DOE O 5630.13, Master Safeguards and Security Agreements
Functional areas: Classified Matter, Defense Programs, Information Security, Nuclear Safety, Safety and Security
To establish the Department of Energy policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's). Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.13A
Superseded By:
DOE O 5630.13A, Master Safeguards and Security Agreement on Jun 08, 1992
Version history and related documents
Superseded by
A newer version replaces this document.
- DOE O 5630.13AMaster Safeguards and Security Agreement (Jun 08, 1992)
Document text
Text extracted from the attached file. Refer to the original document for the authoritative version.
Section 1
o Q
u.s. Department of Energy ORDER
0',"'\
,. Washington, D.C.
DOE 5630.13
2-3-88
SUBJECT: MASTER SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS
1. PURPOSE. To establish the Department of Energy (DOE) policy,
requirements, responsibilities, and authorities 'for ~he development and'
implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's).
2. SCOPE. The provisions of this Order apply to Departmental Elements and
contractors performing work for the Department as provided by law and/or
contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting officer.
3. APPLICABILITY. ..
a. Facilities which have Category I quantities of special nuclear
material (SNM) or those facilities that have Category II quantities
within the same protected area that roll-up to a Category I quantity,
b. 'Facilities which have a radiological sabotage threat which would
cause an unacceptable impact on the health and safety of the public,
c. Facilities which have an industrial sabotage threat which would cause
an unacceptable impact to those DOE programs supporting national
defense and security, and/or
d. Other facilities that Heads of Departmental Elements deem
appropriate.
4. POLICY.
a. Levels of protection shall be provided in consideration of the
potential risks t~'national securitY,and,the health and safety of the
pub 11 c.
b. The levels of protection identified in approved facility MSSA's
shall be the basis for facility planning, executing, and evaluating
the protection program.
DISTRIBUTION: INITIATED BY:
All Departmental Eler;lents Office of Safeguards and
Security
c
DOE 5630.13
2-3-88
2
5. DEFINITIONS. See Attachment I.
6. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
a. The MSSA establishes a formal agreement requiring the joint approval of the
field element manager, outlay program office manager(s}. and the Assistant
Secretary for Defense Programs for the levels of protection of graded
safeguards and security interests from theft, sabotage, and other
malevolent acts associated with SNM or vital assets which may adversely
affect national security or the health and safety of th~ public. Such
agreements take into account DOE policy applicable to specific
sites and/or programs, to achieve acceptable protection levels that
minimize inherent risks on a cost-effective basis. The format, content,
and specific guidance for the development of MSSA's will be published in
the future.
b. The MSSA's contain summary level infor~tion adequate to describe
th~ basis supporting the agreement, assumptions, exceptions, and
conclusions.
c. The MSSA includes statements of the facility's safeguards and
security performance levels based on the status of seve-ralcomple~entary
performance indicators such as the results of vulnerability assessments,
system performance tests, surveys, inspections, evaluations, and training
levels as well as the field managers' judgment of the effectiveness of the
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protection system.
d. MSSA's are supported by backup documentation, adequate to validate the
MSSA maintained at the field organization or contractor facility.
This may include vulnerability assessments, cost/benefit analyses,
implementation procedures, guidelines, performance exercises, and other
studies. .
e. The MSSA may be used to document exceptions to safeguards and security
policy and to provide the basis for relief from certain safeguards and
security requi rements. ,- .
-f. Each Signatory agrees to support the safeguards and security commitments
Section 2
set forth in MSSA's under their cognizance to the fullest extent
practicable. Planning and budget submittals shall be consistent with the
commitments made in the MSSA. Funding-constraints applied as part of the
budget submission and authorization process may necessitate changes in
plans documented in the MSSA's.
g. The MSSA is reviewed and updated annually.
h. If tests or other indicators demonstrate that the actual level
of protection is less than that approved in the MSSA, action must
be taken to compensate for identified vulnerabilities~
C
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DOE 5630.13 3 .
2-3-88 o 7. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES.
a. All Departmental Elements managing facilities included in
paragraph 3 shall prepare MSSA's. An MSSA shall designate
facility levels of protection which the appropriate field
organization, program office, and Headquarters safeguards
and security responsible official acknowledge to be adequate.
b. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1) shall:
(1) Establish safeguards and security policies, threat
statements. standards. and guidance for the DOE.
(2) Approve all MSSA's.
(3) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process • ..
c. De¥uty Assistant secretar~ for securit~ Affairs (DP-30) through the
Of ice of Safeguards and ecurity (DP- 4), shall:
(1) Formulate safeguards and security policies. threat statements,
standards. and guidance for DOE.
(2) Issue guidelines for the preparation. review, revision. and
approval of MSSA's.
(3) Review, comment. and concur in the MSSA.
(4) Coordinate the review and approval process with all
appropriate organizations.
(5) Verify MSSA's to ensure that they are complete, the assumptions
are supported by technical justification, and that the .
conclusions are supported by appropriate analyses and detailed
documentation.
"
(6) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process.
d. Office of Security Evaluations (DP-4) shall verify compliance with
specific provisions of the MSSA's through inspections and
evaluations.
DOE 5630.134
~~M
JSecretar fore.
(1) Approve MSSA's that apply to their programs (including .
subsequent modifications requiring Headquarters approval).
(2) Support commitments made 1n the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process.
f.
(1) Approve MSSA's that apply to their programs (including subsequent
modifications requiring Headquarters approval).
(2) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process.
g. Heads of Field Elements shall:
(1) Prepare, review, and approve MSSA's for selected safeguards and
security interests under their jurisdiction.
(2) Implement, enforce, and maintain the protection measures and terms
of the MSSA's under their management jurisdiction.
(3) Prepare and maintain adequate documentation for validation of J
MSSA's in support of the requirement of paragraph 6d.
(4) Inspect, evaluate. and review protection systems to validate
assumptions made in the formulation of MSSA's.
(5) Direct the review and consolidation of appropriate changes and
updates to the MSSA's.
(6) Advise the Office Of Safeguards and Security. and appropriate
Program Secretarial Officers of significant delays in implementing
protection features documented in the MSSA.
(7) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
Section 3
possible through the budget process.
o "DOE 5630.13 5 (and 6)
o 2~3-88
8. REVIEW AND REVISION OF MSSA'S.
a. Changes that significantly alter the agreed-on protection philosophy
or performance standards of protection systems shall require the
approval of DP-1, the cognizant program manager(s), and the Head of
the Field Element.
b. Changes that are consistent with agreed-on protection policy may be
made by the Heads of Field Elements with a copy of changes provided
to the Office of Safeguards and Security and the cognizant program
manager(s).
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
®m.'lAWRENCE F. DAVENPORT
l~t Assistant Secretary
Management and Administration
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Page 1
DOE 5630.13 Attachment I
2-3-88
DEFINITIONS
1. ACCEPTED RISK is the acknowledgment that the effectiveness of the current
-protection system is at a level such that the potential for loss of some
safeguards and security interests is acceptably minimized.
2. CATEGORY I AND CATEGORY II QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL. See
DOE 5632.2A, PHYSICAL 'PROTECTION OF SNM AND VITAL EQUIPMENT.
3. CONTRACTOR is any business entity doing work for the Department including
subcontractors, vendors, consultants, bidders, recipients of financial
assistance agreements, and other Federal agencies in the case of
interagency acquisition.
4. EVALUATIONS are determinations of the effectiveness of protection program
topical areas as implemented across the DOE. .
5. FACILITY is an institution, manufact~ing/assembly/process plant,
laboratory, office building, or other complex utilized by the Department,
its contractors, or subcontractors, for the performance of work under
the jurisdiction of the Department.
6. GENERIC THREAT GUIDANCE is the Departmental threat guidance issued
by the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-l).
7. INSPECTIONS are examinations of the effectiveness of the implementation _ ~
of DOE protection programs in selected topical areas at a specific field~
facility.
8. LEVEL OF PROTECTION is the degree of safeguards and security provided to
protect Departmental interests.
9. -MASTER SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AGREEMENT is a formal agreement between
the responsible DOE Headquarters and Field Elements regarding the
safeguards and security interests to be protected, the prescribed levels
of protection, the accepted risk, and the plans to increase protection
system effectiveness, if required.
. . .. o
Attachment I
Page 2 DOE 5630.13
() 2-3-88
10. PROGRAM SECRETARIAL OFFICERS are Headquarters first level officials who
have lead line responsibility for the execution of authorized programs
with appropriated funds.
11. ROLL-UP is the accumulation, within a single event, of Category I
quantities of SNM from Category II quantity locations within the same
protected area.
12. SABOTAGE.
a. Industrial. Any deliberate act which could have unacceptable impact
to DOE programs supporting national defense and security.
b. Radiological. Any deliberate act directed against an SNM facility, an
SNM or weapon security shipment, or a component of such facility or
shipment which could have unacceptable dangers to the health and
safety of the public. •
13. THEFT is the removal of property from Government-authorized physical
bOUnOaries without permission and contrary to law.
14. VALIDATION refers to the confirmation that the MSSA assumptions are.
accurate and in agreement with DOE policy, that the agreement adequately
4[:.'J.... covers all safeguards and security interests, and that their performance
H objectives are being attained.
15. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT is a systematic evaluation process in which
qualitative and70r quantitative techniques are applied to arrive at the
system effectiveness level for. specific targets.