DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 2, Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

Vertical line denotes change. AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY: http://www.directives.doe.gov Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance MANUAL Approved: 8-26-05 Review: 8-26-07 Chg 2: 10-20-10 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance DOE M 470.4-1 DOE M 470.4-1 i 8-26-05 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 1. PURPOSE. To establish program planning and management requirements for the Department’s Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. 2. OBJECTIVES. a. Effect the policy in DOE P 470.1, Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy, by integrating program planning and management into Department of Energy (DOE) operations as determined by line management, and according to sound risk management practices. [DOE P 470.1, Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy, is the Department’s philosophical approach to the management of the S&S Program. A principal objective of the ISSM Program is to integrate S&S into management and work practices at all levels, based on program line management’s risk management- based decisions, so that missions may be accomplished without security events, such as interruption, disruption or compromise. This approach includes individual responsibility and implementation of the security requirements found in this Manual.] b. Establish individual responsibilities to fulfill the requirements in this Manual. c. Establish requirements for S&S planning and evaluations. d. Establish requirements for S&S management. e. Promulgate the requirements of the National Industrial Security Program. 3. PROGRAM INTEGRATION. S&S program planning and management must be integrated with other programs such as physical protection, protective force (PF), information security, personnel security, and nuclear material control & accountability (MC&A). Mechanisms must also exist to assure that S&S program planning is fully integrated with overall site strategic and near-term operational planning. Additionally, the activities and requirements in the weapons surety, foreign visits and assignments, safety, emergency management, cyber security, and intelligence and counterintelligence programs should also be considered in the implementation of this Manual. 4. CANCELLATIONS. The directives listed below are canceled. Cancellation of a directive does not by itself modify or otherwise affect any contractual obligation to comply with the directive. Canceled directives that are incorporated by reference in a contract remain in effect until the contract is modified to delete the reference to the requirements in the canceled directives. The publication of this Manual incorporates or cancels all previous memoranda or letters that were issued by the Office of Security or its predecessor organizations that established policy. ii DOE M 470.4-1 8-26-05 a. DOE N 473.9, Security Conditions, dated 7-8-04. b. DOE M 470.1-1, Safeguards and Security Awareness Program, dated 10-02-02. 5. APPLICABILITY. a. Departmental Elements. Except for the exclusion in paragraph 5c, this Manual applies to all Departmental elements, listed on Attachment 1. This Manual automatically applies to Departmental elements created after it is issued. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will assure that NNSA employees and contractors comply with their respective responsibilities under this Manual.

b. Contractors. (1) The Contractor Requirements Document (CRD), Attachment 2, sets forth requirements of this Manual that will apply to site/facility management contracts that include the CRD. (2) The CRD must be included in the site/facility management contracts that involve classified information or matter, or nuclear materials and contain DOE Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) clause 952.204-2, titled Security Requirements. (a) Departmental elements must notify contracting officers of affected site/facility management contracts to incorporate this directive into those contracts. (b) Once notified, contracting officers are responsible for incorporating this directive into the affected contracts via the Laws, Regulations, and DOE Directives clause of the contracts. (3) A violation of the provisions of the CRD relating to the safeguarding or security of Restricted Data or other classified information may result in a civil penalty pursuant to subsection a. of section 234B, of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 228b.). The procedures for the assessment of civil penalties are set forth in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 824, Procedural Rules for the Assessment of Civil Penalties for Classified Information Security Violations, (10 CFR Part 824). (4) As stated in DEAR clause 970.5204-2, titled Laws, Regulations, and DOE Directives, regardless of the performer of the work, site/facility contractors with the CRD incorporated into their contracts are responsible for compliance with the CRD. Affected site/facility management contractors are responsible for flowing down the requirements of the CRD DOE M 470.4-1 iii 8-26-05 to subcontracts at any tier to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with the requirements. In doing so, contractors must not unnecessarily or imprudently flow down requirements to subcontracts. That is, contractors must both ensure that they and their subcontractors comply with the requirements of this CRD and incur only costs that would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive business. (5) This Manual does not automatically apply to other than site/facility management contracts. Application of any of the requirements in this Manual to other than site/facility management contracts will be communicated as follows. (a) Heads of Field Elements and Headquarters Departmental Elements. Review procurement requests for new non-site-/ non-facility-management contracts that involve classified information or matter, or nuclear materials and contain DEAR clause 952.204-2, titled Security Requirements. If appropriate, ensure that the requirements of the CRD of this Manual are included in the contract. (b) Contracting Officers. Assist originators of procurement requests who want to incorporate the requirements of the CRD of this Manual in new non-site-/non-facility-management contracts, as appropriate. c. Exclusion. In accordance with the responsibilities and authorities assigned by Executive Order 12344 and to ensure consistency throughout the joint Navy and DOE organization of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors will implement and oversee all requirements and practices pertaining to this Manual for activities under the Deputy Administrator’s cognizance. d. Exemption.

(1) Requirements in this Manual that overlap or duplicate requirements of the, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) related to radiation protection, nuclear safety (including quality assurance), and safeguards and security of nuclear material, do not apply to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) facilities. iv DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. (2) This exemption does not apply to requirements for which the NRC defers to DOE or does not exercise regulatory jurisdiction. 6. DEVIATIONS. Deviations from requirements must be processed in accordance with Section M. 7. DEFINITIONS. Terms commonly used in the program are defined in the S&S Glossary located in DOE M 470.4-7, Safeguards and Security Program References. In addition to those in the Glossary, the following definitions are provided for use in this Manual. a. DOE line management refers to DOE and NNSA Federal employees who have been granted the authority to commit resources or direct the allocation of personnel or approve implementation plans and procedures in the accomplishment of specific work activities. b. Line management refers to DOE and NNSA Federal and contractor employees who have been granted the authority to commit resources or direct the allocation of personnel or approve implementation plans and procedures in the accomplishment of specific work activities. c. DOE cognizant security authority refers to DOE and NNSA Federal employees who have been granted the authority to commit security resources or direct the allocation of security personnel or approve security implementation plans and procedures in the accomplishment of specific work activities. d. Cognizant security authority refers to DOE and NNSA Federal and contractor employees who have been granted the authority to commit security resources or direct the allocation of security personnel or approve security implementation plans and procedures in the accomplishment of specific work activities. e. Category I/II refers to facilities or sites possessing Category I quantities of special nuclear material (SNM) or credible rollup quantities of SNM to a Category I quantity. f. For the purposes of this Manual, the Office of Security refers to the DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security. 8. IMPLEMENTATION. Requirements that cannot be implemented within 6 months of the effective date of this Manual or within existing resources must be documented by the cognizant security authority and submitted to the relevant program officers: the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment or the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA; and the Office of Security. The documentation must include timelines and resources needed to fully implement this Manual. The documentation must also include a description of the vulnerabilities and impacts created by the delayed implementation of the requirements. DOE M 470.4-1 v (and vi) 8-26-05 9. CONTACT. Questions concerning this Manual should be directed to the Office of Security at 202-586-3345. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY: CLAY SELL Deputy Secretary DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 vii 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change.. CONTENTS PART 1. PLANNING AND EVALUATIONS SECTION A—SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... A-1

2. REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... A-1 3. PLANNING .................................................................................................................... A-4 APPENDIX 1—SAFEGUARDS AND & SECURITY MANAGEMENT PLAN 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................ Appendix 1-1 2. PART 1—ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................... Appendix 1-1 3. PART 2—ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, DELEGATIONS, AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... Appendix 1-2 4. PART 3—S&S PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ...................................... Appendix 1-3 5. PART 4—PLANNING AND BUDGET (INCLUDING PERSONNEL RESOURCES) .............................................................................................. Appendix 1-3 APPENDIX 2—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TACTICAL DOCTRINE 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... Appendix 2-1 2. TACTICAL DOCTRINE................................................................................ Appendix 2-1 3. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................ Appendix 2-9 SECTION B—SECURITY CONDITIONS 1. OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................................B-1 2. THREAT INDICATORS.................................................................................................B-1 3. SECURITY CONDITIONS.............................................................................................B-2 SECTION C—SITE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PLANS 1. OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................................C-1 2. APPLICATION ...............................................................................................................C-1 3. SCOPE .............................................................................................................................C-1 4. PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................C-1 5. PLAN COMPOSITION ...................................................................................................C-1 6. EVIDENCE FILES ..........................................................................................................C-2 7. DATA COLLECTION ....................................................................................................C-2 8. FORMAT .........................................................................................................................C-2 viii DOE M 470.4-1 8-26-05 CONTENTS (continued) SECTION C—TABLES Table C-1. SNM Theft/Diversion Targets .............................................................................C-6 Table C-2. Radiological Sabotage Targets ............................................................................C-6 Table C-3. Biological/Chemical Sabotage Targets ................................................................C-7 Table C-4. Disruption of Critical Mission Targets ................................................................C-7

Table C-5. Site-Wide Protection Strategies ...........................................................................C-8 Table C-6. Facility Protection Systems ................................................................................C-10 Table C-7. Qualification and Training .................................................................................C-11 Table C-8. MC&A Plans and Procedures ............................................................................C-12 Table C-9. Personnel Security/Human Reliability Program Implementation ......................C-13 Table C-10. Automated Information Systems Security Programs .........................................C-13 Table C-11. S&S-Related Maintenance, Testing, and Records Management Programs ............................................................................................................C-16 Table C-12. Site Protection Program Evaluation Program ....................................................C-16 Table C-13. Deviations from DOE Directives .......................................................................C-17 Table C-14. Pending Deviations from DOE Directives .........................................................C-17 Table C-15. Summary of Identified Risks .............................................................................C-19 Table C-16. SNM Theft/Diversion Targets ...........................................................................C-20 Table C-17. Credible Radiological Sabotage Targets ............................................................C-20 Table C-18. Credible Biological Sabotage Targets ...............................................................C-20 Table C-19 Credible Chemical Sabotage Targets .................................................................C-20 Table C-20. Disruption of Critical Mission Targets ..............................................................C-21 Table C-21. Performance Testing Results of Site-Specific Essential Protection Element Values .................................................................................C-22 Table C-22. Critical Path Scenarios .......................................................................................C-24 Table C-23. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Theft or Diversion of SNM ...........................C-25 Table C-24. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Radiological Sabotage ..................................C-25 Table C-25. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Biological Sabotage ......................................C-26 Table C-26. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Chemical Sabotage .......................................C-26 Table C-27. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Disruption of Critical Missions ....................C-26 DOE M 470.4-1 ix 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. CONTENTS (continued) Table C-28. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Theft or Espionage of Classified Matter .................................................................................................................C-27 Table C-29. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Other Losses .................................................C-27 Table C-30. System Effectiveness Summary .........................................................................C-27 SECTION D—SITE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PLAN/RESOURCE PLAN 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... D-1

2. UNFUNDED/UNSUPPORTED REQUIREMENTS ..................................................... D-5 3. REFERENCES FOR THE RESOURCE PLAN............................................................. D-5 4. HEADINGS AND TERMS FOR TABLES D-1 THROUGH D-5 ................................ D-5 SECTION D—TABLES Table D-1. Operational Requirements .................................................................................. D-1 Table D-2. Capital Equipment .............................................................................................. D-2 Table D-3. General Plant Projects ......................................................................................... D-3 Table D-4. Line Item Construction Projects ......................................................................... D-4 Table D-5. Unfunded/Unsupported Requirements ................................................................ D-4 SECTION E—VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................... E-1 2. CONDUCTING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS ................................................. E-1 3. QUALITY ASSURANCE ............................................................................................... E-3 4. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTATION ........................................... E-3 5. ASSIGNING FIGURES OF MERIT ............................................................................... E-3 6. CRITICAL SYSTEM ELEMENTS ................................................................................ E-4 7. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT REPORTS ............................................................ E-4 8. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS .......................................................................................... E-4 9. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION ............................................................................. E-6 APPENDIX 3—VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MODELING TOOLS ........... Appendix 3-1 APPENDIX 4—SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS EQUATION ..................................................................................... Appendix 4-1 APPENDIX 5—SUGGESTED VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT REPORT FORMAT ......................................................................................... Appendix 5-1 x DOE M 470.4-1 8-26-05 CONTENTS (continued) SECTION F—PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................... F-1 2. REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................... F-1 SECTION G—SURVEY, REVIEW, AND SELF-ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS 1. OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................. G-1 2. REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... G-1 3. CONDUCT ..................................................................................................................... G-4 4. FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................... G-5 5. RATINGS ....................................................................................................................... G-6

6. REPORT CONTENT...................................................................................................... G-8 7. DISTRIBUTION........................................................................................................... G-10 8. NOTIFICATIONS AND ACTIONS FOR LESS THAN SATISFACTORY SURVEY COMPOSITE RATINGS............................................................................. G-11 9. NOTIFICATIONS AND ACTIONS FOR LESS THAN SATISFACTORY SELF-ASSESSMENT COMPOSITE RATINGS ........................................................ G-12 10. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ........................................................................................... G-12 11. UPGRADE OF COMPOSITE RATINGS.................................................................... G-13 12. RECORDS RETENTION ............................................................................................. G-13 13. CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT PROCESS ............................................................ G-13 PART 2. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT SECTION H—FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, OR INFLUENCE PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... H-1 CHAPTER I. GENERAL FOCI PROGRAM INFORMATION 1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................ I-1 2. APPLICABILITY ............................................................................................................. I-2 3. CONTRACT AWARD MUST NOT BE MADE PRIOR TO FCL ISSUANCE ............. I-3 4. ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION/PROCESSING WEB SITE............................................ I-3 CHAPTER II. FOCI ACTIVITIES 1. DETERMINING THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT/AGREEMENT ..........................................................................................II-1 2. DETERMINING THE FCL STATUS OF THE APPLICANT .......................................II-1 DOE M 470.4-1 xi 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. CONTENTS (continued) 3. ACCEPTING A FOCI DETERMINATION RENDERED BY ANOTHER FEDERAL AGENCY ..................................................................................II-1 4. CLASSIFIED CONTRACT ............................................................................................II-1 5. ADJUDICATION ............................................................................................................II-3 6. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES .................II-6 CHAPTER III. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1. FOCI CHANGES OCCUR FOLLOWING SUBMISSION OF AN SF 328 AND BEFORE CONTRACT AWARD .................................................................................. III-1 2. UPDATES...................................................................................................................... III-1 3. ANNUAL CERTIFICATION ....................................................................................... III-3 CHAPTER IV. FOCI MITIGATION ACTION PLANS 1. GENERAL ..................................................................................................................... IV-1 2. MITIGATION ACTION PLANS .................................................................................. IV-1 3. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP .............................................................................................. IV-1

4. ANNUAL COMPLIANCE MEETING ....................................................................... IV-11 5. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH MITIGATION PLANS ................................................. IV-11 APPENDIX 6 – FOCI MATRIX CHART ................................................................ Appendix 6-1 SECTION I—FACILITY CLEARANCES AND REGISTRATION OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES 1. OBJECTIVE ..................................................................................................................... I-1 CHAPTER I. FACILITY CLEARANCE (FCL) PROGRAM 1. GENERAL ........................................................................................................................ I-1 2. EXCEPTIONS TO REGISTRATION IN SSIMS ............................................................ I-3 CHAPTER II. IMPORTANCE RATINGS 1. FACILITY IMPORTANCE RATINGS ..........................................................................II-1 2. UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING A FACILITY’S ASSIGNED IMPORTANCE RATING ...............................................................................................II-2 CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND FCLs 1. FCL FOR SINGLE LEGAL ENTITIES ........................................................................ III-1 2. PARENT–SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP ................................................................ III-2 xii DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 8-26-05 CONTENTS (continued) CHAPTER IV. INTERIM AND LIMITED FCLs 1. INTERIM FCL............................................................................................................... IV-1 2. LIMITED FCL ............................................................................................................... IV-1 CHAPTER V. ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS AND EXCLUSION PROCEDURES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH FCLs 1. ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE FCL ................................................................................................................................. V-1 2. MULTIPLE FACILITY ORGANIZATIONS ................................................................ V-1 3. ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS CONCURRENT WITH THE FCL ............................. V-1 4. EXCLUSION PROCEDURES ....................................................................................... V-2 CHAPTER VI. FACILITY CLEARANCE 1. REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................... VI-1 2. ISSUANCE OF FCLs .................................................................................................... VI-2 3. CHANGED CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE FCL .................................................. VI-2 4. INTERFACE WITH FOCI REQUIREMENTS ............................................................ VI-2 CHAPTER VII. PROCESS FOR FCL AND SECURITY ACTIVITY REGISTRATION 1. ACCEPTING OGA FCLs............................................................................................. VII-1 2. OGA VERIFICATION REQUESTS ............................................................................ VII-5 3. REGISTERING OGA FCLs ......................................................................................... VII-5 4. REGISTRATION OF OGA CONTRACTORS IN SSIMS ......................................... VII-6 5. REGISTERING WORK FOR OTHERS (WFO) ACTIVITIES .................................. VII-6

6. REGISTRATION OF DOE FCLs ................................................................................ VII-7 7. REGISTRATION OF SECURITY ACTIVITIES ...................................................... VII-10 SECTION J—SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE ..................................................................................................................... J-1 2. REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................ J-1 SECTION K—SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... K-1 2. REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... K-1 3. PROGRAM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT ............................................................. K-1 4. BRIEFINGS .................................................................................................................... K-1 DOE M 470.4-1 xiii 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. CONTENTS (continued) 5. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (SF-312) ......... K-5 6. SUPPLEMENTARY AWARENESS ACTIVITIES ...................................................... K-6 SECTION L—CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED VISITS PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................... L-1 2. REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................... L-1 APPENDIX 7—ACCESS TO RESTRICTED DATA IN POSSESSION OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES ........................................................................ Appendix 7-1 SECTION M—DEVIATIONS 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... M-1 2. REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... M-1 3. DEVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………………M-1 4. DEVIATIONS TO NATIONAL POLICY…………………………………………….M-2 5. DOCUMENTATION………………………………………………………………….M-2 6. REVIEW AND UPDATE……………………………………………………………..M-3 SECTION N—INCIDENTS OF SECURITY CONCERN 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... N-1 2. REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... N-1 CHAPTER I. IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1. GENERAL ........................................................................................................................ I-1 2. INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION ......................................... I-1 3. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................... I-8 4. INQUIRY OFFICIALS .................................................................................................. I-14 5. FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL ................. I-15 6. CONDUCT OF INQUIRIES .......................................................................................... I-16 7. INQUIRY REPORT CONTENT/CLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS ............................. I-19 8. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS .................................................................................... I-21

9. RECORDS RETENTION ............................................................................................... I-21 SECTION N, CHAPTER I—TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1. Reportable Categories of Incidents of Security Concern, Impact Measurement Index 1 (IMI-1) ...................................................................................................... I-3 xiv DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. CONTENTS (continued) Table 2. Reportable Categories of Incidents of Security Concern, Impact Measurement Index 2 (IMI-2) .............................................................................. I-4 Table 3. Reportable Categories of Incidents of Security Concern, Impact Measurement Index 3 (IMI-3) .............................................................................. I-5 Table 4. Reportable Categories of Incidents of Security Concern, Impact Measurement Index 4 (IMI-4) .............................................................................. I-7 Figure 1. Incidents of Security Concern ............................................................................. I-10 Figure 2. Example Chain of Custody Form ....................................................................... I-17 CHAPTER II. INCIDENTS OF SECURITY CONCERN INVOLVING COMPROMISE OR POTENTIAL COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 1. INQUIRIES INTO COMPROMISE OF POTENTIAL COMPROMISE OF, OR MISSING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ....................................................................II-1 2. DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS ...........................................................................................II-2 3. CONDUCT OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS .................................................................II-3 4. PROCEDURES................................................................................................................II-3 5. CONTENT OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORTS .................................................II-3 6. COMBINING SIMILAR INCIDENTS ...........................................................................II-4 7. CASES INVOLVING OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY INFORMATION ............II-4 8. CASES INVOLVING FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION .........................II-4 9. JOINT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WITH ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY .........................................................................................................................II-5 SECTION O—RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY-FUNDED TECHNOLOGIES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT AND ITS OPERATIONAL FACILITIES 1. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................... O-1 2. REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... O-1 APPENDIX 9—TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER APPROVAL REQUESTS .............. Appendix 9-1 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1. DEPARTMENTAL ELEMENTS TO WHICH DOE M 470.4-1 APPLIES ATTACHMENT 2. CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 A-1 Vertical line denotes change. PART 1—PLANNING AND EVALUATIONS SECTION A—SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING 1. OBJECTIVE. To establish a standardized approach for protection program planning that will provide an information baseline for use in integrating Departmental safeguards and security (S&S) considerations, facilitating management evaluation of program elements, determining resources for needed improvements, and establishing cost-benefit bases for analyses and comparisons.

2. REQUIREMENTS. The following are essential elements for planning for S&S programs. a. S&S Philosophy. S&S interests and activities must be protected from theft, diversion, terrorist attack, industrial sabotage, radiological sabotage, chemical sabotage, biological sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other acts that may have an adverse impact on national security; the environment; or pose significant danger to the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) Federal and contractor employees or the public. DOE protective forces (PFs) that protect Category I quantities of special nuclear material (SNM); credible rollup of SNM to a Category I quantity; or those facilities that meet or exceed the Threat Level 2 criteria specified in DOE O 470.3A, Design Basis Threat Policy, dated 11-29-05, for chemical, radiological, or biological thresholds, must employ the DOE Tactical Doctrine contained in Appendix 2 of Section A. b. S&S Management Plan. This Plan must provide a description of the implementation of S&S policy and provide detailed information on the assignment of roles, responsibilities, and authorities, as well as the development of budgets and allocation of resources. The S&S Management Plan must be updated annually (at least every 12 months) and must document: (1) roles, responsibilities, delegations, and authorities for the S&S program; (2) organizational structure and accountability; and (3) planning and budget (including personnel resources). See Appendix 1, S&S Management Plan, for content requirements and suggested format. However, if a Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual for S&S has been approved and issued, and it meets the requirements stated above, it can be used in place of a S&S Management Plan. c. S&S Program Operations. Actions must be taken to ensure an acceptable S&S program, including curtailment or suspension of operations when such operations would result in an immediate and unacceptable impact to national security, the environment, or the health and safety of the public or employees. Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 A-2 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. (1) Site-Specific Characterization. Protection programs must be tailored to address specific site characteristics and requirements, current technology, ongoing programs, and operational needs to achieve acceptable protection levels that reduce risks in a cost-effective manner. (2) Threat Policy/Guidance. DOE O 470.3, Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy must be used with local threat guidance during the conduct of vulnerability assessments (VAs) for protection and control program planning. The DBT must be the baseline threat definition but local threat guidance may be used to increase the level of threat to be analyzed. (3) Targeted Protection Strategies. (a) Strategies for the physical protection of special nuclear materials (SNM) and vital equipment must incorporate the applicable requirements established in DOE M 470.4-2, Physical Protection. (b) Protection strategies must be implemented as specified in the DBT. PF resources must focus on decisively defeating the terrorist threat, which is facilitated by positioning posts so there is little or no delay in responding to critical targets, eliminating posts which detract from constant readiness, and maximizing use of physical protection systems to enhance PF effectiveness. PF resources must be positioned to interdict and neutralize the adversary threat as far as possible outside the boundaries of the target location.

(c) Protection program elements must be designed to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of acts of radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage that would cause unacceptable impact to national security, the environment, or the health and safety of the public or employees. Protection elements, such as active denial systems, must be designed and deployed to minimize the need for PF recapture/recovery operations. (d) Strategies for the protection and control of classified information or matter must incorporate the applicable requirements established in DOE M 470.4-4, Information Security. (e) Security systems must be used that prevent, detect, or deter unauthorized access, modification, or loss of classified and unclassified controlled matter and its unauthorized removal from a site or facility. (f) Strategies for the protection of government property not covered above must reflect a graded approach. DOE offices, facilities, and property protection areas (PPAs) must meet or exceed General Services Administration (GSA) minimum security standards. DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 A-3 Vertical line denotes change. (g) Security countermeasures for explosive threats must address a range of activities including hand-carried, mailed, and vehicle-transported devices. d. Graded Protection. The Department recognizes that risks must be accepted (i.e., that actions cannot be taken to reduce the potential for or consequences of all malevolent events to zero); however, an acceptable level of risk must be determined based on evaluation of a variety of facility-specific goals and considerations. By a graded approach, the Department intends that the highest level of protection be given to security interests and activities whose loss, theft, compromise, and/or unauthorized use would seriously affect the national security, the environment, Departmental programs, and/or the health and safety of the public or employees. Protection of other interests and activities must be graded accordingly. e. Risk Management. S&S programs must be based on the results of vulnerability and risk assessments, the results of which are used to design and provide graded protection in accordance with an asset’s importance or the impact of its loss, destruction, or misuse. The results of the assessments, to include the determination of system effectiveness, are one of the key considerations the manager must evaluate when establishing the level of risk. For example, if it is determined that there is high risk that is not being mitigated by compensatory measures, reporting must be made to the Secretary of Energy or the Deputy Secretary who can accept high risk. Cognizant Under Secretaries can accept moderate risk. (1) Vulnerability and risk assessments must be conducted and documented to support the identification of risks to be accepted by the Department. (2) To determine the appropriate level of protection against risk, line management must consider the threat, the vulnerability of the potential target, and the potential consequences of an adversarial act. f. Site-Specific Programs. (1) S&S programs must address site-specific characteristics. (2) Performance assurance programs must be developed, managed, and implemented to ensure that S&S programs and protection program elements protect security interests and activities. These programs must ensure intensive, frequent performance testing of PF individual and unit tactics with oversight by line management and independent oversight organizations.

Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 A-4 8-26-05 (3) A management and planning process to achieve integrated, site-specific protection from unauthorized actions must be implemented. This process must be based on a graded approach that implements the integrated concepts of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response. (4) The DBT must be used as the basis for planning protection programs. 3. PLANNING. a. S&S Plans. S&S plans must be developed for facilities with any of the following S&S interests: (1) Category I quantities of SNM or credible roll-up quantities of SNM to a Category I quantity; (2) Category II, Category III, or Category IV SNM; (3) radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage threats; (4) critical mission disruption threats; (5) intra-/inter-site transportation of SNM; (6) classified information or matter; (7) facilities engaged in the protection of government property; (8) facilities that the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Under Secretaries deem appropriate. b. Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP). The SSSP is a 5-year master planning document that must be prepared for sites with facilities described in paragraphs 3a(1), (3), (4), or (8) above. The SSSP must depict the existing condition of site protection programs and, when the DBT performance standard cannot be met, establish improvement priorities and resource requirements for the necessary improvements. Plan composition is reflected in Part 1, Section C, 5. c. Site Security Plan (SSP). At locations where an SSSP is not required because of the limited scope of interests (i.e., criteria contained in 3a(2), (5), (6), or (7) above, apply), an SSP must be developed to describe the protection program. SSPs must be approved by the local DOE cognizant security authority. In addition, specialized plans must be developed to address protection programs for other protection operations. Requirements for specialized plans that may or may not be components of the SSP are set forth in the applicable DOE directives. d. Planning Inputs. The documents listed below must be used to support program forecasts and information input used in the protection program planning process. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section A 8-26-05 A-5 (and A-6) (1) Applicable Departmental directives, guidance, and intelligence assessment information developed and disseminated by line management or the Office of Security. (2) Programmatic guidance and forecasts of significant changes planned in site operations as communicated through line management. (3) Current and projected operational constraints and resources. (4) Analysis of cost and effectiveness of security technologies versus traditional protection methodologies. e. Plan Review and Approval. (1) The SSSP requires approval by DOE line management and concurrence by the cognizant Head of the Departmental Element (see Attachment 1). Such approval authority must be formally delegated to line management. (a) Copies of approved SSSPs must be provided to the Office of Security for review and comment. (b) Other security plans may be approved as stipulated in the applicable directive. If approving authority is not otherwise stipulated, these security plans may be approved by DOE line management. (2) The SSSP must be submitted to DOE line management within 150 days of the termination date of data collection and approved within 120 days of the submittal date. Directive changes, facility reconfiguration, a new VA, or other activities that occur after the stated effective date will not be considered for purposes of reviewing/approving the plan.

(3) The SSSP must be reviewed annually (at least every 12 months). Updates to the SSSP that may significantly alter the agreed-upon protection philosophy or performance standards of protection systems must be subjected to the formal VA process, and if changes are shown to significantly alter system effectiveness performance, the update(s) will be subject to the same concurrence and approval as stated in paragraph 3e(1), above. (4) An information copy of approved modifications must be provided to the Office of Security. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section A 8-26-05 Appendix 1, 1-1 SECTION A APPENDIX 1—SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY MANAGEMENT PLAN The Safeguards and Security (S&S) Management Plan provides a description of the implementation of S&S policy and provides detailed information on the assignment of roles, responsibilities, and authorities, as well as the development of budgets and allocation of resources. The following outline delineates the content requirements and provides a suggested format. 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. a. Program Mission Statement. Briefly describe the program mission and how the mission relates to national security. Describe the major elements or activities performed in terms of program mission and its relationship to the DOE national security mission. b. S&S Program Structure. Briefly describe the strategy and organizational elements used to implement the S&S program under their cognizance. c. Management and Planning Assumptions. Briefly describe those assumptions that affect the management and planning of the implementation of the S&S program. These assumptions should include items such as: (1) future of the program (mission, staffing levels, site status, etc.); (2) current and planned S&S projects; and (3) status of the organization’s S&S budget. 2. PART 1—ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY a. Line Management Organization. Describe the structure and relationship of line management. Identify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of these line management elements to include organizational charts. b. Cognizant Security Authority Organization. Describe the structure of line management that is specifically responsible for implementing the Departmental element’s S&S program. Identify the individuals and positions responsible for committing resources and directing the activities of personnel associated with the S&S program. (1) Headquarters Organizational Structure. For the Headquarters elements, provide an organizational chart to show the S&S organization and management structure and the lines of authority and points of interface with other programs which affect S&S (e.g., safety, facility operations, and the cognizant security authority’s material control and accountability Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Appendix 1, 1-2 8-26-05 (MC&A) organization, if independent of the security organization). Describe the functions and responsibilities of S&S personnel and indicate how S&S activities are integrated with those of other facility organizations; include organizational responsibilities for line management overseeing the program as well as the interface points with the respective Departmental element.

(2) Field Organizational Structure. For the Field elements, provide an organizational chart to show the S&S organization and management structure and the lines of authority and points of interface with other programs which affect S&S (e.g., safety, facility operations, and the cognizant security authorities’ MC&A organization, if independent of the security organization). Describe the functions and responsibilities of S&S personnel and indicate how S&S activities are integrated with those of other facility organizations; include organizational responsibilities for line management overseeing the program as well as the interface points with the respective Departmental element. c. Contractor Sites. Provide the contract name, number, and other information that describes the authority under which the contractor executes management functions for facilities under the cognizance of a Departmental element. Identify the site contractor elements responsible for S&S programs and describe their S&S activities. Provide Federal and contractor organization charts and identify key positions and the relationships between the organizations responsible for S&S activities. Describe Federal and contractor involvement in the development of S&S resource requirements. 3. PART 2—ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, DELEGATIONS, AND AUTHORITIES. Delegations must be documented in writing and delineate all assigned S&S roles, responsibilities, and authorities for the S&S program. This section: a. documents offices/positions affected by the S&S Management Plan; b. establishes the approval chain for S&S plans, procedures and implementation policy; c. establishes the approval chain for S&S policy deviations; d. assigns reporting requirements for incidents of security concern; and e. provides a list of roles and responsibilities for key positions and the delegated authorities for each. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section A 8-26-05 Appendix 1, 1-3 (and 1-4) 4. PART 3—S&S PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION. This section of the S&S Management Plan documents the processes and methods used to implement the Department’s security policies. This section identifies: a. the methods used for ensuring all applicable programmatic requirements are implemented throughout the organizational element; b. the methods used for ensuring effective integration of S&S programmatic elements; and c. SSSPs and SSPs used to implement S&S policy requirements. 5. PART 4—PLANNING AND BUDGET (INCLUDING PERSONNEL RESOURCES). This section of the S&S Management Plan documents the key processes of planning and budgeting, including strategic planning, budget formulation, budget execution, and program evaluation. a. Describe the strategic planning assumptions used to ensure the S&S program will meet mission objectives. b. Provide a 5-year plan that describes the budget formulation priorities for future S&S resources and programs. c. Provide the current year plan for executing the S&S budget. This plan details the allocation of resources that support S&S functions and missions. d. Provide a program evaluation plan that details how the cognizant security authority will assess the implementation of the S&S program and the organization’s progress toward meeting established missions/goals. The program evaluation plan must cover both the Federal and contractor elements of the Departmental element. This plan can be used to support award fee decisions by the Departmental element.

e. Briefly describe any changes to operational requirements which affect S&S program operations or would require increments or decrements to operational accounts (e.g., program direction, operational support, etc.). DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 Appendix 2, 2-1 Vertical line denotes change. SECTION A APPENDIX 2—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TACTICAL DOCTRINE 1. INTRODUCTION. a. Overview. The establishment of Departmental doctrine governing the defense of sensitive national security assets is necessary to ensure the uniform application of effective security measures throughout the complex. This appendix is the condensed expression of the Department‘s fundamental approach to protecting nuclear weapons and components, special nuclear material, or targets subject to radiological or toxicological sabotage. In keeping with the development of higher standards for individual training and fitness, aggressive small unit tactics must be employed within the bounds of a well-defined and constructed area defense that is supported by fixed strong points, obstacles/barriers, advanced detection and assessment capabilities, coordinated fire planning, updated weapon systems, and armored vehicles. b. Purpose of an Armed Protective Force (PF). Within DOE, armed PFs exist to deter and to defeat terrorist or other adversarial actions that could have major national security consequences; primarily, unauthorized access to nuclear weapons and components, special nuclear material, or targets subject to chemical, biological, or radiological sabotage or that contain a unique capability that must be protected. When availability of armed PFs is limited, they shall not be used to: (1) perform routine, repetitive tasks that are not related directly to target protection; (2) perform access control functions that can be better accomplished through automation; (3) act as administrative escorts for construction projects or service personnel (unless required for protection of assets); or (4) staff posts that offer convenience to management and/or employees. 2. TACTICAL DOCTRINE. a. Concept. In general, at Category I/II facilities within the DOE, defensive plans will involve an area defense with fixed strong points, or fighting positions, that encompass a target and lie within a concentric arrangement of intrusion detection systems and barriers designed to detect, delay, and engage the adversary as far from the target as possible. A Tactical Response Force (TRF) consisting of highly trained, motivated, and skilled tactical units/teams will be positioned on, or in proximity to, each target. Early detection will permit interdiction by mobile Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Appendix 2, 2-2 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. response teams using fire and maneuver techniques to deny further access to adversaries and/or to channel them into attrition areas covered by interlocking bands of fire from fixed, hardened fighting positions. b. Defensive Planning Principles. (1) Prepare the Defensive Area. (a) Prepare a barrier plan to: 1 Minimize the number of access points and/or avenues of approach. 2 Channel the adversary into attrition areas by use of barriers and preplanned, interlocking bands of fire. 3 Control the high ground, either by physical presence or by weapons fire. (b) Prepare a defensive fire plan to ensure that: 1 clear fields of fire and observation across the battlefield are maintained; 2 defensive positions are mutually supporting;

3 high volumes of fire can be brought onto key terrain features, obstacles, and along expected routes of approach; and 4 the volume of fire brought upon an adversary increases as a target area is approached. (2) Integrate All Aspects of the Defensive Plan. (a) Employ multiple layers of detection. (b) Employ multiple layers of delay (e.g., barriers/obstacles). (c) Integrate technology, such as remotely operated weapon systems ROWS), active denial systems, and advanced detection and observation systems, with response force tactics. (d) Ensure that barriers are covered by weapons fire. (e) Ensure that the entire defensive perimeter is covered by interlocking fields of fire from mutually supporting positions. DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 Appendix 2, 2-3 Vertical line denotes change. (f) Where feasible, control the configuration of the battlefield by eliminating anything that could provide potential adversary cover and/or concealment. (g) Ensure that likely avenues of approach are defended with sufficient force to compel a decisive engagement with the adversary. (h) Protect defenders by employing hardened fighting positions situated for mutual support. (i) Establish supplementary defensive positions. (j) Prepare to maneuver offensive forces to attack and to defeat an adversary whose progress is delayed by engagement with defensive fire. (3) Make the Adversary Fight to the Target. (a) Adversary detection and engagement must occur as far from the target as possible. (b) Assign sufficient resources to be able to assess remote alarms to identify the number of adversaries, thereby helping to differentiate between diversionary attacks and the main force. (c) Plan for staged withdrawal of forces dispatched to assess remote alarms to prepared supplementary defensive positions. (d) Plan for overwatch of assessment forces with long range weapons from within the defensive perimeter. (e) Coordinate barrier and fire control planning to ensure that the adversary will be subjected to high volumes of fire in exposed positions prior to entry into the defensive perimeter. (f) Ensure adequate standoff for vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). (g) Limit the ability of airborne improvised explosive devices to impact key defensive positions and primary target buildings. (4) Make the Target Location Deadly. (a) Use technology to distract, interrupt, disable, or neutralize anyone who has obtained unauthorized access to target locations. (b) Include considerations for re-entry and recapture of target locations in all barrier and response plans. Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Appendix 2, 2-4 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. (5) Manage the Site Population. (a) Limit the number of personnel, vehicles, and equipment in the target area at all times. (b) Develop formal site-specific procedures for the disposition of workers in the event of an attack. 1 If the tactical conditions permit, workers may be evacuated to safe areas from prospective target locations and likely avenues of approach. 2 Sheltering in place may be the best option. Workers should be provided with specific instructions, such as to remain off the phone unless they possess information about the event, to lie on the floor, and, if PF enter their location, to keep their hands and security badges visible.

c. Tactical Application. The TRF is deployed in a strategic posture to interrupt, interdict, deny, and neutralize an adversary force attack. The TRF is armed and equipped with state of the art weaponry, tactical equipment, vehicles, and communication systems. The TRF is adept at implementing approved Security Incident Response Plans under adverse emergency conditions. The primary mission of the TRF is the protection of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and SNM from theft, sabotage, and unauthorized control. Ancillary duties include the safeguarding of classified information and other classified assets. (1) Tactical Response Force Characteristics. (a) Survivability (b) Mobility (c) Lethality (d) Flexibility (e) Speed (f) Unpredictability (g) Mutual Support (h) Reliable communications (2) Tactical Response Force Element Missions. A site TRF is composed of small units/teams of no fewer than two SPO II and/or SPO III personnel, deployed in configurations that provide tactical advantages for both DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 Appendix 2, 2-5 Vertical line denotes change. defensive and offensive operations. (a) Special Response Team (SRT). Mission: The SRT executes recapture/recovery and pursuit operations and supports interruption, interdiction, neutralization, containment, and denial strategies. Capabilities: SPO III qualified personnel are deployed as one or more dedicated teams with specialized weapons and equipment, operating from mobile tactical vehicles, as ground assault forces, or a combination of both. (b) Security Police Officer-II. Mission: Executes interruption, interdiction, neutralization, containment, and denial strategies and supports recapture/recovery and fresh pursuit operations. Capabilities: SPO II personnel operate in small units with specialized weapons and equipment from mobile patrols/tactical vehicles and fixed posts. (3) Tactical Response Force Support. All site Security Police Officers and Security Officers have a key role in supporting the overall site security posture and the TRF. (a) Security Police Officer-I. Mission: Supports interruption, interdiction, neutralization, containment, and denial strategies. Capabilities: SPO I personnel operate from mobile patrols and fixed posts. SPO I personnel perform routine S&S related functions and are capable of performing specialized active defense functions such as staffing defensive fighting positions, operating Remotely Operated Weapon Systems (ROWS), and performing Central Alarm Station (CAS) duties. (b) Security Officer. Mission: Ensures routine security-related functions are maintained (e.g., access/egress control, escort duties, CAS operations). Capabilities: Unarmed SOs perform observation and reporting activities, logistical re-supply to other PF elements, message courier duties, and provide transportation support. Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Appendix 2, 2-6 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. (4) Deployment Considerations. (a) A layered, or zone, defensive strategy is implemented that maximizes the TRF’s ability to detect, engage, and neutralize adversary forces as they move toward a target location. (b) Fixed, reinforced fighting positions, or bunkers, are utilized to enhance survivability, deny access to targets, provide overlapping fields of fire for mutual support, and to control avenues of approach. (c) Protection strategies are designed to reduce predictability of the response.

(d) Small units/teams of no fewer than two SPO II and/or SPO III personnel are deployed in configurations that provide tactical advantages for both defensive and offensive operations. (e) Personnel who will occupy fixed fighting positions, those who will perform as the flexible maneuver elements, and those who will, if required, conduct recapture/recovery operations are identified. (f) Each TRF member is issued at least one primary weapon along with a secondary firearm, such as a handgun, used principally for close quarters engagement or for transition in the event of a stoppage of the primary weapon. (g) TRF weapons are capable of tactical operations in both day and night conditions. (h) The TRF employs direct-fire weapons (i.e., machine guns, precision rifles, battle rifles, etc.) to engage and to neutralize adversary forces out to the maximum effective range of the weapon. (i) As prescribed by the SSSP, the TRF employs indirect-fire or explosive projectile weapons (e.g., M3 MAAWS, MK19/GMG, M203, etc.) to deny access to target locations and to suppress and to neutralize adversary forces occupying positions of cover and/or concealment. (j) TRF members are knowledgeable of adversary attack methods identified in the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and critical pathways documented in site-specific vulnerability assessment reports. DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 Appendix 2, 2-7 Vertical line denotes change. (k) A secure tactical command post is identified to ensure that command, control, and communications links are maintained and that backup systems are available. (l) Command and control is structured down to the lowest unit/team level. Operational control of forces includes organizing and employing of forces, designating combat objectives, assigning individual and unit tasks, and issuing orders and directions necessary for mission accomplishment. (m) Accurate adversary and battle information is relayed to command/control centers as it occurs. (n) A system for Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) is employed to minimize incidents of casualties from “friendly fire.” (5) Denial Strategy Implementation. (a) Early warning system technologies are emplaced to detect and to assess adversary movement as far as possible from target locations. (b) Highly mobile tactical vehicles (armored and/or unarmored) mounted with light and/or heavy weapon systems are deployed to support combat operations, conduct reconnaissance operations, control avenues of approach, maneuver to suppress and destroy hostile threats, and to provide mutual support for other tactical vehicles. (c) A commander is designated for each tactical armored vehicle (for a two-person crew, usually the gunner). (d) Potential target access points are covered by suppressive fire weapons. (e) TRF members utilize positions of cover and maximize the element of surprise to the extent possible. (f) The TRF initiates a decisive engagement with adversary forces as far as possible outside the target location. (g) Once an adversary has been identified and engaged, TRF elements never lose contact. (h) Adversaries are engaged while they negotiate obstacles (i.e., fences, barriers, etc.), deploy from vehicles (both airborne and ground based), and cross open ground. Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Appendix 2, 2-8 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. (i) TRF teams, using suppressive fire weapons, maneuver in force against adversaries occupying covered positions.

(j) The TRF has plans in place to transition quickly from defensive to offensive operations. (6) Recapture/Recovery Operations. (a) The site PF is staffed and deployed in sufficient strength to ensure the protection of sensitive assets. The dedicated recapture/recovery element of the SRT is established with additional resources sufficient to ensure that recapture/recovery capabilities continue to exist in the event that the denial strategy fails. (b) SRT training is focused on site-specific targets and ensures that SRTs are adequately prepared to conduct recapture/recovery operations within identified target locations. (c) SRTs possess the tactics, tools, and techniques necessary to gain entry, neutralize the adversary threat, control the situation, and secure national security assets. (d) If hostages are involved and SNM is at risk, regaining control of the SNM is the primary consideration. (e) SRTs are supported by other TRF elements to the maximum extent possible as they move toward the target objective. (f) TRF members provide overwatch for the assault team(s) movement, cover avenues of approach, and provide support by fire to the SRT as they breach/enter the target location. (g) All TRF personnel are capable of providing direct support to the recapture/recovery mission by supplementing the main assault force, controlling the target area, and suppressing enemy defensive positions. (7) Pursuit Operations. (a) TRF members are trained and equipped to conduct Fresh Pursuit operations, on and off DOE property in accordance with DOE M 470.4-3, Section A, Appendix A-1, “Guidelines for Fresh Pursuit.” DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section A 3-7-06 Appendix 2, 2-9 Vertical line denotes change. (b) Fresh Pursuit operations are coordinated with responding Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies according to approved agreements. (c) TRF members use vehicle immobilization techniques and/or other means of applying deadly force to terminate the pursuit. (d) TRF members maintain control of sensitive assets until relieved by cognizant Federal authorities. (8) Weapons of Mass Destruction. (a) All TRF and SPO-I personnel are trained and equipped to operate within an environment where Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have been employed; i.e., chemical, biological, or radiological weaponry. PF training programs include tactical deployment in WMD personal protective equipment. (b) TRF members are able to transition to WMD fighting procedures rapidly enough so as to not weaken the overall combat posture. (c) Individual tactical equipment is compatible with WMD personal protective equipment. 3. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS. a. Training. Training is the key to a quality force, and the best form of tactical training is person-on-person, or force-on-force (FOF) engagements, on a repetitive basis. A requirement for increased FOFs for training purposes does not always have to involve the very large scale exercises that are conducted during inspections and annual SSSP validations. Nor do they always need to occur in or around the actual facilities. Encouraging and assisting PF members to refine their individual and small unit tactical skills and to condition them to the reflex of shooting at adversaries can be facilitated with smaller scale training exercises using surrogate facilities. This will enable the Department to afford a much higher frequency of such activities because the costs in terms of facility shut down, coordination with operations, shadow force deployment, etc., will be substantially avoided. But, in order to achieve the desired results, these exercises must employ engagement simulation systems such as Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES), dye marking cartridge (DMC) weapons, or hybrid DMC/MILES weapons that combine DMC for close-range and MILES for longer range.

b. Planning and Implementation. There are issues that may be considered ancillary to the planning and implementation of the DOE facility defense model but which nevertheless are important to the viability of tactical planning and execution. Some factor directly into the planning process while others relate indirectly. Part 1, Section A DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Appendix 2, 2-10 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. Examples are: (1) Targets must be as small and as few as possible. (2) All tactical training should simulate as closely as practicable the environment and manner in which PF personnel are expected to fight. (3) Persons assigned as full-time staff PF instructors must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of DOE M 470.4-3, Protective Force, Section A, Chapter II, paragraph 9. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section B 8-26-05 B-1 SECTION B—SECURITY CONDITIONS 1. OBJECTIVE. To ensure that the Department uniformly meets the requirements of the Homeland Security Advisory System outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3, (HSPD-3), dated 3-11-02, and provides the responses specified in Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (U), dated 6-21-95. 2. THREAT INDICATORS. While the Design Basis Threat (DBT) provides specific description of threats that all components of the safeguards and security (S&S) system must be capable of defeating, analysis of terrorism should be an ongoing process. Although each analysis relies on information included in previous assessments, judgments with respect to threats to Federal and Department of Energy (DOE)-affiliated personnel, facilities, and assets begin anew with each analysis. a. Homeland Security Threat Conditions [known in DOE as Security Conditions (SECONs)] are established based on the analysis of a continuous and timely flow of integrated all-source threat assessments and reporting provided to Executive Branch decision-makers. A threat indicator is a condition that, when present, increases the possibility of a terrorist incident. Seldom does one single indicator suggest that the threat is imminent, but, when a number of indicators are present, the level of concern should increase correspondingly. A decision on assigning SECONs must integrate a variety of considerations. This integration will rely on qualitative assessment, not quantitative calculation. Higher SECONs indicate greater risk of a terrorist act, with risk including both probability and gravity. Despite best efforts, there can be no guarantee that, at any given SECON, a terrorist attack will not occur. An initial and important factor is the quality of the threat information itself. The evaluation of this threat information includes, but is not limited to, the following factors. (1) To what degree is the threat information credible? (2) To what degree is the threat information corroborated? (3) To what degree is the threat specific and/or imminent? (4) How grave are the potential consequences of the threat? b. Local and site-specific threat analysis is a dynamic process because the threat and the countermeasures used to combat the threat are constantly changing. To keep up with possible changes in the threat, security professionals should develop a predetermined list of general and specific threat indicators. Threat indicators should be revised according to site/facility situations and needs. They should be reviewed at least every 6 months or when a significant incident or change in conditions indicates that the threat level is increasing or decreasing. Examples of threat indicators that can be used to develop a site-/facility-specific assessment are listed below.

Part 1, Section B DOE M 470.4-1 B-2 8-26-05 (1) International incidents or indicators against U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities. (2) Domestic incidents or indicators against Federal or State interests countrywide. (3) Local incidents or indicators directed against Federal or DOE interests. (4) Specific targeting of DOE personnel, facilities, or materials. 3. SECURITY CONDITIONS. The DOE SECON system has been aligned with the Homeland Security Advisory System. a. The DOE SECON system describes a progressive level of common sense protective measures that may be implemented in response to a malevolent or terrorist threat to any or all DOE facilities, assets, and personnel. The purpose of the SECON system is to establish standardized protective measures for a wide range of threats and to help disseminate appropriate, timely, and standardized information for the coordination and support of DOE crisis or contingency activities. Once a SECON level is declared, the associated protective measures should be implemented as soon as possible to the extent they apply to the individual site or facility. Cognizant security authorities must coordinate SECON status through their DOE points of contact, as appropriate, and notify the DOE Headquarters (HQ) Operations Center (OC) and Departmental element of the site/facility SECON status. Measures associated with each SECON are not prioritized but should be initiated concurrently when practical. b. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) facilities must be prepared to respond to SECON directives provided by the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA. Non-NNSA facilities must be prepared to respond to SECON directives provided by the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment for their individual facilities. Headquarters facilities must be prepared to respond to SECON directives provided by the Director, Office of Security. At their discretion, DOE line management may increase protection measures for facilities under their cognizance if they determine that the local threat situation warrants additional security. In this event, the DOE HQ OC and Departmental element must be notified of the SECON level. If DOE line management or Departmental elements believe that their facilities’ SECON levels should be less than those issued by the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment or the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA, a request for exception must be submitted for consideration (see paragraph 3c below). c. Any departure from the requirements of this section must be considered an exception which must be approved in accordance with the requirements set forth in Section M. No exception is permitted to the protective measures when under SECON 1, Severe Condition (Red). DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section B 8-26-05 B-3 d. To the extent possible throughout each increase or decrease in SECON, the cognizant security authority must: (1) keep employees informed; (2) coordinate when appropriate with State and local officials’ actions taken regarding security and emergency planning; and (3) at each level of SECON, review security plans, vulnerability assessments (VAs), emergency response procedures, public affairs guidance and plans, legal authorities, and Continuity of Operations Plans. e. A record of specific actions taken for each measure must be maintained. A description of each SECON, including the necessary circumstances for implementing, the impact on operations, and the purpose of each protective posture, is outlined below.

(1) SECON 5, LOW CONDITION (GREEN). This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. SECON 5, Low Condition (Green) exists when a general threat of possible malevolent or terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture. (2) SECON 4, GUARDED CONDITION (BLUE). This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. SECON 4, Guarded Condition (Blue) applies when there is an increased general threat of possible malevolent or terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of SECON 3, Elevated Condition (Yellow) measures. It may be necessary, however, to implement certain selected measures from higher SECONs to address intelligence received or to act as a deterrent. All measures selected for use under SECON 4, Guarded Condition (Blue) must be capable of being maintained indefinitely. (a) Measure 1. At regular intervals, warn all personnel to report the following to security: 1 suspicious personnel, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers, or those observing, photographing, or asking questions about site operations or security measures; 2 unidentified vehicles parked or operated in a suspicious manner on or in the vicinity of the site or near site facilities; 3 abandoned parcels or suitcases; and 4 any other activity considered suspicious. Part 1, Section B DOE M 470.4-1 B-4 8-26-05 (b) Measure 2. 1 Ensure that security personnel have immediate access to building floor plans and emergency/evacuation plans for all site facilities. 2 Ensure that security personnel are able to seal off an area immediately. 3 Ensure that key personnel required to implement security plans are on-call and readily available. 4 Maintain the site Emergency Management Team (EMT) on 2-hour recall. 5 Expand Operations Security measures. 6 Exercise bomb threat procedures. (c) Measure 3. Secure and seal buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. Maintain a list of secured facilities. (d) Measure 4. Increase unannounced security spot checks (inspection of personal identification; vehicle registration; and the contents of vehicles, suitcases, briefcases, and other containers) at access points for the site and facilities. (e) Measure 5. Reduce the number of access points for vehicles and personnel to minimum levels consistent with the requirement to maintain a reasonable flow of traffic. (f) Measure 6. As a deterrent, randomly apply measures 14, 15, 16, 17, or 18 from SECON 3, Elevated Condition (Yellow) either individually or in combination. (g) Measure 7. Review all operations plans, personnel details, and logistics requirements that pertain to implementing higher SECONs. (h) Measure 8. Review security measures for critical/sensitive personnel (e.g., directors, managers, members of special access/ security programs, etc.) and implement additional measures warranted by the threat and existing vulnerabilities (e.g., identified personnel should alter established patterns of behavior when traveling in public areas). DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section B 8-26-05 B-5 (i) Measure 9. Increase liaison with local law enforcement, intelligence community, security agencies, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI) to monitor the threat to site personnel and facilities. Notify local law enforcement agencies and the FBI concerning SECON 3, Elevated Condition (Yellow) measures that, if implemented, could affect their operations in the local community.

(j) Measure 10. Reserve for site/facility use. (3) SECON 3, ELEVATED CONDITION (YELLOW). A SECON 3, Elevated Condition (Yellow) is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attack. Elevated Condition (Yellow) applies when an increased and more predictable threat of malevolent or terrorist activity exists. The measures in this SECON must be capable of being maintained for lengthy periods without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with the local community. For measures requiring an increase in the frequency of a specific action, the new frequency is to be more often than in the lower-level security condition. In addition to the measures required by SECON 4, Guarded Condition (Blue), the following measures should be implemented. (a) Measure 11. Increase the frequency of warnings required by Measure 1, and inform personnel of additional unclassified threat information, if available. Encourage increased community security awareness of suspicious persons, vehicles, and activities. (b) Measure 12. Maintain EMT personnel on 2-hour recall; periodically exercise recall to ensure readiness. Keep all other personnel involved in implementing special response/contingency plans on call. Identify, contact, and brief specialists that may be required for unique contingencies; coordinate lines of communication. (c) Measure 13. Review provisions of all operations plans and orders and special operating procedures associated with implementing SECON 2, High Condition (Orange). (d) Measure 14. Move automobiles and objects such as trash containers, newspaper boxes, crates, etc., at least 30 yards from all facilities, particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Identify any areas where an improvised explosive device could be hidden (i.e., pallet stacks, trash piles, stacked construction supplies, etc.). If the configuration of the facility or area precludes implementation of this measure, take appropriate compensatory measures per local plans [frequent inspection by Explosive Part 1, Section B DOE M 470.4-1 B-6 8-26-05 Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, if available; controlled access to parking areas; etc.]. Consider centralized parking. (e) Measure 15. Secure, seal, and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas that can be isolated with minimum site impact. (f) Measure 16. At the beginning and end of each work day and at frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or unattended packages and for signs of tampering or indications of unauthorized entry. (g) Measure 17. Implement screening procedures for all incoming official mail to identify possible explosive or incendiary devices or other dangerous material. If available, have EOD-trained teams inspect suspicious items and screen mail periodically. Provide guidance concerning suspicious packages. Encourage employees to inspect their individual mail, report suspicious items to security, and refrain from handling such items until cleared by the appropriate authority. (h) Measure 18. Inspect other deliveries and locally designated common-use facilities to identify explosives and incendiary, biological, or chemical devices. Use EOD-trained teams for some screening inspections when available. Instruct site personnel to report suspicious packages to security and refrain from handling them until cleared by the appropriate authority.

(i) Measure 19. Increase both overt and covert security force surveillance of locally designated soft targets to improve deterrence and build confidence among site personnel. (Covert surveillance must comply with DOE directives and appropriate regulatory restrictions.) (j) Measure 20. Inform employees of the general threat situation. Limit visitors and escorted uncleared personnel. Periodically update all personnel as the situation changes to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm. (k) Measure 21. Brief representatives of all activities on the site concerning the threat and security measures implemented in response to the threat. Explain reasons for actions. Implement procedures to provide periodic updates for these activity representatives. (l) Measure 22. Verify the identity of all personnel entering property protection areas (PPAs) and other sensitive activities specified in DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section B 8-26-05 B-7 local plans (i.e., inspect identification badges and grant access based on visual recognition). Use of automated access control systems at interior security areas is acceptable and encouraged, where practical. On a random basis, visually inspect the interior of all vehicles and the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, packages, and other containers. Increase the frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (trunk, undercarriage, glove boxes, etc.) and the frequency of detailed inspections of suitcases, briefcases, and other containers. (m) Measure 23. Increase the frequency of random identity checks (inspection of security badges and vehicle registration documents) conducted by security force patrols on the site. (n) Measure 24. Remind all personnel to lock parked vehicles and inspect vehicles for suspicious items before entering and driving them. (o) Measure 25. Implement additional security measures for critical/sensitive personnel in accordance with existing plans. (p) Measure 26. Brief all security force personnel concerning the threat and policies governing rules of engagement, use of deadly force, and fresh pursuit. Ensure there is no misunderstanding of these instructions. Repeat this briefing on a periodic basis. (q) Measure 27. Increase liaison with local police, intelligence, security agencies, and the FBI to monitor the threat to site personnel and facilities. Notify local police agencies concerning SECON 2, High Condition (Orange) or SECON 1, Severe Condition (Red) measures that, if implemented, could affect their operations in the local community. (r) Measure 28. Survey the surrounding area to determine whether operational activities near the area might create emergencies or contingencies that could affect the site/facility (e.g., airports, military/other government facilities, industrial facilities, railroads or pipelines, etc.). (s) Measure 29. Reserve for site/facility use. (4) SECON 2, HIGH CONDITION (ORANGE). A SECON 2, High Condition (Orange) is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of malevolent or terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this Part 1, Section B DOE M 470.4-1 B-8 8-26-05 security condition for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the routine activities of the site and its personnel. For measures requiring an increase in the frequency of a specific action, the new frequency is to be more often than in the lower level SECON. The following measures should be implemented.

(a) Measure 30. Continue all SECON 4, Guarded Condition (Blue) and SECON 3, Elevated Condition (Yellow) measures or introduce those that have not already been implemented. (b) Measure 31. Recall staff representatives and initiate 24-hour operation of the EMT. Place the Special Response Team (SRT) on standby alert. Keep all personnel responsible for implementing special/response contingency plans at their places of duty. Review site evacuation plans. (c) Measure 32. Reduce site access points to the absolute minimum necessary for continued operation. (d) Measure 33. Verify the identity of all personnel entering the site/facilities, including appropriate offsite facilities under DOE control. Inspect all security badges for tampering. On a random basis, visually inspect the interior of all vehicles and the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, and other containers. Increase the frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (trunk, undercarriage, glove compartments, etc.) and the frequency of inspections of suitcases, briefcases, and other containers. (e) Measure 34. Implement centralized parking and shuttle bus service, where required. (f) Measure 35. Ensure that security personnel have been briefed concerning policies governing the rules of engagement, use of force, and fresh pursuit, particularly criteria for use of deadly force. Ensure that non-security supervisory personnel are familiar with above policies and procedures, if applicable. Ensure that special equipment and ammunition are available for immediate issue. (g) Measure 36. Increase security patrol activity to the maximum level sustainable. The concept of continuing random security patrol activity is encouraged. (h) Measure 37. Position security force personnel in the vicinity of critical facilities. (i) Measure 38. Erect barriers required to control direction of traffic DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section B 8-26-05 B-9 flow and to protect facilities vulnerable to bomb attack by parked or moving vehicles. (j) Measure 39. Consult local authorities about closing public roads and facilities that might make sites more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. (k) Measure 40. Consider canceling public events. (l) Measure 41. Consider initiating Continuity of Operations plans (m) Measure 42. Reserve for site/facility use. (5) SECON 1, SEVERE CONDITION (RED). A SECON 1, Severe Condition (Red) reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. This condition applies in the immediate area where a malevolent or terrorist attack has occurred that may affect the site or when an attack is initiated on the site. Implementing SECON 1, Severe Condition (Red) will create hardship and affect the activities of the site and its personnel. Normally, this SECON is declared as a localized response. For measures requiring an increase in the frequency of a specific action, the new frequency is to be more often than in the lower-level SECON. The following measures should be implemented. (a) Measure 43. Continue all previous SECON measures and introduce those that have not already been implemented. (b) Measure 44. Augment security forces to ensure absolute control over access to the site, facilities, and other potential target areas. Establish surveillance points; use night-vision devices.

(c) Measure 45. Working closely with facility management, identify the owners of all vehicles already on the site. In those cases where the presence of a vehicle cannot be explained (owner is not present and the vehicle has no obvious site affiliation), inspect the vehicle for explosives; incendiary, chemical, or biological devices; or other dangerous items and remove the vehicle from the vicinity of facilities, soft targets, and other sensitive areas as soon as possible. (d) Measure 46. Inspect all vehicles entering the site. Inspections should include cargo storage areas, undercarriage, glove boxes, and other areas where explosives, incendiary, chemical, or biological devices or other dangerous items could be concealed. (e) Measure 47. Limit access to the site, facilities, and other areas to those personnel with a legitimate and verifiable need to enter. Implement positive identification of all personnel. No exceptions. Part 1, Section B DOE M 470.4-1 B-10 8-26-05 (f) Measure 48. Inspect all baggage such as suitcases, packages, and briefcases brought on the site for explosives, incendiary, chemical, or biological devices, or other dangerous items. (g) Measure 49. Implement frequent inspections of the exterior of buildings (including roof areas) and parking areas. Conduct inspections at facilities and in the vicinity of soft targets. (h) Measure 50. Coordinate with the Operations Division/Center to establish communications, responsibilities, and authorities before, during, and after attack. (i) Measure 51. Request that local authorities close those public roads and facilities in the vicinity of the site/facilities that might facilitate execution of a malevolent or terrorist attack. (j) Measure 52. Cancel public events. (k) Measure 53. Execute Continuity of Operations plans. (l) Measure 54. Reserve for site/facility use. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-1 SECTION C—SITE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PLANS 1. OBJECTIVE. The Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP) is a risk management document that provides summary information used to describe safeguards and security (S&S) programs and vulnerability and risk assessments at applicable sites. The objective of this section is to delineate SSSP content and establish a standard approach to presenting site protection information and vulnerability assessment (VA) results. The results and conclusions contained in the plan are intended to guide long-term planning for site S&S operations. This is accomplished during plan development by identifying: key site protection elements; annually (at least every 12 months) evaluating site protection in terms of its adequacy to meet continued mission and threat parameters; and, identifying resource requirements. 2. APPLICATION. The SSSP is used to evaluate site and facility program elements and resources as they relate to identified threats and risks. The protection measures identified in approved SSSPs become the basis for executing and reviewing site protection programs. 3. SCOPE. The approved SSSP provides assurance that S&S measures address identified threats and risks. To provide this assurance, the plan must reiterate the assumptions identified to, and agreed upon, by line management. These assumptions must include reference to the contract under which the site is operated and those contractual issues that may impact S&S, applicable Department of Energy (DOE) directives, the threat upon which VAs are based, the methodology used to conduct VAs, deviations and proposed deviations, and any unique S&S impacting issues and assumptions that were addressed, and agreed to, by the responsible parties.

4. PURPOSE. The SSSP describes the graded protection of DOE assets required to be implemented by line management. The SSSP identifies site risks, cost-benefit analyses, and comparison of proposed upgrades. The resource plan (RP) must identify near- and long-term resource requirements needed to ensure the integrity of existing and planned S&S upgrades. The annual (at least every 12 months) review serves as the basis for tracking the implementation of protection measures and strategies necessary to maintain system effectiveness and identifies unfunded requirements. 5. PLAN COMPOSITION. The SSSP includes: a. references to implementing documents and evidence files; b. descriptions of site protection strategies, key site S&S programs, approved and pending deviations, plans and procedures designed to implement, manage and maintain S&S programs; c. system effectiveness determinations for the protection of special nuclear material (SNM), prevention or mitigation of sabotage events, and prevention and/or timely detection of the loss of classified information or matter based on the status of Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-2 8-26-05 performance indicators, such as results of VAs, performance tests, surveys, inspections, and evaluations of personnel qualifications and training; d. proposed S&S program upgrades; e. VAs results that support conclusions reported in the SSSP; f. assumptions used as part of the VA process; g. threat parameters used for VAs that are described in the current Design Basis Threat (DBT), regional threat assessments, and impacts made by local area threat assessments, if applicable; h. the details of the changes in the protection through the spectrum of Security Conditions (SECON) (1-5), to include effects on the calculated baseline system effectiveness; i. a description of the evidence files containing material that supports the VAs; and j. an RP that describes S&S upgrades programmed for completion, upgrades being introduced as a result of planned and unplanned site changes impacting the protection program or deficiencies identified as a result of the annual (at least every 12 months) review of the SSSP, a description of the funding source to implement the upgrades, and unfunded requirements. 6. EVIDENCE FILES. Supporting documentation that validates data/information used in the VA process and in other protection program planning presented in the plan and that may require corroboration must be available in evidence files. Evidence files must be maintained to provide VA process and other protection program planning documentation in a logical and readily retrievable form to validate assumptions, modeling input data, test results, and other data that may be used to support protection system design or conclusions regarding protection effectiveness. 7. DATA COLLECTION. The effective date (snapshot in time) of the data contained in the SSSP must be specified. 8. FORMAT. Information provided in the SSSP should be brief, accurate, and concise. Implementing plans and procedures should be referenced in the plan where appropriate. A brief overview of a plan or procedure is adequate. Duplication of information should be avoided. Information already included in other sections of the plan may be referenced or summarized for clarity. A cover letter must be attached to the plan indicating that the plan has been reviewed, risks acknowledged and accepted (if appropriate), and signed by line management. For example, the SSSP should be approved by the Head of Field Element and submitted for concurrence to the Departmental element. If high or marginal risk acceptance is needed,

DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-3 the correspondence must be routed for signature to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary or Under Secretaries, respectively. The use of charts, plats, graphs, drawings, videos, photographs, and matrixes is encouraged wherever appropriate to clarify or satisfy the intent of plan objectives. References to sources of information and the location of supporting documentation should be provided to assist in verifying information contained in the plan. The SSSP is divided into 12 chapters. Each chapter provides specific information relevant to site security. Use of this layout will ensure a uniform SSSP for review and comment or during an emergency. a. Chapter 1, Site Description and Mission. (1) Site Mission Statement. Describe the site mission and how the mission relates to national security and the health and safety of the public, employees, and the environment. Describe the major programs or activities performed at the site in terms of mission and their relationship to the DOE national security mission. (2) Site Description and Area Layout. Describe the physical and geographical area in which the site and the S&S program are located. Provide a map, photograph, or drawing of the site that identifies locations of Category I facilities, facilities with a credible roll-up of SNM to a Category I quantity, the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm stations (SAS), security-related communications facilities, and other facilities of security interest. Show the location of barriers defining the site Protected Area (PA). A small-scale map or drawing should be used to show the relationship of the site to the surrounding area and be of sufficient detail to orient the user. (3) Management Organization, Planning Assumptions and Evidence File. (a) Site Management Organizations. Identify the contract name, number, and other information that describes the authority under which the contractor executes management functions. Identify site contractors responsible for S&S programs and describe their S&S activities. Provide Federal and contractor organization charts and identify key positions and the relationships between the organizations for S&S activities. Provide a list of roles and responsibilities for key positions. Describe Federal and contractor involvement in the development of S&S resource requirements. (b) Management and Planning Assumptions. Describe those assumptions that were addressed and agreed to during the SSSP scoping, preparation, or other SSSP management-related meetings. Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-4 8-26-05 Describe all relevant S&S-related planning assumptions that were formerly agreed to and included in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) by the responsible organization representatives who are party to the development and review of the SSSP. These assumptions should address the following issues: 1 site SECON; 2 VA methodology used for insider, neutralization, outsider, and collusion analyses; 3 identified credible targets; 4 protection strategies; 5 approved compensatory measures; and 6 performance testing conducted or to be conducted. (c) Evidence Files. Describe and identify the contents, location, and control mechanisms for the SSSP evidence files. Reference approved standard operating procedures (SOPs) as applicable. Supporting documentation that validates data/information used in the VA process should not be included in the SSSP. However, this data/documentation should be available in a logical and readily retrievable arrangement in evidence files, for use in review and validation of the SSSP.

b. Chapter 2, Site Threat Description and Target Identification. (1) Threat Description. Establish a graded approach to protection for Category I SNM and SNM facilities with credible roll-up of SNM to a Category I quantity, and facilities having radiological, biological, or chemical, sabotage event potential and facilities having disruption of critical mission sabotage event potential. Use the DBT as the baseline for threat determination, along with higher levels of threat dictated by local and regional threats (when available), and describe the site-specific threats used as the basis for conducting VAs and for which the protection program is designed. (2) Target Identification. Identify, describe, and prioritize targets of security interest that meet the following criteria. (a) Category I quantities of SNM and the facilities with credible roll- up of SNM to a Category I quantity. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-5 (b) A radiological, biological or chemical sabotage inventory that, if released, would cause an unacceptable impact on national security or the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. (c) Critical national security facilities, and assets (as defined in the DBT), designated by the Department (e.g., or each disruption of critical mission target) that would impact DOE programs supporting national defense and security. (d) Those facilities possessing automated information systems that process or contain Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Special Access Program (SAP), weapon data classified Secret Restricted Data (S/RD) Sigma 1, 2, 14 and 15 or higher. (e) Temporary recurring targets. When predictable programmatic operations can reasonably be expected to present temporary SNM, sabotage, or information targets such as those permanent locations previously described, these targets must be described and analyzed at the same level of detail and in the same manner as permanent locations. Provide a brief introductory description of the targets and a chart or list, such as shown below, that indicates the type of target, its location, attractiveness level, size, and configuration. Include SNM theft/diversion targets; radiological, biological, and chemical targets; and disruption of critical mission targets and those facilities possessing automated information systems that process SCI, SAP, weapon data classified S/RD Sigma 1, 2, 14, and 15 or higher. (3) Theft or Diversion of SNM. Describe how Category I SNM targets and SNM facilities that roll-up to a credible Category I quantity have been identified and evaluated as potential abrupt theft targets. Also, describe how these SNM targets have been identified and assessed for protracted theft (diversion), if applicable. For each identified SNM target, provide a description of the following, using a table similar to Table C-1, SNM Theft/Diversion Targets: physical location of identified SNM; the type of material, as described under the several material listings in DOE M 470.4-6, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, such as pure products, high-grade material, weapons, including pits, ingots, oxide fuel elements, etc.; and the Category (I through II) and attractiveness level (A through C) of the target material. Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-6 8-26-05 Table C-1. SNM Theft/Diversion Targets Location SNM Type Category/ Attractiveness Level Goal Quantity/ Portability Bldg. 1, Vault Pu-239 ingots Cat. I/B 2 ingots/ man portable

Bldg. 1, Assay Room Pu-239 ingots Cat. I/B 2 ingots/ man portable Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Pu-238 oxide powder Cat. II/D 2 canisters/ man portable Bldg. 2 U-235 fuel elements Cat. II, roll-up to Cat. I/C 20 fuel element/ not man portable Bldg. 3 U-235 fuel elements Cat. II, roll-up to Cat. I/C 20 fuel element/ not man portable (4) Radiological Sabotage. Indicate the process or methodology used to identify and evaluate radiological sabotage targets. For each identified radiological sabotage target, provide a description using a table similar to Table C-2, Radiological Sabotage Targets, of the following: the physical location of all identified targets; the type of material; the maximum inventory level; and the material size and configuration. Table C-2. Radiological Sabotage Targets Location Material Type Maximum Inventory Material Size and Configuration Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Pu-238 oxide powder 10 kg Paint Cans, at 50 g each Bldg. 4 H3 gas 10 kg Cylinders, at 500 g each (5) Biological or Chemical Sabotage. Describe the methodology used to evaluate biological or chemical targets. Using the criteria referenced in the DBT, determine the sabotage threat level (STL) for each location. Reference the plans and procedures that govern the biological or chemical sabotage assessment program. For each identified target type not addressed by the commercial equivalency protection program, provide a description of the following using a table similar to Table C-3, Biological/Chemical Sabotage Targets: the physical location of additional identified biological or chemical DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-7 sabotage material targets; the type of material; the maximum inventory level; the material size and configuration; and, the exposure level at the near-site boundary (NSB) for maximum inventory release. Table C-3. Biological/Chemical Sabotage Targets Location Material Type Maximum Inventory Material Size and Configuration Exposure Level at NSB Bldg. 5 Chlorine 10,000 lb 55-gal drums, at 350 lb each >ERPG III Levels (6) Disruption of Critical Mission Sabotage. Describe how potential disruption of critical mission sabotage production and process components (machinery, equipment, flow process, power sources, ventilation, waste handling, etc.) have been identified and evaluated for inclusion as disruption of critical mission targets. Ensure that the evaluation includes how the sabotage event would affect production (at the facility, on intersite processes, and on overall national level inventory needs) and, if so, what areas, processes, and/or components within the facility affect those necessary production level capabilities and inventory needs. For each disruption of critical mission target, provide a description, using a chart similar to Table C-4, Disruption of Critical Mission Targets, of the following: the physical location of essential production components; the type of equipment, process, power sources, or vital components; and the dollar value or production capability loss. Table C-4. Disruption of Critical Mission Targets Location Equipment Type Loss of DOE Mission Capability and Mission Impact Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Fuel Fabrication Presses 100 percent loss of capability for 360 days with moderate mission impact Lab. A Laser Tunnel 100 percent loss of capability for 360 days with low mission impact

(7) Intra-Site Transportation of SNM. Describe, in a brief narrative, the Category I SNM targets and credible Category II SNM targets that roll up to Category I quantity that are moved from one location to another on the site on a recurring basis. Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-8 8-26-05 Using a chart, identify the type of SNM, attractiveness level, and size and configuration of the material. c. Chapter 3, Site Protection Strategies. Identify the protection strategies employed that address the overall protection program and enhance the concept of graded protection. Describe the protection program strategies employed. The basic strategies pertaining to protection are denial of access, denial of task, and containment that upon failure could evolve into recapture/recovery or pursuit strategies. Protection programs and tactical deployments designed to prevent unauthorized control of material and devices and to prevent acts of radiological, biological, chemical, and disruption of critical mission must be integrated with protection strategies. These activities could include protection layers of intrusion detection systems (IDS) and concentric security areas, access control measures, compartmentalization, insider protection programs, and procedural measures. The plan should clearly convey the strategy to be employed, and plan reviewers will anticipate that procedures are available to ensure implementation of these strategies. Display in a chart similar to Table C-5, Site-Wide Protection Strategies, the protection strategy used, the facility and target involved, and the title and responsible office for each plan or procedure. Ensure the information provided is consistent with that found in Chapter 2, Site Threat Description and Target Identification. Table C-5. Site-Wide Protection Strategies Protection Strategy Facility or Activity Target Type Implementing Plan or Procedure Responsible Office Denial of Access Facility ABC Cat. I: Pu metal oxide Cat. II: nitrate UF6 Plan ABC 1.3 Protective Force Manager Containment Vault storage Areas 301, 302, and 303 Weapon parts and Pu metallic buttons Plan ADC.1 Protective Force Manager Denial of Task SNM in transit Weapon parts Plan CFE 1.5 Protective Force Manager DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section C 3-7-06 C-9 Vertical line denotes change. d. Chapter 4, Physical Protection Systems. (1) Summary of Physical Protection Systems Used for Category I and Credible Roll-up Quantities of SNM to a Category I Quantity, Sabotage, Classified Information or Matter, and Classified Automated Information Protection. Describe the physical protection systems for each facility that has Category I quantities of SNM; credible roll-up quantities of SNM to a Category I quantity; radiological, biological, chemical and sabotage targets (including disruption of critical mission), and those facilities possessing automated information systems that process or contain SCI, SAP, weapon data classified S/RD Sigma 1, 2, 14 and 15, or higher. Provide a narrative description of the physical protection systems and how these systems are integrated at the site and facility level. Describe how physical protection systems (access control, intrusion detection, assessment, etc.) are implemented to allow the protective force (PF) to focus resources on its primary mission of defeating an armed terrorist threat. Describe how the barriers are protected by an IDS, security lighting, protective force (PF), and assessment systems and how structures located in or on the barrier are protected so as not to degrade protective systems. Describe the design of barrier systems used to deny vehicle approach routes to critical targets.

Following the narrative, complete a chart similar to Table C-6, Facility Protection Systems, that includes the following facility protection systems: security areas and their barriers, access controls (automated card access for both interior and exterior locations and contraband screening by the PF at protected and material access areas); assessment [closed circuit television (CCTV) and/or PFs both interior and exterior]; security computer system integrator/ processor; CAS and SAS; CCTV cameras monitoring and switching systems; security lighting; electrical and back- up power sources (emergency batteries and/or generators); and communications. In the chart, list the major physical protection systems, the location of the systems, and a brief description of the type of equipment installed. (2) Physical Protection Measures for Category I and Credible Roll-Up Quantities of SNM to a Category I Quantity in Transit (Onsite). Describes the types, frequency, and protection measures used for the intra-site shipment of Category I SNM and credible roll-up quantities to a Category I quantity. Provide a narrative that describes the typical physical protection measures taken to ensure the integrity of those shipments from their point of loading, through transit, and at the off-load destination. If other materials are transported on site that would represent an STL 1 concern, provide a narrative that describes the typical physical protection measures from their point of loading, through transit, and at the off-load destination. Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 C-10 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. Table C-6. Facility Protection Systems Protection System Equipment Description Location Responsible Office Exterior Intrusion Detection “H” Field Protected Area Perimeter Associated Areas Office of the Plant Engineer Exterior Assessment/ CCTV Microwave Taut Wire CCTV System Protected Area Perimeter Associated Areas Office of the Plant Engineer Interior Intrusion Detection Volumetric Infrared Motion Detectors All Material Access Areas Office of the Plant Engineer e. Chapter 5, Site Protective Force. (1) PF Mission, Organization, and Capabilities. Describe the PF organization and equipment deployed to perform 24-hour-per-day protection. Confirm that the basis for PF organization and planning is based on the identified site threat. Provide a narrative summary of the PF mission(s), capabilities, and deployment concepts used for site protection. Describe the methods used to review and prioritize post assignment priorities and eliminate posts that detract from combat readiness at high priority sites. Indicate the availability of plans and procedures that address normal and emergency deployment. Describe the PF equipment used including firearms, communications, vehicles, and any special items. Provide an organization chart of the PF, including response forces, showing the management and organization structure and key organizational interface positions with the cognizant security authorities and site operations and safety organizations. Using a schematic, display the PF communications network and include available secure networks and linkages to offsite law enforcement organizations with whom support agreements exist. In a chart, show the weapons and special equipment assigned to PF personnel, including members of the response force.

(2) Qualifications and Training. Indicate that the qualifications for hire and training of the PF conform to current policy requirements. In a chart similar to Table C-7, Qualifications and Training, list the titles and offices responsible for implementing and maintaining the plans or procedures that describe the following pertaining to the PF: qualifications for employment and the hiring process; initial, specialized and advanced training; tactical performance testing program; and other relevant written documentation, such as post and general orders that enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the PF. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-11 Table C-7. Qualifications and Training Plan/Procedures Title Responsible Office Specialized Training Plan Training Department Tactical Response Plans Department (3) Special Response Teams (SRTs) and Plans. Ensure the availability of SRTs and current response plans and procedures for implementing site-specific S&S program strategies and tactics for denial of access, denial of task, containment, recapture/recovery, pursuit, and contingency operations, as described in current DOE policy. Indicate that requalification training and exercises are used to verify the effectiveness of SRTs. Identify and document agreements and MOUs with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies regarding requests for on-site support during a contingency event. Ensure that a VA was used to assist management in determining the equipment and deployment of SRTs. In a brief narrative, confirm the availability of personnel and response plans and procedures that provide assurance of adequate protection. Indicate that contingency plans and procedures are available to respond to the activities listed below. (a) Containment/denial of access/denial of task (includes a range of tactical options designed to either preclude adversary force access to nuclear weapons/materials or to deny unauthorized removal). (b) Recapture/recovery or pursuit operations (used when containment/ denial fail and could involve SRTs and other force options including the use of off-site law enforcement agencies). Describe the organization, equipment, and training provided to SRTs and how training and performance testing are used to verify the effectiveness of SRT planning in the strategies described above. Describe the role of VA in determining SRT deployment, equipment, and training. In a chart similar to Table C-7, list tactical response plans and procedures and the office responsible for implementing and maintaining them. Use a similar chart to list memoranda or letters of understanding and other agreements with local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies regarding requests for onsite support during a contingency event. f. Chapter 6, MC&A Program. Describe the MC&A management program and summarize the results of the MC&A VA and other MC&A program planning activities. Describe the mission of the site MC&A organization. Summarize current and planned nuclear Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-12 8-26-05 materials processing and storage activities. Using an organization chart, show the MC&A organization and management structure and the lines of authority and points of interface with other S&S programs, facility operations, and the cognizant security authorities’ MC&A organization. Describe the functions and responsibilities of safeguards personnel and indicate how MC&A activities are integrated with those of site protection programs and other facility organizations; include organizational responsibilities for those program elements that support multiple S&S programs (e.g., portal monitors and access controls). Confirm that MC&A personnel complete required training.

List, in a chart similar to Table C-8, MC&A Plans and Procedures, the facilities required to develop and maintain MC&A plans and procedures, the titles of those plans and procedures, and the office(s) responsible for approving and maintaining them. Table C-8. MC&A Plans and Procedures Facility Name Plan/Procedure Title Responsible Office(s) ABC Facility ABC Facility MC&A Plan, 1/1/99 S&S Director XYZ Facility XYZ Facility MC&A Plan, 6/9/99 S&S Director Give the name(s) and date(s) of reports of MC&A VAs and other planning exercises. Summarize the results of these assessment(s). Identify those components of the MC&A system that provide the greatest effectiveness against theft and diversion. Describe actions taken to remediate identified program deficiencies or to prepare for planned changes in facility nuclear materials processing and storage activities. g. Chapter 7, Site Personnel Security and Human Reliability Programs. Describes the site-wide program for personnel security that, in conjunction with information and physical security programs, ensures only authorized access to classified information or matter, or SNM and confirms that the personnel security program is in conformance with and implements the requirements prescribed in current DOE policy. Describe the key elements of the site-wide personnel security program for access authorizations and, if applicable, the key elements of the site’s Human Reliability Program (HRP). Describe the method(s) used at the site to ensure the appropriate level of access authorizations are issued for the category of material processed or stored at the site and for approving justification, processing, and reevaluating the need for such access authorizations. Indicate how the effectiveness of the program is assessed. Indicate the site procedures that require contractors to perform pre-hire checks to ensure proper qualifications and suitability of the applicant before submitting requests for access authorizations. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-13 Briefly describe the programs used to mitigate the effectiveness of potential “insider” activities and the application of these programs in addressing insider concerns. Provide an organization chart showing the location of the personnel security organization in relationship to the cognizant security authority and other contractor S&S organizations. Provide an organization chart identifying the designated HRP management official in relationship to the cognizant security authority and the designated HRP certifying official. Verify that the site has a current HRP implementation plan. List, in a chart similar to Table C-9, Personnel Security/Human Reliability Program Implementation, the titles of site-wide personnel security-related plans and procedures, the HRP implementation plan, if applicable, and the office(s) responsible for implementing and maintaining them. Table C-9. Personnel Security/Human Reliability Program Implementation Plan/Procedure Title Responsible Office XYZ Implementation Plan Security Department h. Chapter 8, Automated Information Security Program. Briefly describe the automated information systems for those facilities possessing automated information systems that process SCI, SAP, weapon data classified S/RD Sigma 1, 2, 14, and 15 or higher. Provide an organization chart showing the responsible automated information systems security program and its relationship to the cognizant security authority and contractor organizations.

In a chart similar to Table C-10, list the title of the automated information systems security program plans and procedures with the associated office responsible for implementing and maintaining the plan and procedures, the plans and procedures governing the automated information system VAs with the associated office responsible for implementing and maintaining the plan and procedures, and the reports containing the results of the VAs. Table C-10. Automated Information Systems Security Programs Plan/Procedure/Report Title Responsible Office Date (if pertinent) Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 C-14 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. i. Chapter 9, S&S Equipment Maintenance and Testing Programs. Describe maintenance and testing programs and life cycle planning, designed to enhance the continuous operability of S&S-related equipment used in the protection of Category I SNM (including areas with credible roll up of SNM to a Category I quantity), and classified automated information systems. Summarize in a narrative the maintenance and testing programs in use that ensure the availability and operability of S&S-related equipment and systems. Indicate the availability of compensatory measures/procedures that are used when equipment is taken out of service or otherwise not available. Describe how S&S maintenance and testing programs are incorporated into the Performance Assurance Program Plans. Indicate how the performance testing and other S&S site and facility maintenance programs comply with DOE policy. Describe the life cycle planning conducted for major S&S equipment and component replacement. Relate how this planning is used to support and validate S&S equipment budget requirements. In a chart similar to Table C-11, list the maintenance, testing, and records management programs; the relevant plans and procedures that implement the programs; and the responsible office, as these programs apply to equipment used by the PF, security related systems, and equipment and instrumentation used for MC&A. Many of these may be addressed in a single maintenance and testing program. Describe the records management program used for scheduling, recording, and tracking identified S&S maintenance requirements, deficiencies, and testing schedules. j. Chapter 10, Site Protection Evaluation Program. Chapter 10 is designed to ensure the availability and use of testing and evaluation programs for site S&S programs and systems. In a narrative, describe the programs available and used to evaluate the effectiveness of S&S protection programs and the interaction of these evaluation tools (i.e., surveys may focus on shortfalls found in security inspections). Include in this narrative an outline of the PF tactical performance testing program describing the evaluation mechanisms used by line management. At a minimum, the programs described in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the SSSP should be addressed and the evaluation plan or procedure identified. In a chart similar to Table C-12, Site Protection Program Evaluation Program, list the names of the evaluation plans/procedures used by the cognizant security authority to assist in determining the effectiveness of site and facility protection programs and systems. List the office responsible for the evaluation plan/procedure and its purpose. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-15

Indicate, in a brief description, that performance testing is used to verify the effectiveness of S&S systems/programs and to validate VA activities. Additionally, briefly describe barriers and other systems that cannot be adequately performance tested to demonstrate protection capabilities and their integration into protection strategies due to physical, operational, or policy parameters. k. Chapter 11, Deviations from DOE Directives. List all deviations that have been approved. In a table similar to Table C-13, Deviations from DOE Directives, list the deviation, the officially assigned deviation number, the directive reference (DOE directive and section within the directive), and the dates the deviation was approved and expires. Provide similar information for those deviations pending approval. This information should be displayed in a chart similar to Table C-14, Pending Deviations from DOE Directives. l. Chapter 12, Summary of VA and Risk Assessment Results. (1) Executive Summary. Summarize the VA and risk assessments results for Category I SNM, Category II SNM (including credible roll up of SNM to a Category I quantity), theft targets, radiological, biological, and chemical sabotage targets, and disruption of critical missions. Confirm in the narrative that performance testing was used to validate VA input data and the results of the VA. Following the narrative, complete a matrix similar to Table C-15, Summary of Identified Risks, which identifies the risk associated with the results of the VA. In part 10 of the matrix, summarize the proposed corrective actions or upgrades. For line item construction project (LICP) work or other major capital expenditures, cite the source of the required funding. Use the RP information as the basis for this summary. (2) Scope. Describe the targets to be covered, the items/issues to be excluded, and the limits on the conduct of the VAs in this SSSP. (3) Methodology. (a) Theft or Diversion of SNM. Identify the SNM targets subject to theft and/or diversion. Describe the rationale and mechanism used to identify these targets. Using a table similar to Table C-16, SNM Theft/Diversion Targets, provide a description for each identified SNM target consisting of the following: the physical location of identified SNM; the type of material (such as pure products, high grade material, weapons, etc.) which could include pits, ingots, oxide fuel elements, etc.; the Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-16 8-26-05 Category (I through II) and attractiveness level (A through E) of the target material; and the size and portability of the theft target. Table C-11. S&S-Related Maintenance, Testing, and Records Management Programs Program Area Plan/Procedure Title Test Plan or Management Plan Responsible Office/Organization PF - Equipment - Training Courses - Firearms Qualification - Other Vehicles/Aircraft Communications MC&A Security Systems - Personnel Access and Inspection Equipment - Security Lighting - Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems - Electrical Power Supplies Sensitive Area Access Control Survey/Inspection Deficiencies Table C-12. Site Protection Program Evaluation Program Plan/Procedure Name Or Title Responsible Office Plan or Procedure Goal/Purpose Performance Assurance Program Contractor Manager Establish/confirm system effectiveness DOE/Contractor Self-Assessment Program Program Manager Identify program strengths/weaknesses Facility Approval, Security Surveys

Cognizant Security Authority Confirm availability and adequacy of required S&S programs Force on Force Exercises Contractor Manager Confirm system effectiveness Limited Scope Performance Tests Contractor Manager Confirm system effectiveness Joint Tactical Simulation Model Contractor Manager Confirm system effectiveness DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-17 Table C-13. Deviations from DOE Directives Deviation Description Deviation Number Directive Reference Approval and Expiration Dates Table C-14. Pending Deviations from DOE Directives Deviation Description Deviation Number Directive Reference Approval And Expiration Dates (b) Radiological Sabotage. Identify the radiological targets subject to sabotage. Describe the rationale and mechanism used to identify these targets. A key source of information to assist in the identification and/or elimination of radiological targets is the facility safety analysis report. Using a table similar to Table C-17, Credible Radiological Sabotage Targets, provide a description for each identified radiological sabotage target consisting of the following: the physical location of all identified targets, the type of material, the maximum inventory level, and the material size and configuration. (c) Biological Sabotage. Identify the biological targets subject to sabotage. Describe the rationale and mechanism used to identify these targets. Reference any policy and analyses external to the SSSP that address biological targets. Using a table similar to Table C-18, Credible Biological Sabotage Targets, provide a description for each identified biological sabotage target consisting of the following: the physical location of all identified targets, the type of material, the maximum inventory level, and the material size and configuration. (d) Chemical Sabotage. Identify the chemical targets subject to sabotage. Describe the rationale and mechanism used to identify these targets. Indicate whether security protection provided for chemical sabotage targets is comparable to that provided by the commercial sector for similar materials. A key source of Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-18 8-26-05 information to assist in the identification and/or elimination of chemical targets is the facility safety analysis report. Reference any policy and analyses external to the SSSP that address chemical targets. Using a table similar to Table C-19, Credible Chemical Sabotage Targets, provide a description for each identified chemical sabotage target consisting of the following: the physical location of all identified chemical sabotage targets, the type of material, the maximum inventory level, how the security provided is not comparable to that of the commercial sector, the material size and configuration, and the exposure level at the NSB for maximum inventory release. (e) Disruption of Critical Mission. Identify the disruption of critical mission targets. Describe the rationale and mechanism used to identify these targets. Ensure that the evaluation includes how the disruption would cause an unacceptable impact on national security. Using a table similar to Table C-20, Disruption of Critical Mission Targets, provide a description for each identified target consisting of the following: the physical location of the target, a description of the function of the target, the impact to national security, and the estimated time for recovery.

(f) VA Parameters and Planning Assumptions. Describe/list the baseline parameters and planning assumptions used in conducting the VAs. Provide a summary list of parameters and planning assumptions used in completing VAs. These should include assumptions discussed and concurred in by appropriate DOE offices or planning assumptions identified as a result of data collection/discovery during the VA process. D O E M 470.4-1 P art 1, S ection C 8-26-05 C -19 Table C-15. Summary of Identified Risks Target Number Target Location and Description Threat Type and Number Risk Rating (High, Moderate, Low) Remarks Analyses Validated by Perf. Testing Base Case Current Modif. Rating (date) Protected Action and Adjusted Rating: Near-Term (<2 yr) (date) Protected Action and Adjusted Rating: Long- Term (>2 yr) (date) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) SNM Theft Targets 1 2 Glovebox 112-A Bldg. 222 Test samples in NDA room, Bldg. 222 Terrorist, X outsiders with help of insider Criminal Insiders High High High High Relocate SI to access door Enhance HRP for NDA technicians and supervisors Mod High Harden access portal Install CCTV recording for post-review of activities in NDA room Low Mod Install hardware to allow SL relocation (FY-89 GPP) SNM protection unchanged, but probability of attempt reduced thru HRP and delayed assessment capability Yes Yes Radiological Sabotage Targets 3 Test reactor #5 North Area, Bldg. 408 Insider Mod Mod Reinforce SI number when in use Low None Low Use overtime when reactor in use-3 times per year No Chemical Sabotage Targets 4 Laboratory Bldg. 4 Insider Mod Mod None Low None Low None No Biological Sabotage Targets 5 Fabrication Room, Bldg. 1 Insider Mod Mod None Low None Low None No Disruption of Critical Mission Targets 6 7 Access port 4 D-line process line, Bldg. 460 Extrusion equipment in fuel manufacturing area, Bldg. 97 Disgruntled employee Psychotic employee High High Mod High Implement 2-man rule Establish spares inventory for long lead time parts Low Mod Harden and remote control of portal Identify alternate extrusion capability off-site Low Low Install hardware to reduce high manpower costs (use FY-92 GPP) Additional physical protection not cost- effective. Improved spares also provide repair capability for non-sabotage outages Yes Yes Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-20 8-26-05 Table C-16. SNM Theft/Diversion Targets Location SNM Type Category/ Attractiveness Level Quantity/ Portability Bldg. 1, Vault Pu-239 ingots Cat. I,/B 2 ingots/man portable Bldg. 1, Assay Room Pu-239 ingots Cat. I,/B 2 ingots/man portable Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Pu-238 oxide powder Cat. II/D 2 canisters/man portable Bldg. 2 U-235 fuel elements Cat. II, roll-up to Cat. I/ C 20 fuel elements/not man portable Bldg. 3 U-235 fuel elements Cat. II, roll-up to Cat. I/ C 20 fuel elements/not man portable Table C-17. Credible Radiological Sabotage Targets Location Material Type Maximum Inventory Material Size and Configuration Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Pu-238 oxide powder 10 kg Paint Cans, at 50 g each Bldg. 4 H3 gas 10 kg Cylinders, at 500 g each Table C-18. Credible Biological Sabotage Targets Location Material Type Maximum Inventory Material Size and Configuration Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Anthrax solution 10 g 20 petri dish at 0.5 g each Bldg. 4 Botulism aerosol 20 g 10 2-liter cylinders, at 5 kg each

Table C-19. Credible Chemical Sabotage Targets Location Material Type Maximum Inventory Commercial Sector Security Difference Material Size & Configuration Exposure Level at NSB Bldg. 5 Chlorine 10,000 lb Lack of access control 55-gallon drums, at 350 lb each >ERPG III levels DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-21 Table C-20. Disruption of Critical Mission Targets (g) Critical Path Protection Elements. Describe the process used to identify critical path protection elements and the types of tests to which site protection elements are subjected (procedural, simulation, barrier, equipment, PF, etc.). Using a table similar to Table C-21, Performance Testing Results of Site Specific Essential Protection Element Values, provide a list of: physical security system components for each protection layer [Limited Area (LA), PA, material access area (MAA), and Target Area], the critical protection element tested, if any, as determined from performance testing. Also, indicate the number of tests conducted to obtain results and the testing frequency used to monitor the protection element specific value. (h) Single Point Failure Analysis. Describe the analyses used to determine any single-point failures identified during the VA. Describe/list the single-point failure(s) to include the nature of the vulnerability, measures to mitigate the vulnerability and the potential exploitability by an adversary. (i) Critical Path Scenarios. Describe and provide the critical path scenarios, including the bounding scenarios, developed during the VA for each target. Identify the protection system effectiveness (PE) value for each of these targets. Describe and identify the critical detection points along each adversary path. Should multiple targets exist within the same security area, such as several SNM targets within the same MAA and same building, bounding critical path scenarios may be described. Provide justification that supports bounding cases. For each critical path scenario provide floor plans, diagrams, sketches, or an adversary path description (as shown in Table C-22) or, if appropriate, refer to the descriptions that may have been used previously to illustrate the critical path and protection elements described in the scenarios. Identify and describe the point along the adversary path at which detection is required to allow for sufficient response time for adversary neutralization to be effected for each of the critical path scenarios (i.e., critical detection point). Location Target Function Impact to National Security Estimated time for Recovery Site A, Bldg. 4 Fuel cell production Increased reliance on fossil fuels 180 days Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-22 8-26-05 Table C-21. Performance Testing Results of Site-Specific Essential Protection Element Values Protection Layer and Physical Security System Components Tested Critical Elements Tested No. of Tests Used as Basis for VA values Test Frequency Value used in VA PA - Identification and Intrusion Element Attempt to smuggle firearms through Portal 1. 36 Quarterly 0.6 Attempt to defeat door contacts Bldg. 1, door 3. 34 Quarterly 0.7 MAA - Search Component Attempt to smuggle firearms through MAA portal 24 Once every 2 months 0.8 Target Area - Identification Component Attempt to gain unauthorized vault access 48 Monthly 0.9

(j) Protection System Effectiveness. Verify that the PE values identified for each critical path scenario were used to calculate conditional risk for each identified target. Using tables similar to those on the following pages (Table C-23, Protection Effectiveness PE for Theft or Diversion of SNM; Table C-24, Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Radiological Sabotage; Table C-25, Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Biological Sabotage; Table C-26, Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Chemical Sabotage; Table C-27, Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Disruption of Critical Missions; Table C-28, Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Theft or Espionage of Classified Information or Matter; and Table C-29, Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Other Losses), show the targets and PE values for each target. (k) Neutralization Analyses. Identify and describe the mechanism(s) used to determine/calculate the neutralization value(s) used in the risk evaluation. Identify and describe the basis for the neutralization values, parameters that impact the neutralization calculations and any site-specific issues that modify neutralization calculations. (l) Insider Analysis. Describe the analysis for determining the insider threat for each target class included in the SSSP. This analysis must include the programs supporting the elimination/mitigation of select insider groups from the threat spectrum, identification of the potential insider population, and insider protection programs that were not included in other protection system elements. Describe DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section C 8-26-05 C-23 the programs that are factored into the VA process and provide justification for their use. Identify by position and title the participants in the HRP. (m) Conclusions. Provide a summary of system effectiveness for the identified targets. Document VA analyst’s observations and recommendations developed as a result of the VA process. Summarize the system effectiveness using a table similar to C-30, System Effectiveness Summary. Part 1, Section C DOE M 470.4-1 C-24 8-26-05 Table C-22. Critical Path Scenarios Scenario Title: Base Case 1 Results Facility: Building XYZ PI . Target Location: Room,123 State, Open PN Adversary Threat/Adversary: Terrorist w/insider: X# outsider, Y# insiders Goal Type/Quantity: Oxide, Xx kg PE VA Path Analysis Tool: ASSESS C Computer File ID: .PPS, .OUT; .NEU Syst. Eff.: Neutralization Tool: JTS Syst. Eff.: Time (Sec) SCENARIO ACTIONS Total ADV PF Adversary pre-positions escape vehicles Adversary mails weapons and explosives into PA (No x-ray or explosives detection capability) Adversary proceeds to access control portal 0 20 Adversary attempt to deceit through portal (PD = 0.xx – badge check with xxxx at access portal). If detected, adversary begins overt actions. CRITICAL DETECTION POINT 25 CAS receives alert and begins to annunciate alert 20 25 Adversary proceeds to target building XYZ, door 7 on the NE corner 25 Protective Force units begin response 70 Unit A responds to NE corner of building XYZ 55 Unit B responds to SE corner of building XYZ 80 Unit C responds to SE corner of building XYZ 60 Unit D responds to SE corner of building XYZ 45 5 Adversary reaches door 7 to building XYZ, insider opens door 7 into building XYZ (PD = 0.xx – BMS) 50 5 Adversaries enter building XYZ and transverse to vault room 123. CAS receives BMS door alarm and annunciates the alarm

55 50 Adversaries collect target material 80 Unit B reaches response position 85 Unit D reaches response position 95 Unit A reaches response position 105 5 Adversaries proceed to door 7 to exit building XYZ. Unit C reaches response position. 110 Adversary exits building XYZ via door 7. (PD = xxx - , ) 112 Unit A engages adversary Etc. D O E M 470.4-1 P art 1, S ection C 8-26-05 C -25 Table C-23. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Theft or Diversion of SNM Location Material Type Facility Condition Adversary Type Adversary Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value Bldg. 1, Vault Pu-239 ingots Open Terrorist Vault open. Outsiders deceit into PA. Insider crashes out of Bldg. 1 MAA with material. Hands off to outsiders. Adversaries leave PA/site by vehicle. Armed response to BMS door alarm. Containment at MAA boundary. Positioning of blocking forces at PA boundary if MAA containment defeated. Pursuit in PPA if escape from facility. .7 Bldg. 1, Assay Room Pu-239 ingots Open Terrorist Scenario same as vault open scenario. Scenario same as vault open scenario. .7 Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Pu-238 oxide powder Open Terrorist Scenario same as vault open scenario. Scenario same as vault open scenario. .7 Table C-24. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Radiological Sabotage Location Material Type Facility Condition Adversary Type Adversary Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value Bldg. 1, Fabrication Room Pu-238 oxide powder Open Terrorist Building open. Outsiders deceit into PA. Outsiders force MAA boundary by foot. Insider allows access into Bldg. 1 Outsiders enter fabrication room, obtain Pu-238 oxide, defeat HEPA filters, and vent material to environment through building ventilation. Armed response to MAA boundary alarm. .4 Bldg. 4 H3 gas Open Terrorist Building open. Outsiders deceit into PA. Outsiders force MAA boundary by foot. Insider allows access into Bldg. 4. Outsiders disperse H3 to the environment with explosives. Armed response to MAA boundary alarm. .4 P art 1, S ection C D O E M 470.4-1 C -26 8-26-05 Table C-25. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Biological Sabotage Location Material Type Facility Condition Adversary Type Adversary Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value Bldg. 5 Anthrax Open Terrorist Building open. Outsiders deceit into PA. Insider allows access into Bldg. 5. Outsiders disperse anthrax to the environment with explosives. Building Containment .2 Closed Terrorist Outsiders deceit into PA. Outsiders breach door into Bldg. 5. Outsiders disperse anthrax to the environment with explosives. Building Containment .2 Table C-26. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Chemical Sabotage Location Material Type Facility Condition Adversary Type Adversary Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value Bldg. 5 Chlorine Open Terrorist Building open. Outsiders deceit into PA. Insider allows access into Bldg. 5. Outsiders disperse chlorine to the environment with explosives. Building Containment .2 Closed Terrorist Outsiders deceit into PA. Outsiders breach door into Bldg. 5. Outsiders disperse chlorine to the environment with explosives. Building Containment .2 Table C-27. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Disruption of Critical Missions Location Equipment Type Facility Condition Adversary Type Adversary Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value

Bldg. 1, Fabricatio n Room Fuel Fabrication Open Nonviolent Insider Insider enters Fab. Room. Starts fire to destroy equipment located in room. Building Containment .2 D O E M 470.4-1 P art 1, S ection C 8-26-05 C -27 (and C -28) Table C-28. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Theft or Espionage of Classified Information or Matter Location Classified Information or Matter Facility Condition Adversary Type Worst-case Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value Bldg. 5, Office Area TSRD Documents Open Nonviolent Insider Insider obtains TSRD, makes copies, encloses copies in envelope, and hand- carries out of Bldg. 5. Insider mails classified documents out of PA to off-site location. None .2 Table C-29. Protection Effectiveness (PE) for Other Losses Location Item Facility Condition Adversary Type Worst-case Scenario Summary Protective Force Response Summary PE Value Bldg. 5, Lab Area R&D Laboratory Open Nonviolent Insider Insider starts fire in laboratory. Building Containment .2 Table C-30. System Effectiveness Summary Goal Target Location Operations PE Theft of SNM Bldg. 1 Vault Day Shift .8 Theft of SNM Bldg. 1 Assay Room Day Shift .8 Theft of SNM Bldg. 1 Fab. Room Day Shift .75 Rad. Sabotage Bldg. 1 Fab. Room Day Shift .85 Rad. Sabotage Bldg. 4 Bldg. 4 Day Shift .9 Chem. Sabotage Bldg. 5 Laboratory Day Shift .8 Bio. Sabotage Bldg. 5 Laboratory Day Shift .8 Indust. Sabotage Bldg. 1 Fab. Room Day Shift .8 Espionage of Classified Bldg. 5 Office Area Day Shift .8 Other Losses Bldg. 5 Laboratory Day Shift .8 DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section D 8-26-05 D-1 SECTION D—SITE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PLAN RESOURCE PLAN 1. OBJECTIVE. The Resource Plan (RP) identifies safeguards and security (S&S) resources necessary to ensure protection of Department assets and identifies changes in resource requirements (i.e., operational requirements, capital equipment, general plant projects (GPPs) and line item construction projects (LICPs) that directly impact risk, indirectly impact risk, or derive from changing S&S policy, directives, guidance, or other Department or other Departmental direction. a. Operational Requirements. Briefly describe operational requirements relating to S&S operations that would require increments or decrements to operational accounts (e.g., program direction, operational support, etc.). Operational requirements must include, but are not limited to, material consolidation, facility mission changes, changes in the Design Basis Threat (DBT) impacting site operations, protective force (PF) redeployments, maintenance and testing changes, PF manning levels, procuring technical expertise and support personnel, and additional training requirements. Summarize the pertinent information in a table such as outlined in Table D-1, Operational Requirements. The table and supporting narrative must include the following: (1) the title of each operational requirement; (2) the basis of the requirement (drivers behind the requirement); (3) the funding profile and the impacts if not funded (if possible, state the impact in terms of probability of system effectiveness (PE) and indicate if this is a new resource requirement); and (4) provide a status of operational requirements that were previously authorized but have not yet been completed. Provide a separate section for each operational requirement. Table D-1. Operational Requirements Requirement (section) Basis Funding Request/Profile Currently

in Budget (Y or N) Type of Expense FY xxxx (current year) FY + 1 FY + 2 FY + 3 FY + 4 FY + 5 b. Capital Equipment. Briefly describe identified/proposed capital equipment procurements and funding requirements that are not part of a LICP or GPP, and Part 1, Section D DOE M 470.4-1 D-2 8-26-05 support S&S programs and operations. These procurements could include, but are not limited to, alarm and assessment system components, material control and accountability (MC&A) systems, access control system components, and equipment necessary to complete the S&S mission (e.g., breaching tools, vehicles, PF armaments, additional capabilities necessary to address changes in the DBT). Summarize the pertinent information in a table as outlined in Table D-2, Capital Equipment. The table and supporting narrative must include the following: (1) a title for each capital equipment procurement; (2) the basis of the requirement (drivers behind the requirement); (3) the funding profile and the impacts if not funded (if possible, state the impact in terms PE, and indicate if this is a new resource requirement); and (4) a status of capital equipment upgrades that were previously authorized but have not yet been completed. Provide a separate section for each capital equipment procurement. Table D-2. Capital Equipment Capital Equipment (section) Basis Funding Request/Profiles Currently in Budget (Y or N) FY xxxx (current year) FY + 1 FY + 2 FY + 3 FY + 4 FY + 5 c. GPP. Describe significant identified/proposed GPPs that are not part of an LICP or capital equipment expense but that are necessary to support S&S programs and operations. These GPPs could include, but are not limited to, alarm and assessment systems/components, MC&A systems, access control systems/components, or infrastructure improvements. Summarize the pertinent information in a table as outlined in Table D-3, General Plan Projects. The table and supporting narrative must include: (1) a title for each GPP; (2) the basis of the requirement (drivers behind the requirement); (3) the funding profile and the impacts if not funded (if possible, state the impact in terms PE, and indicate if this is a new resource requirement); (4) a status of general plan project upgrades that were previously authorized but have not yet been completed. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section D 8-26-05 D-3 Provide a separate section for each GPP. Table D-3. General Plant Projects General Plant Projects (section) Basis Funding Request/Profiles Currently in Budget (Y or N) FY xxxx (current year) FY + 1 FY + 2 FY + 3 FY + 4 FY + 5 d. LICPs. Describe current and proposed LICPs that are not part of a GPP or capital equipment procurement but are necessary to support S&S programs and operations. Summarize the pertinent information in a table as outlined in Table D-4, Line Item Construction Projects. The table and supporting narrative must include: (1) a title for each LICP; (2) the basis of the requirement (drivers behind the requirement); (3) the funding profile and the impacts if not funded (if possible, state the impact in terms PE, and indicate if this is a new resource requirement); and (4) the status of S&S upgrades that were authorized but have not yet been completed. Discuss any changes to cost estimates [i.e., total estimated cost (TEC) versus total project cost (TPC)] identified in the previous RP. Provide a separate section for each LICP. P art 1, S ection D D O E M 470.4-1 D -4 8-26-05

Table D-4. Line Item Construction Projects LICP Title (section) Basis Funding Request/Profiles Total Costs Schedule Currently in Budget (Y or N) FY xxxx (current year) FY + 1 FY + 2 FY + 3 FY + 4 FY + 5 TEC TPC Start Date Finish Date Table D-5. Unfunded/Unsupported Requirements Requirement (section) Basis Resource Type Base FY Original Funding Request/Profiles Impact FY xxxx FY + 1 FY + 2 FY + 3 FY + 4 FY + 5 DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section D 8-26-05 D-5 2. UNFUNDED/UNSUPPORTED REQUIREMENTS. Briefly describe proposed S&S operational requirements, capital equipment procurements, GPPs, or LICPs that had been previously identified and have not been funded supported. Summarize the pertinent information in a table such as Table D-5, Unfunded/Unsupported Requirements. The table and supporting narrative must include: a. a title for each unfunded requirement; b. the basis for the requirement (drivers behind the requirement); c. the type of resource requested (operating expense, capital equipment, GPP, or LICP); d. the fiscal year the requirement was originally identified; e. the proposed funding profile and impacts due to lack of funding (if possible, state the impact in terms of PE). Provide a separate section for each unfunded requirement. 3. REFERENCES FOR THE RESOUCE PLAN. a. Facility SSSP. Provide a reference to the most recent/current SSSP. b. Programmatic Documentation. Provide a reference (include title, date, and responsible organization) for any programmatic policy, directive, or guidance necessitating the allocation of additional resources. 4. HEADINGS AND TERMS FOR TABLES D-1 THROUGH D-5. Following are the types of data to be included in the RP. a. Basis. (1) Compliance. (2) Risk reduction. (3) SSSP derived. (4) Cost-efficiency. (5) Operational efficiency. (6) Enhanced operations. (7) DBT change. b. Type of expense. (1) Operational = annual recurring cost that will need to be added to the budget baseline. (2) Single = one time only expense paid from operating dollars. c. Total Costs.1 1As defined in DOE O 413.3, Chg 1, Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. Part 1, Section D DOE M 470.4-1 D-6 8-26-05 (1) TEC = Total estimated cost. (2) TPC = Total project cost. d. Resource Type. (1) OE = operational expense. (2) CE = capital expense. (3) GPP = general plant project. (4) LICP = line item construction project. (5) BASE FY = fiscal year in which the resources were identified and requested. e. Impact. (1) Continued risk. (2) Cost escalation. (3) Unable to comply with xxxx (list applicable directive). (4) Programmatic impact. (5) Operational impact. (6) Other (list). DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section E 3-7-06 E-1 Vertical line denotes change. SECTION E—VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE. The Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Program must consider other programs such as protective force (PF), material control and accountability (MC&A), emergency operations, safety, maintenance, facility operations, personnel security, physical protection, and information security. 2. CONDUCTING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS. The process of conducting a VA includes gathering data that describe the physical and operational characteristics of a safeguards and security (S&S) system, assigning values such as delay and detection, and analyzing the results to determine the relative effectiveness in conjunction with the adversary’s capabilities as identified in the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and the Adversary Capabilities List (ACL). Below is a description of the VA process.

a. Assumptions. Assumptions and scoping agreements must be defined. All assumptions must be documented in the VA report. b. Threat. The person responsible for the conduct of VAs, hereinafter referred to as the analyst (see paragraph 9 of this section), must understand how the DBT relates to VAs. The analyst performing the VA must apply DOE Headquarters (HQ), regional and local threat guidance. (1) DOE HQ Threat. (a) The DBT must be used to define threat against which VA analysts evaluate the protection system (b) The site’s protective systems must be analyzed against the ACL. (2) Regional and local threats must be considered during the conduct of VAs. c. Targets. All security interests whose loss, theft, compromise, and/or unauthorized use will affect the national security and/or the health and safety of DOE and contractor employees, the public, the environment, or DOE programs are potential targets. The analyst must consider target configurations and conditions, as well as operational conditions and acquisition times. d. Modeling. Modeling is used to analyze S&S programs, interests, assets, and the effectiveness of program implementation. Modeling can include computer-based tools and simulations, table-top analyses, and subject matter expert analyses. Section E, Appendix 3, VA Modeling Tools, lists those modeling tools approved by DOE. Methods to ensure that the models accurately reflect the facility posture must be part of the final VA results. The modeling process must establish critical pathways. The following must be considered: (1) facility characterization; Part 1, Section E DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 E-2 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. (2) System effectiveness models and equations must be used. Section E, Appendix 4, System Performance Effectiveness Equation, delineates the system effectiveness equation; (3) response force times; (4) the probability of neutralization (PN) must be calculated using data available regarding the PF response and their ability to interrupt and neutralize an adversary. The methods used must be documented and retained as part of the evidence file. The calculated number for PN must be derived from more than one source, one of which must be joint tactical simulation (JTS), joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS), or force-on-force (FoF) exercises; (5) blast effect modeling must consider blast effects on barrier breaching, a force multiplier, and target buildings; (6) table-top methods used to determine system effectiveness must be documented and a means provided to allow for validation or verification; (7) radiological sabotage must be fully analyzed against the DBT and ACL. Existing information from safety analyses can be used but must be analyzed to consider deliberate rather than accidental release; (8) chemical and biological sabotage must be analyzed against the DBT and ACL; (9) the analysis must use the thresholds stated in DOE O 470.3, Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy; and (10) the use of chemical and biological agents must be analyzed as a force multiplier. Methods of release and mitigation measures must be a part of the analysis. e. Performance Testing. If conducted, the results of the following tests (including validation) must be considered in determining system effectiveness: (1) FoF exercises; (2) limited scope performance tests (LSPTs); (3) alarm response and assessment performance tests (ARAPTs); (4) breaching test data; and (5) critical system element tests.

DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section E 8-26-05 E-3 f. Results. The results of VAs indicate PE. The VA results must be used for determining: (1) protection system effectiveness reporting; (2) S&S upgrades; (3) manning/armament levels for the PF; and (4) justifications for waivers of and exceptions to S&S policy. g. VA Practitioner Training. VA practitioners must successfully complete VA Program training within 2 years of appointment. This requirement can be met through the National Training Center (NTC). 3. QUALITY ASSURANCE. The analyst must verify the data used for the analyses. These data include: a. modeling data to include detection, assessment, delay, interruption, neutralization, PF response times, etc.; b. all facility modeling characterization direct settings, rationales, and documentation; c. performance test results and documentation; and d. sensitivity analyses such as single point failure and critical system element analyses. 4. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. All information used to support or document VAs must be maintained and made available upon request. Examples include: a. modeling inputs; b. PF response; c. adversary capabilities; d. blast effects; e. sabotage data; f. timeline data; and g. neutralization data. 5. ASSIGNING FIGURES OF MERIT. “Figures of merit” is defined as numerical values and/or qualitative ratings assigned to component systems and personnel associated with Part 1, Section E DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 E-4 3-7-06 Vertical line denotes change. the protection system. Collectively the qualitative and/or quantitative measures provide the basis for determining system effectiveness. Approved reference materials must be used to provide initial data and to calculate accurate detection and delay numbers. A list of approved references is provided in DOE M 470.4-7, Safeguards and Security Program References. Reference materials are to be used only as a basis for the relative figures of merit. Non-default figures of merit must be documented and based on performance testing or engineering studies. 6. CRITICAL SYSTEM ELEMENTS. Critical system elements are components or subcomponents of an S&S protection system that directly affects the ability of the system to perform a required function. Critical system elements may be equipment, procedures, or personnel. Failure of a critical system element would result in the protection system effectiveness of the target being reduced to levels requiring management action. Critical system elements must be: a. identified for every target that requires a VA; b. specifically delineated such that specific performance tests can be performed to determine the ability of the protection measures to perform their intended function; and c. tested, documented, and the results analyzed to validate element effectiveness. 7. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT REPORTS. The vulnerability assessment report (VAR) documents the results of a VA. The VARs must include targets analyzed, methodology used, system effectiveness results, parameters and assumptions under which the VA was conducted, and reference to evidence files. VARs published in support of an SSSP should conform to the suggested format given in Section E, Appendix 5, Suggested VA Report Format. The approval chain for VARs is below. a. The analyst responsible for the VA must sign the report. b. Line management responsible for the facility/site VA Program must approve the report.

c. DOE line management responsible for the VA Program must concur with the report. d. The DOE cognizant security authority must concur with the report. 8. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS. Only the Secretary of Energy or the Deputy Secretary can accept low protection system effectiveness that results in high risk. Cognizant Under Secretaries can accept marginal protection system effectiveness that results in moderate risk. If the results of a VA, survey, self-assessment, audit, or inspection conducted by the cognizant security authority, Departmental element, Office of Security, or Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance indicate a decreased (low or marginal) protection system effectiveness that is not mitigated by compensatory measures DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section E 8-26-05 E-5 based on a risk management determination (see Section A, paragraph 2e), the following actions must be initiated: a. Low Protection System Effectiveness. (1) Once a low protection system effectiveness condition that results in high risk is identified, that condition must be reported to the responsible Departmental element within 4 hours. (2) A corrective action plan must be submitted to the responsible Departmental element within 8 hours, with a copy to the Office of Security. (3) The Departmental element must make formal notification to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary within 24 hours. (4) The Departmental element in consultation with the Office of Security must provide comments on the protection system effectiveness and recommendations to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary within 36 hours. (5) The responsible Departmental element must update the Secretary or Deputy Secretary on low protection system effectiveness conditions every 30 days with an information copy to the Office of Security. b. Marginal Protection System Effectiveness. (1) Once a marginal protection system effectiveness condition that results in moderate risk is identified, that condition must be reported to the responsible Departmental element within 2 working days. (2) The Departmental element must notify the appropriate Under Secretary within 3 working days. (3) A corrective action plan with recommendations must be submitted to the responsible Departmental element within 5 working days with a copy to the Office of Security. (4) The Office of Security must provide comments to the Departmental element within 5 working days. (5) The responsible Departmental element must update the Secretary or Deputy Secretary and appropriate Under Secretary on marginal protection system effectiveness conditions every 90 days with an information copy to the Office of Security. Part 1, Section E DOE M 470.4-1 E-6 8-26-05 9. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION. a. The analyst responsible for the conduct of Vulnerability Assessments must complete the Department-approved training program (scheduled to be fully implemented by 2008). b. The analyst must be certified as outlined in the Vulnerability Assessment Certification Program Manual which is currently under development. c. Any person currently conducting VAs may be “grandfathered” until such time as the Vulnerability Assessment Certification Program Manual is issued. DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section E 3-7-06 Appendix 3, 3-1 (and 3-2) Vertical line denotes change. SECTION E APPENDIX 3—VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MODELING TOOLS 1. ASSESS—Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security. 2. ATLAS—Adversary Time Line Analysis System.

3. BATLE—Brief Adversary Threat Loss Estimator. 4. JTS—Joint Tactical Simulation. 5. JCATS—Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation. 6. AT Planner—Anti-Terrorist Planner. 7. BLAST X—Explosive Effects Analysis Software. 8. BLAST FX—Explosive Effects Analysis Software. 9. ConWEP—Conventional Weapons Effects Program. 10. BEEM—Blast Effects Estimation Model. 11. HOTSPOT—HOTSPOT Health Physics Code provides the capability to calculate the radiation effects associated with the short-term (less than 24 hours) atmospheric release of radioactive materials. 12. RSAC—Radiological Safety Analysis Computer program calculates the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. 13. ACATS—Airborne Chromatograph for Atmospheric Trace Species. 14. ISA—Iterative Site Analysis. 15. VISA—Vulnerability of Integrated Security Analysis. 16. VISA II—Vulnerability of Integrated Security Analysis II. 17. ERAD—Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersion. 18. ALOHA—Area Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres. 19. ARAC—Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability. 20. ACCS 2—Accident Consequence Code System for the calculation of the health and economic consequences of accidental atmospheric radiological releases. 21. HPAC—Hazard Prediction Analysis Code provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of hazardous material releases into the atmosphere. DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section E 3-7-06 Appendix 4, 4-1 Vertical line denotes change. SECTION E APPENDIX 4—SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS EQUATION The methodology requires the determination of the probability of sensing, probability of assessment, and probability of detection at each layer. These are then combined to determine the contribution to overall system effectiveness represented by each layer. Mathematically, this can be expressed as the equation: PEL = PIL x PNL = PDL * PNL = PAL * PSL * PNL Where: PEL is the system effectiveness contribution for layer L; PIL – Probability of Interruption given first detection at layer L, PIL = PDL if detection on layer L is timely, and is equal to 0 (PIL = 0) if detection is not timely; PDL – Probability of Detection at layer L, PDL = PSL x PAL on layer L. PDL is the probability of first detection at layer L, given that detection has not occurred at an earlier layer, multiplied by the probability of sensing at an earlier layer, multiplied by the probability of sensing at layer L (PSL) and the probability of assessment at layer L (PAL); PSL – Probability of Sensing on layer L; PAL – Probability of Assessment on layer L; and PNL – Probability of Neutralization given first detection at layer L. L is defined as the number of detection layers in the system before the critical detection point (CDP) in the adversary path(s). Detection after the CDP cannot not be counted. PE is defined as the system effectiveness of the layer. The system effectiveness of the layer is the product of the probability of interruption of the layer and the probability of neutralization given that detection occurred at that layer (PI x PN). The probability of neutralization is determined discretely for each layer given detection at the layer. The neutralization determination is made if detection (regardless of the extent) takes place at the layer in question. Neutralization will occur sometime past the detection point and would be valid for the probability of neutralization of that specific layer.

PD of the layer is defined as the product of the probability of sensing and the probability of assessment of the layer (PS x PA). Note that detection and assessment will be different between the elements of the layer and between layers. PIL of the layer is defined as PIL = PDL if detection on layer L is timely, and is equal to 0 (PIL = 0) if detection is not timely. The  symbol is the summation of terms. The summation symbol is defined as: Part 1, Section E DOE M 470.4-1 Appendix 4, 4-2 8-26-05 n n i i kkkk   ...21 1 The  symbol is the product of terms. The product symbol is defined by: n n i i ffff   ...2 1 1 For those protection systems based on sensing, assessment, detection, interruption, and active neutralization of an adversary, credit can only be taken up to the “point on the pathway” at which the total of the adversary task time, engagement times, and delay times exceeds the protective force response times. This limiting criteria eliminates credit being taken for protection system capabilities that are not engaged prior to the adversary completing their objective. For denial based protection systems, the point on the pathway is the critical detection point. The critical detection point is defined as the point at which the protective force must have timely detection, assessment, and response to initiate a response to have a high probability of success in the neutralization of the adversary or denial of the adversary’s task/objective. Therefore, for a facility employing multiple, complementary layers of protection, the representative total protection system effectiveness is calculated up to the point at which the protection systems can still effectively engage an adversary prior to completion of the objective. The contributions of each layer along the adversary pathway are then combined to determine the overall system effectiveness, where the overall system effectiveness is provided by the sum of the contributions of each layer (only those encountered along the adversary pathway) to the system effectiveness. An example of the system effectiveness equations for a three-layer system protecting SNM would be as follows: In extended notation, the Overall System Effectiveness is: PE = (PA1 x PS1 x PN1) + [(1 – (PA1 x PS1)) x (PA2 x PS2 x PN2)] + {(1 – ((PA1 x PS1) + [(1 – (PA1 x PS1)) x (PA2 x PS2)])) x (PA3 x PS3 x PN3)} Which reduces to: PE = (PD1 x PN1) + [(1 – PD1) x (PD2 x PN2)] + {(1 – (PD1 + [(1 – PD1) x PD2])) x (PD3 x PN3)}, and since PIL = PDL when detection is timely, PE = (PI1 x PN1) + [(1 – PI1) x (PI2 x PN2)] + {(1 – (PI1 + [(1 – PI1) x PI2])) x (PI3 x PN3)} PE = PE1 + [(1 – PI1) x PE2] + {(1 – (PI1 + [(1 – PI1) x PI2])) x PE3)} DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section E 3-7-06 Appendix 5, 5-1 Vertical line denotes change. SECTION E APPENDIX 5—SUGGESTED VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT REPORT FORMAT 1.0 Executive Summary Objective Purpose and Summary of Protection Effectiveness 2.0 Introduction Scope Changes in the VAR Methodology and Assumptions 3.0 Target Identification and Description Theft or Diversion Sabotage (Radiological) Sabotage (Chemical and/or Biological) Theft or Espionage of Classified Information or Matter Other Losses 4.0 Threat Definition Adversary Type(s) Adversary Attributes 5.0 S&S Protection Elements Physical Security Systems Protective Forces (Response Strategies, Interruption, Neutralization)

Material Control and Accountability Reliability Program Part 1, Section E DOE M 470.4-1 Appendix 5, 5-2 8-26-05 6.0 Performance Testing Program Description Site Protection Elements Critical Protection Elements 7.0 S&S Protection Effectiveness Scenario Protection Effectiveness Validation Testing 8.0 Summary of S&S Protection Effectiveness Protection Effectiveness Recommendations DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 Part 1, Section F 3-7-06 F-1 Vertical line denotes change. SECTION F—PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 1. OBJECTIVE. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the protection provided Departmental safeguards and security (S&S) interests by systematically evaluating all protection program essential elements. 2. REQUIREMENTS. Each performance assurance program must be developed to validate the performance of all essential S&S protection elements. a. Operability and Effectiveness. Performance assurance programs must provide for operability and effectiveness testing of each protection program essential element or component. (1) Operability tests provide measures of integrity and must check the essential elements or total system to confirm operability. (2) Performance tests provide comprehensive assurance that protection program elements are performing as designed and provide the required levels of protection. (a) Performance tests results are used to validate the effectiveness of all elements of a layered S&S system. (b) Performance tests are not substitutes for compliance with requirements. b. Continuity. Performance assurance programs must evaluate operational continuity of all S&S essential elements. Limited Scope Performance Tests (LSPTs) and/or force-on-force (FoF) tests may be used as a means of meeting specific performance assurance testing requirements. Performance assurance programs must be evaluated as part of the DOE survey and the facility self-assessment programs as described in Section G of this Manual. (1) New protection program essential elements and components must be validated through acceptance testing before operational use. (2) Essential elements that have been repaired or undergone maintenance must be validated through testing before use. (3) The protective force (PF) must be performance tested both individually and in small tactical units. (4) Performance tests must ensure that approved protection strategies of denial, containment, recapture, recovery, and pursuit can be accomplished by the PF. (5) Essential elements of the protection program security systems and subsystems are performance tested to ensure that system detection, Part 1, Section F DOE M 470.4-1 F-2 8-26-05 assessment, and response to alarms and adversarial actions meet stated requirements. c. Reliability. Each essential element whose failure would reduce protection to an unacceptable level must be tested at frequencies that provide high assurance of operability and reliability. (1) Testing frequencies must reflect site-specific conditions and operational needs. (2) Testing frequencies must be documented for each essential element. d. Performance Tests. At least every 365 days, an integrated performance test encompassing all essential protection elements associated with a comprehensive site or facility threat scenario must be conducted to evaluate the overall facility S&S effectiveness. (1) Those Category I facilities requiring denial protection strategies must conduct integrated performance testing on a quarterly basis (at least every 3 months).

OR (2) Those sites with multiple Category I facilities requiring denial protection strategies may rotate quarterly performance testing so that at least one facility is tested on a quarterly basis (at least every 3 months). However, an integrated performance test for all Category I facilities must occur at least once every 365 days. e. Documentation. (1) Performance Assurance Program Plan. This plan must be an integral part of the site safeguards and security plan (SSSP)/site security plan (SSP), or material control and accountability (MC&A) plan, as applicable. The performance assurance program plan must describe the program and its administration and implementation by: (a) identifying protection elements for the protection of Category I and II special nuclear material (SNM) and Top Secret matter; (b) describing how the performance of these elements is to be ensured, including the manner in which credit is taken for activities performed by external oversight organizations; (c) addressing how deficiencies identified during performance assurance activities are to be corrected. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section F 8-26-05 F-3 (and F-4) (2) Performance Assurance Reports. The results of performance assurance program testing must be documented. (3) Document Retention. Record keeping systems must provide an audit trail for performance assurance activities and reports. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section G 8-26-05 G-1 SECTION G—SURVEY, REVIEW, AND SELF-ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS 1. OBJECTIVES. a. Provide assurance to the Secretary of Energy, Departmental elements, and other government agencies (OGAs) that safeguards and security (S&S) interests and activities are protected at the required levels. b. Provide a basis for line management to make decisions regarding S&S program implementation activities, including allocation of resources, acceptance of risk, and mitigation of vulnerabilities. The results must provide a compliance- and performance-based documented evaluation of the S&S program. c. Identify S&S program strengths and weaknesses, develop and complete a process improvement schedule, and use the results to correct and improve the overall S&S program. d. Provide documentation of oversight and assessment activities. 2. REQUIREMENTS. a. Types and Frequencies of Surveys and Assessments. (1) Initial Surveys. Initial surveys must be conducted at facilities where there will be a facility clearance established for a facility with an importance rating of: A, B, C, or PP (see Section I, Chapter II). Survey activities must be comprehensive and result in a satisfactory composite rating prior to a facility clearance (FCL) being granted. (2) Periodic Surveys. Periodic surveys are conducted for all facilities and must cover all applicable topics to ensure survey program objectives are met. The periodic survey may be composed of multiple special survey reports, providing all the requirements of this section are met. Integration of internal and external reports including quality assurance, property appraisals, performance assurance, and other evaluation reports may be used to augment the requirement for a periodic survey. A DOE Federal facility (e.g. site office) conducting a periodic survey fulfills the self-assessment requirement as noted in paragraph 2a(6) below. (a) Facilities with importance ratings of A, B, or C must be surveyed once every 12 months [with the exception of Category IV special nuclear material (SNM) only facilities—see paragraph 2a(2)(c) below].

(b) Facilities with an importance rating of PP must be surveyed once every 24 months. Part 1, Section G DOE M 470.4-1 G-2 8-26-05 (c) For facilities with Category IV SNM and nuclear material, including source material, the nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) topical area must be surveyed at least every 24 months. (d) Facilities with importance ratings of D, NP, or E do not require surveys but do require periodic reviews [see paragraph 2(a)(5) below]. (3) Special Surveys. Special surveys may be conducted at facilities for specific limited purposes. Examples include extended survey activities, technical security activities, “for cause” reviews, line management direction, shipment of nuclear and/or classified information or matter, or a change in the contractor operating a government-owned facility. (4) Termination Surveys. Termination surveys must be conducted to verify the termination of Departmental activities and appropriate disposition of S&S interests. Examples of survey activities include: the appropriate disposition, destruction, or return of classified information or matter, SNM, hazardous material, property, security badge retrieval, debriefings, and verification of the termination or transfer of Department of Energy (DOE) access authorizations. (a) Onsite termination surveys must be conducted at facilities possessing Top Secret matter, sensitive compartmented information (SCI)/ special access program (SAP) information or matter, or SNM. (b) Onsite or correspondence termination surveys must be accomplished for all other possessing facilities. (5) Periodic Reviews. A documented review of entities (D, NP, and E facilities) such as subcontractors, consultants, and common carriers must be performed by the DOE cognizant security authority at least every 5 years. (6) Self-Assessments. Self-assessments must be conducted between the periodic surveys conducted by the cognizant security authority and include all applicable facility S&S program elements. The self-assessment must ensure the S&S objectives are met (see paragraph 1 above). Federal facilities may use the self-assessment to substitute for the Periodic Survey requirement. NP facilities are not required to conduct self-assessments. However, sponsoring organizations (Federal or contractor) must include in their self-assessments a thorough review of their registration program for NP facilities which may result in a program review of identified subcontractors. DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section G 8-26-05 G-3 (7) Reviews or Inspections by Other DOE Elements or OGAs. Reviews/inspections conducted by other DOE elements (including site quality assurance programs) or OGAs may be used to meet survey requirements. When using reviews/inspections conducted by other organizations to meet the requirements of the survey, the guidelines below must be followed. (a) The review/inspection must have been conducted within the survey period. (b) Applicable portions of the review/inspection must be attached to the survey report. (c) Portions of topical and subtopical areas not covered by the review/inspection must be surveyed. (d) If ratings were not assigned during the review/inspection, the surveying office must analyze the impact of any deficiencies and assign ratings. (8) Extension of Frequency. The results of previous surveys may affect the frequency of future surveys. The interval between periodic surveys may be increased up to 24 months by the DOE cognizant security authority. Documentation of the justification for increases in the interval of periodic surveys must be maintained by the DOE cognizant security authority.

(a) The following conditions must be met for extensions: 1 the facility was rated satisfactory during the most recent survey activity; 2 the facility has no unmitigated deficiencies that impact the security posture of the facility, and all applicable topical area ratings are satisfactory from the previous survey; and 3 all applicable topical area ratings from the most recent self-assessment are satisfactory, and the DOE cognizant security authority concurs with the ratings. (b) Increasing the interval between surveys for a facility possessing Category I SNM or with credible roll-up to Category I SNM must be approved, in writing, by the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security or the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment. (c) All modifications to survey frequency requirements must be documented in the Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS). Part 1, Section G DOE M 470.4-1 G-4 8-26-05 b. Scope and Methodologies. Surveys and self-assessments must provide an integrated evaluation of all topical and subtopical areas to determine the overall status of the S&S program and ensure the objectives of this section are met (see paragraph 1 above). The integrated evaluation is a comprehensive synergistic approach using multiple S&S program elements that ensures total system effectiveness and, if properly implemented, will meet the objectives identified in paragraph 1 above. The scope of these activities and the methods used must include those listed below. (1) Compliance. Compliance reflects the status of the S&S program as measured against implementation of applicable Federal statutes, regulations, policies, approved site safeguards and security plans (SSSPs)/site security plans (SSPs), and other approved security plans. (2) Performance. Performance indicates the degree to which the elements of the S&S program meet protection objectives based on the operational testing of program elements. (3) Comprehensiveness. Comprehensiveness identifies the breadth of protection afforded all activities and interests within a facility. This is accomplished by an evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of programs and a thorough examination of the implementation of policies, practices, and procedures to ensure compliance and performance. All applicable topical areas identified on DOE Form (F) 470.8, “Survey/Inspection Report” Form must be evaluated. (4) Other. The scope of special and termination surveys is determined by the DOE cognizant security authority in coordination with the surveying office. Determinations of survey scope are predicated on the nature or status of operations at the facility, activity, or element being surveyed. These surveys may not cover all topical areas identified on DOE F 470.8. 3. CONDUCT. Local survey and self-assessment procedures implementing this section must be developed, documented, and approved by the cognizant security authority. Procedures must ensure completion of the objectives contained in paragraph 1 above and must include the requirements listed below. a. Team Composition. Survey and self-assessment team personnel must possess qualifications, experience, and training sufficient to review and inspect the topical/subtopical areas of the survey/self-assessment. The National Training Center (NTC) provides training courses for survey team leaders and team members. (1) Survey teams must be led by a Federal employee and may be composed of Departmental Federal and contractor personnel.

DOE M 470.4-1 Part 1, Section G 8-26-05 G-5 (2) Self-assessments must include at least one person from the cognizant security authority. b. Planning, Scheduling, and Integration. Surveys and self-assessments must be planned, scheduled, and conducted in an integrated manner to achieve the objectives identified in paragraph 1 above. If topical and subtopical area evaluations are performed separately, the surveying office must document and integrate the results of each into a single (periodic) survey report that includes a composite facility rating. The frequency between topical and subtopical areas cannot exceed the frequency for the single (periodic) survey. c. Validation. Results must be validated by methods including, but not limited to, document reviews, performance testing, and interview analyses and observations. d. Exit Briefing. An exit briefing must be conducted with the surveyed or assessed organization to include the minimum facts: (1) program strengths and weaknesses, including all findings; (2) corrective action reporting requirements for all open findings, regardless of source; and (3) topical and composite ratings. For less than satisfactory ratings, the communication of the composite rating initiates the actions required in paragraph 8 of this section. 4. FINDINGS. a. Identification and Documentation. Findings are any validated program deficiency (failure to meet a performance or compliance requirement) regardless of source. Findings may be reflected in documents resulting from internal and external reviews, audits, appraisals, and other sources [e.g., the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of the Inspector General (IG), previous surveys, self-assessments, etc.]. All open findings must be reviewed during the survey or self-assessment to validate the status of corrective action and to evaluate the impact on the existing S&S program. Findings identified during the current survey or self-assessment must be reported immediately to the Departmental element and contractor line management if a vulnerability to national security, classified information or matter, nuclear materials, or Department property results, or may result, in a programmatic impact to the Department. Findings identified during a survey or self-assessment, even if closed during the survey or self-assessment activity, must be documented in the associated report. Part 1, Section G DOE M 470.4-1 G-6 8-26-05 b. Tracking. Findings and deficiencies, regardless of source, and corrective action plans (milestones and estimated completion dates) must be entered into SSIMS in accordance with SSIMS guidelines and tracked until closed. Quarterly status reports must be entered into SSIMS by January 15, April 15, July 15, and October 15, of each year. Self-assessment deficiencies are not required to be entered into SSIMS; however, a local mechanism/system must be used to track these deficiencies and corrective action until closed. c. Trending. Trending evaluations must be considered in the resolution of findings in the subtopical area of program management to determine if systemic and systematic causal factors exist within the S&S program. Results of this evaluation that indicate negative trends must be analyzed to ensure corrective action plans address root causes and the need to ensure continuous improvement of the S&S program. 5. RATINGS.

a. Types. Ratings must be based on the effectiveness and adequacy of the program at a facility and reflect a balance of performance and compliance results as well as the impact of the deficiency(ies) (e.g., findings, IG recommendations, etc.) and mitigating factors. The ratings listed below must be used for all surveys (except termination), reviews, and self-assessments. Does Not Apply (DNA) and Not Rated (NR) may also be used in applicable situations. (1) Types of Ratings. (a) Satisfactory. The element being evaluated meets protection objectives or provides reasonable assurance that protection objectives are being met. (b) Marginal. The element being evaluated partially meets protection objectives or provides questionable assurance that protection objectives are being met. (c) Unsatisfactory. The element being evaluated does not meet protection objectives or does not provide adequate assurance that protection objectives are being met. (d) Inspection Ratings. “Effective Performance,