DOE N 5632.2, Physical Protection of Production Reactors Against Acts of Sabotage

~ U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. NOTICE DOE N 5632 .2 6-1-81 EXPIRES: 6-1-82 SUBJECT: PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PRODUCTION REACTORS AGAINST ACTS OF SABOTAGE 1. PURPOSE. To estab l ish minimum physica l protection standards for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials production reactors against acts of industrial or radiologica l sabotage and provide speci f i c inter im require­ ments pending i ssuance of directives for the physical protection of DOE property and the physical protect ion of speci al material s (SNM). 2. SCOPE . The prov is ions of this Noti ce apply to all elements of the Department of Energy and to contractors and subcontractors i nVolved with t he DOE's nuclear materials production reactors at t he Richland and Savannah River Operations Offices. 3. DEFINITIONS. a. Isol ation Zone. An area surrounding the protected fac i l i ty cleared of any objects which could conceal veh icles or ind ividua ls , and which affords unuustructed obs~rvations of, or other means of de­ tect i on of, entry into the area. b. Protected Area. An area encl osed by a physical barrier with in the perimeter of t he iso lation zone . Vehi cular or personnel access to the protect ed area i s con trol led by hardened guard stations . Access to this area i s con t rol led through the minimum number of portals . Access to protected areas does not provide immediate access to any vita l equipment . c. Vi ta l Area. An area which contai ns equipment vital to the contin ued safe operation of the reactor and which i s contained within a protected area . d. Coun t er. Any action taken to deter or prevent acts of s botage, or to delay the successful compietion of an act of sabotage, until sufficient response forces can arrive on-scene . 4. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES. It is DOE pol icy to physically protect all special nucl ear materials (SNM) and key fac i lities, including materials product i on reactors against acts of sabotage . The objecti ves of this po 1 icy a re to : DISTRIBUTION: All Departmenta l Elements Federa l Energy Regulatory Commission (info) INITIATED BY: Office of Safeguards and Security 2 a. • ~ Protect the health and safety of the public; and DOE N 5632. 2 6-1 -81 b. Maintain program continuity by preventi ng a long-term loss of major facilities. 5. GENERAL. Physical protection systems should be designed and implemented to counter a range of threats, wttich .. include:. a -group .o-fi-several -we"ll-armed. trained, and dedicated saboteurs with or without the assistance of a single, well-placed insider. The group may operate in several modes, including frontal and diversionary assault modes, or by a combination of assault, stea lth, and decei t. Additional credible threats which the physical prut ection system should counter include intrusion by organized demonstrators and individual vandals. 6. PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS . a. Security Perimeters . Each reactor shal l be co1,tained within a concentric set of security perimeters, with the innermost being the vital area peri­ meter. Next, outboard will be the protection area perimeter(s), and, finally, the isolation zone. Specific requirements are: ( l ) ( 2 ) Vital Area. Vital areas contain all vital equipment within their perimeters. There may be more than one vital area within a given protected area. The perimeter of a vital area shall be estab lished to permit detection of unauthor ized attempts at entry. Access contro l s shall be provided; (a) for annunciation and assessment of an alarm at a central guard post, and (b) to delay an adversary from gaining access to vital equipment until the arrival, on-scene, of response forces. Alternately, vital areas shall be contained in protected areas wh i ch meet these requirements .

Protected Area. Procedures and requirements are contained in DOE 5632.2, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL, page 11, paragraph 8b. b. Access Controls. (l ) All persons admitted to protected or vital areas must be properly cl eared and authorized, or be under the escort of a cleared and authorized person knowledgeable of facility operations, safe­ guards. and security procedures . (2) All persons who are afforded unescorted access to protected areas wi 11 be 11 L11 or 11 S11 cleared. .. .. I ' ,,.,. • ' I DOE N 5632 .2 6- 1-81 . ,,......, 3 {and 4) {3) All persons who are afforded unescorted access to vital areas wi 11 be 11 Q11 or 11 TS11 cleared. c. Records. Records must be maintained of all nonroutine personnel entering an isolation zone, protected area, or vital area. d. Onsite Security Force. The onsite security force will have the capability of either defea ting or delaying, until sufficient backup units arrive, the largest and best equipped credible attacking force hypothesized. In no event should there be less than five security inspectors {as defined by DOE 5632. 1, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATTE~) ava·ilab le for response within 5 111inutes of an alarm. These responding secur i ty inspectors shall be other than those mann ing the si te's central alarm assessment and control center . 7. IMPLEMENTATION. Add i tional i mp l ementation procedures wi l l be pub l ished in fut ure di rectives re lating to physical protection of DOE property and Special nuclear material. William S. Heffelfinger Assistant Secretary Management and Administration