions described within this Order. Any technical standard or
industry standard that is mentioned in or referenced by this Order, but is not included in
the list below, is not invoked by this Order. Note: DOE O 251.1D, Appendix J provides a
definition for “invoked technical standard.”
a. DOE Standard (STD)-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility
Documented Safety Analysis. This DOE technical standard is required to be used
for specified new non-reactor hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and
major modifications to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 non-reactor nuclear facilities.
In addition, Section 3.3.1 of this technical standard is required to be used for
existing DOE nuclear facilities that have mitigated off-site dose estimates greater
than 25 rem. See Section 4 and Attachment 1 for specific requirements.
b. DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and
Safety Design Basis Documents. This DOE technical standard is required to be
used by DOE personnel for review and approval of safety basis and safety design
basis documents. See Section 4 for specific requirements.
8 DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
c. DOE-STD-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. This DOE
technical standard is required to be used for development and integration of safety
analysis and supporting design for new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear
facilities and major modifications to existing hazard category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear
facilities. See Attachment 2, Chapter I for specific requirements.
d. DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at DOE
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. This DOE technical standard is required to be used
for conduct of criticality safety evaluations at DOE facilities and activities with
the potential for inadvertent criticalities, unless another documented method is
approved by DOE. See Attachment 2, Chapter III for specific requirements.
e. DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design
Criteria for DOE Facilities. This DOE technical standard is required to be used
for developing the design of new facilities and major modifications. See
Attachment 2, Chapter IV for specific requirements.
Section 12
f. American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society
(ANS)-8 Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards. This set of industry standards is
required to be satisfied by Criticality Safety Programs for facilities and activities
with the potential for inadvertent criticalities, unless otherwise modified and
approved by DOE. See Attachment 2, Chapter III for specific requirements.
g. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 379-2014, IEEE Standard
for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating
Station Safety Systems. This industry standard is required to be applied to the
design of safety-class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for new
nuclear facilities and major modifications, unless another applicable standard is
approved by DOE. See Attachment 3 for specific requirements.
h. IEEE 323-2003 (R2008), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for
Nuclear Power Generating Stations. This industry standard is required to be used
to ensure environmental qualifications of safety-class SSCs for new nuclear
facilities and major modifications, unless another applicable standard is approved
by DOE. See Attachment 3 for specific requirements.
i. IEEE 384-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class IE Equipment
and Circuits. This industry standard is required to be used for new nuclear
facilities and major modifications for physical and electrical separation methods,
including the use of separation distance, barriers, electrical isolation devices, or
any combination thereof, unless another applicable standard is approved by DOE.
See Attachment 3 for specific requirements.
7. APPLICABLE STANDARDS. An applicable DOE technical standard or industry code
or standard is one for which it has been determined by the contractor that it will be used
or will be applied for a specific facility/site to meet the design, construction, and
DOE O 420.1C 9 (and 10)
12-4-2012
operational requirements described in this Order. This Order provides the process for
determining which standards will be applicable (as described in the Attachments to this
Order). DOE approves the contractor’s list of applicable DOE technical standards or
industry codes or standards via different means, including approval of safety design
documents, the fire protection program, and inclusion of the DOE technical standards or
industry codes or standards in the contract.
Once a standard is identified as applicable, this Order requires that the applicable
requirements of the applicable standards be followed unless relief is obtained. The
provisions for relief (exemptions and equivalencies) for applicable standards are different
than the relief provisions for invoked standards, and are described in Section 3.c and
Attachment 1, Section 2. Together, the invoked standards, the applicable standards, and
any other applicable DOE requirement documents, along with any exemptions and
equivalencies, make up the “Code of Record” for a given project or design, and reflect
DOE’s commitment to standard-based safety management.
8. REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS. References and acronyms can be found in
Attachment 4 of this Order.
9. CONTACT. Address inquiries to the Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security;
Office of Nuclear Safety, 301-903-3331.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
DAN R. BROUILLETTE
Deputy Secretary
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 1
12-4-2012 Page 1
CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
DOE O 420.1C, FACILITY SAFETY
Section 13
This Contractor Requirements Document (CRD) includes requirements outlined in Attachments
2 and 3 of Department of Energy (DOE) Order (O) 420.1C, Facility Safety, referenced in and
made a part of this CRD, and which provide program requirements and/or information
applicable to contracts in which this CRD is inserted.
1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.
a. This CRD establishes facility safety requirements for design, construction,
operation, management, decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition of
DOE sites or facilities. Regardless of the performer of the work, the contractors
are responsible for complying with the requirements of this CRD. The contractors
are responsible for flowing down the requirements of this CRD to subcontractors
at any tier, to the extent necessary, to ensure the contractors’ compliance with the
requirements.
b. Contractors must satisfy the requirements set forth in Attachments 2 and 3 of
DOE O 420.1C.
c. For design and construction activities, contractors must identify the applicable
industry codes and standards, including the International Building Code (IBC),
and the applicable DOE requirements and technical standards. If approved by the
responsible DOE Head of the Field Element, state, regional, and local building
codes may be used in lieu of the IBC upon contractor submission of
documentation providing a basis that demonstrates that implementation of the
substituted code for the specific application will meet or exceed the level of
protection that would have been provided by the IBC. Additionally,
DOE O 413.3B Chg. 5, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of
Capital Assets, requires nuclear projects to establish and maintain a Code of
Record (COR) early in project design for identifying applicable industry codes
and standards. For leased facilities that are not nuclear hazard category 1, 2, or 3
facilities, the requirements of this paragraph apply to the extent determined by the
DOE Head of Field Element.
d. Contractors must satisfy the requirements (i.e., mandatory statements) in DOE
technical standards and industry codes and standards that are identified as
applicable in accordance with Section 1.c. above, unless relief is approved in
accordance with Section 2, below.
e. When the DOE-STD-3009 methodology is used to satisfy 10 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, contractors must
prepare Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) in accordance with
DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented
Safety Analysis, for new DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities and major
modifications to existing DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities. Note: for such major
Attachment 1 DOE O 420.1C
Page 2 12-4-2012
modifications to existing non-reactor nuclear facilities, the appropriate Head of
Departmental Element, with concurrence by the applicable Central Technical
Authority, may approve use of DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S.
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses,
Chg. Notice 3.
f. Contractors must carry out the analysis prescribed in Section 3.3.1 of
DOE-STD-3009-2014 and include the results of this analysis in applicable DSAs
for existing DOE nuclear facilities and activities whenever the safety analysis
concludes that the mitigated off-site dose consequences for one or more accident
scenarios exceed the Evaluation Guideline of 25 rem.
2. RELIEF FROM REQUIREMENTS, CODES AND STANDARDS.
Section 14
a. Requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the requirements of this attachment
are processed in accordance with DOE O 251.1D, Departmental Directives
Program. For such equivalencies and exemptions, DOE O 251.1D requires
approval, in consultation with the Office of Primary Interest, by the responsible
Head of Departmental Element or designee, or in the case of NNSA, by the
Administrator or designee. Because this Order affects nuclear safety, requests for
advice from the Office of Primary Interest (i.e., Office of Nuclear Safety) on
proposed equivalencies and exemptions for nuclear facilities should allow 45
days, in accordance with DOE O 251.1D. Requests for equivalencies and
exemptions to the requirements of this attachment must be provided to the
responsible contracting officer to facilitate DOE review. (Note: The requirements
in this paragraph also address the requirements of this attachment, and those in
Attachments 2 and 3, that relate to DOE technical standards and industry codes
and standards that are invoked as required methods.)
b. Equivalencies to DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards
determined to be applicable to the facility design or operations must demonstrate
an equivalent level of safety (i.e., meets or exceeds the level of protection) and be
approved by the DOE Head of Field Element or designee.
3. REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS. Attachment 4 of DOE O 420.1C provides a list of
references and acronyms. Reference documents that may be helpful in implementing this
Order include rules, directives, guidance, DOE technical standards, and industry codes
and standards.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page i (and Page ii)
FACILITY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
This attachment provides information and/or requirements associated with the Department of
Energy (DOE) Order (O) 420.1C, Facility Safety, as well as information and/or requirements
applicable to contracts into which the associated Contractor Requirements Document (CRD),
(see Attachment 1 of DOE O 420.1C) is inserted.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page I-1
CHAPTER I. NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for safety design of DOE hazard category 1, 2,
and 3 nuclear facilities to support implementation of DOE Policy (P) 420.1, Department
of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy.2
The requirements of this chapter (and the criteria in Attachment 3 of DOE O 420.1C)
support implementation of the requirements for hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities
in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B,
Safety Basis Requirements.
2. APPLICABILITY.
a. This chapter applies to the design and construction of:
(1) new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, as defined by 10 CFR
Part 830; and
(2) major modifications to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, as
defined in 10 CFR Part 830, that could substantially change the facility
safety basis (Note: See DOE Standard (STD)-1189-2016, Integration of
Safety into the Design Process, for criteria and discussion on major
modifications).
b. This chapter does not impose requirements on existing facilities, except for major
modifications3 to those facilities. The requirements of this chapter may be used to
develop comparisons of existing facilities to the requirements for new facilities, as
one aide to judgment when evaluating the costs and benefits of non-mandatory
upgrades to existing facilities.
Section 15
c. Except for the requirements of Section 3.b.(3), this chapter does not apply to
nuclear deactivation or decontamination and decommissioning activities at
end-of-facility-life if the safety analysis demonstrates that adequate protection is
provided consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 830 through alternate
means and it is not cost beneficial to apply the provisions of this chapter for the
limited remaining life of the activity.
2 DOE’s nuclear safety policy (DOE P 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy) is to design,
construct, operate, and decommission its nuclear facilities in a manner that ensures adequate protection of
workers, the public, and the environment.
3 DOE-STD-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, provides a definition and examples of major
modifications.
Attachment 2
Page I-2
DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. Integration of Safety with Design.
(1) Safety analysis and supporting design must be developed and integrated in
accordance with DOE-STD-1189-2016.
(2) Safety analyses must be used to:
(a) identify safety class and safety significant structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) needed to fulfill the safety functions in order to
prevent and/or mitigate design basis accidents (DBAs), including
natural and man-induced hazards and events;
(b) identify the safety functional requirements of the safety class and
safety significant SSCs; and
(c) identify specific administrative controls (SACs) needed to fulfill
safety functions. (Note: See DOE-STD-1186-2016, Specific
Administrative Controls).
b. Nuclear Facility Design.
(1) The nuclear facility design must include multiple layers of protection (as
part of the design defense-in-depth) to prevent or mitigate the unintended
release of radioactive materials into the environment.
(2) Defense-in-depth must include all of the following:
(a) choosing an appropriate site;
(b) minimizing the quantity of material-at-risk;
(c) applying conservative design margins;
(d) applying quality assurance;
(e) using successive/multiple physical barriers for protection against
radioactive releases (Note: If an exemption to having multiple
barriers is required, it is the responsibility of the Head of
Departmental Element to approve, or disapprove, the exemption for
not including multiple physical barriers);
(f) using multiple means to ensure safety functions are met by—
1 controlling processes;
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page I-3
2 maintaining processes in safe status;
3 providing preventive and/or mitigative controls for
accidents with the potential for radiological releases; and
4 providing means for monitoring facility conditions to
support recovery from upset or accident conditions;
(g) using equipment in combination with administrative controls that—
1 restrict deviation from normal operations;
2 monitor facility conditions during and after an event; and
3 provide for response to accidents to achieve a safe
condition;
(h) providing means to monitor accident releases as required for
emergency response (see DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive
Emergency Management System, for detailed requirements); and
(i) establishing emergency plans for minimizing the effects of an
accident (see DOE O 151.1D for detailed requirements).
Section 16
(3) Hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities with uncontained radioactive
materials (as opposed to materials determined by safety analyses to be
adequately contained within qualified drums, grout, or vitrified materials)
must have the means to confine the uncontained radioactive materials to
minimize their potential release in facility effluents during normal
operations and during and following accidents, up to and including DBAs.
Confinement design must include the following:
(a) For a specific nuclear facility, the number, arrangement, and
characteristics of confinement barriers as determined on a case-by
case basis.
(b) The type, quantity, form, and conditions for dispersing the
radioactive material in the confinement system design.
(c) An active confinement ventilation system as the preferred design
approach for nuclear facilities with potential for radiological
release.4 Alternate confinement approaches may be acceptable if a
technical evaluation demonstrates either that the alternate
confinement approach results in very high assurance of the
4 The safety classification (if any) of the ventilation system is determined by the facility DSA.
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page I-4 12-4-2012
confinement of radioactive materials or that an active confinement
system provides no benefits.
Guidance for confinement ventilation systems and evaluation of
the alternatives is provided in DOE Guide (G) 420.1-1A,
Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for Use with
DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety. Some facilities where the only
radioactive hazard/material is tritium have determined there is no
benefit from an active confinement ventilation system.
(4) Hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities must be designed to:
(a) facilitate safe deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination, and
demolition at the end of facility life, including incorporation of
design considerations during the operational period that facilitate
future decontamination and decommissioning;
(b) facilitate inspections, testing, maintenance, repair, and replacement
of safety SSCs as part of a reliability, maintainability, and
availability program with the objective of maintaining the facility in
a safe state;
(c) keep occupational radiation exposures within regulatory limits, and
as low as reasonably achievable; and
(d) provide hazard controls for prevention and mitigation of hazardous
material releases and for defense in depth, consistent with the
hierarchy described in DOE-STD-1189-2016.
(5) Facility process systems must be designed to minimize waste production
and mixing of radioactive and non-radioactive wastes.
(6) Safety SSCs and safety software must be designed to perform their safety
functions when called upon.
(7) Active safety class systems must be designed to meet single failure5
criterion.
(8) DOE G 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria for Use
with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, provides an acceptable method to
meet the requirements stated in this chapter.
5 IEEE 379-2014, IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station
Safety Systems, provides a definition of the single failure criterion. ANS 58.9-2002 (R2009), Single Failure Criteria
for Light Water Reactor Safety-Related Fluid Systems, provides additional guidance for single failure criteria for
mechanical systems.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page I-5 (and Page I-6)
Section 17
(9) Critical experiments facilities must be designed and operated in
accordance with applicable American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. ANSI/ANS-1-2000
(R2012), Conduct of Critical Experiments, and ANSI/ANS-14.1-2004
(R2014), Operation of Fast Pulse Reactors, are two such standards that
may be applicable.
(10) Facility design must also be integrated with other design requirements, as
applicable, including explosive safety, industrial safety, and nuclear
explosive safety (if applicable).
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page II-1
CHAPTER II. FIRE PROTECTION
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for comprehensive fire protection programs for
DOE facilities and emergency response organizations to:
a. Minimize the likelihood of occurrence of a fire-related event;
b. Minimize the consequence of a fire-related event affecting the public, workers,
environment, property and missions; and
c. Provide a level of safety protection consistent with the “highly protected risk”
class of industrial risks.
2. APPLICABILITY. This chapter applies to organizations that have responsibility for the
design, construction, maintenance, or operation of government-owned or
government-leased facilities and contractor-leased facilities used for DOE mission
purposes. For leased facilities that are not nuclear hazard category 1, 2, or 3 facilities, the
requirements of this chapter apply to the extent determined by the DOE Head of Field
Element. (Note: DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection, provides guidance on a graded
approach to fire protection for leased facilities.)
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. General Fire Protection Program Requirements.
(1) Policy Statement. A policy must be established that affirms the
contractor’s commitment to provide a comprehensive fire protection and
emergency response program that meets the requirements of this chapter,
related DOE directives, and other applicable requirements.
(2) Codes and Standards. The codes and standards determined to be
applicable, including DOE technical standards, the building code, National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards, and other
industry codes and standards, must be identified in the fire protection and
emergency response programs. The fire protection and emergency
response programs may specify provisions for relief (exemptions and
equivalencies) from identified, applicable fire protection codes and
standards; otherwise, see Attachment 1, Section 2 for relief provisions.
(a) Facilities, and major modifications thereto, must be constructed to
meet applicable codes and standards that are in effect when design
criteria are approved (otherwise known as the Code of Record, or
COR). Other facility changes must meet the most recent applicable
codes and standards to the extent determined by the Authority
Having Jurisdiction (AHJ).
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page II-2 12-4-2012
(b) Provisions of subsequent editions of codes or standards
(promulgated after the COR is established) are mandatory only to
the extent that they are explicitly stated to be applicable to existing
facilities.
(c) Conflicts between DOE O 420.1C; NFPA codes and standards; and
the applicable building code must be resolved as follows:
1 Requirements of DOE O 420.1C take precedence over all
NFPA and building code requirements and are subject to the
relief requirements of DOE O 420.1C.
Section 18
2 Conflicts between NFPA requirements and the applicable
building code requirements are resolved by the DOE Head
of Field Element, consistent with DOE-STD-1066-2016,
and in consultation with designated building code and fire
protection subject matter experts.
b. Fire Protection Program Administration.
(1) Documentation. A documented fire protection program that includes the
elements and requirements identified in this chapter for design; operations;
emergency response; fire analysis and assessments; wildland fire; and
specific fire protection program criteria must be developed, implemented,
and maintained by the contractor. Contractor must submit this documented
fire protection program to the DOE Head of Field Element for review and
approval (Note: this may be accomplished in conjunction with submittals
required by 10 CFR Part 851, Worker, Health and Safety Program).
(2) Fire Protection Methods. Fire Protection Programs must describe the
methods used to implement the requirements of this chapter.
DOE-STD-1066-2016 is the applicable fire protection standard for use at
DOE facilities. [Note: Relief provisions for applicable fire protection
standards are described in Section 3.a.(2) above.]
(3) Self-Assessments. A documented comprehensive self-assessment of the
fire protection program must be performed at least every three years, or at
a frequency with appropriate justification approved by the DOE Head of
Field Element.
c. Design.
(1) Design Process. A process must be established to ensure that fire
protection program requirements are documented and incorporated into
plans and specifications for design of new facilities and modifications to
existing facilities.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page II-3
(2) Protection Thresholds6 .
(a) New facilities (non-relocatable) exceeding 5,000 sq. ft. of floor area
must be of Type I or Type II construction, as defined in the
applicable building codes.
(b) Automatic fire suppression systems must be provided throughout
new facilities exceeding 5,000 sq. ft. of floor area or where a
Maximum Possible Fire Loss (MPFL) exceeds $5.9 million (in
2018 dollars7), unless a specific provision of an applicable NFPA
code provides different criteria for coverage (such as elimination of
sprinklers from a small closet).
(c) Automatic fire suppression systems must be provided throughout
facilities in which any of the following conditions exist:
1 where required by safety basis document (for example, to
prevent loss of safety functions or provide
defense-in-depth);
2 significant life safety hazards;
3 where fire may cause unacceptable mission or program
interruption if automatic fire suppression systems are not
provided;
4 where a modification to an existing facility would cause the
MPFL to exceed $5.9 million (in 2018 dollars) for the
facility; or
5 where a modification to an existing facility results in facility
floor area that exceeds 5,000 sq. ft.
(d) For property protection, multiple fire protection approaches, such
as a fire suppression system and a fire detection and alarm system,
must be provided in areas where the MPFL exceeds $177 million
(in 2018 dollars) (refer to DOE-STD-1066-2016).
(e) For property protection, fire areas must be established such that the
MPFL for each fire area does not exceed $412 million (in 2018
6 Some of the requirements in this section on protection thresholds may not apply to portions of subterranean
facilities that otherwise meet the requirements in Appendix D of DOE-STD-1066-2016.
Section 19
7 DOE G 413.3-21 Chg. 1, Cost Estimating Guide, Section 6.4.4 provides guidance on historical cost estimates and
historical cost indexes. To convert 2018 dollar amounts to present value, an applicable historical cost index is
selected, documented, and used, as described in DOE G 413.3-21.
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page II-4 12-4-2012
dollars). Fire walls or other separation approaches may be used to
meet this requirement.
(3) Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems.
(a) Fire Suppression. The inadvertent operation or failure of fire
suppression systems must not result in the loss of function of safety
class or safety significant systems. (Note: This requirement
addresses proper design of the fire suppression system to ensure it
does not impact safety systems and is not intended to drive need for
redundancy in safety significant system design.)
(b) Fire Barriers. Complete fire-rated construction and barriers,
commensurate with the applicable codes and/or safety basis
requirements, must be provided to isolate hazardous areas and
minimize fire spread and loss potential consistent with limits as
established in this chapter. Fire barrier locations and construction
must be documented.
(c) Fire Detection. Automatic fire detection must be provided to the
extent required by applicable industry codes and standards.
(d) Life Safety. Requirements for life safety and means of egress are
provided in 10 CFR Part 851. Other codes and standards, such as
the International Building Code (IBC), and NFPA 101, Life Safety
Code, may also be applicable.
( e ) Water Supply and Distribution. A reliable and adequate water
supply and distribution system must be provided for fire
suppression, as documented through appropriate analysis.
(f) Emergency Notification. A means to notify responders and building
occupants of a fire must be provided (e.g., fire alarm signaling
system and/or site-wide mass notification capabilities for major
incidents affecting the site).
(4) Special Hazards. Fire protection systems or features, and appropriate
procedures to address fire and related hazards that are special or unique to
DOE and not addressed by industry codes and standards, must be
established.
d. Operations.
(1) Criteria and Procedures. Comprehensive, written fire protection criteria
and procedures must be established to implement the fire protection
program requirements that include:
(a) site-specific requirements;
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page II-5
(b) staff organization, resources, training, and roles and
responsibilities;
(c) inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire protection systems;
(d) use and storage of combustible, flammable, radioactive, and
hazardous materials;
(e) a “hot-work” control program;
(f) identification and tracking of fire protection system impairments;
(g) fire prevention measures (e.g., reduced combustible loading,
hot-work procedures, ignition source controls);
(h) facility and Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) assessment programs;
(i) design and construction oversight; and
(j) equivalencies, exemptions, modifications, and variances processes.
(2) Implementation. To ensure effective implementation of these
requirements, the following elements must be addressed.
(a) Staffing. The contractor must ensure it has access to qualified,
trained fire protection staff (that includes fire protection engineers
(FPEs), technicians, and firefighting personnel) needed to
implement the requirements of this chapter.
Section 20
(b) Design Review. Documented review of plans, specifications,
procedures, and acceptance tests must be conducted by an FPE
(Note: A definition for FPE is provided in DOE-STD-1066-2016).
A process must be established to oversee fire protection-related
activities from conceptual design to final acceptance.
(c) Equivalencies and Exemptions. A process must be established for
developing and requesting AHJ approval of fire protection
equivalencies and exemptions to fire protection requirements.
Records of technical justification must be maintained and
reevaluated for appropriateness as activities or operations change.
(d) Assigned Authority. If assigned, the contractor must document the
level of authority to execute the duties and responsibilities of the
AHJ, in accordance with the contractor’s overall fire protection and
emergency response programs.
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page II-6 12-4-2012
e. Emergency Response. Provide emergency response capabilities, as necessary, to
meet site needs as established by the baseline needs assessment (BNA), safety
basis requirements, and applicable regulations, codes and standards.
(1) Baseline Needs Assessment. A BNA of the fire protection and emergency
response organization must be conducted, and the BNA must:
(a) establish capabilities to provide:
1 effective response to extinguish fires;
2 emergency medical, rescue and hazardous materials
response; and
3 staffing, apparatus, facilities, equipment, training,
pre-incident plans, mutual aid, and procedures.
(b) reflect applicable requirements of NFPA codes and standards, and
DOE direction;
(c) be submitted to the DOE Head of Field Element for approval;
(d) be reviewed at least every three years, or whenever a significant
new hazard that is not covered by the current BNA is introduced,
and be updated as appropriate (Note: If no update is necessary, this
result must be documented following the review) and submitted to
the DOE Head of Field Element for approval; and,
(e) be incorporated into site emergency plans, FHAs, and safety basis
documentation.
(2) Pre-Incident Plans. Pre-incident strategies, plans, and standard operating
procedures must be established to enhance the effectiveness of manual fire
suppression activities, including areas within or adjacent to,
moderator-controlled areas. The criticality safety staff must review
pre-incident plans and procedures related to moderator-controlled areas.
(3) Manual Fire Suppression Activities.
(a) physical access and appropriate equipment that is accessible for
effective manual firefighting intervention must be provided.
(b) procedures governing the use of fire-fighting water or other neutron
moderating materials to suppress fire within, or adjacent to,
moderation controlled areas must be established and reviewed by a
criticality subject matter expert prior to release.
DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
Attachment 2
Page II-7
(c) procedures governing firefighting techniques to be used during
deactivation, decontamination, and demolition phases must be
established, when applicable.
(d) where no alternative exists to criticality safety restrictions on the
use of water for fire suppression, the need for such restrictions must
be fully documented with written technical justification.
f. Fire Hazard Analyses and Facility Assessments.
Section 21
(1) Fire Hazards Analyses. FHAs, using a graded approach, must be
conducted for the following cases: (1) all hazard category 1, 2, and 3
nuclear facilities and major modifications thereto; (2) facilities that
represent unique fire safety risks; (3) new facilities or modifications to
existing facilities with value greater than $177 million (in 2018 dollars);
and (4) when directed by the responsible DOE authority. The FHAs must
be:
(a) performed under the direction of an FPE;
(b) reviewed every three years by an FPE and revised as appropriate
(Note: If no revision is necessary, this result must be documented
following the review);
(c) revised when−
1 changes to the facility structure or layout, processes,
occupancy, safety basis documentation, or BNA impacts the
analysis in the FHA;
2 a modification to an associated facility or process adds a
significant new fire safety risk; or,
3 the periodic (three-year) review identifies the need for
changes; and
(d) integrated into safety basis documentation.
(2) Facility Assessments. Fire protection assessments must be conducted:
(a) annually, or at a frequency with appropriate justification approved
by the DOE Head of Field Element, for facilities with a
replacement value in excess of $118 million (in 2018 dollars),
facilities considered a high hazard, or those in which vital programs
are involved, as defined by the responsible DOE authority; and,
Attachment 2
Page II-8
DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
(b) at least every three years, or at a frequency with appropriate
justification approved by the DOE Head of Field Element, for
remaining low and ordinary hazard facilities.
g. Wildland Fire. An integrated site-wide wildland fire management plan, consistent
with the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, must be developed, provided
to DOE Head of Field Element for approval, and implemented in accordance with
the relevant portions of the NFPA 1143, Standard for Wildland Fire
Management.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page III-1
CHAPTER III. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for developing and implementing nuclear
criticality safety programs (CSPs) for nuclear facilities and activities, including materials
transportation activities, which provide adequate protection to the public, workers, and
the environment.
2. APPLICABILITY. This chapter is applicable to DOE elements and DOE contractors
with responsibility for nuclear facilities and activities that involve or will potentially
involve radionuclides in such quantities that are equal to or greater than the single
parameter limits for fissionable materials listed in ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014, Nuclear
Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, and
ANSI/ANS-8.15-2014, Nuclear Criticality Safety Control of Selected Actinide Nuclides.
These limits must be adjusted where process conditions could credibly involve
moderators or reflectors that are more effective than light water.
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. A CSP document must be developed and maintained that describes how the
contractor will implement the requirements in this chapter, including the standards
invoked by this chapter.
b. The CSP document must describe how the contractor will satisfy the requirements
of the ANSI/ANS-8 series of nuclear criticality safety standards that are in effect
as of the date this Order, unless otherwise modified and approved by the DOE
Head of Field Element. The CSP document must include an explanation as to why
any recommendation in applicable ANSI/ANS-8 standards is not implemented.
Section 22
c. The CSP document must be submitted to and approved by the DOE Head of Field
Element.
d. Criticality safety evaluations must be conducted in accordance with
DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at DOE
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, or by other documented methods approved by the
DOE Head of Field Element.
e. Fissile Material Accumulation Control. Facilities that conduct operations using
fissionable material in a form that could inadvertently accumulate in significant
quantities must include procedures for detecting and characterizing
accumulations. The following national standards provide relevant guidance for
procedure development: ASTM C1455-14e1, Standard Test Method for
Nondestructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray
Spectroscopic Methods, and any other nondestructive assay consensus or DOE
standards applicable to the measurement technique selected.
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page III-2 12-4-2012
f. Criticality safety evaluations must show that entire processes involving
fissionable materials will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal
conditions, including those initiated by design basis events.
g. The criteria and process for developing the guidelines for firefighting in areas
within or adjacent to moderator-controlled areas must be coordinated with
firefighting pre-incident plans and procedures.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page IV-1
CHAPTER IV. NATURAL PHENOMENA HAZARDS MITIGATION
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for DOE facility design, construction, and
operations to protect the public, workers, and the environment from the impact of natural
phenomena hazards (NPH) events (e.g., earthquake, wind, flood, lightning, snow, and
volcanic eruption).
2. APPLICABILITY. Requirements in this chapter apply to all government-owned and
government-leased nuclear and nonnuclear facilities and sites. Design requirements
(Sections 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c, below) apply to new facilities, major modifications, and
modifications that may be warranted based on periodic NPH assessment and upgrade
requirements. For leased facilities that are not nuclear hazard category 1, 2, or 3 facilities,
the requirements of this chapter apply to the extent determined by the DOE Head of Field
Element.
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. General. Facilities must be designed, constructed, maintained, and operated to
ensure that SSCs will be able to perform their intended safety functions
effectively under the combined effects of NPH and normal loads defined in the
applicable building codes contained in facilities’ CORs. Nuclear facility safety
functions that the SSCs must perform during and after an NPH event must be
defined in the facility’s safety basis documentation. Safety functions include:
(1) confinement/containment of hazardous materials;
(2) protection of occupants and co-located workers of the facility and the
public;
(3) continued operation of essential facilities and equipment;
(4) safe shutdown of hazardous facilities and equipment; and
(5) maintenance of personnel access to areas needed for responding to
accidents during NPH events.
b. NPH Design Criteria. The design of new facilities and major modifications must
be developed in accordance with the applicable requirements and criteria contained
in DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design
Criteria for DOE Facilities. (Note: Requirements for non-nuclear facilities are
described in Section 2.2 of DOE-STD-1020-2016.)
Section 23
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page IV-2 12-4-2012
c. NPH Accident Analysis. The NPH analysis supporting design and construction of
facilities and safety SSCs must be documented and include evaluation of:
(1) potential damage to and failure of safety SSCs resulting from both direct
and indirect NPH events; and,
(2) common cause/effect and interactions resulting from failures of other
nearby facilities or other SSCs in the same facility caused by or induced
by an NPH event.
d. Review and Upgrade Requirements for Existing DOE Nuclear Facilities (Hazard
Category 1, 2 and 3).
(1) Existing facility or site NPH assessments must be reviewed at least once
every ten years and whenever significant changes in NPH data, criteria,
and assessment methods warrant updating the assessments. Section 9.2 of
DOE-STD-1020-2016 contains criteria and guidance for performing these
reviews. The review results, along with any recommended update actions,
must be submitted to the DOE Head of Field Element for approval. If no
update is necessary, this result must be documented following the review.
(2) If a new assessment of NPH indicates deficiencies in existing SSC design,
a plan for upgrades must be developed and implemented on a prioritized
schedule, based on the safety significance of the upgrades, time or funding
constraints, and mission requirements. The upgrade plans must also be
submitted to the DOE Head of Field Element for approval. Sections 9.3
and 9.4 of DOE-STD-1020-2016 contain guidance on performing upgrade
evaluations.
e. Seismic Detection. DOE sites with nuclear or hazardous materials must have
instrumentation or other means to detect and record the occurrence and severity of
seismic events.
f. Post-Natural Phenomena Procedures. Facilities or sites with hazardous materials
must have procedures for inspecting facilities for damage from severe NPH
events and placing a facility into a safe configuration when damage has occurred.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page V-1
CHAPTER V. COGNIZANT SYSTEM ENGINEER PROGRAM
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for a cognizant system engineer (CSE) program
for hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and to ensure continued operational
readiness of the systems within its scope.
A key element of the CSE program is the designation of CSEs who are responsible for
maintaining overall cognizance of assigned systems; providing systems engineering
support for operations and maintenance; and technical support of line management safety
responsibilities for ensuring continued system operational readiness.
2. APPLICABILITY. Requirements of this chapter apply to all hazard category 1, 2, and 3
nuclear facilities that have attained operational status (such as achieving Critical
Decision 4 (CD-4) per DOE O 413.3B, Chg. 5, Program and Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets) and have:
a. active safety class or safety significant SSCs, as defined in the facility’s
DOE-approved safety basis documentation; or
b. other active systems that perform important defense-in-depth functions, as
designated by facility line management.
Note: This chapter does not apply to passive systems or design features. Facility
management should consider establishing CSE programs before CD-4 to ensure their
stability and operation at CD-4. CSE programs should remain in place as long as the
covered systems are credited in the safety basis or designated by facility line management.
3. REQUIREMENTS.
Section 24
a. General. The protocols for implementing the site or facility CSE program must be
documented, must include the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of CSEs,
and must address the following elements:
(1) Identification of systems covered by the CSE program and identification of
systems assigned for coverage;
(2) Configuration management;
(3) Support for operations and maintenance; and
(4) Training and qualifications of CSEs.
b. CSE Program Coverage.
(1) The CSE program must be applied to active safety class and safety
significant systems, as defined in the facility’s DOE-approved safety basis,
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page V-2 12-4-2012
as well as to other active systems that perform important defense-in-depth
functions, as designated by facility line management. The designated
systems and the rationale for assignment of CSEs in a graded approach
(see below) must be documented.
(2) A graded approach must be used in applying the requirements of the CSE
program. The program must be tailored to facility hazards and the systems
relied upon to prevent or mitigate those hazards, considering:
(a) Remaining Facility Lifetime and the Safety Significance of
Remaining Operations. Facilities undergoing deactivation or
decontamination/decommissioning may undergo frequent changes,
modifications, or removal of systems no longer needed to support
the safety basis of those operations. CSE programs may require
more CSE attention in these operations than during normal
operations. After deactivation, or when a facility is in long-term
surveillance and maintenance, there may be less need for CSE
attention.
(b) Safety Importance of the System. Not all systems are equal as
measured by the likelihood and consequences of the hazard and the
accidents that they prevent or mitigate. The level of system
documentation detail in configuration management should be
tailored to the importance of the system.
(3) A qualified CSE must be assigned to each active system within the scope
of the program. Consistent with the graded approach, large, complex, or
very important systems may require assignment of more than one CSE.
Conversely, a single individual may be assigned to be the CSE for more
than one system.
c. Configuration Management.
(1) A documented configuration management program must be established
and implemented that ensures consistency among system requirements and
performance criteria, system documentation, and physical configuration of
the systems within the scope of the program. DOE-STD-1073-2016,
Configuration Management, describes an acceptable methodology for
establishing configuration management programs. The configuration
management program must address:
(a) system design documentation;
(b) system assessments;
(c) control of maintenance;
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 2
12-4-2012 Page V-3
(d) change control; and
(e) aging degradation and technical obsolescence.
(2) System design documents and supporting documents must be identified
and kept current using formal change control and work control processes.
DOE-STD-3024-2011, Content of System Design Descriptions, describes
an acceptable methodology to achieve this function. Design
documentation must include:
(a) system requirements and performance criteria essential to
performance of the system’s safety functions;
(b) the basis for system requirements; and
(c) a description of how the current system configuration satisfies the
requirements and performance criteria.
Section 25
(3) System assessments must include periodic reviews of system operability,
reliability, and material condition. Reviews must assess the system for:
(a) the ability to perform design and safety functions;
(b) physical configuration as compared to system documentation; and
(c) system and component performance in comparison to established
performance criteria.
(4) System maintenance and repair and modification must be controlled
through a formal change control process to ensure that changes are not
inadvertently introduced and that required system performance is not
compromised. Post maintenance or modification testing must be
conducted to confirm continued capability to fulfill system requirements.
d. CSE Support for Operations and Maintenance. The CSE must:
(1) ensure that system configuration is being managed effectively (see
Section 3.c. of this Chapter);
(2) remain apprised of operational status and ongoing modification activities;
(3) assist operations review of key system parameters and evaluate system
performance;
(4) initiate actions to correct problems;
(5) remain cognizant of system-specific maintenance and operations history
and industry operating experience, as well as manufacturer and vendor
Attachment 2 DOE O 420.1C
Page V-4 12-4-2012
recommendations and any product warnings regarding their assigned
systems;
(6) identify trends from operations and maintenance;
(7) provide assistance in determining operability, correcting
out-of-specification conditions, and evaluating questionable data;
(8) provide or support analysis when the system is suspected of inoperability
or degradation;
(9) review and concur with design changes, use-as-is, equivalency, and
commercial grade dedication determinations; and
(10) review, and provide input into the development of, and concur on
operating, maintenance, and test procedures related to their assigned
systems.
e. CSE Qualification Requirements. Qualification requirements for CSEs must be
consistent with those defined for Technical Support personnel in DOE O 426.2,
Admin. Chg. 1, Personnel Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification
Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities (see associated CRD), as applicable.
Qualification requirements must include knowledge of:
(1) related facility safety bases including safety system functions, safety
system performance criteria, and any relationship to SACs;
(2) system functional classification and bases;
(3) codes and standards applicable to assigned systems;
(4) system design, procurement, replacement, and related quality assurance
requirements;
(5) the existing condition of the systems;
(6) related facility operations; and
(7) vendor manuals, product warnings, and updates related to assigned
systems, available (in print or online).
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 3
12-4-2012 Page 1
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR
SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS
This attachment provides requirements for the design and construction of safety structures,
systems, and components (SSCs).
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for the design and construction of safety SSCs,
both safety class and safety significant, by identifying an applicable set of industry codes
and standards, as well as Department of Energy (DOE) design criteria, standards, and
directives. Compliance with these requirements will ensure reliable performance of the
safety function of safety SSCs under those conditions and events for which they are
intended.
2. APPLICABILITY.
Section 26
a. This attachment applies to the design and construction of:
(1) new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities as defined by 10 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management; and
(2) major modifications to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, as
defined in 10 CFR Part 830, that substantially change the facility safety
basis.
b. This attachment does not impose requirements on existing facilities, except for
major modifications to those facilities. The requirements of this attachment may
be used to develop comparisons of existing facilities to the requirements for new
facilities.
c. This attachment does not apply to nuclear deactivation or decontamination and
decommissioning activities at end-of-facility-life, if the safety analysis
demonstrates that adequate protection is provided consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 830 through alternate means and it is not
cost-beneficial to apply the provisions of this attachment for the limited remaining
life of the activity.
3. REQUIREMENTS. Safety SSCs must be designed, commensurate with the importance
of the safety functions performed, to perform their safety functions when called upon, as
determined by the safety analysis.
a. General Design Criteria.
(1) Conservative Design Margin. Safety SSCs must be designed with
appropriate margins of safety, as defined in applicable DOE or industry
codes and standards.
Attachment 3 DOE O 420.1C
Page 2 12-4-2012
(2) System Reliability.
(a) The single failure criterion, requirements, and design analysis
identified in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) 379-2014, IEEE Standard for Application of the
Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station
Safety Systems, must be applied to safety class SSCs during the
design process as the primary method of achieving reliability,
unless another applicable standard is approved by DOE in
accordance with the process for obtaining DOE review and
approval of the applicability of codes and standards as described in
DOE-Standard (STD)-1189-2016. ANSI/ANS 58.9-2002 (R2015),
Single Failure Criteria for LWR Safety-Related Fluid Systems, may
be used in defining the scope of active safety class mechanical
SSCs.
(b) Safety significant SSCs must be designed to reliably perform all
their safety functions. This can be achieved through a number of
means, including use of redundant systems/components, increased
testing frequency, high reliability components, and diagnostic
coverage (e.g., on-line testing; monitoring of component and
system performance; and monitoring of various failure modes).
DOE-STD-1195-2011, Design of Safety Significant Safety
Instrumented Systems Used at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities,
provides an acceptable method for achieving high reliability of
safety significant safety instrumented systems.
(3) Environmental Qualification.
(a) Safety class SSCs must be designed to perform all safety functions
with no failure mechanism that could lead to common cause
failures under postulated service conditions. The requirements of
IEEE 323-2003 (R2008), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, must be used
to ensure environmental qualifications of safety class SSCs, unless
another applicable standard is approved by DOE in accordance with
the process for obtaining DOE review and approval of the
applicability of codes and standards as described in
DOE-STD-1189-2016.
Section 27
(b) Safety significant SSCs located in a harsh environment must be
evaluated to establish qualified life. This may be accomplished
using manufacturers’ recommendations or other appropriate
methods.
(4) Safe Failure Modes. The facility design must provide reliable safe
conditions and sufficient confinement of hazardous material during and
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 3
12-4-2012 Page 3
after all design basis accidents (DBAs). At both the facility- and
SSC-level, the design must ensure that most probable modes of failure
(e.g., failure to open versus failure to close) will increase the likelihood of
a safe condition.
(5) Support System and Interface Design.
(a) Support SSCs must be designed as safety class or safety significant
SSCs if their failures prevent safety SSCs or specific administrative
controls (SACs) from performing their safety functions.
(b) Interfaces—such as pressure retention boundaries, electrical supply,
instrumentation, cooling water, and other support systems—may
exist between safety SSCs and non-safety SSCs. These interfaces
must be evaluated to identify SSC failures that would prevent safety
SSCs from performing their intended safety function. IEEE
384-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class IE
Equipment and Circuits, must be used for physical and electrical
separation methods, including the use of separation distance,
barriers, electrical isolation devices, or any combination thereof,
unless another applicable standard is approved by DOE in
accordance with the process for obtaining DOE review and
approval of the applicability of codes and standards as described in
DOE-STD-1189-2016. This application includes a design to ensure
that both direct and indirect impacts of DBAs (e.g., fire, seismic)
will not cause failure of safety functions.
(6) Protection Against Fire. Safety class systems must be designed with
redundancy or other means, such that safety function is maintained for any
postulated fire events that credit the safety class systems.
(7) Quality Assurance. A quality assurance program must be established that
satisfies 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart A, “Quality Assurance Requirements,”
and DOE Order (O) 414.1D, Admin. Chg. 1, Quality Assurance, early in
the project, such that safety SSCs and their associated support systems are
designed, procured, fabricated, erected, and tested to standards and quality
requirements commensurate with their importance to safety.
b. Specific Design Criteria and Use of National Codes and Standards. The selection
and use of an appropriate set of applicable codes and standards establishes design
criteria to provide assurance that the SSCs are designed to reliably perform their
intended functions. The DOE technical standards and industry codes and
standards identified below, which are widely used for nuclear facility design and
construction, must be evaluated for applicability.
DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards are considered
applicable when they provide relevant design requirements for the safety SSCs
Attachment 3 DOE O 420.1C
Page 4 12-4-2012
that are being designed (i.e., they provide design requirements that are needed to
ensure that desired SSC functions are achieved, and these requirements are
appropriate for the design materials, configuration, and service conditions).
Further, the use of specific codes and standards may be directed by the DOE Head
of Field Element. (Note: The stated applicability of industry codes and standards
(e.g., for nuclear reactors) should not be used to narrowly interpret relevancy for
SSC design.)
Section 28
Before using these codes and standards, their application to specific DOE
design(s) must be reviewed. Once a code or standard is identified as applicable,
the applicable requirements (i.e., mandatory statements) must be applied in the
design. The process for obtaining DOE review and approval of the applicability of
codes and standards is described in DOE-STD-1189-2016.
The Safety Design Strategy developed in accordance with DOE-STD-1189-2016
may be used to specify provisions for relief (exemptions and equivalencies) from
identified, applicable design and construction codes and standards. If the Safety
Design Strategy is not used to specify relief provisions, the process for obtaining
relief (i.e., equivalencies or exemptions) from applicable requirements in
applicable DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards is described
in Attachment 1 of DOE O 420.1C. (Note: Relief is not necessary for
requirements within an applicable industry code or standard where the
requirements are not relevant to the design or construction. Relief from Order
420.1C requirements, including requirements to follow invoked standards, would
still be required to follow Attachment 1, Section 2.a, unless the requirements
specifically relate to satisfying DOE technical standards and industry codes and
standards that have been identified as applicable.)
The set of codes and standards identified below is not meant to be all-inclusive. It
is expected that design of SSCs will require selection of additional codes and
standards beyond those identified below. For example, unique design features,
detailed design considerations, and release of advancements may drive selection
of additional codes and standards. Facility designers must identify the complete
set of codes and standards necessary to meet the general design criteria identified
above (see also Attachment 4 of DOE O 420.1C for additional codes and
standards).
(1) Structural. Table 1 provides relevant codes and standards. Attachment 2,
Chapter IV of DOE O 420.1C provides additional natural phenomena
hazards (NPH) design requirements.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 3
12-4-2012 Page 5
Table 1: Codes for Safety Significant and Safety Class Structures
Structures Safety Significant Safety Class
Concrete
ACI-318;
ACI-349 ACI-349
Steel
ANSI/AISC 360;
AISC 325;
ANSI/AISC N690
ANSI/AISC N690
Note: See DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis
and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities, for further discussion on
selection and use of codes for structural design of SSCs.
(2) Mechanical and Process Equipment. Table 2 provides relevant codes and
standards.
Table 2: Codes for Safety Significant and Safety Class Process Equipment
Process
Equipment Safety Significant Safety Class
Pressure vessels ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1
or 2
ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1
or 2
Tanks (0-15
psig)
API-620;
ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 1
or 2
API-620;
ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1
or 2
Tanks
(containing
flammable
liquids)
API-620;
API-650;
Applicable NFPA codes and standards
API-620;
API-650;
Applicable NFPA codes and standards
Tanks
(atmospheric
pressure)
API-650;
AWWA D100
API-650;
AWWA D100
Pumps
ASME B73.1, B73.2;
ASME BPVC, Section VIII;
AWWA D100;
Hydraulic Institute Standards, as
applicable
ASME B73.1, B73.2;
ASME BPVC, Section VIII;
AWWA D100;
Hydraulic Institute Standards, as
applicable
Piping ASME B31.3 ASME B31.3
Valves
ASME B16.5;
B31.3;
ANSI N278.1
ASME B16.5;
B31.3;
ANSI N278.1
Section 29
Heat
Exchangers
ASHRAE Handbook;
ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1;
TEMA B, C, or R
ASHRAE Handbook;
ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1;
TEMA B, C, or R
Gloveboxes ASTM C852;
AGS-G006
ASTM C852;
AGS-G006
Attachment 3 DOE O 420.1C
Page 6 12-4-2012
(3) Ventilation. Table 3 provides relevant codes and standards.
Appendix A of DOE Guide (G) 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety
Design Criteria for use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, and
DOE-HDBK-1169-2003, Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook, provide
guidance for confinement ventilation systems design and performance
criteria. Alternate methods must be approved by DOE Heads of Field
Element.
Table 3: Codes for Safety Significant and Safety Class Ventilation System Components
Ventilation Safety Significant Safety Class
Ducts ASME AG-1 ASME AG-1
Fans ASHRAE Handbook;
ASME AG-1
ASHRAE Handbook;
ASME AG-1
Filtration ASME AG-1;
DOE-STD-3020-2015
ASME AG-1;
DOE-STD-3020-2015
Balance of system for
confinement ventilation ASME AG-1 ASME AG-1
Off-gas treatment ASME AG-1 ASME AG-1
(4) Mechanical Handling Equipment. Table 4 provides relevant codes and
standards.
Table 4: Codes for Safety Significant and Safety Class Handling Equipment
Handling
Equipment Safety Significant Safety Class
Cranes
Applicable CMAA standards;
ASME NOG-1;
ASME NUM-1;
ASME B30.2;
DOE-STD-1090-2011
Applicable CMAA standards;
ASME NOG-1;
ASME NUM-1;
ASME B30.2;
DOE-STD-1090-2011
Other equipment ASME B30 Series: DOE-STD-1090-2011
ASME B30 Series;
DOE-STD-1090-2011
(5) Electrical. Tables 5 and 6 provide relevant codes and standards.
Note: ANSI/IEEE standards, below, define requirements for the
manufacturing, installation, and testing of commercial reactor
Safety-Class 1E electrical systems and components. While these
requirements may not be directly applicable to nonreactor nuclear
facilities, these standards contain useful and significant information that
should be considered.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 3
12-4-2012 Page 7
Table 5: Codes for Safety Significant and Safety Class Electrical Systems
Electrical Safety Significant Safety Class
Hardware
Applicable NFPA codes and standards;
IES HB-10;
IEEE C2, C37;
IEEE-80, -141, -142, -242, -399, -446 -
493, -577
Applicable NFPA codes and standards;
IES HB-10;
IEEE C2, C37;
IEEE-80, -141, -142, -242, -308, -338, -379
, -384, -399, -493, -577
Table 6: IEEE Standards used for Both Safety Significant
and Safety Class Electrical Systems, as appropriate
Electrical Safety Significant and Safety Class
Guidance standards for use as applicable for specific
hardware
IEEE-323, -334, -336, -344, -352 -382, -383, -387,
-420, -450, -484, -493, -535, -603, -627, -628, -649
, -650, -833, -946
(6) Instrumentation, Control, and Alarm Systems. The design of safety class
instrumentation and control systems must incorporate sufficient
independence, redundancy, diversity, and separation to ensure that all
safety-related functions associated with such equipment can be performed.
Safety significant components must be evaluated as to the need for
redundancy on a case-by-case basis. DOE-STD-1195-2011 provides an
acceptable method for achieving high reliability of safety significant
safety instrumented systems.
Table 7 provides relevant codes and standards. The codes and standards
for electrical systems (in Tables 5 and 6) may also be applicable to design
of instrumentation and control systems and need to be evaluated in this
context.
Section 30
Table 7: Codes for Safety Significant and Safety Class
Instrumentation, Control, and Alarm Components.
Instruments,
Controls,
and Alarms
Safety Significant Safety Class
Hardware
Applicable NFPA codes and standards;
ANSI/ANS-8.3,
-58.8,
-N13.1,
-N323D;
ANSI/ISA-Series including ISA
67.04.01 and ISA TR 84.00.06;
IEEE-C2,
-N42.18,
-1023,
Applicable NFPA codes and standards;
ANSI/ANS-8.3,
58.8,
-N13.1,
ANSI-N323D;
ANSI/ISA-Series including ISA 67.04.01
and ISA TR 84.00.06;
IEEE-C2,
-N42.18,
-603,
Attachment 3 DOE O 420.1C
Page 8 12-4-2012
Instruments,
Controls,
and Alarms
Safety Significant Safety Class
-1050;
-7-4.3.2; and
DOE-STD-1195-2011
-1023,
-1050,
-7-4.3.2
(7) Fire Protection Systems. DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection, provides
acceptable methods for the design of fire protection systems. Design
requirements for safety class and safety significant fire barriers, water
supplies, and wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided in Appendix A of
DOE-STD-1066-2016. Fire protection system designs are also required to
address the applicable design requirements for similar safety systems
provided in this attachment.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 4
12-4-2012 Page 1
REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS
1. REFERENCES. The following reference documents and information sources are cited to
assist in implementing this Order. This attachment does not provide a complete listing of
industry codes and standards that may be needed.
a. Public Law (Pub. L.).
(1) Pub. L. 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
(2) Pub. L. 94-580, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), as amended.
(3) Pub. L. 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
as amended.
b. Executive Orders (E.O.) and Federal Policies.
(1) E.O. 12344, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 02-01-1982.
(2) Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, National Interagency Fire
Center, 1995 (R 2001).
(3) Secretarial Delegation Order Number 00-033.00C, 08-12-2016.
c. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
(1) 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management.
(2) 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection.
(3) 10 CFR Part 851, Worker Safety and Health Program.
(4) 29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards.
(5) 29 CFR Part 1926, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction.
(6) 48 CFR Part 970, Section 970.5223-1, “Integration of Environment,
Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution.”
d. DOE Directives.
(1) DOE P 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy, 02-08-11.
(2) DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System,
8-11-16.
Attachment 4 DOE O 420.1C
Page 2 12-4-2012
(3) DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight
Policy, 04-25-11.
(4) DOE O 227.1A, Independent Oversight Program, 12-21-15.
(5) DOE O 251.1D, Departmental Directives Program, 01-17-17.
(6) DOE O 410.1, Central Technical Authority Responsibilities Regarding
Nuclear Safety Requirements, 08-28-07.
(7) DOE O 413.3B Chg. 5, Program and Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets, 04-12-18.
(8) DOE O 414.1D, Admin. Chg. 1, Quality Assurance, 05-08-13.
(9) DOE O 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities, 07-21-11.
(10) DOE O 426.2 Admin. Chg. 1, Personnel Selection, Training,
Qualification, and Certification Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities,
07-29-13.
(11) DOE O 433.1B Chg. 1, Maintenance Management Program for DOE
Nuclear Facilities, 03-12-13.
(12) DOE O 435.1 Chg. 1, Radioactive Waste Management, 01-09-07.
Section 31
(13) DOE O 450.2, Integrated Safety Management, 04-25-11.
(14) DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program,
01-26-15.
(15) DOE O 452.2E, Nuclear Explosive Safety, 01-26-15.
(16) DOE M 435.1-1 Chg. 2, Radioactive Waste Management Manual,
06-08-11.
(17) DOE G 413.3-21 Chg. 1, Cost Estimating Guide, 10-22-15.
(18) DOE G 414.1-2B Chg. 2, Quality Assurance Program Guide, 05-08-13.
(19) DOE G 414.1-4, Safety Software Guide for use with 10 C.F.R 830 Subpart
A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality
Assurance, 11-03-10.
(20) DOE G 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria for Use
with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, 12-04-12.
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 4
12-4-2012 Page 3
e. DOE Technical Standards (STDs).
(1) DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design
Criteria for DOE Facilities.
(2) DOE-STD-1027-1992, Chg. 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident
Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear
Safety Analysis Reports, September 1997.
(3) DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection.
(4) DOE-STD-1073-2016, Configuration Management.
(5) DOE-STD-1090-2011, Hoisting and Rigging.
(Formerly Hoisting and Rigging Manual).
(6) DOE-STD-1098-2008, Radiological Control.
(7) DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety
Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents.
(8) DOE-STD-1128-2013, Guide of Good Practices for Occupational
Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities.
(9) DOE-STD-1158-2010, Self-Assessment Standard for DOE Contractor
Criticality Safety Programs.
(10) DOE-STD-1186-2016, Specific Administrative Controls.
(11) DOE-STD-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.
(12) DOE-STD-1195-2011, Design of Safety Significant Safety Instrumented
Systems Used at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.
(13) DOE-STD-1212-2012, Explosives Safety.
(14) DOE-STD-1628-2013, Development of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for
Nuclear Safety Applications.
(15) DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at DOE
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.
(16) DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy
Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, Chg. Notice 3,
March 2006.
(17) DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility
Documented Safety Analysis.
Attachment 4 DOE O 420.1C
Page 4 12-4-2012
(18) DOE-STD-3020-2015, Specifications for HEPA Filters Used by DOE
Contractors.
(19) DOE-STD-3024-2011, Content of System Design Descriptions.
f. DOE Handbooks (HDBKs).
(1) DOE-HDBK-1132-1999, Design Considerations.
(2) DOE-HDBK-1163-2003, Integration of Multiple Hazard Analysis
Requirements and Activities.
(3) DOE-HDBK-1169-2003, Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook.
g. Department of Defense.
MIL-STD-1472F, Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard: Human
Engineering, August 1999.
h. American Concrete Institute (ACI).
ACI 349-06, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures
(ACI 349-06) and Commentary, 2006.
i. American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
ACGIH 2096, Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practices for
Design, January 2010.
j. American Glovebox Society (AGS).
AGS-G006-2005, Standard of Practice for the Design and Fabrication of Nuclear
Application Gloveboxes, 2005.
k. American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
(1) ANSI N13.1-2011, Guide to Sampling and Monitoring Releases of
Airborne Radioactive Substances from the Stacks and Ducts of Nuclear
Facilities, 2011.
Section 32
(2) ANSI N43.2-2001 (R2010), Radiation Safety for X-ray Diffraction and
Fluorescence Analysis Equipment, 2001.
(3) ANSI N278.1-1975 (R1992), Self-Operated and Power-Operated
Safety-Related Valves Functional Specification Standard, 1975.
(4) ANSI N323D-2002, American National Standard for Installed Radiation
Protection Instrumentation, 2002.
DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
Attachment 4
Page 5
(5) ANSI/AIHA Z9.2-2012, Fundamentals Governing the Design and
Operation of Local Exhaust Ventilation Systems, 2012.
(6) ANSI Z358.1-2009, American National Standard for Emergency Eyewash
and Shower Equipment, 2009.
l. American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel Construction
(AISC).
(1) AISC 325:2011, Steel Construction Manual, 2011.
(2) ANSI/AISC 360:10, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, 2010.
(3) ANSI/AISC N690-12, Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for
Nuclear Facilities, 2012.
m. American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANS).
(1) ANSI/ANS-1-2000 (R2007) (R2012), Conduct of Critical Experiments,
2000.
(2) ANSI/ANS-6.4.2-2006, Specification for Radiation Shielding Materials,
2006.
(3) ANSI/ANS-8 Series Standards.
(4) ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with
Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, 2014.
(5) ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 (R2003) (R2012), Criticality Accident Alarm
System, 1997.
(6) ANSI/ANS-8.15-2014, Nuclear Criticality Safety Control of Selected
Actinide Nuclides, 2014.
(7) ANSI/ANS-14.1-2004 (R2009) (R2014), Operation of Fast Pulse
Reactors, 2004.
(8) ANSI/ANS-58.8-1994 (R2001) (R2008), Time Response Design Criteria
for Safety-Related Operator Actions, 1994.
(9) ANSI/ANS-58.9-2002 (R2015), Single Failure Criteria for LWR
Safety-Related Fluid Systems, 1981.
n. American National Standards Institute/International Society of Automation (ISA).
(1) ANSI/ISA 7.0.01-1996, Quality Standard for Instrument Air, 1996.
Attachment 4 DOE O 420.1C
Page 6 12-4-2012
(2) ANSI/ISA 18.1-1979 (R2004), Annunciator Sequences and Specifications,
1979.
(3) ANSI/ISA 67.01.01-2002 (R2007), Transducer and Transmitter
Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications, 2002.
(4) ANSI/ISA S67.02.01-1999, Nuclear-Safety-Related Instrument Sensing
Line Piping and Tubing Standard for Use in Nuclear Power Plants, 1999.
(5) ANSI/ISA 67.04.01-2006 (R2011), Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related
Instrumentation, 2006.
o. American Petroleum Institute (API).
(1) API-620, Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-Pressure
Storage Tanks, 2013.
(2) API-650, Welded Tanks for Oil Storage, 2013.
p. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE).
(1) ASHRAE Handbook, Fundamentals (Inch-Pound Edition), 2013.
(2) ASHRAE Standard 62.1-2010, Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air
Quality, 2010.
q. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME).
(1) ASME AG-1-2015, Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment, 2015.
(2) ASME BPVC, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 2015.
(3) ASME B16.5-2013, Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings: NPS ½ through
NPS 24 Metric/Inch Standard, 2013.
(4) ASME B30.2-2011, Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge,
Single or Multiple Girder, Top Running Trolley Hoist), 2011.
(5) ASME B31.3-2014, Process Piping, 2014.
(6) ASME B73.1-2012, Specification for Horizontal End Suction Centrifugal
Pumps for Chemical Process, 2012.
(7) ASME B73.2-2003 (R2009), Specifications for Vertical In-Line
Centrifugal Pumps for Chemical Process, 2003.
Section 33
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 4
12-4-2012 Page 7
(8) ASME NOG-1-2010, Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry
Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder), 2010.
(9) ASME NUM-1-2009, Rules for Construction of Cranes, Monorails, and
Hoists (with Bridge or Trolley or Hoist of the Underhung Type), 2009.
(10) ASME NQA-1-2012, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear
Facility Applications, 2013.
r. ASTM International.
(1) ASTM C852-09, Standard Guide for Design Criteria for Plutonium
Gloveboxes, 2009.
(2) ASTM C1455-14e1, Standard Test Method for Nondestructive Assay of
Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic
Methods, 2014.
s. American Water Works Association (AWWA).
AWWA D100-11, Welded Carbon Steel Tanks for Water Storage, 2011.
t. Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA).
CMAA Standards, as applicable.
u. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB).
DNFSB Recommendation 2004-2, Active Confinement Systems.
v. Hydraulic Institute Standards.
Hydraulic Institute Standards, as applicable.
w. Illuminating Engineering Society (IES).
IES HB-10-11, IES Lighting Handbook, 2011.
x. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)/International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
(1) IEEE C2-2017, National Electrical Safety Code, 2017.
(2) IEEE C37 Standards Collection, Power Switchgears, Substations, and
Relays, Standards on switchgear as applicable, 2010.
Attachment 4 DOE O 420.1C
Page 8 12-4-2012
(3) IEEE N42.18-2004, American National Standard Specification and
Performance of On-Site Instrumentation for Continuously Monitoring
Radioactivity in Effluents, 2004.
(4) IEEE N323D-2002, American National Standard to Installed Radiation
Protection Instrumentation, 2003.
(5) IEEE 7-4.3.2-2016, IEEE Standard Criteria for Programmable Digital
Devices in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2016.
(6) IEEE 80-2013, IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding, 2013.
(7) IEEE 141-1993 (R1999), IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power
Distribution for Industrial Plants, 1993.
(8) IEEE 142-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial
and Commercial Power Systems, 2007.
(9) IEEE 242-2001, IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and
Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (IEEE Buff
Book), 2001.
(10) IEEE 308-2012, IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for
Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2012.
(11) IEEE 323-2003 (R2008), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2003.
(12) IEEE 334-2006 (R2012), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Continuous Duty
Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(13) IEEE 336-2010, IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation, Inspection,
and Testing for Class 1E Power, Instrumentation, and Control Equipment
at Nuclear Facilities, 2010.
(14) IEEE 338-2012, IEEE Standard for Criteria for the Periodic Surveillance
Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety, 2012.
(15) IEEE 344-2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment
for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013.
(16) IEEE 352-1987, IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis
of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, 1987.
(17) IEEE 379-2014, IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure
Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, 2014.
DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
Attachment 4
Page 9
Section 34
(18) IEEE 382-2006, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Safety-Related
Actuators for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(19) IEEE 383-2015, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Electric Cables and
Splices for Nuclear Facilities, 2015.
(20) IEEE 384-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E
Equipment and Circuits, 2008.
(21) IEEE 387-1995 (R2007), IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generator
Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generation
Stations, 1995.
(22) IEEE 399-1997, IEEE Recommended Practice for Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems Analysis (IEEE Brown Book), 1997.
(23) IEEE 420-2013, IEEE Standard for the Design and Qualification of Class
1E Control Boards, Panels, and Racks Used in Nuclear Power Generating
Stations, 2013.
(24) IEEE 446-1995 (R2000), IEEE Recommended Practice for Emergency
and Standby Power Systems for Industrial and Commercial Applications,
1995.
(25) IEEE 450-2010, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing,
and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary
Applications, 2010.
(26) IEEE 484-2002, IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation Design and
Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications,
2002.
(27) IEEE 493-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable
Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, 2007.
(28) IEEE 535-2013, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class 1E Vented Lead
Acid Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013.
(29) IEEE 577-2012, IEEE Standard Requirements for Reliability Analysis in
the Design and Operation of Safety Systems for Nuclear Power
Generating Stations, 2012.
(30) IEEE 603-2009, IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations, 2009.
(31) IEEE 627-2010, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Equipment Used in
Nuclear Facilities, 2010.
http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=IEEE+420-2001
http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=IEEE+420-2001
http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=IEEE+420-2001
Attachment 4 DOE O 420.1C
Page 10 12-4-2012
(32) IEEE 628-2011, IEEE Standard Criteria for the Design, Installation, and
Qualification of Raceway Systems for Class 1E Circuits for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations, 2011.
(33) IEEE 649-2006 (R2011), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Motor
Control Centers for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(34) IEEE 650-2006, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class 1E Static
Battery Chargers and Inverters for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,
2006.
(35) IEEE 833-2005 (R2011), IEEE Recommended Practice for the Protection
of Electric Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations from Water
Hazards, 2005.
(36) IEEE 946-2004, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of DC
Auxiliary Power Systems for Generating Systems, 2004.
(37) IEEE 1023-2004 (R2010), IEEE Recommended Practice for the
Application of Human Factors Engineering to Systems, Equipment, and
Facilities of Nuclear Power Generating Stations and other Nuclear
Facilities, 2004.
(38) IEEE 1050-2004, IEEE Guide for Instrumentation and Control Equipment
Grounding in Generating Stations, 2004.
y. International Code Council (ICC).
ICC, International Building Code, 2015.
z. International Society of Automation (ISA).
ISA-TR84.00.06, Safety Fieldbus Design Considerations for Process Industry
Sector Applications, 2009.
aa. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP).
Section 35
NCRP Report 49, “Structural Shielding Design and Evaluation for Medical Use of
X Rays and Gamma Rays of Energies Up to 10 MeV,” 1976.
bb. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).
(1) NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2015.
(2) NFPA 70, National Electric Code, 2017.
(3) NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2016.
http:ISA-TR84.00.06
DOE O 420.1C Attachment 4
12-4-2012 Page 11
(4) NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2015.
(5) NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2016.
(6) NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems,
2017.
(7) NFPA 1143, Standard for Wildland Fire Management, 2014.
cc. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
NUREG-0700, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines, 2002.
dd. Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association (TEMA).
TEMA, 9th Edition TEMA Standards: Standards on Heat Exchangers Classes B,
C, and R. Appendix F, Concluding Material. New York, 2007.
Attachment 4
Page 12
2. ACRONYMS.
AHJ
ANS
ANSI
BNA
CD
CFR
COR
CRD
CSE
CSP
DBA
DOE
DSA
FHA
FPE
G
IBC
IEEE
M
MPFL
NFPA
NPH
O
P
SAC
SSC
STD
DOE O 420.1C
12-4-2012
Authority Having Jurisdiction
American Nuclear Society
American National Standards Institute
Baseline Needs Assessment
Critical Decision
Code of Federal Regulations
Code of Record
Contractor Requirements Document
Cognizant System Engineer
Criticality Safety Program
Design Basis Accident
Department of Energy
Documented Safety Analysis
Fire Hazards Analysis
Fire Protection Engineer
Guide
International Building Code
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Manual
Maximum Possible Fire Loss
National Fire Protection Association
Natural Phenomena Hazards
Order
Policy
Specific Administrative Controls
Structures, Systems, and Components
Standard
ChgChart-o420.1C-Chg2-minchg
1. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES.
2. LOCATIONS OF CHANGES:
o420.1C-Chg2-minchg
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish facility and programmatic safety requirements for the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), for:
a. Nuclear safety design criteria;
b. Fire protection;
c. Criticality safety;
d. Natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation; and,
e. Cognizant system engineer (CSE) program.
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Facility safety requirements for explosive, chemical, and industrial hazards are contained in other DOE rules and directives.
2. CANCELLATIONS. This Order (O) cancels: DOE O 420.1B, Chg. 1, Facility Safety; DOE Guide (G) 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for DOE Nuclear Facilities and Nonnuclear Facilities; and, DOE G 420.1-3, Implementation Guid...
3. APPLICABILITY.
a. Departmental Applicability. This Order applies to all DOE elements with responsibility for design, construction, management, operation, decontamination, decommissioning, or demolition of government-owned or government-leased facilities and contract...
The NNSA Administrator will ensure that NNSA employees comply with their respective responsibilities under this directive. Nothing in this Order will be construed to interfere with the NNSA Administrator’s authority under section 3212(d) of Public Law...
b. DOE Contractors. Except for the equivalencies and exemptions in Section 3.c, the CRD (see Attachment 1 of this Order) sets forth requirements of this Order that will apply to contracts that include the CRD. The CRD, or its requirements, must be ins...
c. Equivalencies and Exemptions.
(1) Requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the requirements of this Order are processed in accordance with DOE O 251.1D, Departmental Directives Program. Central Technical Authority (or designee) concurrence is required for both exemptions and e...
(2) Equivalencies to DOE technical standards, as well as industry codes, and standards, determined to be applicable to the facility design or operations must demonstrate an equivalent level of safety (i.e., meets or exceeds the level of protection) an...
(3) Equivalency. In accordance with the responsibilities and authorities assigned by Executive Order (E.O.) 12344, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, codified in 50 United States Code (U.S.C.) sections 2406 and 2511, and to ensure consistency through t...
(4) Exemption. This Order does not apply to activities that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or a state under an agreement with the NRC, including activities certified by the NRC under Section 1701 of Pub. L. 83-703, Atomic Ene...
(5) Exemption. This Order does not apply to transportation activities that are regulated by the Department of Transportation.
(6) Exemption. The following portions of this Order do not apply to accelerator facilities that are covered by DOE O 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities: (1) nuclear safety design requirements, and (2) system engineer program requirements.
(7) Exemption. Specific, individual requirements of this Order do not apply to Nuclear Explosive and Weapons Surety Program activities, including transportation activities, for the prevention of nuclear detonations if application of such specific requ...
(8) Exemption. This Order does not apply to the Bonneville Power Administration, in accordance with Secretarial Delegation Order Number 00-033.00C to the Bonneville Power Administrator and Chief Executive Officer.
(9) Exemption. The design requirements in this Order do not apply to projects that have reached a high level of design maturity, as determined by the appropriate Head of Departmental Element. Examples of projects that have reached a high level of desi...
(10) Exemption. This Order does not apply to off-site office facilities that are owned or leased by the General Services Administration.
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d. Government-Owned, Government-Operated Facilities. The CRD (see Attachment 1 of this Order) sets forth requirements that must also be applied to DOE government-owned, government-operated facilities. Government operators must comply with the requirem...
4. REQUIREMENTS. DOE Elements must:
a. Approve and oversee contractor programs, as specified in Section 5 of this Order.
b. Implement the requirements in Attachment 1 of this Order for government-owned government-operated facilities.
c. Provide oversight of the contractor CSE program and the operability of safety systems under the purview of the CSE program.
d. Document any operational responsibilities that are assigned to the contractor regarding the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) for matters involving fire protection as defined by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes.
e. Document any authorities associated with the building code official, as defined in DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection, that are assigned to the contractor.
f. Establish an integrated site-wide wildland fire management plan, consistent with the relevant portions of the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy.
g. Direct its contractors, as applicable, to use DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis, for preparing documented safety analyses (DSAs), when the DOE-STD-3009 method is used to satisfy 10 Code of Fede...
h. Direct its contractors, as applicable, to carry out the analysis prescribed in Section 3.3.1 of DOE-STD-3009-2014 pertaining to “Existing Facilities with Mitigated Offsite Consequence Estimates over the EG,” and include the results of this analysis...
i. Review and approve safety basis and safety design basis documents in accordance with DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES.
a. Heads of Departmental Elements, and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
(1) Ensure that the requirements of this Order and the CRD are implemented for facilities, activities, or programs under their cognizance. Review and, where justified, approve requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the requirements of this Order...
(2) In accordance with Section 3.c.(1) of this Order, approve the basis for not including multiple physical barriers to prevent or mitigate the unintended release of radioactive materials to the environment, as part of the hazard category 1, 2, and 3 ...
(3) Review and approve safety basis and safety design basis documents in accordance with DOE-STD-1104-2016.
b. Associate Under Secretary, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security.
(1) Develops and maintains policy, requirements, guidance, and technical standards relating to this Order and the CRD.
(2) Provides technical advice and assistance on the implementation of policy, requirements, guidance, and technical standards related to this Order and the CRD.
(3) Provides comments on requests for exemptions from requirements of this Order.
c. Director, Office of Enterprise Assessments.
Plans and conducts independent oversight reviews of implementation of the requirements of this Order and the CRD (see DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, and DOE O 227.1A, Independent Oversight Program, for details).
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d. Heads of Field Elements.
(1) Ensure that the facilities, activities, and programs under their purview operate in compliance with the requirements of this Order and the CRD.
(2) Identify contracts to which the CRD applies and notify contracting officers when contracts are affected by this Order.
(3) Review and, where justified, approve equivalencies to DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards determined to be applicable to the facility design or operations.
(4) Approve contractor emergency services organization baseline needs assessments (BNAs) that meet the requirements in Attachment 2, Chapter II, Section 3.e.(1) of this Order.
(5) Approve contractor fire protection programs (this may be accomplished in conjunction with 10 CFR Part 851, Worker Health and Safety Program) and Wildland Fire Management Plans.
(6) Fulfill the roles and responsibilities for the AHJ for matters involving fire protection, as defined by the NFPA, including documentation of any delegation or assignment of related responsibilities (See Section 5.2.4 of DOE-STD-1066-2016, for furt...
(7) Fulfill the roles and responsibilities for the building code official, as defined in DOE-STD-1066-2016, including documentation of any delegation or assignment of related responsibilities.
(8) Perform responsibilities of ‘owner,’ or other equivalent term in the application of DOE technical standards or industry codes and standards, including documentation of any delegation or assignment of related responsibilities.
(9) Approve contractor’s criticality safety program documentation, ensure that it meets requirements in Chapter III of Attachment 2 of this Order. (This may be accomplished through the safety basis documentation approval process.)
(10) Approve periodic NPH assessment evaluations, any recommended update actions, and any recommended upgrade plans, in accordance with Chapter IV of Attachment 2 of this Order.
(11) Provide oversight for contractor CSE programs and the operability of associated safety systems.
(12) Consistent with DOE O 226.1B, establish and implement an appropriate self-assessment and oversight program for the elements of this Order.
(13) When delegated, review and approve safety basis and safety design basis documents in accordance with DOE-STD-1104-2016.
e. Contracting Officers.
Incorporate the CRD, or its requirements, into affected contracts and procurement requests in a timely manner when notified.
f. Central Technical Authorities.
(1) Review and, where justified, concur on requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the requirements of this Order, processed in accordance with DOE O 251.1D.
(2) Provide support, as requested by the DOE Heads of Field Element, on review of equivalencies to DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards determined to be applicable to the facility design or operations.
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6. INVOKED STANDARDS. The following DOE technical standards and industry standards are invoked as required methods in this Order in accordance with the applicability and conditions described within this Order. Any technical standard or industry standa...
a. DOE Standard (STD)-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis. This DOE technical standard is required to be used for specified new non-reactor hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and major modificat...
b. DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents. This DOE technical standard is required to be used by DOE personnel for review and approval of safety basis and safety design basis documents...
c. DOE-STD-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. This DOE technical standard is required to be used for development and integration of safety analysis and supporting design for new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and...
d. DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. This DOE technical standard is required to be used for conduct of criticality safety evaluations at DOE facilities and activities with the potential f...
e. DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities. This DOE technical standard is required to be used for developing the design of new facilities and major modifications. See Attachment 2, Chapter IV for s...
f. American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS)-8 Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards. This set of industry standards is required to be satisfied by Criticality Safety Programs for facilities and activities with the pot...
g. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 379-2014, IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems. This industry standard is required to be applied to the design of s...
h. IEEE 323-2003 (R2008), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. This industry standard is required to be used to ensure environmental qualifications of safety-class SSCs for new nuclear facilities and m...
i. IEEE 384-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits. This industry standard is required to be used for new nuclear facilities and major modifications for physical and electrical separation methods, including th...
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7. APPLICABLE STANDARDS. An applicable DOE technical standard or industry code or standard is one for which it has been determined by the contractor that it will be used or will be applied for a specific facility/site to meet the design, construction,...
Once a standard is identified as applicable, this Order requires that the applicable requirements of the applicable standards be followed unless relief is obtained. The provisions for relief (exemptions and equivalencies) for applicable standards are ...
8. REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS. References and acronyms can be found in Attachment 4 of this Order.
9. CONTACT. Address inquiries to the Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security; Office of Nuclear Safety, 301-903-3331.
ATTACHMENT 1. CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.
a. This CRD establishes facility safety requirements for design, construction, operation, management, decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition of DOE sites or facilities. Regardless of the performer of the work, the contractors are responsible...
b. Contractors must satisfy the requirements set forth in Attachments 2 and 3 of DOE O 420.1C.
c. For design and construction activities, contractors must identify the applicable industry codes and standards, including the International Building Code (IBC), and the applicable DOE requirements and technical standards. If approved by the responsi...
d. Contractors must satisfy the requirements (i.e., mandatory statements) in DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards that are identified as applicable in accordance with Section 1.c. above, unless relief is approved in accordance with...
e. When the DOE-STD-3009 methodology is used to satisfy 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, contractors must prepare Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreacto...
f. Contractors must carry out the analysis prescribed in Section 3.3.1 of DOE-STD-3009-2014 and include the results of this analysis in applicable DSAs for existing DOE nuclear facilities and activities whenever the safety analysis concludes that the ...
2. RELIEF FROM REQUIREMENTS, CODES AND STANDARDS.
a. Requests for equivalencies and exemptions to the requirements of this attachment are processed in accordance with DOE O 251.1D, Departmental Directives Program. For such equivalencies and exemptions, DOE O 251.1D requires approval, in consultation ...
b. Equivalencies to DOE technical standards and industry codes and standards determined to be applicable to the facility design or operations must demonstrate an equivalent level of safety (i.e., meets or exceeds the level of protection) and be approv...
3. REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS. Attachment 4 of DOE O 420.1C provides a list of references and acronyms. Reference documents that may be helpful in implementing this Order include rules, directives, guidance, DOE technical standards, and industry codes an...
FACILITY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
CHAPTER I. NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for safety design of DOE hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities to support implementation of DOE Policy (P) 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy.1F
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The requirements of this chapter (and the criteria in Attachment 3 of DOE O 420.1C) support implementation of the requirements for hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Manageme...
2. APPLICABILITY.
a. This chapter applies to the design and construction of:
(1) new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, as defined by 10 CFR Part 830; and
(2) major modifications to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, as defined in 10 CFR Part 830, that could substantially change the facility safety basis (Note: See DOE Standard (STD)-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process,...
b. This chapter does not impose requirements on existing facilities, except for major modifications2F to those facilities. The requirements of this chapter may be used to develop comparisons of existing facilities to the requirements for new faciliti...
c. Except for the requirements of Section 3.b.(3), this chapter does not apply to nuclear deactivation or decontamination and decommissioning activities at end-of-facility-life if the safety analysis demonstrates that adequate protection is provided c...
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. Integration of Safety with Design.
(1) Safety analysis and supporting design must be developed and integrated in accordance with DOE-STD-1189-2016.
(2) Safety analyses must be used to:
(a) identify safety class and safety significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) needed to fulfill the safety functions in order to prevent and/or mitigate design basis accidents (DBAs), including natural and man-induced hazards and events;
(b) identify the safety functional requirements of the safety class and safety significant SSCs; and
(c) identify specific administrative controls (SACs) needed to fulfill safety functions. (Note: See DOE-STD-1186-2016, Specific Administrative Controls).
b. Nuclear Facility Design.
(1) The nuclear facility design must include multiple layers of protection (as part of the design defense-in-depth) to prevent or mitigate the unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment.
(2) Defense-in-depth must include all of the following:
(a) choosing an appropriate site;
(b) minimizing the quantity of material-at-risk;
(c) applying conservative design margins;
(d) applying quality assurance;
(e) using successive/multiple physical barriers for protection against radioactive releases (Note: If an exemption to having multiple barriers is required, it is the responsibility of the Head of Departmental Element to approve, or disapprove, the exe...
(f) using multiple means to ensure safety functions are met by—
1 controlling processes;
2 maintaining processes in safe status;
3 providing preventive and/or mitigative controls for accidents with the potential for radiological releases; and
4 providing means for monitoring facility conditions to support recovery from upset or accident conditions;
(g) using equipment in combination with administrative controls that—
1 restrict deviation from normal operations;
2 monitor facility conditions during and after an event; and
3 provide for response to accidents to achieve a safe condition;
(h) providing means to monitor accident releases as required for emergency response (see DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, for detailed requirements); and
(i) establishing emergency plans for minimizing the effects of an accident (see DOE O 151.1D for detailed requirements).
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(3) Hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities with uncontained radioactive materials (as opposed to materials determined by safety analyses to be adequately contained within qualified drums, grout, or vitrified materials) must have the means to c...
(a) For a specific nuclear facility, the number, arrangement, and characteristics of confinement barriers as determined on a case-by case basis.
(b) The type, quantity, form, and conditions for dispersing the radioactive material in the confinement system design.
(c) An active confinement ventilation system as the preferred design approach for nuclear facilities with potential for radiological release.3F Alternate confinement approaches may be acceptable if a technical evaluation demonstrates either that the ...
(4) Hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities must be designed to:
(a) facilitate safe deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition at the end of facility life, including incorporation of design considerations during the operational period that facilitate future decontamination and decommissioning;
(b) facilitate inspections, testing, maintenance, repair, and replacement of safety SSCs as part of a reliability, maintainability, and availability program with the objective of maintaining the facility in a safe state;
(c) keep occupational radiation exposures within regulatory limits, and as low as reasonably achievable; and
(d) provide hazard controls for prevention and mitigation of hazardous material releases and for defense in depth, consistent with the hierarchy described in DOE-STD-1189-2016.
(5) Facility process systems must be designed to minimize waste production and mixing of radioactive and non-radioactive wastes.
(6) Safety SSCs and safety software must be designed to perform their safety functions when called upon.
(7) Active safety class systems must be designed to meet single failure4F criterion.
(8) DOE G 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria for Use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, provides an acceptable method to meet the requirements stated in this chapter.
(9) Critical experiments facilities must be designed and operated in accordance with applicable American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. ANSI/ANS-1-2000 (R2012), Conduct of Critical Experiments, an...
(10) Facility design must also be integrated with other design requirements, as applicable, including explosive safety, industrial safety, and nuclear explosive safety (if applicable).
CHAPTER II. FIRE PROTECTION
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for comprehensive fire protection programs for DOE facilities and emergency response organizations to:
a. Minimize the likelihood of occurrence of a fire-related event;
b. Minimize the consequence of a fire-related event affecting the public, workers, environment, property and missions; and
c. Provide a level of safety protection consistent with the “highly protected risk” class of industrial risks.
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2. APPLICABILITY. This chapter applies to organizations that have responsibility for the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of government-owned or government-leased facilities and contractor-leased facilities used for DOE mission purposes...
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. General Fire Protection Program Requirements.
(1) Policy Statement. A policy must be established that affirms the contractor’s commitment to provide a comprehensive fire protection and emergency response program that meets the requirements of this chapter, related DOE directives, and other applic...
(2) Codes and Standards. The codes and standards determined to be applicable, including DOE technical standards, the building code, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards, and other industry codes and standards, must be identi...
(a) Facilities, and major modifications thereto, must be constructed to meet applicable codes and standards that are in effect when design criteria are approved (otherwise known as the Code of Record, or COR). Other facility changes must meet the most...
(b) Provisions of subsequent editions of codes or standards (promulgated after the COR is established) are mandatory only to the extent that they are explicitly stated to be applicable to existing facilities.
(c) Conflicts between DOE O 420.1C; NFPA codes and standards; and the applicable building code must be resolved as follows:
1 Requirements of DOE O 420.1C take precedence over all NFPA and building code requirements and are subject to the relief requirements of DOE O 420.1C.
2 Conflicts between NFPA requirements and the applicable building code requirements are resolved by the DOE Head of Field Element, consistent with DOE-STD-1066-2016, and in consultation with designated building code and fire protection subject matter ...
b. Fire Protection Program Administration.
(1) Documentation. A documented fire protection program that includes the elements and requirements identified in this chapter for design; operations; emergency response; fire analysis and assessments; wildland fire; and specific fire protection progr...
(2) Fire Protection Methods. Fire Protection Programs must describe the methods used to implement the requirements of this chapter. DOE-STD-1066-2016 is the applicable fire protection standard for use at DOE facilities. [Note: Relief provisions for ap...
(3) Self-Assessments. A documented comprehensive self-assessment of the fire protection program must be performed at least every three years, or at a frequency with appropriate justification approved by the DOE Head of Field Element.
c. Design.
(1) Design Process. A process must be established to ensure that fire protection program requirements are documented and incorporated into plans and specifications for design of new facilities and modifications to existing facilities.
(2) Protection Thresholds5F .
(a) New facilities (non-relocatable) exceeding 5,000 sq. ft. of floor area must be of Type I or Type II construction, as defined in the applicable building codes.
(b) Automatic fire suppression systems must be provided throughout new facilities exceeding 5,000 sq. ft. of floor area or where a Maximum Possible Fire Loss (MPFL) exceeds $5.9 million (in 2018 dollars6F ), unless a specific provision of an applicabl...
(c) Automatic fire suppression systems must be provided throughout facilities in which any of the following conditions exist:
1 where required by safety basis document (for example, to prevent loss of safety functions or provide defense-in-depth);
2 significant life safety hazards;
3 where fire may cause unacceptable mission or program interruption if automatic fire suppression systems are not provided;
4 where a modification to an existing facility would cause the MPFL to exceed $5.9 million (in 2018 dollars) for the facility; or
5 where a modification to an existing facility results in facility floor area that exceeds 5,000 sq. ft.
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(d) For property protection, multiple fire protection approaches, such as a fire suppression system and a fire detection and alarm system, must be provided in areas where the MPFL exceeds $177 million (in 2018 dollars) (refer to DOE-STD-1066-2016).
(e) For property protection, fire areas must be established such that the MPFL for each fire area does not exceed $412 million (in 2018 dollars). Fire walls or other separation approaches may be used to meet this requirement.
(3) Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems.
(a) Fire Suppression. The inadvertent operation or failure of fire suppression systems must not result in the loss of function of safety class or safety significant systems. (Note: This requirement addresses proper design of the fire suppression syste...
(b) Fire Barriers. Complete fire-rated construction and barriers, commensurate with the applicable codes and/or safety basis requirements, must be provided to isolate hazardous areas and minimize fire spread and loss potential consistent with limits a...
(c) Fire Detection. Automatic fire detection must be provided to the extent required by applicable industry codes and standards.
(d) Life Safety. Requirements for life safety and means of egress are provided in 10 CFR Part 851. Other codes and standards, such as the International Building Code (IBC), and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, may also be applicable.
(e) Water Supply and Distribution. A reliable and adequate water supply and distribution system must be provided for fire suppression, as documented through appropriate analysis.
(f) Emergency Notification. A means to notify responders and building occupants of a fire must be provided (e.g., fire alarm signaling system and/or site-wide mass notification capabilities for major incidents affecting the site).
(4) Special Hazards. Fire protection systems or features, and appropriate procedures to address fire and related hazards that are special or unique to DOE and not addressed by industry codes and standards, must be established.
d. Operations.
(1) Criteria and Procedures. Comprehensive, written fire protection criteria and procedures must be established to implement the fire protection program requirements that include:
(a) site-specific requirements;
(b) staff organization, resources, training, and roles and responsibilities;
(c) inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire protection systems;
(d) use and storage of combustible, flammable, radioactive, and hazardous materials;
(e) a “hot-work” control program;
(f) identification and tracking of fire protection system impairments;
(g) fire prevention measures (e.g., reduced combustible loading, hot-work procedures, ignition source controls);
(h) facility and Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) assessment programs;
(i) design and construction oversight; and
(j) equivalencies, exemptions, modifications, and variances processes.
(2) Implementation. To ensure effective implementation of these requirements, the following elements must be addressed.
(a) Staffing. The contractor must ensure it has access to qualified, trained fire protection staff (that includes fire protection engineers (FPEs), technicians, and firefighting personnel) needed to implement the requirements of this chapter.
(b) Design Review. Documented review of plans, specifications, procedures, and acceptance tests must be conducted by an FPE (Note: A definition for FPE is provided in DOE-STD-1066-2016). A process must be established to oversee fire protection-related...
(c) Equivalencies and Exemptions. A process must be established for developing and requesting AHJ approval of fire protection equivalencies and exemptions to fire protection requirements. Records of technical justification must be maintained and reeva...
(d) Assigned Authority. If assigned, the contractor must document the level of authority to execute the duties and responsibilities of the AHJ, in accordance with the contractor’s overall fire protection and emergency response programs.
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e. Emergency Response. Provide emergency response capabilities, as necessary, to meet site needs as established by the baseline needs assessment (BNA), safety basis requirements, and applicable regulations, codes and standards.
(1) Baseline Needs Assessment. A BNA of the fire protection and emergency response organization must be conducted, and the BNA must:
(a) establish capabilities to provide:
1 effective response to extinguish fires;
2 emergency medical, rescue and hazardous materials response; and
3 staffing, apparatus, facilities, equipment, training, pre-incident plans, mutual aid, and procedures.
(b) reflect applicable requirements of NFPA codes and standards, and DOE direction;
(c) be submitted to the DOE Head of Field Element for approval;
(d) be reviewed at least every three years, or whenever a significant new hazard that is not covered by the current BNA is introduced, and be updated as appropriate (Note: If no update is necessary, this result must be documented following the review)...
(e) be incorporated into site emergency plans, FHAs, and safety basis documentation.
(2) Pre-Incident Plans. Pre-incident strategies, plans, and standard operating procedures must be established to enhance the effectiveness of manual fire suppression activities, including areas within or adjacent to, moderator-controlled areas. The cr...
(3) Manual Fire Suppression Activities.
(a) physical access and appropriate equipment that is accessible for effective manual firefighting intervention must be provided.
(b) procedures governing the use of fire-fighting water or other neutron moderating materials to suppress fire within, or adjacent to, moderation controlled areas must be established and reviewed by a criticality subject matter expert prior to release.
(c) procedures governing firefighting techniques to be used during deactivation, decontamination, and demolition phases must be established, when applicable.
(d) where no alternative exists to criticality safety restrictions on the use of water for fire suppression, the need for such restrictions must be fully documented with written technical justification.
f. Fire Hazard Analyses and Facility Assessments.
(1) Fire Hazards Analyses. FHAs, using a graded approach, must be conducted for the following cases: (1) all hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and major modifications thereto; (2) facilities that represent unique fire safety risks; (3) ne...
(a) performed under the direction of an FPE;
(b) reviewed every three years by an FPE and revised as appropriate (Note: If no revision is necessary, this result must be documented following the review);
(c) revised when(
1 changes to the facility structure or layout, processes, occupancy, safety basis documentation, or BNA impacts the analysis in the FHA;
2 a modification to an associated facility or process adds a significant new fire safety risk; or,
3 the periodic (three-year) review identifies the need for changes; and
(d) integrated into safety basis documentation.
(2) Facility Assessments. Fire protection assessments must be conducted:
(a) annually, or at a frequency with appropriate justification approved by the DOE Head of Field Element, for facilities with a replacement value in excess of $118 million (in 2018 dollars), facilities considered a high hazard, or those in which vital...
(b) at least every three years, or at a frequency with appropriate justification approved by the DOE Head of Field Element, for remaining low and ordinary hazard facilities.
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g. Wildland Fire. An integrated site-wide wildland fire management plan, consistent with the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, must be developed, provided to DOE Head of Field Element for approval, and implemented in accordance with the relevan...
CHAPTER III. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for developing and implementing nuclear criticality safety programs (CSPs) for nuclear facilities and activities, including materials transportation activities, which provide adequate protection to the public, w...
2. APPLICABILITY. This chapter is applicable to DOE elements and DOE contractors with responsibility for nuclear facilities and activities that involve or will potentially involve radionuclides in such quantities that are equal to or greater than the ...
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. A CSP document must be developed and maintained that describes how the contractor will implement the requirements in this chapter, including the standards invoked by this chapter.
b. The CSP document must describe how the contractor will satisfy the requirements of the ANSI/ANS-8 series of nuclear criticality safety standards that are in effect as of the date this Order, unless otherwise modified and approved by the DOE Head of...
c. The CSP document must be submitted to and approved by the DOE Head of Field Element.
d. Criticality safety evaluations must be conducted in accordance with DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, or by other documented methods approved by the DOE Head of Field Element.
e. Fissile Material Accumulation Control. Facilities that conduct operations using fissionable material in a form that could inadvertently accumulate in significant quantities must include procedures for detecting and characterizing accumulations. The...
f. Criticality safety evaluations must show that entire processes involving fissionable materials will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions, including those initiated by design basis events.
g. The criteria and process for developing the guidelines for firefighting in areas within or adjacent to moderator-controlled areas must be coordinated with firefighting pre-incident plans and procedures.
CHAPTER IV. NATURAL PHENOMENA HAZARDS MITIGATION
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for DOE facility design, construction, and operations to protect the public, workers, and the environment from the impact of natural phenomena hazards (NPH) events (e.g., earthquake, wind, flood, lightning, snow...
2. APPLICABILITY. Requirements in this chapter apply to all government-owned and government-leased nuclear and nonnuclear facilities and sites. Design requirements (Sections 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c, below) apply to new facilities, major modifications, and m...
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. General. Facilities must be designed, constructed, maintained, and operated to ensure that SSCs will be able to perform their intended safety functions effectively under the combined effects of NPH and normal loads defined in the applicable buildin...
(1) confinement/containment of hazardous materials;
(2) protection of occupants and co-located workers of the facility and the public;
(3) continued operation of essential facilities and equipment;
(4) safe shutdown of hazardous facilities and equipment; and
(5) maintenance of personnel access to areas needed for responding to accidents during NPH events.
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b. NPH Design Criteria. The design of new facilities and major modifications must be developed in accordance with the applicable requirements and criteria contained in DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE F...
c. NPH Accident Analysis. The NPH analysis supporting design and construction of facilities and safety SSCs must be documented and include evaluation of:
(1) potential damage to and failure of safety SSCs resulting from both direct and indirect NPH events; and,
(2) common cause/effect and interactions resulting from failures of other nearby facilities or other SSCs in the same facility caused by or induced by an NPH event.
d. Review and Upgrade Requirements for Existing DOE Nuclear Facilities (Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3).
(1) Existing facility or site NPH assessments must be reviewed at least once every ten years and whenever significant changes in NPH data, criteria, and assessment methods warrant updating the assessments. Section 9.2 of DOE-STD-1020-2016 contains cri...
(2) If a new assessment of NPH indicates deficiencies in existing SSC design, a plan for upgrades must be developed and implemented on a prioritized schedule, based on the safety significance of the upgrades, time or funding constraints, and mission r...
e. Seismic Detection. DOE sites with nuclear or hazardous materials must have instrumentation or other means to detect and record the occurrence and severity of seismic events.
f. Post-Natural Phenomena Procedures. Facilities or sites with hazardous materials must have procedures for inspecting facilities for damage from severe NPH events and placing a facility into a safe configuration when damage has occurred.
CHAPTER V. COGNIZANT SYSTEM ENGINEER PROGRAM
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for a cognizant system engineer (CSE) program for hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and to ensure continued operational readiness of the systems within its scope.
2. APPLICABILITY. Requirements of this chapter apply to all hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities that have attained operational status (such as achieving Critical Decision 4 (CD-4) per DOE O 413.3B, Chg. 5, Program and Project Management for...
a. active safety class or safety significant SSCs, as defined in the facility’s DOE-approved safety basis documentation; or
b. other active systems that perform important defense-in-depth functions, as designated by facility line management.
3. REQUIREMENTS.
a. General. The protocols for implementing the site or facility CSE program must be documented, must include the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of CSEs, and must address the following elements:
(1) Identification of systems covered by the CSE program and identification of systems assigned for coverage;
(2) Configuration management;
(3) Support for operations and maintenance; and
(4) Training and qualifications of CSEs.
b. CSE Program Coverage.
(1) The CSE program must be applied to active safety class and safety significant systems, as defined in the facility’s DOE-approved safety basis, as well as to other active systems that perform important defense-in-depth functions, as designated by f...
(2) A graded approach must be used in applying the requirements of the CSE program. The program must be tailored to facility hazards and the systems relied upon to prevent or mitigate those hazards, considering:
(a) Remaining Facility Lifetime and the Safety Significance of Remaining Operations. Facilities undergoing deactivation or decontamination/decommissioning may undergo frequent changes, modifications, or removal of systems no longer needed to support t...
(b) Safety Importance of the System. Not all systems are equal as measured by the likelihood and consequences of the hazard and the accidents that they prevent or mitigate. The level of system documentation detail in configuration management should be...
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(3) A qualified CSE must be assigned to each active system within the scope of the program. Consistent with the graded approach, large, complex, or very important systems may require assignment of more than one CSE. Conversely, a single individual may...
c. Configuration Management.
(1) A documented configuration management program must be established and implemented that ensures consistency among system requirements and performance criteria, system documentation, and physical configuration of the systems within the scope of the ...
(a) system design documentation;
(b) system assessments;
(c) control of maintenance;
(d) change control; and
(e) aging degradation and technical obsolescence.
(2) System design documents and supporting documents must be identified and kept current using formal change control and work control processes. DOE-STD-3024-2011, Content of System Design Descriptions, describes an acceptable methodology to achieve t...
(a) system requirements and performance criteria essential to performance of the system’s safety functions;
(b) the basis for system requirements; and
(c) a description of how the current system configuration satisfies the requirements and performance criteria.
(3) System assessments must include periodic reviews of system operability, reliability, and material condition. Reviews must assess the system for:
(a) the ability to perform design and safety functions;
(b) physical configuration as compared to system documentation; and
(c) system and component performance in comparison to established performance criteria.
(4) System maintenance and repair and modification must be controlled through a formal change control process to ensure that changes are not inadvertently introduced and that required system performance is not compromised. Post maintenance or modifica...
d. CSE Support for Operations and Maintenance. The CSE must:
(1) ensure that system configuration is being managed effectively (see Section 3.c. of this Chapter);
(2) remain apprised of operational status and ongoing modification activities;
(3) assist operations review of key system parameters and evaluate system performance;
(4) initiate actions to correct problems;
(5) remain cognizant of system-specific maintenance and operations history and industry operating experience, as well as manufacturer and vendor recommendations and any product warnings regarding their assigned systems;
(6) identify trends from operations and maintenance;
(7) provide assistance in determining operability, correcting out-of-specification conditions, and evaluating questionable data;
(8) provide or support analysis when the system is suspected of inoperability or degradation;
(9) review and concur with design changes, use-as-is, equivalency, and commercial grade dedication determinations; and
(10) review, and provide input into the development of, and concur on operating, maintenance, and test procedures related to their assigned systems.
e. CSE Qualification Requirements. Qualification requirements for CSEs must be consistent with those defined for Technical Support personnel in DOE O 426.2, Admin. Chg. 1, Personnel Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Requirements fo...
(1) related facility safety bases including safety system functions, safety system performance criteria, and any relationship to SACs;
(2) system functional classification and bases;
(3) codes and standards applicable to assigned systems;
(4) system design, procurement, replacement, and related quality assurance requirements;
(5) the existing condition of the systems;
(6) related facility operations; and
(7) vendor manuals, product warnings, and updates related to assigned systems, available (in print or online).
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ATTACHMENT 3. DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENT
1. OBJECTIVE. To establish requirements for the design and construction of safety SSCs, both safety class and safety significant, by identifying an applicable set of industry codes and standards, as well as Department of Energy (DOE) design criteria, ...
2. APPLICABILITY.
a. This attachment applies to the design and construction of:
(1) new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities as defined by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management; and
(2) major modifications to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, as defined in 10 CFR Part 830, that substantially change the facility safety basis.
b. This attachment does not impose requirements on existing facilities, except for major modifications to those facilities. The requirements of this attachment may be used to develop comparisons of existing facilities to the requirements for new facil...
c. This attachment does not apply to nuclear deactivation or decontamination and decommissioning activities at end-of-facility-life, if the safety analysis demonstrates that adequate protection is provided consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Pa...
3. REQUIREMENTS. Safety SSCs must be designed, commensurate with the importance of the safety functions performed, to perform their safety functions when called upon, as determined by the safety analysis.
a. General Design Criteria.
(1) Conservative Design Margin. Safety SSCs must be designed with appropriate margins of safety, as defined in applicable DOE or industry codes and standards.
(2) System Reliability.
(a) The single failure criterion, requirements, and design analysis identified in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 379-2014, IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safe...
(b) Safety significant SSCs must be designed to reliably perform all their safety functions. This can be achieved through a number of means, including use of redundant systems/components, increased testing frequency, high reliability components, and d...
(3) Environmental Qualification.
(a) Safety class SSCs must be designed to perform all safety functions with no failure mechanism that could lead to common cause failures under postulated service conditions. The requirements of IEEE 323-2003 (R2008), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Clas...
(b) Safety significant SSCs located in a harsh environment must be evaluated to establish qualified life. This may be accomplished using manufacturers’ recommendations or other appropriate methods.
(4) Safe Failure Modes. The facility design must provide reliable safe conditions and sufficient confinement of hazardous material during and after all design basis accidents (DBAs). At both the facility- and SSC-level, the design must ensure that mos...
(5) Support System and Interface Design.
(a) Support SSCs must be designed as safety class or safety significant SSCs if their failures prevent safety SSCs or specific administrative controls (SACs) from performing their safety functions.
(b) Interfaces—such as pressure retention boundaries, electrical supply, instrumentation, cooling water, and other support systems—may exist between safety SSCs and non-safety SSCs. These interfaces must be evaluated to identify SSC failures that woul...
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(6) Protection Against Fire. Safety class systems must be designed with redundancy or other means, such that safety function is maintained for any postulated fire events that credit the safety class systems.
(7) Quality Assurance. A quality assurance program must be established that satisfies 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart A, “Quality Assurance Requirements,” and DOE Order (O) 414.1D, Admin. Chg. 1, Quality Assurance, early in the project, such that safety SSCs...
b. Specific Design Criteria and Use of National Codes and Standards. The selection and use of an appropriate set of applicable codes and standards establishes design criteria to provide assurance that the SSCs are designed to reliably perform their in...
(1) Structural. Table 1 provides relevant codes and standards. Attachment 2, Chapter IV of DOE O 420.1C provides additional natural phenomena hazards (NPH) design requirements.
(2) Mechanical and Process Equipment. Table 2 provides relevant codes and standards.
(3) Ventilation. Table 3 provides relevant codes and standards.
(4) Mechanical Handling Equipment. Table 4 provides relevant codes and standards.
(5) Electrical. Tables 5 and 6 provide relevant codes and standards.
(6) Instrumentation, Control, and Alarm Systems. The design of safety class instrumentation and control systems must incorporate sufficient independence, redundancy, diversity, and separation to ensure that all safety-related functions associated with...
(7) Fire Protection Systems. DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection, provides acceptable methods for the design of fire protection systems. Design requirements for safety class and safety significant fire barriers, water supplies, and wet pipe sprinkler s...
ATTACHMENT 4. REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS
1. REFERENCES. The following reference documents and information sources are cited to assist in implementing this Order. This attachment does not provide a complete listing of industry codes and standards that may be needed.
a. Public Law (Pub. L.).
(1) Pub. L. 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
(2) Pub. L. 94-580, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), as amended.
(3) Pub. L. 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.
b. Executive Orders (E.O.) and Federal Policies.
(1) E.O. 12344, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 02-01-1982.
(2) Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, National Interagency Fire Center, 1995 (R 2001).
(3) Secretarial Delegation Order Number 00-033.00C, 08-12-2016.
c. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
(1) 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management.
(2) 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection.
(3) 10 CFR Part 851, Worker Safety and Health Program.
(4) 29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards.
(5) 29 CFR Part 1926, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction.
(6) 48 CFR Part 970, Section 970.5223-1, “Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution.”
Section 51
d. DOE Directives.
(1) DOE P 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy, 02-08-11.
(2) DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, 8-11-16.
(3) DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, 04-25-11.
(4) DOE O 227.1A, Independent Oversight Program, 12-21-15.
(5) DOE O 251.1D, Departmental Directives Program, 01-17-17.
(6) DOE O 410.1, Central Technical Authority Responsibilities Regarding Nuclear Safety Requirements, 08-28-07.
(7) DOE O 413.3B Chg. 5, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, 04-12-18.
(8) DOE O 414.1D, Admin. Chg. 1, Quality Assurance, 05-08-13.
(9) DOE O 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities, 07-21-11.
(10) DOE O 426.2 Admin. Chg. 1, Personnel Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities, 07-29-13.
(11) DOE O 433.1B Chg. 1, Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities, 03-12-13.
(12) DOE O 435.1 Chg. 1, Radioactive Waste Management, 01-09-07.
(13) DOE O 450.2, Integrated Safety Management, 04-25-11.
(14) DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, 01-26-15.
(15) DOE O 452.2E, Nuclear Explosive Safety, 01-26-15.
(16) DOE M 435.1-1 Chg. 2, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, 06-08-11.
(17) DOE G 413.3-21 Chg. 1, Cost Estimating Guide, 10-22-15.
(18) DOE G 414.1-2B Chg. 2, Quality Assurance Program Guide, 05-08-13.
(19) DOE G 414.1-4, Safety Software Guide for use with 10 C.F.R 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, 11-03-10.
(20) DOE G 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria for Use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, 12-04-12.
e. DOE Technical Standards (STDs).
(1) DOE-STD-1020-2016, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities.
(2) DOE-STD-1027-1992, Chg. 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, September 1997.
(3) DOE-STD-1066-2016, Fire Protection.
(4) DOE-STD-1073-2016, Configuration Management.
(5) DOE-STD-1090-2011, Hoisting and Rigging. (Formerly Hoisting and Rigging Manual).
(6) DOE-STD-1098-2008, Radiological Control.
(7) DOE-STD-1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents.
(8) DOE-STD-1128-2013, Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities.
(9) DOE-STD-1158-2010, Self-Assessment Standard for DOE Contractor Criticality Safety Programs.
(10) DOE-STD-1186-2016, Specific Administrative Controls.
(11) DOE-STD-1189-2016, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.
(12) DOE-STD-1195-2011, Design of Safety Significant Safety Instrumented Systems Used at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.
(13) DOE-STD-1212-2012, Explosives Safety.
(14) DOE-STD-1628-2013, Development of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Safety Applications.
(15) DOE-STD-3007-2017, Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.
(16) DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, Chg. Notice 3, March 2006.
(17) DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.
(18) DOE-STD-3020-2015, Specifications for HEPA Filters Used by DOE Contractors.
(19) DOE-STD-3024-2011, Content of System Design Descriptions.
Section 52
f. DOE Handbooks (HDBKs).
(1) DOE-HDBK-1132-1999, Design Considerations.
(2) DOE-HDBK-1163-2003, Integration of Multiple Hazard Analysis Requirements and Activities.
(3) DOE-HDBK-1169-2003, Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook.
g. Department of Defense.
MIL-STD-1472F, Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard: Human Engineering, August 1999.
h. American Concrete Institute (ACI).
ACI 349-06, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures (ACI 349-06) and Commentary, 2006.
i. American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
ACGIH 2096, Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practices for Design, January 2010.
j. American Glovebox Society (AGS).
AGS-G006-2005, Standard of Practice for the Design and Fabrication of Nuclear Application Gloveboxes, 2005.
k. American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
(1) ANSI N13.1-2011, Guide to Sampling and Monitoring Releases of Airborne Radioactive Substances from the Stacks and Ducts of Nuclear Facilities, 2011.
(2) ANSI N43.2-2001 (R2010), Radiation Safety for X-ray Diffraction and Fluorescence Analysis Equipment, 2001.
(3) ANSI N278.1-1975 (R1992), Self-Operated and Power-Operated Safety-Related Valves Functional Specification Standard, 1975.
(4) ANSI N323D-2002, American National Standard for Installed Radiation Protection Instrumentation, 2002.
(5) ANSI/AIHA Z9.2-2012, Fundamentals Governing the Design and Operation of Local Exhaust Ventilation Systems, 2012.
(6) ANSI Z358.1-2009, American National Standard for Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment, 2009.
l. American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC).
(1) AISC 325:2011, Steel Construction Manual, 2011.
(2) ANSI/AISC 360:10, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, 2010.
(3) ANSI/AISC N690-12, Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities, 2012.
m. American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANS).
(1) ANSI/ANS-1-2000 (R2007) (R2012), Conduct of Critical Experiments, 2000.
(2) ANSI/ANS-6.4.2-2006, Specification for Radiation Shielding Materials, 2006.
(3) ANSI/ANS-8 Series Standards.
(4) ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, 2014.
(5) ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 (R2003) (R2012), Criticality Accident Alarm System, 1997.
(6) ANSI/ANS-8.15-2014, Nuclear Criticality Safety Control of Selected Actinide Nuclides, 2014.
(7) ANSI/ANS-14.1-2004 (R2009) (R2014), Operation of Fast Pulse Reactors, 2004.
(8) ANSI/ANS-58.8-1994 (R2001) (R2008), Time Response Design Criteria for Safety-Related Operator Actions, 1994.
(9) ANSI/ANS-58.9-2002 (R2015), Single Failure Criteria for LWR Safety-Related Fluid Systems, 1981.
n. American National Standards Institute/International Society of Automation (ISA).
(1) ANSI/ISA 7.0.01-1996, Quality Standard for Instrument Air, 1996.
(2) ANSI/ISA 18.1-1979 (R2004), Annunciator Sequences and Specifications, 1979.
(3) ANSI/ISA 67.01.01-2002 (R2007), Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications, 2002.
(4) ANSI/ISA S67.02.01-1999, Nuclear-Safety-Related Instrument Sensing Line Piping and Tubing Standard for Use in Nuclear Power Plants, 1999.
(5) ANSI/ISA 67.04.01-2006 (R2011), Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation, 2006.
o. American Petroleum Institute (API).
(1) API-620, Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-Pressure Storage Tanks, 2013.
(2) API-650, Welded Tanks for Oil Storage, 2013.
Section 53
p. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE).
(1) ASHRAE Handbook, Fundamentals (Inch-Pound Edition), 2013.
(2) ASHRAE Standard 62.1-2010, Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality, 2010.
q. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME).
(1) ASME AG-1-2015, Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment, 2015.
(2) ASME BPVC, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 2015.
(3) ASME B16.5-2013, Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings: NPS ½ through NPS 24 Metric/Inch Standard, 2013.
(4) ASME B30.2-2011, Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Single or Multiple Girder, Top Running Trolley Hoist), 2011.
(5) ASME B31.3-2014, Process Piping, 2014.
(6) ASME B73.1-2012, Specification for Horizontal End Suction Centrifugal Pumps for Chemical Process, 2012.
(7) ASME B73.2-2003 (R2009), Specifications for Vertical In-Line Centrifugal Pumps for Chemical Process, 2003.
(8) ASME NOG-1-2010, Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder), 2010.
(9) ASME NUM-1-2009, Rules for Construction of Cranes, Monorails, and Hoists (with Bridge or Trolley or Hoist of the Underhung Type), 2009.
(10) ASME NQA-1-2012, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications, 2013.
r. ASTM International.
(1) ASTM C852-09, Standard Guide for Design Criteria for Plutonium Gloveboxes, 2009.
(2) ASTM C1455-14e1, Standard Test Method for Nondestructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods, 2014.
s. American Water Works Association (AWWA).
AWWA D100-11, Welded Carbon Steel Tanks for Water Storage, 2011.
t. Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA).
CMAA Standards, as applicable.
u. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB).
DNFSB Recommendation 2004-2, Active Confinement Systems.
v. Hydraulic Institute Standards.
Hydraulic Institute Standards, as applicable.
w. Illuminating Engineering Society (IES).
IES HB-10-11, IES Lighting Handbook, 2011.
Section 54
x. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
(1) IEEE C2-2017, National Electrical Safety Code, 2017.
(2) IEEE C37 Standards Collection, Power Switchgears, Substations, and Relays, Standards on switchgear as applicable, 2010.
(3) IEEE N42.18-2004, American National Standard Specification and Performance of On-Site Instrumentation for Continuously Monitoring Radioactivity in Effluents, 2004.
(4) IEEE N323D-2002, American National Standard to Installed Radiation Protection Instrumentation, 2003.
(5) IEEE 7-4.3.2-2016, IEEE Standard Criteria for Programmable Digital Devices in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2016.
(6) IEEE 80-2013, IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding, 2013.
(7) IEEE 141-1993 (R1999), IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution for Industrial Plants, 1993.
(8) IEEE 142-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, 2007.
(9) IEEE 242-2001, IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (IEEE Buff Book), 2001.
(10) IEEE 308-2012, IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2012.
(11) IEEE 323-2003 (R2008), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2003.
(12) IEEE 334-2006 (R2012), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Continuous Duty Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(13) IEEE 336-2010, IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation, Inspection, and Testing for Class 1E Power, Instrumentation, and Control Equipment at Nuclear Facilities, 2010.
(14) IEEE 338-2012, IEEE Standard for Criteria for the Periodic Surveillance Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety, 2012.
(15) IEEE 344-2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013.
(16) IEEE 352-1987, IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, 1987.
(17) IEEE 379-2014, IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, 2014.
(18) IEEE 382-2006, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Safety-Related Actuators for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(19) IEEE 383-2015, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Electric Cables and Splices for Nuclear Facilities, 2015.
(20) IEEE 384-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, 2008.
(21) IEEE 387-1995 (R2007), IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generation Stations, 1995.
(22) IEEE 399-1997, IEEE Recommended Practice for Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Analysis (IEEE Brown Book), 1997.
(23) IEEE 420-2013, IEEE Standard for the Design and Qualification of Class 1E Control Boards, Panels, and Racks Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013.
(24) IEEE 446-1995 (R2000), IEEE Recommended Practice for Emergency and Standby Power Systems for Industrial and Commercial Applications, 1995.
(25) IEEE 450-2010, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2010.
(26) IEEE 484-2002, IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2002.
Section 55
(27) IEEE 493-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, 2007.
(28) IEEE 535-2013, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class 1E Vented Lead Acid Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2013.
(29) IEEE 577-2012, IEEE Standard Requirements for Reliability Analysis in the Design and Operation of Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2012.
(30) IEEE 603-2009, IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2009.
(31) IEEE 627-2010, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Equipment Used in Nuclear Facilities, 2010.
(32) IEEE 628-2011, IEEE Standard Criteria for the Design, Installation, and Qualification of Raceway Systems for Class 1E Circuits for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2011.
(33) IEEE 649-2006 (R2011), IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Motor Control Centers for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(34) IEEE 650-2006, IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class 1E Static Battery Chargers and Inverters for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2006.
(35) IEEE 833-2005 (R2011), IEEE Recommended Practice for the Protection of Electric Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations from Water Hazards, 2005.
(36) IEEE 946-2004, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Power Systems for Generating Systems, 2004.
(37) IEEE 1023-2004 (R2010), IEEE Recommended Practice for the Application of Human Factors Engineering to Systems, Equipment, and Facilities of Nuclear Power Generating Stations and other Nuclear Facilities, 2004.
(38) IEEE 1050-2004, IEEE Guide for Instrumentation and Control Equipment Grounding in Generating Stations, 2004.
y. International Code Council (ICC).
ICC, International Building Code, 2015.
z. International Society of Automation (ISA).
ISA-TR84.00.06, Safety Fieldbus Design Considerations for Process Industry Sector Applications, 2009.
aa. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP).
NCRP Report 49, “Structural Shielding Design and Evaluation for Medical Use of X Rays and Gamma Rays of Energies Up to 10 MeV,” 1976.
bb. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).
(1) NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2015.
(2) NFPA 70, National Electric Code, 2017.
(3) NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2016.
(4) NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2015.
(5) NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2016.
(6) NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems, 2017.
(7) NFPA 1143, Standard for Wildland Fire Management, 2014.
cc. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
NUREG-0700, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines, 2002.
dd. Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association (TEMA).
TEMA, 9th Edition TEMA Standards: Standards on Heat Exchangers Classes B, C, and R. Appendix F, Concluding Material. New York, 2007.
2. ACRONYMS.