DOE G 151.1-1B, Comprehensive Emergency Management System Guide

AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY: www.directives.doe.gov National Nuclear Security Administration DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-2022 Comprehensive Emergency Management System Guide [This Guide describes suggested non-mandatory approaches for meeting requirements. Guides are not requirements documents and are not to be construed as requirements in any audit or appraisal for compliance with the parent Policy, Order, Notice, or Manual.] U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE G 151.1-1B i 7-26-2022 Table of Contents Emergency Management Fundamentals .............................................................. 1-1 1.1. DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System ............................................ 1-1 1.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1-1 1.1.2. Requirements and Guidance ......................................................................................... 1-3 1.1.3. Application of Guidance ............................................................................................... 1-4 1.1.4. Conceptual Foundation of DOE Emergency Management .......................................... 1-5 1.1.5. Emergency Management Programs .............................................................................. 1-6 1.1.6. Emergency Management Program Elements ................................................................ 1-9 1.1.7. DOE/NNSA Emergency Management and Integrated Safety Management (ISM) ... 1-14 1.1.8. DOE/NNSA Emergency Management and National Incident Management System ........................................................................................................................ 1-15 1.2. Core Program Facilities .............................................................................................. 1-17 1.2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1-17 1.2.2. Program Elements ....................................................................................................... 1-17 1.3. Hazardous Materials Program Facilities ................................................................... 1-19 1.3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1-20 1.3.2. Program Elements ....................................................................................................... 1-20 1.4. Leased Facilities ........................................................................................................... 1-23 1.4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1-23 1.4.2. Application of Emergency Management Guidance .................................................... 1-24 1.5. Closure Activities ......................................................................................................... 1-29 1.5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1-29 1.5.2. All-Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis ........................................................ 1-30 1.5.3. Programmatic Elements .............................................................................................. 1-31 1.5.4. Response Elements ..................................................................................................... 1-33

1.6. Biosafety Facilities ....................................................................................................... 1-35 1.6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1-36 1.6.2. General Approach ....................................................................................................... 1-36 All Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis ................................................. 2-1 2.1. All-Hazards Planning Basis .......................................................................................... 2-1 2.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 2-1 2.1.2. General Approach — All-Hazards Planning Basis....................................................... 2-1 2.1.3. Step 1: Describe the Facility and Identify its Hazards.................................................. 2-2 2.1.4. Step 2: Screen Hazardous Materials to Determine Need for an Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA) ....................................................................................... 2-3 2.1.5. Step 3: Identify Applicable Types of Emergency Incidents and Conditions ................ 2-4 2.1.6. Step 4: Qualitatively Describe Potential Impacts ......................................................... 2-6 2.1.7. Step 5: Identify Applicable Planning and Preparedness Requirements ........................ 2-6 2.1.8. All-Hazards Survey Documentation ............................................................................. 2-7 2.1.9. Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) ............................... 2-7 ii DOE G 151.1B 7-26-2022 2.2. Technical Planning Basis ............................................................................................. 2-12 2.2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2-12 2.2.2. General Approach - Technical Planning Basis ........................................................... 2-14 2.2.3. Step 1: Define and Describe Facility and Operations ................................................. 2-16 2.2.4. Step 2: Characterize the Hazardous Materials ............................................................ 2-17 2.2.5. Step 3: Select Scenarios for Analysis ......................................................................... 2-19 2.2.6. Step 4: Analyze Scenarios .......................................................................................... 2-27 2.2.7. Step 5: Document the Results of the Analysis ............................................................ 2-38 2.2.8. Special Topics............................................................................................................. 2-43 2.2.9. Using Safety Analysis Results in EPHAs ................................................................... 2-46 2.2.10. Using Security Risk Assessment in EPHAs ............................................................... 2-47 2.3. Emergency Planning Zones ......................................................................................... 2-49 2.3.1. Background ................................................................................................................. 2-49 2.3.2. General Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) Concepts ................................................ 2-50 2.3.3. Developing Facility EPZs ........................................................................................... 2-51

2.4 Maintaining All-Hazards Surveys and EPHAs ......................................................... 2-56 Programmatic Elements ........................................................................................ 3-1 3.1. Program Administration and Management ................................................................ 3-1 3.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3-1 3.1.2. General Approach - Program Administration and Management .................................. 3-1 3.1.3. Planning Responsibilities ............................................................................................. 3-3 3.1.4. Preparedness Responsibilities ....................................................................................... 3-8 3.1.5. Readiness Assurance Responsibilities ........................................................................ 3-11 3.1.6. Response Responsibilities .......................................................................................... 3-13 3.1.7. Document Control Systems ........................................................................................ 3-15 3.1.8. Classified/Controlled Unclassified Information ......................................................... 3-16 3.2. Training and Drills ...................................................................................................... 3-16 3.2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3-16 3.2.2. General Approach- Training and Drills ...................................................................... 3-17 3.2.3. Training Program Management .................................................................................. 3-18 3.2.4. Training Needs Assessment ........................................................................................ 3-23 3.2.5. Specific Training Requirements ................................................................................. 3-24 3.2.6. Training Development ................................................................................................ 3-29 3.2.7. Training Delivery ....................................................................................................... 3-32 3.2.8. Drills ......................................................................................................................... 3-33 3.3. Readiness Assurance .................................................................................................... 3-37 3.3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3-37 3.3.2. General Approach - Readiness Assurance .................................................................. 3-39 3.3.3. Readiness Assurance Program .................................................................................... 3-40 3.3.4. Evaluations ................................................................................................................. 3-51 3.3.5. Evaluation Process ...................................................................................................... 3-56 3.3.6. Self-Assessments ........................................................................................................ 3-64 3.3.7. Performance Indicators ............................................................................................... 3-66 3.3.8. Exercise Program ........................................................................................................ 3-68

DOE G 151.1-1B iii 7-26-2022 3.3.9. Types of Exercises ...................................................................................................... 3-70 3.3.10. Exercise Planning ....................................................................................................... 3-75 3.3.11. Exercise Documentation ............................................................................................. 3-82 3.3.12. Post-Emergency Evaluation ....................................................................................... 3-91 3.3.13. Exercise Objectives .................................................................................................... 3-92 3.3.14. Exercise Preparation ................................................................................................... 3-94 3.3.15. Conduct of the Exercise .............................................................................................. 3-96 3.3.16. Exercise Evaluation .................................................................................................. 3-100 3.3.17. Follow-up Activities ................................................................................................. 3-107 Response Elements ................................................................................................. 4-1 4.1. Emergency Operations Systems ................................................................................... 4-1 4.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4-1 4.1.2. General Approach – Emergency Operations System ................................................... 4-2 4.2. Emergency Response Organization.............................................................................. 4-2 4.2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4-2 4.2.2. General Approach – Emergency Response Organization (ERO) ................................. 4-2 4.2.3. ERO Structure............................................................................................................... 4-3 4.2.4. Staffing the ERO ........................................................................................................ 4-10 4.2.5. Operational Aspects of the ERO................................................................................. 4-12 4.2.6. Maintenance of the ERO ............................................................................................ 4-14 4.2.7. Special Response Function/Positions ......................................................................... 4-15 4.3. Offsite Response Interfaces ......................................................................................... 4-20 4.3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4-20 4.3.2. General Approach – Offsite Response Interfaces ....................................................... 4-20 4.3.3. Offsite Agencies and Organizations ........................................................................... 4-21 4.3.4. Support Agreements ................................................................................................... 4-23 4.3.5. Interface Information and Issues to Address .............................................................. 4-24 4.3.6. Interfaces during Response ......................................................................................... 4-26 4.3.7. Offsite Response during Severe Events ...................................................................... 4-27

4.4. Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems ......................................................... 4-28 4.4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4-28 4.4.2. General Approach – Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems ......................... 4-28 4.4.3. Role of the All-Hazards Survey/EPHA ...................................................................... 4-29 4.4.4. Emergency Facilities .................................................................................................. 4-31 4.4.5. Emergency Equipment ............................................................................................... 4-36 4.4.6. Maintenance of Facilities and Equipment .................................................................. 4-42 4.5. Emergency Categorization and Classification .......................................................... 4-42 4.5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4-42 4.5.2. General Approach – Emergency Categorization and Classification .......................... 4-43 4.5.3. Operational Emergency Definition ............................................................................. 4-44 4.5.4. Emergency Categorization ......................................................................................... 4-44 4.5.5. Classification of Hazardous Material Operational Emergencies ................................ 4-55 4.5.6. Development of Emergency Action Levels ................................................................ 4-60 4.5.7. Testing Categorization Criteria and EALs ................................................................. 4-68 iv DOE G 151.1B 7-26-2022 4.6. Notifications and Communications ............................................................................ 4-68 4.6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4-68 4.6.2. General Approach – Notifications and Communications ........................................... 4-68 4.6.3. Notifications ............................................................................................................... 4-70 4.6.4. Communications ......................................................................................................... 4-75 4.6.5. Response Documentation ........................................................................................... 4-77 4.7. Consequence Assessment ............................................................................................ 4-78 4.7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4-78 4.7.2. General Approach – Consequence Assessment .......................................................... 4-78 4.7.3. Decision-Making in an Emergency Environment ...................................................... 4-79 4.7.4. General Consequence Assessment Process ................................................................ 4-81 4.7.5. Initial Incident Recognition, Categorization/Classification, and Protective Actions . 4-84 4.7.6. Timely Initial Assessment .......................................................................................... 4-84 4.7.7. Continuous Ongoing Assessment (COA) ................................................................... 4-89 4.7.8. Documentation.......................................................................................................... 4-106 4.7.9. Quality Assurance ..................................................................................................... 4-106

4.8. Protective Actions ...................................................................................................... 4-107 4.8.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4-107 4.8.2. General Approach – Protective Actions ................................................................... 4-108 4.8.3. Protective Actions..................................................................................................... 4-109 4.8.4. Reentry ..................................................................................................................... 4-130 4.9. Emergency Medical Support .................................................................................... 4-137 4.9.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4-137 4.9.2. General Approach- Emergency Medical Support ..................................................... 4-137 4.9.3. Site Emergency Medical Support ............................................................................. 4-138 4.9.4. Interfaces and Coordination ...................................................................................... 4-143 4.9.5. Medical Records and Treatment History .................................................................. 4-146 4.9.6. Emergency Medical Response Preparedness Activities ........................................... 4-147 4.9.7. Federal Medical Assistance ...................................................................................... 4-148 4.10. Emergency Public Information ................................................................................ 4-149 4.10.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4-149 4.10.2. General Approach - Emergency Public Information (EPI) ...................................... 4-149 4.10.3. EPI Functions and Staffing ....................................................................................... 4-151 4.10.4. EPI Response ............................................................................................................ 4-153 4.10.5. Media Relations ........................................................................................................ 4-159 4.10.6. EPI/JIC Facilities and Equipment ............................................................................. 4-162 4.10.7. EPI Preparedness Activities ...................................................................................... 4-164 4.11. Termination and Recovery........................................................................................ 4-167 4.11.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4-167 4.11.2. General Approach – Termination and Recovery ...................................................... 4-168 4.11.3. Termination .............................................................................................................. 4-169 4.11.4. Recovery ................................................................................................................... 4-172 4.11.5. Resumption of Normal Operations ........................................................................... 4-177 DOE G 151.1-1B v 7-26-2022

Biosafety Facilities .................................................................................................. 5-1 5.1. Biosafety .......................................................................................................................... 5-1 5.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 5-1 5.1.2. General Approach – Biosafety Facilities ...................................................................... 5-2 5.2. Hazardous Biological Materials and Biosafety ........................................................... 5-3 5.2.1. Hazardous Biological Agents and Toxins .................................................................... 5-3 5.2.2. Select Agent Regulations .............................................................................................. 5-3 5.2.3. Principles of Biosafety, Containment, and Barriers ..................................................... 5-5 5.3. Operational Emergencies Involving Biological Materials.......................................... 5-6 5.3.1. DOE O151.1D and Hazardous Biological Materials .................................................... 5-6 5.3.2. Emergency Management Issues ................................................................................... 5-6 5.3.3. Biological Operational Emergencies .......................................................................... 5-10 5.3.4. Biological Agent/Toxin Transport Mechanisms ........................................................ 5-10 5.3.5. Environmental Dispersion .......................................................................................... 5-11 5.3.6. Infected Host .............................................................................................................. 5-12 5.3.7. Contamination ............................................................................................................ 5-13 5.3.8. Biological Agent Release Scenarios ........................................................................... 5-13 5.3.9. Recognizing Operational Emergencies ....................................................................... 5-18 5.3.10. Initial Protective Actions ............................................................................................ 5-20 5.3.11. Public Health Response .............................................................................................. 5-22 5.4. Biosafety Facilities: All Hazards Planning /Technical Planning Basis ................... 5-24 5.4.1. All-Hazards Survey .................................................................................................... 5-24 5.4.2. Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA) ................................................... 5-25 5.4.3. Example Release Scenarios ........................................................................................ 5-27 5.5. Biosafety Facilities: Programmatic Elements ........................................................... 5-37 5.5.1. Program Administration and Management ................................................................. 5-37 5.5.2. Training and Drills...................................................................................................... 5-39 5.5.3. Readiness Assurance .................................................................................................. 5-39

5.6. Biosafety Facilities: Response Elements .................................................................... 5-41 5.6.1. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) ................................................................ 5-41 5.6.2. Emergency Operations Systems ................................................................................. 5-42 5.6.3. Offsite Response Interfaces ........................................................................................ 5-42 5.6.4. Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems ........................................................... 5-43 5.6.5. Emergency Categorization and Classification ............................................................ 5-43 5.6.6. Notifications and Communications ............................................................................ 5-44 5.6.7. Consequence Assessment ........................................................................................... 5-45 5.6.8. Protective Actions....................................................................................................... 5-47 5.6.9. Emergency Medical Support ...................................................................................... 5-48 5.6.10. Emergency Public Information ................................................................................... 5-49 5.6.11. Termination and Recovery ......................................................................................... 5-49 Appendix A. Hazardous Material Screening Process ......................................................... A-1 Appendix B. Onsite Transportation Analysis ...................................................................... B-1 Appendix C. Consequence Thresholds ................................................................................. C-1 vi DOE G 151.1B 7-26-2022 Appendix D. Combustion Products and Toxicity in Hazards Assessments ...................... D-1 Appendix E. Integration of Incident Categorization/Classification with Normal Operations ......................................................................................................... E-1 Appendix F. Methods and Examples for Implementation of Incident Categorization and Classification, including Barrier Approach to Emergency Action Level Development ....................................................................................................... F-1 Appendix G. Ingestion Pathway Calculations for Radioactive Releases ........................... G-1 Appendix H. Field Monitoring .............................................................................................. H-1 Appendix I. Operational Emergency Scenarios for Biosafety Facilities ............................ I-1 Appendix J. Acronyms ............................................................................................................ J-1 List of Tables and Figures Table 2-1 Example Threats and Hazards by Category……………. ....................................... 2-8 Table 3-1 Documents for Field Element Manager/Federal Manager ...................................... 3-5 Table 3-2 Focus and Limitations of Evaluation Tools ................................................... 3-453-45 Table 3-3 Sample Planning Schedule for a Site-level Annual Exercise ............................... 3-81 Table 4-1 Summaries of Emergency Classes ........................................................................ 4-59

Table 4-2 Examples of Incident-Based and Symptom-Based EAL Statements for the Same Initiating Condition ........................................................................................ 4-634-63 Table 4-3 Example Symptom-Based EALs for Different Severity Levels for the Same Initiating Condition ........................................................................................ 4-644-64 Table 4-4 Example Incident-Based EALs for Different Severity Levels for the Same Initiating Condition........................................................................................................ 4-654-65 Table 4-5 Infiltration Rates – Air Change/Hr .............................................................. 4-654-116 Table 4-6 Air Changes per Hour .................................................................................. 4-654-117 Table 4-7 Concentration vs Dose ................................................................................. 4-654-118 Table 4-8 Decision Aid – Checklist ............................................................................. 4-654-123 Table 4-9 Typical Contents of an Emergency Public Information Plan ............................ 4-153 Table 5-1 Transport Mechanisms and Barriers / Controls .................................................... 5-17 Table 5-2 Eight BSC Scenarios from DOE O 151.1D .......................................................... 5-31 Table 5-3 Source and Release Parameters ............................................................................ 5-32 Table 5-4 Recognition Factors .............................................................................................. 5-34 Table 5-5 Example Protective Actions .................................................................................. 5-35 Table 5-6 Examples of Generic Initial Protective Actions – Standard Initial Protective Actions .................................................................................................................. 5-36 Table 5-7 Airborne Release Scenarios .................................................................................. 5-37 Table D-1 Yields of HCN and HCl from NIST Room Fire Tests ........................................... D-3 Table D-2 Amount of Toxic Gases Needed to Exceed Applicable ERPG-2 Value at Various Distances ................................................................................................................ D-3 Table D-3 Mass of Combustibles to Produce a 15-Minute Average Concentration of Specified Toxic Gases Equal to ERPG-2 at 100 meters ........................................................ D-4 Table F-1 Example SAE EALs Two Barriers Failed ............................................................ F-12 Table F-2 Example EAL Sub-Categories for Category Number 1 ....................................... F-13 DOE G 151.1-1B vii 7-26-2022 Figure 1-1 Emergency Management Program Overview ......................................................... 1-8 Figure 4-1 Emergency Operations System Structure ............................................................... 4-1 Figure 4-2 Basic Functions in the Timely Initial Assessment Process ................................... 4-86 Figure 4-3 Basic Functions in the Continuous Ongoing Assessment ..................................... 4-91 Figure 5-1 Schematic Representation of Biological Release Scenario .................................. 5-17

Figure A-1 Hazardous Material Screening Process ................................................................ A-10 DOE G 151.1-1B 1-1 7-26-22 Emergency Management Fundamentals 1.1. DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System 1.1.1. Introduction The United States Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), manages a wide variety of sites, facilities, and activities throughout the country. These include: • National Laboratories; • Nuclear weapons complex; • Legacies of the Manhattan project and the early days of the Nation's atomic energy program; • Transportation of hazardous materials: – Office of Secure Transportation – Hazardous waste shipments • Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs); and • Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The National Laboratories conduct basic and applied research, ranging from high energy particle physics to the human genome, alternative sources of energy, and applications of technology to homeland security. Activities at other sites include development, stockpiling, and dismantling of nuclear weapons, production of nuclear power sources for space vehicles, environmental cleanup at legacy sites, transportation of waste materials generated by Departmental operations, and storage and isolation of radioactive waste. The Department also manages the national SPR, which stores reserves of petroleum product in case of a national emergency that impacts normal supplies, and is the home of the PMAs, which function both as distributors of electric power and brokers of regional energy supplies. Finally, the DOE/NNSA is involved in energy restoration activities following major disruptions of supply or distribution. The diversity of these activities indicates DOE/NNSA sites and facilities store, use, produce, and dispose of many different hazardous substances, including radioactive materials, toxic chemicals, and biological agents and toxins. In managing these hazards, DOE holds the safety of workers and the public to be paramount. By maintaining high standards of facility design, conduct of operations, safety oversight, and personnel training, DOE activities consistently achieve accident and injury rates that compare very favorably with those of similar operations in the private sector. In addition to the systems 1-2 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 of workplace hazard controls that prevent incidents and ensure worker safety, the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System superimposes additional protections over all operations involving dispersible hazardous materials in quantities that could harm people outside the immediate workplace. The overall mission of DOE/NNSA emergency management is to be ready to respond promptly, efficiently, and effectively to any emergency involving or affecting DOE/NNSA sites, facilities, or activities (SFAs) by applying the necessary resources to mitigate the consequences and protect workers, the public, the environment, and national security. It is important to note that not all DOE/NNSA activities occur within DOE/NNSA site boundaries. DOE is also the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function #12 - Energy, under the National Response Framework and the Sector Specific Agency for the energy sector under Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21, PPD-41, and the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act. The DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System provides a framework within

which to address all hazards, from natural, technological, and human caused, and all the components of an effective emergency management program. The standard components of a DOE emergency management program are planning, preparedness, response, and readiness assurance. DOE/NNSA will directly and indirectly employ unique technical expertise and resources that are specific to a radiological incident occurring locally, nationally, or internationally. • Planning involves determining, in advance, what will be done in response to specific emergencies. • Preparedness is putting in place procedures, equipment, and personnel capabilities that will be needed to respond. • Response is the actual mobilization of personnel including people, equipment, and resources to take action during an emergency, emergency termination, and when initiating recovery to return the site/facility/activity operations to normal. • Readiness Assurance is the ongoing process of validating and demonstrating readiness to respond. The current DOE emergency management requirements are the result of the evolution that began after the Three Mile Island reactor accident in 1979. At that time, the Department was still operating several reactors and producing materials for nuclear weapons. Accordingly, throughout the early- and mid-1980’s, DOE emergency management requirements focused heavily on nuclear and radiological hazards. The Department expanded its emergency management requirements in 1991 to include toxic chemicals after the 1984 tragedy involving a methyl isocyanate gas leak in Bhopal, India, that resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, and other accidents that turned the world’s attention to chemical release hazards. After the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enhanced its worker protection regulations and included hazardous waste operations, DOE expanded its emergency management requirements to DOE G 151.1-1B 1-3 7-26-22 stipulate a level of basic emergency planning for all sites/facilities/activities (SFAs), with more specific and detailed requirements for activities using radioactive materials and toxic chemicals. Current emergency management requirements also address biological toxins and infectious agents, since research is ongoing at some DOE/NNSA laboratories using these materials to develop detectors and support other homeland security-related programs. The DOE comprehensive, all-hazards approach to emergency management became firmly established with the issuance of DOE O 151.1 in 1995. The Order was subsequently updated several times, culminating in DOE O 151.1D, which incorporated emergency management lessons learned from international events such as Hurricane Katrina (2005), and Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi disaster (2011), and direction from DOE. The Order established DOE policy that provides a general structure and framework for response to any emergency at a DOE site, facility, or activity, and specific requirements to address protection of the workers, the public, and the environment from the release of hazardous materials. Note: This guide uses the term site/facility/activity (SFA) similarly to DOE O 151.1D. The use of this term is meant to encompass all labs/plants/sites/Program Secretarial Offices (PSO) involved throughout the DOE/NNSA Complex. The purpose for this is to limit the ambiguity that could be construed through the constant use of different terms. 1.1.1.1. Cancellation

This guide was updated to reflect the changes in DOE O 151.1D. It cancels and supersedes the following: DOE G 151.1-1A, Emergency Management Fundamentals and the Operational Emergency Base Program, dated 7-11-07 DOE G 151.1-2, Technical Planning Basis Emergency Management Guide, dated 7-11-07 DOE G 151.1-3, Programmatic Elements Emergency Management Guide, dated 7-11-07 DOE G 151.1-4, Response Elements Emergency Management Guide, dated 7-11-07 DOE G 151.1-5, Biosafety Facilities Emergency Management Guide, dated 7-11-07 1.1.2. Requirements and Guidance DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, current version (the Order) establishes policy, assigns roles and responsibilities, and provides the framework for the development, coordination, control, and direction of the DOE Emergency Management System. This Guide does not provide requirements; instead, the Order establishes requirements for emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response, and describes the approach for effectively integrating these activities under a 1-4 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 comprehensive, all-hazards emergency concept. DOE SFAs, Field Elements, and DOE (HQ) offices are required to develop emergency management programs as components of an integrated and comprehensive emergency management system. Together, these elements ensure that DOE emergency management is prepared to respond promptly, efficiently, and effectively to any emergency involving DOE SFAs to protect workers, the public, the environment, and national security. The Order requires that SFA emergency management programs be developed commensurate with the hazards at that particular SFA. To assist SFAs in implementing the Order requirements, DOE/NNSA has developed this comprehensive guidance applicable to all DOE/NNSA SFAs and generally applicable at DOE/NNSA organizational levels, including Field Elements and Headquarters (HQ) offices. If official interpretation of the requirements in DOE O 151.1D or guidance in the associated Emergency Management Guide is needed, the NNSA Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations serves as DOE’s primary point of contact for all emergency management activities. Questions or requests should be submitted directly to the Office of Emergency Management, Office of Policy. Questions and accompanying interpretations will be posted as Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the Enterprise Data Management System (EDMS) by the Office of Emergency Management Policy. 1.1.3. Application of Guidance The Emergency Management Guide (EMG) provides acceptable approaches to emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response activities at DOE/NNSA SFAs, including DOE transportation activities, Field Elements, and HQ offices. This EMG provides preferred, non-mandatory, supplemental information about acceptable methods for implementing requirements of the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. This EMG “does not impose requirements but may quote requirements as long as the sources are adequately cited.” (DOE O 251.1D) Thus, the DOE/NNSA guide is not a requirements document and may not be construed as establishing requirements in any audit or assessment of compliance with the associated Order. Further, the guide provides needed clarification regarding the intent of DOE O 151.1D requirements. Guidance contained in this EMG is generic in nature because detailed guidance on every

conceivable type of emergency for every SFA cannot be provided. Other equivalent approaches for meeting the Order requirements may be acceptable to accommodate the wide range and diversity of DOE operations and activities, facility types and missions, hazards, and site characteristics. Features such as local and state political structures, geography, and local demography may also contribute to unique SFA-specific solutions for developing and maintaining an acceptable emergency management program that complies with the Order requirements. Using phrases such as “must” or “shall,” throughout this guide that seem to establish new requirements actually reiterate requirements from DOE O 151.1 current version, emphasize steps in a required process, DOE G 151.1-1B 1-5 7-26-22 or promote steps as part of previously identified best practices. Must or shall, within the context of this guide, when choosing to implement a best practice methodology contained within this document, is deliberately intended to represent those specific actions that when executed deliver best practice and compliance with established requirements in DOE O 151.1. For a best practice to prove reliable, the identified specific actions, procedures, and deliverables for the specified best practice must or shall be performed. Using either the guidance contained in this EMG or another acceptable approach to implement the Order requirements, the resulting emergency management program should be integrated and coordinated with regulations and plans developed by other Federal agencies, states, local authorities, and other DOE offices. These regulations and plans may establish requirements similar to those required within the Emergency Management Core Program and Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program, and should be integrated, where applicable, to ensure a standard approach and continuity of effort. Newly issued or revised DOE Orders, regulations, or plans should be incorporated in accordance with corresponding implementation requirements at least by their implementation deadline, or otherwise, as soon as reasonably achievable (e.g., during the performance of the all-hazards survey(AHS) and EPHA reviews/updates). 1.1.4. Conceptual Foundation of DOE Emergency Management The DOE approach to emergency management is built upon three guiding principles or conceptual foundation stones of emergency management. These key concepts are: • Effective response is the last line of defense against adverse consequences. Regardless of how sound the fundamental safety programs and controls may be, incidents will sometimes happen that have adverse health effects on people or the environment. This principle expresses the DOE position that if controls should fail, the SFA must be prepared to take actions to limit or prevent adverse health and safety impacts to workers and the public. The application of this principle requires some level of emergency response planning even for those incidents whose severity exceeds the design basis for safety controls. • Planning, preparedness, response, and recovery must be specific to and commensurate with the hazards. The Department is responsible for a large number of different hazards that could threaten the health and safety of workers or the public if not controlled. These hazards are varied in the nature of the potential impacts on people, their behavior in the environment, and the distance at which adverse impacts

may be experienced. While the basic emergency management framework is the same for all DOE SFAs, the specific planning and response measures for each hazard are to be tailored to the hazard, such that they are specific ( technically appropriate) to the hazard and commensurate with (in size, scope, or scale) the magnitude of the hazard and its potential impacts. • Early recognition is vital to timely, effective, and commensurate response. In many cases, warning potentially affected workers and the public and directing them to 1-6 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 take actions to prevent or limit their exposure is the only way of mitigating the adverse health effects. Hence, the early recognition of an incident is essential if warnings are to be delivered in time to be executed effectively. By developing a full understanding of possible scenarios and the indications that would point to an actual or impending incident, emergency management will increase the likelihood of successful warning and intervention to prevent or limit health impacts. This analysis of scenarios and development of recognition indicators provides the basis for tailoring the response to the actual or potential hazard (commensurate response). 1.1.5. Emergency Management Programs The DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System is based on a three-tiered management structure consisting of SFA, Field Element, and HQ, with each tier having specific roles and responsibilities during an emergency. Each organizational tier provides management, direction, and support of emergency response activities. The SFA develops an emergency management program, which manages the tactical response to the emergency by directing the mitigative actions necessary to resolve the problem, protect the workers, the public, and the environment, and return the SFA to a safe condition. The Field Element Manager oversees the SFA response, provides local assistance, guidance, operational direction to the SFA management, and coordinates the tactical response to the incident with Tribal, State, and local governments. DOE HQ provides strategic direction to the response, provides assistance and guidance to the Field Element Managers, and evaluates the broad impacts of the emergency on the DOE complex. DOE HQ also coordinates with other Federal agencies on a national level, provides information to representatives of the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government, and responds to inquiries from the national media. DOE O 151.1D requires that emergency management programs are established and maintained at each organizational level to implement requirements pertaining to the comprehensive emergency management system. Because DOE/NNSA and its contractors are involved in a variety of operations and activities incorporating a broad range of hazards to be considered in effective emergency management, the Order requires that the emergency management program for a specific SFA be commensurate with the hazards present at that SFA (a tailored approach.) Each DOE SFA is required by DOE O 151.1D to have an Emergency Management Core Program, which provides the framework for evaluating hazards that pose serious threats, or conditions that involve the health and safety of workers and the public, the environment, and safeguards and security. Although DOE O 151.1D establishes several DOE-unique requirements and a minimum set of generic requirements for the Core

Program, the framework for response results mainly from the implementation of the requirements of DOE regulations, other DOE orders, and applicable non-DOE Federal, Tribal, State, and local laws/regulations/ordinances. The specific requirements that constitute the Emergency Management Core Program are the emergency planning and preparedness aspects of these Orders and laws/regulations/ordinances. Examples of emergency response features addressed in other DOE Orders and laws/regulations/ordinances include medical support, worker evacuation plans, fire drills, DOE G 151.1-1B 1-7 7-26-22 worker notification systems, hazardous material communication, contingency planning for oil spills, environmental spill drills and exercises, and DOE security and safeguards requirements. The objective of the Core Program is to achieve an effective integration of emergency planning and preparedness requirements into an emergency management program that provides capabilities for All-Hazards emergency response, through communication, coordination, and an efficient and effective use of resources. DOE O 151.1D requires an SFA-specific EPHA be conducted for each DOE SFA where identified hazardous materials are present in quantities exceeding the amounts that can be “easily and safely manipulated by one person” and whose potential release would cause the impacts and require response activities characteristic of an Operational Emergency (OE). An EPHA is a quantitative analysis that includes the identification and characterization of hazardous materials specific to an SFA, analyses of potential accidents or incidents, and evaluation of potential consequences. The results of the EPHA determine whether an Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program is required. If the analysis results indicate that no potential incidents and conditions would be classified as an Alert or higher (as defined in DOE O 151.1D), then the Core Program (including 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.120 requirements) constitutes the appropriate emergency management program for the SFA. If the analysis results associated with an SFA indicate the potential for an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency (GE) as defined in DOE O 151.1D, an Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program is required; the analysis results will also provide the technical planning basis for the program. 1-8 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 Figure 1-1. Emergency Management Program Overview 1 1 BHA Bounding Hazards Analysis (BHA) is an LBNL-specific term for what is more commonly referred to as the "PAC-30 Analysis" at other DOE sites. This is an example of an Emergency Management Program Overview and is not meant to be universal across the DOE/NNSA complex. DOE G 151.1-1B 1-9 7-26-22 1.1.6. Emergency Management Program Elements The DOE/NNSA emergency management system consists of four standard components: • Emergency planning including the identification of hazards and threats, hazard mitigation, development and preparation of emergency management plans and procedures, and identification of personnel and resources needed for an effective response • Emergency preparedness including the acquisition and maintenance of resources and training and drills • Emergency response including the application of resources to mitigate consequences to workers, the public, the environment, and national security, and the initiation of recovery from an emergency

• Readiness assurance including evaluations, exercises, improvements, and documentation to assure that stated emergency capabilities are sufficient to implement emergency plans In order to more clearly indicate the roles that the fifteen (15) Program Elements of the emergency management program perform, they are separated into the following three groups: Technical Planning Basis (Planning), Programmatic Activities (Planning, Preparedness, Readiness Assurance), and Response Activities. Within each of the program elements, specific activities, tasks, products, etc., and their related plans, procedures, and tools contribute to the successful accomplishment of the intended product(s) in each specific area. Examples of individual products can include: incident classification, press briefings, source term estimates, Protective Action Recommendations (PARs), consequence versus distance calculations, exercise programs for the site, training plans, effectively trained ERO personnel, detection equipment requirements, meetings with public or offsite response organizations, EPZ, etc. The intended objective from each function or activity is evaluated in terms of the desired qualitative or quantitative performance characteristics of each of the products. These performance characteristics are determined by the role that the goal plays in meeting the overall emergency management performance objective. The resulting evaluations will be referred to as performance-based evaluations where the focus of the evaluation methodology is not on specific prescriptive details of plans, procedures, calculation techniques, administrative structure, etc., but on the desired performance characteristics of the resulting output. The collective performance associated with the program elements supports the overall performance goal of emergency management programs. In order to provide a logical structure for evaluating the overall emergency management program, an individual performance objective has been developed for each program element. These goals were derived from the requirements of DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency 1-10 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 Management System, augmented with additional guidance from this EMG (Chapter 2 All Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis), other DOE-directives, and other Federal, Tribal, State, and local regulations. As indicated above, these groups represent the core emergency management activities and encompass the fifteen (15) Program Elements of the DOE/NNSA emergency management program: • ALL-HAZARDS PLANNING/TECHNICAL PLANNING BASIS – All-Hazards Survey/Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment • PROGRAMMATIC - activities that sustain the program – Program Administration and Management – Training and Drills – Readiness Assurance • RESPONSE - elements that respond or contribute to response as needed in an emergency – Emergency Response Organization (ERO) – Emergency Operations System – Offsite Response Interfaces – Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems – Emergency Categorization and Classification – Notifications and Communications – Consequence Assessment – Protective Actions – Emergency Medical Support – Emergency Public Information – Termination and Recovery DOE G 151.1-1B 1-11 7-26-22 Comprehensive Emergency Management Program (CEMP) Elements All-Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis 1. All-Hazards Survey. An examination of the features and characteristics of the SFA

that identifies the generic emergency incidents and conditions, and the potential effects of such emergencies is to be addressed by the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. The All-Hazards Survey identifies key components of the Emergency Management Core Program that provide a foundation of basic emergency management requirements and an integrated framework for response to serious incidents involving health and safety, the environment, safeguards, and security. For SFAs involved in producing, processing, handling, storing, or transporting hazardous materials that have the potential to pose a serious threat to workers, the public, or the environment, the All-Hazards Survey provides a hazards screening process for determining whether further analysis of the hazardous materials in an EPHA is required. 2. Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA). Performed for each SFA involving at least one qualifying hazardous material, as identified through the hazardous material screening process and indicated in the All-Hazards Survey. EPHAs involve the application of rigorous hazards analysis techniques that provide sufficient detail to assess a broad spectrum of postulated incidents or conditions involving the potential onsite release of (or loss of control over) hazardous materials and analyzing the resulting potential consequences. Each EPHA reflects both the magnitude and the diversity of the hazards and the complexity of the processes and systems associated with the hazards, and provides the technical planning basis for determining the necessary plans/procedures, personnel, resources, equipment, and analyses (determination of an EPZ) for the Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program. Programmatic Elements 1. Program Administration and Management. Effective organizational management and administrative control of the SFA emergency management program is provided by establishing and maintaining authorities and necessary resources commensurate with the responsibility to plan, develop, implement, and maintain a viable, integrated, and coordinated comprehensive emergency management program. 2. Training and Drills. A comprehensive, coordinated, and documented program of training and drills is an integral part of the emergency management program to ensure that preparedness activities for developing and maintaining program- specific emergency response capabilities are accomplished. 3. Readiness Assurance. A Readiness Assurance program provides a framework and associated mechanisms to assure that emergency plans, implementing procedures, and resources are adequate and sufficiently maintained, exercised, and evaluated 1-12 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 (including evaluations and assessments), and that appropriate and timely improvements are made in response to needs identified through coordinated comprehensive emergency planning, resource allocation, exercises, and evaluations. 4. Exercises. All elements of an emergency management program are validated over a multi-year period through a formal exercise program. The exercise program validates SFA-level emergency management program elements by initiating response to simulated, realistic emergency incidents/conditions in a manner that replicates an integrated emergency response to an actual incident as nearly as possible. Planning and preparation use an effective, structured approach that includes documentation of specific objectives, scope, timelines, injects, controller

instructions, and evaluation criteria for realistic scenarios. Each exercise is conducted, controlled, evaluated, and critiqued effectively and reliably. Lessons learned are developed, resulting in corrective actions and improvements. Response Elements 1. Emergency Response Organization. An ERO, a structured organization with overall responsibility for initial and ongoing emergency response and mitigation, is established and maintained. The ERO establishes effective control at the event/incident scene and integrates local agencies and organizations providing onsite response services. An adequate number of experienced and trained primary and alternate response personnel are available on demand for timely and effective performance of ERO functions. 2. Emergency Operations System. All the systems and logistical support needed to provide an effective emergency response by Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff, Incident Command, first responders, site managers, and building emergency organizations including all the necessary facilities, systems, and equipment. 3. Offsite Response Interfaces. Effective interfaces are established and maintained to ensure that emergency response activities are integrated and coordinated with the Federal, Tribal, State, and local agencies and organizations responsible for emergency response and protection of workers, the public, and the environment. 4. Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems. Facilities and equipment adequate to support emergency response are available, operable, and maintained. Specifically, an adequate and viable command center and personal protective equipment (PPE) are available and operable to meet the needs of the responders. 5. Emergency Classification & Categorization. Major unplanned or non-routine events or conditions involving or affecting DOE or NNSA SFA by causing, or having the potential to cause, serious health and safety impacts onsite or offsite to workers or the public, serious detrimental effects on the environment, direct harm to people or the environment as a result of degradation of security or safeguard conditions, or release of (or loss of control over) hazardous materials, are recognized promptly, categorized, DOE G 151.1-1B 1-13 7-26-22 and declared as Operational Emergencies (OE). In addition to being categorized as OE, incidents involving the actual or potential airborne release of (or loss of control over) hazardous materials from an SFA also require prompt and accurate classification based on health effect thresholds (for initiating protective actions) measured or estimated at specific receptor locations (i.e., site and facility boundaries, etc.). Predetermined conservative onsite and offsite protective action recommendations are associated with the classification of OE. 6. Notifications and Communications. Prompt, accurate, and effective initial emergency notifications are made to workers and emergency response personnel/organizations, including appropriate DOE or NNSA elements, and other Federal, Tribal, State, and local organizations and authorities. Accurate and timely follow-up notifications are made when conditions change or when the classification is upgraded, or the emergency is terminated. Continuous, effective, and accurate communications among response components or organizations are reliably maintained throughout an OE. 7. Consequence Assessment. Estimates of onsite and offsite consequences of actual or

potential releases of hazardous materials are correctly computed and assessed in a timely manner throughout the emergency. Consequence assessments are integrated with incident classification and protective action decision-making, incorporate facility and field indications and measurements, and are coordinated with offsite agencies. 8. Protective Actions. Protective actions are promptly and effectively implemented or recommended for implementation, as needed, to minimize the consequences of emergencies and to protect the health and safety of workers and the public. Protective actions can be implemented individually, or in combination, to reduce exposures from a wide range of hazardous material types and include evacuation, sheltering, decontamination of people, medical care, ad hoc respiratory protection, control of access, shielding, radioprotective prophylaxis administration of stable iodine, chelating agents, or diuretics), control of foodstuffs and water, relocation, decontamination of land and equipment, and changes in livestock and agricultural practices. Protective actions are reassessed throughout an emergency and modified as conditions change. Reentry activities are planned, coordinated, and accomplished properly and safely. 9. Emergency Medical Support. Medical support is provided for workers contaminated by hazardous materials. Arrangements with offsite medical facilities to transport, accept, and treat contaminated, injured personnel are documented. 10. Emergency Public Information. Accurate, candid, and timely information must be provided to workers, the news media, and the public during an emergency to establish facts and avoid speculation. Emergency public information efforts must be coordinated with State, Tribal, and local governments, and be part of Federal emergency response plans as appropriate. Workers and the public are informed of emergency management plans and planned protective actions before emergencies. 1-14 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 11. Termination and Recovery. An OE is terminated only after a predetermined set of criteria has been met and termination has been coordinated with offsite agencies. Recovery from a terminated OE involves communication and coordination with Tribal, State, local, and other Federal agencies; planning, management, and organization of the associated recovery activities; and ensuring the health and safety of workers and the public. 1.1.7. DOE/NNSA Emergency Management and Integrated Safety Management (ISM) As the last line of defense in protecting workers, the public, and the environment, the comprehensive emergency management program at each DOE/NNSA SFA is a key element of work planning and execution in accordance with ISM. Emergency management (like quality assurance, maintenance, personnel training, conduct of operations, fire protection, and waste management) should be a specific function addressed by the safety management program necessary to ensure the safe operation of an SFA. The DOE emergency management system ensures consistency across the complex through a common understanding of emergencies and expected DOE response at all organizational levels, including the local worker and SFA level, which are the primary focus of ISM. The approach begins with identifying the type and nature of the emergencies that could affect DOE SFAs followed by analyses of the resultant hazards to workers, the public, the

environment, and national security. Based on the hazards analyses, the requirements in the Order are tailored to develop an emergency management program that addresses the unique hazards and operating environment of each SFA. The All-Hazards Survey and Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA), which are integral parts of the commensurate with hazards or tailoring approach, provide the recognition tools and define the appropriate response to potential releases of hazardous materials. Such hazard controls are essential components in the last line of defense in protecting workers, the public, and the environment. Continuous Improvement is a fundamental concept embedded in ISM and the DOE emergency management system. In DOE emergency management, continuous improvement is provided through the readiness assurance program required of all DOE/NNSA SFA emergency management programs. Readiness assurance provides the framework and associated mechanisms to assure that planning and resources are adequate and sufficiently maintained, exercised, and evaluated, and that appropriate, timely improvements are made in response to needs identified. A structured and focused program of evaluations (Criteria Review and Approach Document (CRAD) and exercise evaluations) and reliable lessons learned via process ensure that an effective program of continuous improvement maintains DOE/NNSA emergency management programs. Thus, the fundamental concepts that characterize DOE emergency management and the requirements contained in DOE O 151.1D set forth DOE/NNSA expectations for emergency management and provide effective mechanisms for integrating emergency DOE G 151.1-1B 1-15 7-26-22 management objectives effectively and seamlessly with ISM fundamental concepts and core safety management functions. 1.1.8. DOE/NNSA Emergency Management and National Incident Management System 1.1.8.1. National Response Framework The National Response Framework (NRF) provides a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. It is an all-hazards plan built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NRF, using NIMS, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for incident management. The NRF can be partially or fully implemented in response to an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response. The NRF is based on the premise that incidents are typically handled at the lowest jurisdictional level, with first responders using existing authorities. Consequently, when an Operational Emergency occurs at a DOE/NNSA SFA, the initial response is conducted by the site/facility/activity using plans and procedures developed commensurate with the hazards at the SFA and according to the requirements of the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. These plans could include use of response capabilities from the surrounding jurisdictions. Most OE should be resolved using these plans and capabilities. There may be situations where the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) are needed to augment the local response. Requested NEST teams are generally directed through the appropriate DOE Regional Coordinating Office to the DOE HQ EOC. All other requests for the NEST go directly to the DOE HQ EOC. When other agencies receive requests for Federal radiological monitoring and assessment assistance, they notify the DOE HQ EOC.

The DOE serves as the coordinating agency for the Federal response to radiological incidents involving DOE/NNSA SFAs, or material otherwise under its jurisdiction (transportation of material shipped by or for DOE/NNSA). The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), found in 40 CFR Part 300, provides similar planning guidance and operational concepts for Federal response to other hazardous material incidents, including incidents involving source, by-product, or special nuclear material, or other ionizing radiation sources requiring Federal coordination. DOE O 151.1D contains requirements for the Field Element Managers to pre-designate personnel to oversee the SFA response and assign tasks to those Federal assets that are deployed to support the SFA, under the authority of the full NRF, the Nuclear/Radiological Annex to the Response and Recover Federal Interagency Operations Plans, or the NCP. As part of the DOE O 151.1D planning process, DOE/NNSA SFAs and Field Elements should identify the scenarios where response capabilities may be exceeded and broader assistance from the Federal Government would be needed. The scenarios requiring these response capabilities are likely to be limited to the high- 1-16 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 consequence end of the spectrum of potential incidents. It is possible that, commensurate with the hazards at the DOE/NNSA SFAs, Federal response capabilities or assistance may not be needed. Implementation of the NRF reveals concepts that are not directly addressed within the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management Program. As part of the change to an all- hazards approach at the Federal level, the NRF broadened concepts related to incident management and began the process of establishing a common terminology related to emergency management. The National Preparedness System describes a framework that includes: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Where the DOE emergency management program names the standard components as planning, preparedness, response, and readiness assurance, the NRF includes two other concepts, prevention and mitigation. These are defined in the NRF as follows: Prevention includes capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Within the context of national preparedness, the term prevention refers to dealing with imminent threats. Mitigation is the effort to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of incidents. Mitigation includes any activities that prevent an emergency, reduce the chance of an emergency incident occurring, or reduce the damaging effects of unavoidable incidents. Prevention involves the use of information and data to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. The primary focus of activity in incident management involves the use of intelligence data or other types of surveillance activities to anticipate and stop/avoid the incident. Prevention activities are more closely related to activities undertaken in the security, safety, or health programs, before the incident rises to the seriousness of an emergency. On the other hand, DOE activities, representing the standard components of a DOE emergency management program, explicitly incorporate the NRF concept of mitigation. Examples include: • The planning analysis associated with a hazards assessment can identify

opportunities to reduce the consequences of a potential hazardous material release incident using hazard mitigation activities such as inventory reduction or inventory dispersal. • Response activities include the execution of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes. • Readiness assurance activities include incorporating lessons learned from evaluations and actual emergencies to improve the response and, perhaps, identifying vulnerabilities in hazardous materials safety procedures and systems. DOE G 151.1-1B 1-17 7-26-22 These and other NRF concepts and terminology will be more fully integrated into the DOE emergency management system in future versions of the Order and this guidance. 1.1.8.2. National Incident Management System For years, DOE requirements and guidance have discussed the need to have an incident command system at the SFA level that could seamlessly integrate response assets from the surrounding jurisdictions. NIMS is designed to achieve the same integration at all levels of government. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) promulgated NIMS, 3rd Edition, in October 2017, under the authority of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. NIMS is the nationwide template enabling Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies. 1.2. Core Program Facilities 1.2.1. Introduction Emergency management programs for each DOE/NNSA SFA are documented in an emergency management plan. The plan describes provisions for response to OEs and activities for maintaining the emergency management program. The recommended emergency management plan content for Core Program Facilities is provided in this section. A Departmental SFA with no additional requirements for an Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program must develop and implement an emergency management plan for a Core Program. 1.2.2. Program Elements 1. All-Hazards Planning Basis List all hazards that are applicable to the operation of a given entity and establish the planning basis for an emergency management program. This list can cover single facilities, multiple facilities and activities, or an entire site. Conduct a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) as described by Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201. 2. Program Administration and Management State the overall function and mission of the facility or site. Broadly describe the facility or site; for a site, this includes the buildings and facilities within the site. State the name, position, mailing address, and telephone number of the emergency management program administrator at the facility or site level. (This information should also be in the appendix that lists Emergency Management Personnel.) 3. Training and Drills 1-18 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 List drills and training programs that are provided to employees. Indicate refresher training for employees who are certified operators or supervisors and those workers who are likely to witness a hazardous material release. 4. Readiness Assurance Ensure that the procedure for annual self-assessments is listed in this section. The formal improvement program consisting of lessons learned from evaluations and

drills/exercises should be described. Describe the process for identifying and implementing relevant lessons learned from external sources. Exercises— Describe the exercise program. Describe how exercises will be controlled and evaluated and how lessons learned from exercises, improvements, or corrective actions are incorporated into emergency planning. List all offsite agencies involved in the exercise program (i.e., HQ, other Federal agencies, and local agencies). List annual testing of all emergency notification equipment. 5. Emergency Response Organization List the individual who has been assigned to manage and control all aspects of the SFA response. Indicate how the individual will fit into the responding Incident Command System (ICS). 6. Emergency Operations Systems List the process for centralized collection, validation, analysis, and coordination of information relating to an emergency supporting on scene responses. 7. Offsite Response Interfaces Outline all coordination with Tribal, State, and local agencies and organizations responsible for emergency response or protection of the health and safety of the public. If there is no offsite coordination, provide a brief justification statement. 8. Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems Identify the SFA capabilities and specific equipment in place that is used to support an emergency response, including systems and equipment used to notify and evacuate employees. 9. Emergency Categorization This section should provide criteria for determining quickly if an incident is an Operational Emergency (OE) and how categorization is accomplished within 15 minutes. 10. Notifications and Communications Discuss the required and documented notification process for onsite and offsite notifications for all OEs. Identify positions responsible for both initiating and receiving notifications. Discuss the method of notification. Discuss notification DOE G 151.1-1B 1-19 7-26-22 procedures for termination of an incident. Include copies of all notification forms, particularly those used in response to DOE O 231.1B Admin Chg. 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and its successors. Describe the communications systems and equipment that would be employed by emergency personnel at the site or any specific facility for any notifications, sirens, or warnings to the public, including a description of primary and alternate systems. Discuss communications interface with onsite and offsite organizations. Identify what portions of the system are dedicated to emergency management. Describe the equipment, back-up equipment, quality assurance, and testing procedures. 11. Consequence Assessment Since there are no minimum requirements specified for this area, this section would contain only references to types of consequence assessment functional areas required by other Departmental Orders or Federal regulations. 12. Protective Actions Describe the procedures to determine personnel accountability and evacuation. Discuss the method and procedures for accountability of onsite personnel and visitors, locations of shelters, and other conditions. Describe access control procedures for evacuated areas. Describe the system to ensure safe shutdown of operations following the declaration of an emergency. Describe the plan and criteria for reentry at each facility and, where applicable, for the entire site; identify all reentry plans. 13. Emergency Medical Support

Identify onsite medical support, if applicable, as well as offsite medical response agencies and facilities responsible for providing support in normal and mass casualty situations. 14. Emergency Public Information List all onsite organizations and personnel (by position) responsible for providing information to the media during an emergency incident. Additionally, maintain lists of the offsite organizations’ Public Information Officers (PIOs) for rapid coordination in event of an emergency. 15. Termination and Recovery Detail notifications associated with termination of an OE and the criteria for resumption of normal operations. 1.3. Hazardous Materials Program Facilities 1-20 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 1.3.1. Introduction Emergency management programs for each DOE/NNSA SFA are documented in an emergency management plan. The plan describes provisions for response to OEs and activities for maintaining the emergency management program. The recommended emergency management plan content for Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Programs is provided in this section. The requirements for Core Programs and Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Programs should be seamlessly integrated into one emergency management plan for the facility or site with hazardous materials that require a more substantial level of planning and response capabilities. 1.3.2. Program Elements 1. Technical Planning Basis An All-Hazards Survey shall be used by the site, facility, or activity Emergency Manager to identify the planning requirements addressed in the Emergency Management Core Program. A Departmental site, facility, or activity may then be required to establish and maintain a quantitative Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA). The quantitative EPHA analyzes hazards significant enough to warrant consideration in an SFA or activity Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program. Include or summarize the results of the All-Hazards Survey. Describe known hazards originating outside the Departmental facility that could impact the health and safety of onsite personnel or other Departmental interests. List or summarize the significant radiological and non-radiological hazards present. Describe the system for updating the EPHA. Identify technical supporting documents that describe the methodology and information of EPHAs used as the basis for emergency planning. 2. Program Administration and Management (Same as Core) Hazardous Material Facilities will follow the same format for this as previously mentioned in the Core Program requirements. 3. Training and Drills Describe the goals and objectives of the facility or site training and drills program. Describe the overall approach to the design of the training and drill program, including training analysis methodology, overall curriculum design, and qualifications. (a) Defense Nuclear Facilities DOE G 151.1-1B 1-21 7-26-22 Describe the goals and objectives of the facility using a graded approach and incorporate all aspects of emergency staff as mentioned in DOE O 151.1D. 4. Readiness Assurance Describe the procedures for developing a structured readiness assessment program, including program and exercise evaluations. Describe the emergency management exercise program and how it conforms to the requirements of DOE O 151.1D and any other applicable Federal, State, and local regulations. Describe how exercises will be controlled and evaluated and

how lessons learned from exercises (improvements or corrective actions) are incorporated into emergency planning. (a) Defense Nuclear Facilities Describe how the site exercise program meets additional requirements provided by DOE O 151.1D (involvement of staff, involving Department Radiological Emergency Response Assets no less than once every 3 years, causal analysis for corrective actions, etc.). 5. Emergency Response Organization (Same as Core) Hazardous Material Facilities will follow the same format for this as previously mentioned in the Core Program requirements. 6. Emergency Operations Systems (Same as Core) Hazardous Material Facilities will follow the same format for this as previously mentioned in the Core Program requirements. 7. Offsite Response Interfaces Provide an overview of relationships, both formal and informal, with offsite organizations, including other Departmental elements and other Federal government, Tribal, State, and local organizations with emergency management or emergency planning responsibilities. Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs), Memoranda of Agreements (MOAs), and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) should be described in this section. 8. Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems List and provide a brief description of all emergency-related facilities EOC, Alternate EOC, Joint Information Center (JIC). Distinguish between dedicated and non-dedicated facilities. Maps and floor plans of facilities should be included when a complete description of the facility will be useful in a response. 1-22 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 List and describe the equipment likely to be used for responding to emergencies. Include in the list equipment capability and limitations, quantity of equipment, locations (both fixed and portable equipment), consumables, maintenance requirements, certification requirements, expiration dates, and computer/communications compatibilities. (a) Defense Nuclear Facilities List shutdown or walkaway strategies for equipment and facilities during emergencies and provide a description for a transition of responsibilities and required actions between normal work activities, incident activities, and recovery operations. 9. Emergency Classification State the definitions of OEs and emergency classes per DOE O 151.1D. In the interest of consistency, the definitions as provided in the Departmental Orders can be repeated. 10. Notifications and Communications Discuss the required and documented notification process for onsite and offsite notifications for all OEs. Identify personnel (positions) responsible for both initiating and receiving notifications. Discuss the method of notification. Discuss the notification procedure for termination of an incident. Discuss the procedure variance for classified notifications. Include copies of all notification record forms, particularly those forms used in response to DOE O 231.1B Admin Chg. 1, and its successors. Describe the communications systems and equipment employed by emergency personnel at the site or any specific facility for any notifications, sirens, or warnings to the public, including a description of primary and alternate systems. Discuss communications interface with offsite organizations; describe the integration of the site’s communications with offsite response resources, such as the police, fire, and offsite EROs. Identify what portions of the system are dedicated to the Emergency Management

System. Describe the equipment, back-up equipment, readiness assurance, and testing procedures. Describe the troubleshooting system for ensuring that problems noted during tests and drills are identified, tracked, and resolved. Reference to any listing of communication equipment in the Emergency Equipment chapter is acceptable. Describe the procedures and plans for communicating classified information. 11. Consequence Assessment Describe the procedures used to determine the potential consequences based on the results of emergency planning hazards assessments and input from all other DOE G 151.1-1B 1-23 7-26-22 pertinent areas, such as intelligence and meteorological information. Describe the methodologies used for consequence assessment and reference technical supporting documentation. Describe the expected utilization of the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center capabilities during a response. Describe the procedures for continually (and in real time, where appropriate) monitoring an emergency or a continuing situation to update the consequence assessment. Describe the processes for initiating and performing field monitoring for both radiological and chemical releases. When appropriate, include a discussion of any special circumstances associated with coordination and execution of offsite field monitoring. Describe the procedure to coordinate with other Federal, Tribal, State, and local organizations information necessary to make accurate and timely consequence determinations. 12. Protective Actions Identify the purpose and intended use of protective actions. Describe protective actions used at the SFA and under what circumstances they are implemented. 13. Emergency Medical Support (Same as Core) Hazardous Material Facilities will follow the same format for this as previously mentioned in the Core Program requirements. 14. Emergency Public Information Maintain information on hazardous materials facilities, programs, and personnel by position who can provide information to the media and general public as related to the emergency. The PIO will maintain documented procedures for release of information, personnel by position who may clear information for release, and timelines for release of information (i.e., first tweet, first press release, press conference). 15. Termination and Recovery Describe the plan and criteria for declaring the emergency condition terminated and transitioning to recovery at each facility, where applicable, and for the entire site. Provide references to technical supporting documentation if applicable. 1.4. Leased Facilities 1.4.1. Introduction Leasing facilities within DOE/NNSA sites for non-DOE/NNSA work presents some unique difficulties for those responsible for implementing site-wide emergency management programs. In accordance with the Guidance on Protection of Workers 1-24 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 Utilizing DOE Leased Facilities, issued through the Department’s Safety Council on August 6, 1999, each Field Element Manager, in consultation with the Lead PSO, should: • Develop evaluation criteria that result in leasing conditions that provide protection to workers at leased facilities from radioactive, chemical, and biological hazardous materials; and, • Determine the appropriate level of protection by grading facilities being leased by hazard to worker safety and health. Prior to leasing a facility for private use, each

Field Element Manager is required to make a determination that the facility is suitable for reuse and that worker safety and health will be protected. To ensure protection of worker health and safety in the event of an emergency involving or affecting the leased facility, arrangements with lessees should effectively integrate the activities of the leased facilities into the DOE/NNSA site-wide emergency management program. These arrangements should ensure consistent interfaces with offsite EROs and establish and sustain an effective working partnership for emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response activities. Arrangements with lessees should include: • Integration of each of the lessee’s emergency management program elements into the site-wide program; • Annual reporting of the tenant’s hazardous materials inventories to the site emergency management organization; and • Means for reporting significant changes to the facility or to hazardous materials inventories to the site emergency management organization prior to implementing the changes. Incorporating leased facilities into site-wide emergency management programs should be addressed consistently across the DOE/NNSA complex. To promote this consistency, emergency management factors that should be considered by DOE/NNSA elements with responsibility for leasing facilities at DOE/NNSA sites for non-DOE or non-NNSA work are presented in Section 1.4.2. 1.4.2. Application of Emergency Management Guidance Leased facilities at DOE/NNSA sites should be included in site-wide emergency management programs using criteria from DOE O 151.1D, whether the leased facility uses significant quantities of hazardous materials or not. DOE/NNSA should share information standards with lessee, or consider document procedures to carry out their own assessment. Specifically, the following factors should be considered for selected elements of the emergency management program. DOE G 151.1-1B 1-25 7-26-22 1.4.2.1. All-Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis • DOE/NNSA ensures: – Security vulnerability assessments (VAs) are changed as appropriate to reflect leased facility conditions; – Emergency responders and medical treatment providers have appropriate information to plan and respond to an emergency incident involving or affecting the leased facility. • DOE/NNSA provides: – An assessment of potential hazards to the leased facility from DOE/NNSA facilities and activities, and from DOE/NNSA onsite transportation activities, with periodic updates; – Information on hazards and medical concerns that DOE/NNSA, other emergency responders, or medical treatment providers may encounter. • The lessee provides: – Information on hazards and activities that could affect DOE/NNSA facilities and activities, with periodic updates. 1.4.2.2. Programmatic Elements Training, Drills, and Readiness Assurance • DOE/NNSA provides: – Initial and refresher training on the site emergency management plan for personnel at the leased facility; – Opportunity for personnel at the leased facility to participate as appropriate in site drills and exercises for postulated emergency incidents affecting the leased facility; – Opportunity for personnel at the leased facility to participate as appropriate in the planning and critique processes for emergency response exercises involving incidents that affect the leased facility. • DOE/NNSA ensures:

– Site responders and decision-makers receive training on all hazards associated with the leased facility and all facets of emergency response associated with incidents involving or affecting the leased facility, and that these factors are practiced during drills and tested during exercises; 1-26 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 – Leased facilities and personnel are incorporated in site emergency response drills and exercises as appropriate; – DOE/NNSA travels to lessee facilities and conducts periodic tests and assessments that lessee staff and facilities are complying with sites/DOE/NNSA emergency management plans. • The lessee ensures: – Personnel at the leased facility attend initial and refresher training on the site emergency management plan; – Personnel at the leased facility participate as appropriate in site drills and exercises for postulated emergency incidents involving or affecting the leased facility. 1.4.2.3. Response Elements ERO • DOE/NNSA ensures: – Designated Incident Commanders (ICs) have access to hazards related to leased facilities; – Lessee emergency response resources are effectively integrated through plans, procedures, drills, and exercises with site and other emergency response resources; – The emergency management plan and implementing procedures contain provisions for personnel from the leased facility to be integrated into the site ERO as appropriate during emergency incidents involving or affecting the leased facility. • The lessee ensures: – The scope of emergency services provided through the site-wide emergency management program and associated incident command is fully understood and effectively integrated in the emergency response plan and implementing procedures, practiced during drills, and tested through exercises for the leased facility; – The emergency management plan and implementing procedures contain provisions for a representative to interact with site emergency management personnel during emergency incidents involving or affecting the leased facility. Offsite Response Interfaces • DOE/NNSA ensures: DOE G 151.1-1B 1-27 7-26-22 – Local agencies, law enforcement officials, and offsite mutual aid and support organizations are aware of the relationship and the respective emergency management roles and responsibilities between the site and the leased facility for response and notifications to hazardous material and security incidents. This includes information on hazards and medical concerns that offsite emergency responders or medical treatment providers may encounter. • The lessee ensures: – Information concerning unique facility-specific hazards is made available to offsite emergency responders and emergency medical personnel. Communication/Notifications • DOE/NNSA ensures: – Site-wide plans and procedures contain provisions and assignment of responsibilities to contact representatives of the lessee in event of a site emergency affecting the leased facility, and that these provisions are practiced during drills and tested during exercises; – Site-wide plans and procedures, and those of potentially affected DOE/NNSA facilities, contain provisions for receipt of notification of an emergency at the leased facility; – Coordination with the lessee on communication equipment and protocols and messages for timely and effective notifications of emergency incidents. • The lessee ensures: – Plans and procedures contain provisions to notify and protect personnel in

accordance with OSHA requirements for hazards at the leased facility. Consequence Assessment • DOE/NNSA ensures: – Site-wide consequence assessment models include the leased facility locations for emergency management decision makers; – Site-wide consequence assessment models include appropriate hazards information specific to the leased facility; – Site-wide field monitoring (radiological, chemical, and biological) plans, personnel, equipment, and resources appropriately consider leased facility hazards and site hazard impacts on the leased facility. • The lessee ensures: 1-28 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 – Facility-specific consequence assessment models and field monitoring plans, personnel, equipment, and resources are available to DOE/NNSA for integration into the site-wide consequence assessment capability. Protective Actions • DOE/NNSA ensures: – Pre-determined protective actions are identified for the leased facility based on site hazards that could impact the leased facility, and that these actions are coordinated with the lessee; – Pre-determined protective actions are identified for site facilities that could be affected by hazards at the leased facility; – Provisions for protection (appropriate protective equipment, monitoring equipment, hazard information, potential exposure information, safe routes of entry/egress) of site and other emergency responders and security personnel are incorporated into plans and procedures, practiced during drills, and tested during exercises involving leased facility hazards; – Site evacuation planning includes consideration of personnel at the leased facility; – Plans and procedures for site medical facilities appropriately consider hazards and personnel at the leased facility; – Lessee plans for personnel accountability in the event of an emergency involving or affecting the leased facility are understood and integrated into site plans and procedures, practiced during drills, and tested during exercises involving the leased facility; – Potential responders have access to leased facility hazard information and building layout for safe search and rescue and emergency mitigation. • The lessee ensures: – Pre-determined protective actions are identified for the leased facility based on site hazards that could affect the leased facility, and that these actions are coordinated with the lessee; – Protective actions are identified in accordance with OSHA requirements for hazards at the leased facility. • The lessee provides: – Hazard information and building layout to permit safe search and rescue and emergency mitigation; DOE G 151.1-1B 1-29 7-26-22 – Plans for personnel accountability in the event of an emergency involving or affecting the leased facility. Emergency Public Information • DOE/NNSA provides: – Access to the JIC for emergencies at the leased facility. • DOE/NNSA ensures: – Ongoing and coordinated planning between PIOs of the site and leased facilities; – Emergency information released through news releases and statements to the press is coordinated with leased facility representatives when the emergency directly impacts the lessee; – Site PIOs are aware of designated lessee emergency contacts as well as hazards specific to leased facilities. • The lessee ensures: – News releases and statements to the press regarding an emergency incident at the leased facility are coordinated with the site PIO;

– Complete and accurate information concerning emergencies at the leased facility is made available in a timely manner to support DOE/NNSA response to public inquiries. 1.5. Closure Activities 1.5.1. Introduction Closure activities and conditions can pose significant challenges to emergency planners. Often, the changes inherent in SFA closure affect the planning basis for emergency response as well as the response itself. The critical problem is to ensure that inevitable reductions in response capabilities do not overtake the decrease in hazards posed by the SFA processes and materials, resulting in an inadequate emergency response capability. The planner should recognize that the resolution of issues included in this chapter should be in total concert with a basic tenet of the DOE emergency management systems, namely: planning, preparedness, and response must be specific to and commensurate with the hazards. The purpose of this chapter is to address important issues that should be considered when planning changes to an emergency management program based on the projected closure of the SFA. The approach for addressing a closure’s impact on emergency management is to provide precautionary statements that give emergency planners thought-provoking 1-30 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 considerations that may apply to specific elements of emergency management at their closure facilities/sites. The following sections present a number of these important reminders related to the impact of closure activities on DOE emergency management program elements. Note that there is a different effect on the emergency management program when there is a closure of an entire site versus the closure of a single facility or group of facilities on a site that will continue to operate. The closure of an entire site will affect both site-level and facility-level programs and assets, whereas the closure of a facility on a site may leave site-level programs intact, since these would likely support Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Programs at other facilities on the site. When necessary, this distinction will be specifically addressed in the following sections. 1.5.2. All-Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis All-Hazards Surveys and EPHAs. Frequent and often dramatic physical changes at closure SFAs challenge the efforts of emergency planners to keep all-hazards surveys information current. It is imperative, therefore, that emergency planning be a priority consideration for managing change at a closure SFA. Examples of physical changes that may affect emergency planning and preparedness include: • Dismantling any item that will alter process unit safety, facilities, or information; • Change in a critical instrumentation device or alarm; • Dismantling that may reopen closed/sealed systems or components containing contamination; • Addition or deletion of piping connections, drains; • Change in firefighting equipment or capacity; and • Temporary use of equipment not covered by existing procedures. The introduction of short-term hazards during the Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) process can add to the planning basis for the program, requiring temporary response measures. Site/facility changes can result in the introduction of common usage hazardous materials that pose a new threat as an initiator for a hazardous material release. Since changing inventories of toxic chemicals may occur frequently at closure

facilities/sites, administrative systems should be in place to ensure that emergency managers are informed of these changes in a timely manner. The importance of reliable and comprehensive methods of hazardous material identification during closure activities cannot be overemphasized. Past methods or systems may not be reliable for identifying changes in hazardous material inventories when an SFA is involved in D&D. DOE G 151.1-1B 1-31 7-26-22 Communication of changes in hazards to emergency response personnel is critical and can only be ensured if a reliable system is in place to communicate change to those responsible for the technical planning basis for the program. One method for tracking progress is to have an emergency planner attend the periodic production planning meetings, which address the hazards that will be encountered with the next dismantling activities. Changes may be subtle or can occur quickly at a closure SFA. Barriers to release of hazardous materials, storage locations and mixes, engineering controls, administrative controls, and safeguards and inventory systems may change. A production facility may be closed, and process equipment removed, but hazards may still reside as holdup in ductwork or piping. The release of those hazards becomes a potential emergency when piping is cut during final dismantlement. The EPHA that applies for a production facility does not apply when the same building is empty. If hazards still exist, based on a revised All-Hazards Survey, then a new EPHA may be needed. Similarly, the EPHA that applies when the building is empty would likely not apply after it is demolished. During the dynamic progression of D&D activities, a facility should not be expected to update the EPHA document constantly. However, the emergency management program must remain prepared to respond to whatever emergency current hazards present. Hence, as hazards are removed during closure, facilities/sites should develop and implement a timely, efficient, and effective process that facilitates the modification of the emergency management program using associated criteria for initiating changes. A possible approach for tracking changes associated with the closure activities is to ensure that emergency management is integrated with the safety hazards analysis and work order processes used by facility management (ISM systems). Before closure begins at an SFA, a generic hazards analysis is required to identify potential hazards to be encountered. Additionally, at each step in the process of D&D, there should be a work order that includes a specific safety hazard analysis for the work to be performed. For example, safety analyses of many DOE/NNSA sites/facilities, which use or store radioactive materials, will include criticality analyses to address accumulation and movement of nuclear materials in piping. If emergency planners at the closure SFA are involved in review of these work orders and hazards analyses and are prepared to use this information to ensure readiness to respond to emergencies, then it is reasonable that they take credit for the safety management processes used during D&D. 1.5.3. Programmatic Elements Program Administration and Management. An emergency management administrator at a closure SFA needs to ensure that changes taking place will not adversely impact the ability of the program to respond effectively to an emergency. Emergency administrators

need to have access to the appropriate level of management to make decision makers aware, on an ongoing basis, of facility, equipment, materials, personnel, and resource issues that may impact SFA ability to respond to an emergency. 1-32 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 Also, emergency management administrators at closure facilities/sites may be tasked with collateral duties that could interfere with and affect responsibilities to ensure that the emergency management program readiness is maintained. Efficient planning by the program administrator becomes critically important. Administrators should ensure that provisions are in place for rapid development, approval, and issuance of changes to response procedures, and timely scheduling of training to ensure these changes are implemented. Maintaining plans and procedures can become a significant task when frequent change is occurring involving people, facilities, materials, and expertise at an SFA. Training and Drills. Emergency response training programs should be reviewed and updated periodically, based on the frequent change characteristic of such facilities/sites. Emergency management administrators should have frequent input to General Employee Training programs for changes in basic emergency response. Drill programs should be dynamic to address the needs of the SFA and issues identified in real incidents, exercises, and reinforce training. This should include both operational and closure facilities. For example, aggressive milestones may not allow time for a regular drill schedule. As a result, shorter drills that are focused on changes to areas and materials may provide a solution for some facilities/sites. Facility and organizational experience and knowledge may be lost when an SFA transitions from production to closure. Facilities/sites may need to put in place a means to capture critical knowledge before the transition is made and to incorporate some of this knowledge in training for emergency managers and responders. Training of offsite emergency responders may become more critical as site resources for emergency response are reduced. Offsite responders may be expected to have an increased role in response to SFA OEs. Readiness Assurance. Maintaining, updating, and testing/validating plans and procedures can become a virtually continuous task at a closure SFA because the nature of closure activities may mean frequent changes in hazards, physical facilities, organizational expertise, management, number of personnel at the site, and ERO resources available to support response. Evaluation and improvement programs at closure SFAs need to be vigilant in adjusting to change and its impact on the readiness of the SFA to respond to emergencies, as well as on new vulnerabilities that require adjustments in resources. These programs will by necessity be driven by short-term objectives to ensure readiness through careful attention to focused evaluations of the modified aspects of the planned response. Improvements and lessons learned would be implemented on a schedule that should coincide with the schedule of changes caused by the closure activities. As a site undergoes changes from an operational site to a site focused on demolition and closure processes, the exercise requirements and community expectations will change. However, exercises do help reassure the community that the site can still respond and mitigate the hazards in an emergency. Hence, participation in the annual site-level

exercise should be maintained at an acceptable level to provide assurances that response DOE G 151.1-1B 1-33 7-26-22 will be adequate in the event of an emergency. This level of participation might be ensured by tracking a performance measure or as an explicit inclusion as part of contractual agreements. The demolition and closure of an individual or group of facilities on an operating site should have no effect on the site-wide programs. However, closure facilities will, at some point, be excluded from being the source of the hazards, but should still participate in the exercise as a collocated facility responding to an OE incident elsewhere on the site. 1.5.4. Response Elements Emergency Response Organization. Ensuring that an adequate number of primary and alternate response personnel are available, prepared, and qualified becomes a challenge for closure facilities/sites emergency management programs. Responsive and creative programs are needed in the ERO organizational structure when a site transitions from production to closure. For example, some programs may need to consider moving to a dedicated and specialized emergency response brigade when organizational changes create conditions in which the usual volunteer ERO is not available or reliable. Reduction in hazards may drive an SFA to tailor its cadre of emergency responders. These types of changes should be considered as part of the site Closure Plan, and emergency management professionals should have an active role in site closure planning. Responsibility for control of operations, monitoring, and repair teams should be vested with a single individual; however, at a closure SFA, it is possible that personnel who would staff these teams will be subcontractors. In this case, organizational changes or provisions would need to be made to ensure resource availability and adequate organizational controls in an emergency. The dynamic nature of closure facilities/sites may also create conditions in which tools, parts, and even PPE needed by repair and maintenance teams are not readily available for mitigating an emergency. There should be ongoing dialog with operations and maintenance managers on these types of issues. Emergency planners should be particularly cognizant of possible changes in the effectiveness of emergency fire response on closure sites. Changes in SFA hazards due to closure activities should be communicated to the Fire Department. Physical facility and site changes may affect timely fire response as well as security. SFA changes could also impact the usability and reliability of pre-arranged fire preplans for facilities undergoing D&D. Emergency Operations Systems. Sites that are transitioning toward closure should maintain the function of the emergency operations system such that it is scalable to the emergency. Offsite Response Interfaces. Sites that are transitioning toward closure generally experience changes in the contracting process, budgeting for emergency management, management priorities, and the nature of site hazards. These changes can result in significant changes in the relationship with local and state offsite EROs. If resources for emergency management are reduced overall, there may be an impact on agreements for 1-34 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 mutual assistance and a site’s ability to supplement offsite emergency response programs. However, during closure, MOU for offsite resources, such as emergency medical support,

often become even more critical as onsite resources diminish. These impacts may not result from the closure of a single facility or a group of facilities, since offsite interfaces may be implemented and maintained at the site-level. In any closure situation, if SFA hazards change significantly, there may be a need to inform offsite agencies. Similarly, the ultimate impact of closure on offsite communities may be significant and affect offsite relations that are important to emergency preparedness. Discussing these issues with offsite agency contacts early during the closure planning process will help preserve relationships that must be maintained for effective response. Emergency Facilities and Equipment/Systems. Within the D&D environment of a closure SFA, there is still the need to maintain operational capability, staffing and support systems for communications, protection, and utilities at emergency operations facilities. Facility reference materials at the EOC, such as site maps and facility drawings, must be kept current and available to responders. The operability of public address systems and alarm systems needs to be maintained and not allowed to become vulnerable in a deconstruction environment. Similarly, storage locations for response equipment may change. Emergency management staff must stay aware of such changes. Surveillance of emergency response facilities, communication systems, and equipment may be needed more frequently. Ultimately, as the site-wide hazards on a closure site are significantly reduced, the need to maintain a state-of-the-art EOC may not be warranted, and a simple command center location may be adequate. Emergency Categorization and Classification. At a closure SFA, the readily available indications or observable conditions that provide decision-makers’ criteria for categorization of OEs may change. The SFA-specific criteria must be kept up to date and responsible persons kept informed and trained on the changes. Site-/facility-specific EALs may also require updating and decision-makers must be knowledgeable of these changes.. As initiating conditions and emergency scenarios may change, emergency planners may need to intensify programs for reviewing and testing criteria to categorize OEs and EALs for classification of closure of SFAs. Notifications and Communications. Impacts on communication and notification systems can result from a D&D modified environment. This could involve changes to the effectiveness of an SFA’s public address systems, facility alarm systems, or offsite communications. Lines of communication and notification are essential for timely notifications. On a site where selected facilities are undergoing D&D, it is essential that workers at a closure facility are not isolated from the rest of the site, even if the closure facility emergency management program is no longer required for its own hazards. A release at a nearby operating facility can still affect the closure facility. Consequence Assessment. Because of the potential dynamic conditions at closure facilities/sites, indicators necessary to assess emergency consequences may continually change, or at least the ability of responders to monitor the indicators may be affected. DOE G 151.1-1B 1-35 7-26-22 Emergency planners should also be alert to the need for changes to input data requirements for the consequence assessment process (source term estimates) when

hazards change. Emergency planners should ensure that the Consequence Assessment Team has access to the most current planning basis documents. A process should be developed and implemented to ensure that consequence assessment tools reflect changes in an SFA’s hazards due to closure activities in a timely manner. Protective Actions. Changes to SFA physical characteristics may affect worker and responder access and egress procedures. The D&D conditions may force changes in evacuation routes. Emergency planners should look for SFA changes that may pose new hazards or impediments along established evacuation routes. Any changes to these logistical aspects of protective actions need to be communicated to the workforce. Similarly, receptor locations for predicted hazardous material consequences may change when physical SFA changes occur. The potential for changes in the pre-planned initial protective actions for onsite areas and protective action recommendations for offsite areas should also be recognized. Emergency Medical Support. Emergency planners should be cognizant of SFA changes on emergency medical response capabilities. Changes in facility hazards should be communicated to the site medical director. Physical SFA changes may affect timely medical response; for example, location for landing a life-flight helicopter at a closure site could change. The SFA changes could also affect the usability and location of pre- arranged decontamination facilities. Agreements with offsite medical providers may still be needed during the closure process and those offsite providers should be made aware of the impact of SFA changes on possible medical emergency needs. Emergency Public Information (EPI). Emergency planners should ensure the EPI staff (both onsite and offsite) are informed of any significant changes in SFA hazards, emergency response capabilities, and plans/procedures, and be prepared to address these in the event of an emergency. A PIO should be part of the closure planning team. As facilities/sites downsize during closure, adequate emergency public information resources may still be needed to provide a public information response should an emergency occur. A media center should be designated and available for use in the event of an emergency, even when a closure site emergency management program is reduced to a Core Program. Termination and Recovery. The termination of an Operational Emergency on a closure site will be based on many of the same general criteria that an operational site will use. However, the criteria, and subsequent recovery, will not have as their ultimate goal to return a facility undergoing D&D to operating status, but to restart and continue the closure processes. Senior management will need to determine the level of termination criteria that is consistent with protecting the workers, the public, and the environment, and performing the D&D activities safely. The termination criteria will likely be similar to criteria for planning, scheduling, and accomplishing D&D work on a daily basis. Recovery planning may only include the determination of the cause of the incident to prevent reoccurrence in future closure operations. 1.6. Biosafety Facilities 1-36 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 1.6.1. Introduction The primary requirements specific to DOE/NNSA biosafety facilities using or storing select agents or toxins are contained in 10 CFR Part 851, Appendix A, Section 7,

Biological Safety, and the regulations from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regarding certain hazardous biological agents and toxins and their possession and use in the United States (U.S.), receipt from outside the U.S., and transfer within the U.S. of certain hazardous biological agents and toxins. For purposes of this guidance, the rules that address the HHS and USDA requirements will be referred to collectively as the Select Agent Rules. At a minimum, an entity registering under these requirements needs to develop and implement an incident response plan. For DOE/NNSA sites, the biosafety facility incident response plan needs to be coordinated and integrated with the implemented site-wide emergency management plan. The required contents of an incident response plan are described in brief statements related to various emergency management issues. Emergency management personnel at sites with planned, or currently operating biosafety labs, will recognize that a DOE/NNSA emergency management program addresses many of the same issues in the Program Elements defined in DOE O 151.1D and the other guidance chapter in this EMG. Although the major focus of the current DOE emergency management Order and EMG is on radioactive and chemical hazardous materials, requirements and guidance are generally valid for biosafety facilities through modifications to account for the unique properties and issues related to biological hazards. 1.6.2. General Approach Integration of hazardous biological materials into the emergency management program is directed by 10 CFR Part 851, Worker Safety and Health Program, Appendix A, 7. Biological Safety. According to this rule, contractors must establish and implement a biological safety program that establishes an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) or equivalent. The IBC must review the site’s security, safeguards, and emergency management plans and procedures to ensure they adequately consider work involving biological etiologic (i.e., disease causing) agents. In addition, the biological safety program confirms that the site safeguards, security plans, and emergency management programs address biological etiologic agents, with emphasis on biological select agents. Other Federal regulations that govern the use and storage of select agents and toxins (to be introduced in subsequent chapters) require that mandated incident response planning be “integrated with any site-wide emergency response plans.” For purposes of DOE O 151.1D and this Guide, a biosafety facility can include a standalone building with a single research activity, a floor in a building, or simply a laboratory consisting of a single room or several rooms on a floor in a building where storage is maintained, or work/research is performed involving biological etiologic agents or hazardous biological toxins. A biosafety facility will have an assigned containment level consistent with applicable guidelines provided in Biosafety in Microbiological and DOE G 151.1-1B 1-37 7-26-22 Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Public Health Service (PHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH), Fifth Edition, Revised 2009. The primary focus in this guidance is on biosafety facilities that store or support activities involving

biological select agents or toxins, although the approach can also be applied to other etiologic agents and hazardous toxins. Other activities in a building containing a biosafety facility may be using or storing radioactive or toxic chemical hazardous materials. The Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program for the building/facility should represent an integration of planning, preparedness, and response activities for all hazardous materials. For example, a single EPHA should be produced for the facility covering analyses of all hazardous materials identified in the All-Hazards Survey. As indicated above, complications influencing application of the traditional DOE hazardous materials approach to biological releases dictates that each agent be analyzed and researched to examine variations in agent characteristics that may not be bounded by a standard hazardous materials planning and response approach. Hence, emergency management planners need to familiarize themselves with the specifics of each agent in use in the biosafety facility to augment the standard planning and response template, as necessary. The guidance contained here is aimed at both biosafety and emergency management professionals responsible for implementing the Select Agent Rules and DOE O 151.1D. To satisfy the needs of both disciplines, the general subject of biosafety is covered in the Biosafety Facilities, Chapter 5. Biosafety concepts of containment and barriers, biosafety levels (BSLs), and biosafety controls are introduced in the context of the Select Agent Rules and are taken directly from the BMBL. Note that descriptions of facility operations or biosafety programs are provided to support examples and concepts discussed in Chapter 5. However, these descriptions should not be interpreted as necessarily representing actual DOE/NNSA biosafety facility operations and programs. According to 10 CFR Part 851 Appendix A, 7. Biological safety, DOE/NNSA biosafety facilities are required to establish an IBC to review any work with biological etiologic agents for compliance with appropriate CDC (i.e., BMBL), NIH, World Health Organization (WHO), and other international, Federal, Tribal, State, and local guidelines and the site security, safeguards, and emergency management plans and procedures. Understanding the basic biosafety concepts contained in these guidelines are essential for interpreting and implementing the guidance to be presented in this guidance document. In addition, because of the impact that agent characteristics and diverse transport/transmission mechanisms have on specific emergency management planning issues (threshold quantities, measures of severity, protective actions), a brief discussion of these issues are provided in Chapter 5 to support the approach contained in DOE O 151.1D. Agents and their relevant general characteristics are discussed with special emphasis on potential transport/transmission mechanisms. OEs related to the 1-38 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 release of biological agents to the environment, the characterization of biological release scenarios, and tools for their recognition are also discussed. This analysis and the Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program, which are required for any DOE/NNSA facility subject to the Select Agent Rule(s), address the actual or potential release of biological agents outside of the secondary barriers of biocontainment. Results of the EPHA will form the basis for the emergency management

program that will be commensurate with the biological hazards in the facility. Planning, preparedness, and response activities will reflect the characteristics and release transport/transmission mechanisms of the potential hazards. Biological select agents are emphasized in the guidance contained in Chapter 5; biological toxins are essentially extremely toxic chemicals generally covered by guidance contained throughout this guide. However, clarifications and discussions in this Guide will specifically address the release of toxins when necessary. In addition, further discussion in Chapter 5 will focus on planning for human or overlap select agents. Future guidance will include toxins and agents that are solely animal and plant pathogens. DOE G 151.1-1B 2-1 7-26-22 All Hazards Planning/Technical Planning Basis 2.1. All-Hazards Planning Basis 2.1.1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assist Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) field elements in complying with the DOE O 151.1D requirement that an All-Hazards Survey be prepared, maintained, and used for emergency planning purposes. The Order requires that emergency management efforts begin with the identification and qualitative assessment of the site/facility/activity (SFA) specific hazards and the associated emergency conditions that may require a response, and that the scope and extent of emergency planning and preparedness at a DOE facility reflect these facility-specific hazards. The first step in the implementation of this commensurate with hazards approach to emergency management is an All-Hazards Survey. Based on an examination of the features and characteristics of the facility, the All- Hazards Survey identifies the generic types of emergency incidents and conditions (including natural phenomena such as earthquakes and tornadoes, wildland fires, and other serious incidents involving or affecting health and safety, the environment, and safeguards and security at the facility) and the potential impacts of such emergencies to be addressed by the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. The All- Hazards Survey also identifies key components of the Emergency Management Core Program that provide a foundation of basic emergency management requirements and an integrated framework for response to serious emergency incidents or conditions. For facilities involved in producing, processing, handling, storing, or transporting hazardous materials that may pose a serious threat to workers, the public, or the environment, the All-Hazards Survey provides a screening process to determine if further analysis of the hazardous materials in an Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA) is required. This guidance is directed at operations and emergency management staff responsible for DOE and NNSA facilities at field offices, service centers, and operating contractor organizations. It is expected that emergency management staff will obtain support from site and facility management in addition to a variety of scientific and technical disciplines within their respective organizations. Appendix A provides recommended screening approaches for radioactive and chemical hazardous materials. 2.1.2. General Approach — All-Hazards Planning Basis Every facility and activity on a DOE/NNSA site should be included in a documented All- Hazards Survey. Much of the information necessary to generate an All-Hazards Survey

will already have been developed and documented in the course of meeting other DOE and Federal agency requirements relating to facility safety, occupational safety, environmental and effluent controls, and hazardous materials management. However, the 2-2 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 intent of the Order will not be met by simply defining existing documents or analyses as the All-Hazards Survey document. The All-Hazards Survey process involves the review of facility programs already in place to meet Federal, State, and local requirements related to worker health and safety, environmental protection, and hazardous materials reporting. It is not suggested that emergency management departments assume increased responsibility and authority for ensuring compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), and the Occupational Health and Safety Requirements (OSHA) requirements. The SFA management may find it useful to incorporate the All-Hazards Survey process into its program of internal oversight and compliance monitoring for hazardous materials, environmental protection, and worker safety regulations (See DOE-STD-3009-2014). The All-Hazards Survey should be a distinct document that contains or references the information specified in this chapter. Recommended Steps: Step 1 Briefly describe each facility and identify their hazards. Step 2 Screen hazardous materials to determine the need for further analyses in a facility- specific quantitative Emergency Planning Hazards Analysis (EPHA). Step 3 Identify the generic types of emergency incidents and conditions for each facility. Step 4 Qualitatively describe the potential effects of applicable emergencies to health, safety, environmental, or national security. Step 5 Document the applicable Core Program planning and preparedness requirements. An All-Hazards Survey may address a single facility, multiple facilities, or may even cover an entire site. A tabular/matrix presentation can be used to efficiently summarize and document the survey information. 2.1.3. Step 1: Describe the Facility and Identify its Hazards Each facility or activity covered by the All-Hazards Survey should be identified and a brief description of its operations provided. Detailed descriptive information should be included by reference. A general understanding of the facility and its associated hazards can be adequately presented in a table or matrix. That information should include: • A general characterization of the facility and its operations; • The number of workers normally assigned; DOE G 151.1-1B 2-3 7-26-22 • Special designations, such as nuclear facility; radiological facility; hazardous waste site; Treatment, Storage, or Disposal facility; etc.; and • Whether hazardous materials other than standard office products and cleaning supplies are used or stored in the facility. The use or storage of radioactive, chemical hazardous materials, or hazardous biological agents or toxins in the facility should be noted and described. Sources of information on hazardous materials include documents such as Basis for Interim Operations (BIO), Safety Analysis Reports (SARs), Safety Assessment Documents (SADs), Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs), Design Basis Threats (DBTs), process safety management/risk management analyses documentation, and databases including chemical and radioactive

material inventories. Facility walk-downs enable emergency management staff and hazards analysts to familiarize themselves first-hand with actual facility systems, processes, practices, equipment and, especially, material inventories. Periodic walk- downs can provide checks on the accuracy of documentation and material inventory databases and may identify additional hazards from by-products of chemical processes or potential accidental mixing interactions. If hazardous materials other than office products/cleaning supplies are identified, further screening should be done in accordance with Section 2.1.4 below to determine if a facility specific quantitative EPHA is required. 2.1.4. Step 2: Screen Hazardous Materials to Determine Need for an Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment (EPHA) Due to the myriad forms and quantities of hazardous materials in use throughout DOE/NNSA facilities and activities, the Comprehensive Emergency Management System provides a screening process to reduce the number of hazardous materials quantitatively analyzed for emergency planning purposes. Use of the screening process described here is not intended to avoid analyses of hazardous materials, but to allow emergency management resources to be focused on analyzing materials that, because of their quantity, toxicity, and dispersibility, have the potential to harm people who are outside the immediate workplace where the materials are used or stored. The hazardous material screening process identifies inventories of specific materials in an SFA that, if released, could cause a hazard significant enough to warrant specific consideration in an Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program. To determine whether a facility requires a quantitative analysis of its hazardous materials in an EPHA, the screening process must identify at least one hazardous material that requires further analysis. The results of the EPHA will then determine if the release of each identified material could cause a hazard significant enough to be included as part of the Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program planning basis. DOE O 151.1D requires a quantitative emergency planning hazards assessment if the all- hazards survey screening process identifies specific hazardous materials and quantities 2-4 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 that could produce impacts consistent with the definition of an Operational Emergency (OE). In general, an OE involving an uncontrolled release of a hazardous material must immediately threaten or endanger those in close proximity of the incident; have the potential for dispersal beyond the immediate vicinity of the release in a quantity that threatens the health of onsite personnel or the public in co-located facilities, activities, on or offsite; and have a potential rate of dispersal sufficient to require a time-urgent response to implement protective actions for workers and the public. (For guidance on co- located workers and facilities see DOE-STD-3009-2014.) All radioactive materials and chemicals with known or suspected toxic properties should be subjected to a hazardous material screening process that identifies all hazardous materials in an SFA that are to be considered for further analysis in an EPHA. Some materials may be excluded from analysis in an EPHA based on use, form, dispersibility, or toxicity. Radioactive materials requiring further analysis include those listed in DOE-

STD-1027-2018 Chg. Notice 1, in quantities greater than Category 3 values. Chemicals assigned Health Hazard Ratings 0, 1, or 2 based on the handbook of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 704, Standard System for the Identification of Hazardous Materials for Emergency Response, may be excluded from further EPHA analysis. With some exceptions for extraordinarily high toxicity, chemicals in quantities less than those that can be easily and safely manipulated by one person, also referred to as laboratory scale quantities, may be excluded from further analysis. Appendix A provides a discussion of the hazardous material screening process and describes a recommended screening approach. If the screening process identifies at least one hazardous material requiring further quantitative analysis, the All-Hazards Survey should indicate that an EPHA is needed for that SFA. A description of the screening process and the results of its application should be provided in the All-Hazards Survey or supporting documents. 2.1.5. Step 3: Identify Applicable Types of Emergency Incidents and Conditions The generic types of emergency incidents and conditions that may occur at each facility for which some planning and preparedness may be required should be identified and documented. The word incident is used by sites and facilities for an unexpected occurrence, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect life or property that affect a site. For planning purposes, SFAs should always plan for events as they would normally happen (weather events, change in normal operations, severe incidents, demonstrations, etc.) Hazardous materials not specifically addressed in a quantitative EPHA should also be considered when identifying the emergency conditions. At a minimum, the following types of emergency conditions should be considered: • Structure fires and explosions; • Natural phenomena impacts; • Environmental releases (of oil or other pollutants that degrade the environment); • Hazardous material (HAZMAT) releases; DOE G 151.1-1B 2-5 7-26-22 • National Security impacts (see definition in DOE O 460.1D); • Multiple facility/building incidents; • Malevolent acts (see DOE O 470.3C for applicable scenarios); • Workplace accidents/mass casualty incidents (explosion, release of toxic fumes, high energy system failure); • Hazards external to the SFA; and • Accidental criticality. The DOE/NNSA Comprehensive Emergency Management System emphasizes emergencies involving the release of hazardous materials. The inventories of materials in facilities will be subject to the screening process discussed above. If a potential release may cause a classified OE, then an EPHA is required. If, on the other hand, the facility contains an aggregation of small quantities (i.e., less than screening thresholds) that may be released during large-scale destructive incidents, such as a fire or explosion in a laboratory, an aircraft crashing into a building, or an earthquake that collapses a structure, this should also be indicated in the All-Hazards Survey. A site may consider defining such incidents as categorized, but not classified OEs if it appears the condition would meet all the aspects of an OE. The potential HAZMAT aspect of these destructive incidents may be used as a qualitative factor or criterion (without the support of detailed quantitative calculations of consequences) in defining specific OEs related to these

incidents. However, even without the inclusion of this category, a site may be required to categorize such an incident as an OE under one of the existing definitions contained in the Order. Some types of emergency conditions will apply to nearly every facility, while others will only apply to facilities that exceed a threshold inventory of some hazardous material or environmental pollutant or are located near other hazards. Site-specific risks/hazards, such as flooding from a nearby dam failure, should be included in the list of potential emergencies to identify the facilities that are potentially threatened. Facility and site hazards can be identified by using subject matter experts (SMEs), BIO reports, SARs, SADs, DSAs, DBTs, Vulnerability Assessments (VAs), chemical and radioactive material inventory databases, and even Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Weather Service, and insurance industry documents. Hazards originating outside the DOE facility or site that could affect the health and safety of onsite personnel or other DOE interests should be identified and examined. At a minimum, the Local Emergency Planning Committee should be consulted to identify nearby facilities containing hazardous material inventories that could affect the DOE site. Railroads, highways, and other transportation arteries that pass through or near a DOE facility or site should be considered possible locations of hazardous material 2-6 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 transportation accidents. If the transportation artery is a known corridor for particular hazardous substances, identify the substance, quantities, approximate shipment frequencies, and Protective Action Zone distance specified in the Department of Transportation (DOT) Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG). Protective Action Zone distances may need to be calculated for hazardous substances not specified in the ERG. Once this information is collected, determine whether specific arrangements should be made for protection of onsite personnel. If no specific information can be obtained, the transportation arteries should be identified as potential sources of hazards to onsite personnel. 2.1.6. Step 4: Qualitatively Describe Potential Impacts Qualitatively describe the potential impacts of the emergency conditions identified in Step 3. These descriptions should relate the potential impacts to the different types of OEs identified in the Order. Consideration should be given to cascade effects, where the emergency condition can result in plausible disruption of response capabilities, such as when an earthquake could result in fires from downed power lines while rupturing fire mains. Examples of potential impacts of several emergency conditions include: Facility Type Emergency Qualitative Description of Impact Condition Office Building Structure Fire Workers killed/injured by smoke inhalation and burns. Waste Incinerator Earthquake Workers killed/injured/ trapped by building collapse; release of hazardous materials; contamination of facility and surroundings; spill of fuel oil into streams/wetlands. Onsite Transportation Activity Collision Actual or potential release of hazardous materials; exposures exceeding Protective Action Criteria (PAC). 2.1.7. Step 5: Identify Applicable Planning and Preparedness Requirements Various Federal, State, and local regulations include requirements that pertain to planning and preparedness for emergencies. The Order recognizes these as Core Program

requirements and directs that they be incorporated into the site emergency management programs. Emergency planners should correlate All-Hazards Survey results with the relevant planning and preparedness requirements from other Federal, State, or local regulations that apply to a specific facility, and provide a summary of the required scope of emergency planning and preparedness at the site. Examples of possible Core Program planning and preparedness requirements are listed in the Order. The All-Hazards Survey should serve as a guide for assessing site compliance with a variety of DOE and non-DOE emergency planning and preparedness requirements that are integral parts of the Comprehensive Emergency Management System. DOE G 151.1-1B 2-7 7-26-22 2.1.8. All-Hazards Survey Documentation As noted in Section 1.2, a single All-Hazards Survey document may address multiple facilities with the results presented in several ways. The tabular/matrix presentation format is an efficient method of summarizing and documenting survey information for many facilities. Using this approach, the All-Hazards Survey document can consist of brief descriptions of the facilities, types of hazards that apply, potential impacts of hazards, applicable regulations, and other common information, followed by a table or matrix indicating which items apply to each facility. If the number of facilities is small, separate text section(s) can be devoted for each. For facilities with hazardous materials, the All-Hazards Survey document should identify the sources of inventory information and summarize the hazardous material screening methods and results. Sites are not expected to reproduce extensive texts from original sources to incorporate in the All-Hazards Surveys. Instead, existing site documents or record systems such as facility descriptions, building pre-incident plans, and hazardous material inventories may be included in a table or matrix in the All-Hazards Survey. Hazardous material inventory information for an SFA or activity should be documented to support the results of the hazardous material screening process. The inventory information need only be documented in the All-Hazards Survey to the extent necessary to indicate whether a quantitative EPHA is required. If an EPHA is required, the results of the screening process for all materials in an SFA should be included in the EPHA. Otherwise, the screening results can be included as part of the supporting documentation for the All- Hazards Survey. Sites must ensure EPHA documentation is reviewed for classified or CUI prior to release, when required, with particular emphasis on the quantity and location of hazardous materials (especially nuclear materials) and malevolent acts scenarios associated with these materials. 2.1.9. Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) 2.1.9.1. Introduction The purpose of the THIRA is to provide a strategic-level view of identified threats and hazards impacting the area, and anticipated capabilities necessary to address these threats and hazards. Requirements for performing an All-Hazards Survey, including conducting a THIRA, are described in Attachment 3, Section 2 of DOE O 151.1D. Information provided through the THIRA will serve as the baseline for NA-41 (HQ) development of the Department’s comprehensive, enterprise-wide threat and risk

assessment that supports Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) and the National Preparedness System in accordance with its guiding principles of a risk-informed culture and risk-informed decision making. The DOE Enterprise THIRA will create a common operating picture for DOE leadership for strategic planning purposes such as formulation of level direction and priorities. 2-8 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 The DHS Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 provides guidance for developing a THIRA that is flexible and scalable. The intent of the Order requirement is to allow flexibility in how the guidance in CPG 201 is applied to each SFA, while maintaining a common framework and a consistent approach for identifying and assessing risks and impacts. For information on an over-pressurization hazard and on how it is presented in DOE O 151.1D, and how to account for it in a THIRA, SFAs should refer to the analysis in DOE-STD-1212-2012. 2.1.9.2. Step 1: Identify Threats and Hazards of Concern For the purposes of the THIRA, the CPG 201 organizes threats and hazards into three categories. • Natural hazards: acts of nature • Technological hazards: accidents or the failures of systems and structures • Human-caused incidents: the intentional actions of an adversary SFAs can use scenarios previously derived from SAR/SAD/DSA/DBT development to fit into these categories to help meet the requirements of the THIRA. Table 2-1 provides examples of the types of threats and hazards that an SFA may encounter (the list is not all-inclusive). Table 2-1 Example Threats and Hazards by Category Natural Technological Human-caused • Avalanche • Drought • Earthquake • Epidemic • Flood • Hurricane • Landslide • Pandemic • Tornado • Tsunami • Volcanic eruption • Wildland fire • Winter storm • Airplane • Dam failure • Levee failure • Mine accident • Hazardous materials release • Power failure • Radiological release • Train derailment • Urban conflagration • UAS-Incursions • Active shooter / threat • Biological attack • Chemical attack • Cyber incident • Explosives attack • Radiological attack • Sabotage DOE G 151.1-1B 2-9 7-26-22 Likelihood of a Threat or Hazard Affecting a Site/Facility Activity (SFA) For the purposes of the THIRA, likelihood is defined as “the chance of a given threat or hazard affecting an SFA.” Considering likelihood is critical because SFAs must allocate limited resources strategically. Likelihood of occurrence should be the determining factor in allocating resources for threats and hazards. Through the THIRA, SFAs identify threats and hazards that are challenging enough to expose capability gaps, and likely enough to justify investing in the capabilities necessary to manage them. The ability to predict the likelihood of a specific incident varies. Some hazards have mature prediction models that allow SFAs to calculate the probability of a specific incident with a moderate degree of accuracy. Other hazards, such as terrorism, are more difficult to predict and may be most easily expressed either on a logarithmic or ordinal scale. Regardless of how SFAs express the probability of a specific incident, understanding the likelihood of threats and hazards can help understand capability requirements and prioritizations of investments. Including estimates of probability in the THIRA is not necessary but may be included if deemed appropriate. SFA staff may consider additional sources for useful likelihood and

consequence information to inform threat and hazard selections, such as hazard mitigation plans. Regardless of whether probability is included in the THIRA process, SFA staff should only consider the threats and hazards that could realistically occur. The Impacts of a Threat or Hazard The projected impacts of threats and hazards determine the level of capability an SFA will need to address impacts. To understand risks effectively, the staff at the SFA should identify and select threats and hazards that most challenge their capabilities. Different incidents present different challenges. In some cases, the sheer magnitude of the incident may be substantial; in other cases, there may be operational or coordination complexities or economic and social challenges. When assessing potential impacts, SFA staff may include as many threats or hazards in the THIRA as they desire but include as many as necessary to challenge each of the 32 core capabilities. 2.1.9.3. Step 2: Give Threats and Hazards Context Context Descriptions Threats and hazards were identified in Step 1. In Step 2 of the THIRA, create context descriptions and estimate the impacts of the threats and hazards. If an element of the scenario is essential to understanding the effect of an incident and the capabilities required to manage it, the element should be included in the context description. 2-10 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 For example: How would the location of an incident affect the SFA’s ability to manage it? Which locations would be most likely to have the greatest impacts (populated areas, isolated areas, or areas with large amounts of hazardous materials)? Estimate Impacts SFA staff write impacts in the language of common emergency management metrics, for example, the affected population, the number of people requiring shelter, or the number of people requiring screening. The standardized impact language communicates metrics estimated and, in most cases, across multiple threats and hazards. SFA staff will develop capability targets in Step 3 based on estimated impacts. As such, they will identify a specific number for the standardized impact when estimating impacts before proceeding to Step 3. Ideally, SFA staff estimate all standardized impacts for each threat or hazard scenario. However, at a minimum, to develop capability targets in THIRA Step 3, they will develop an estimate for each standardized impact at least once across all included threats and hazards. In addition to impacts for which standardized language exists, other impacts may be included in the THIRA as deemed appropriate. Non-standardized language may be used to describe impacts when not included in the standardized impact language. If SFA staff choose to estimate an impact using data from a single scenario, they should choose the scenario that could create the most challenging impact. 2.1.9.4. Step 3: Establish Capability Targets Capability targets are not a reflection of current capabilities, but represent a long-term desired proficiency level. Capability targets are established to describe the level of competence to work toward to achieve core capabilities. When developing capability targets SFA staff should consider what is required to address the impacts of threats and hazards. Impacts, Objectives, and Timeframe Metrics Each capability target describes a critical task that, when completed, helps successfully manage a threat or hazard. These critical tasks:

(1) Are based on the activities that emergency managers plan for; and (2) Define activities that must be performed for a wide variety of threats and hazards, not only the ones identified in the THIRA. Additionally, SFAs estimate which threat or hazard most challenges their ability to achieve the critical task described in each capability target. This adds more utility to the THIRA during real-world incidents. Capability targets are specific and measurable, and can be built by combining impacts, which represent the size of the capability requirement, and timeframe metrics, which represent the timeframe in which the action must be performed. DOE G 151.1-1B 2-11 7-26-22 Impacts and Objectives For each capability target, SFAs should identify the level of capability they want to work toward. To determine this desired level of capability, consider the impacts of threats and hazards, estimated resource requirements, expected available resources, and other relevant factors. The impact that is selected as a target does not need to match the impacts previously identified. However, SFAs should ensure they understand the risk posed by their threats and hazards and use that knowledge to inform the impacts they include in their capability targets. If an impact is selected that is different from the one previously identified, describe how it was chosen and the sources used. THIRA capability targets should reflect the SFAs’ unique planning and investment strategies. In addition to capability targets, SFAs may also set an additional target called a maximum requirement target. The maximum requirement reflects the highest level of a potential capability requirement. This maximum requirement reflects the impacts of the threat or hazard that most challenge the critical task described in the capability target. It is important to note that not all capability targets are impact-based. While most targets use post-incident quantitative impacts as explained above, some capabilities focus on preventing an occurrence, or lessening the vulnerabilities that affect the scale of a threat or hazard. Instead of a traditional standardized impact, these targets include a measurable objective that represents a goal that has been set for that core capability. Timeframe Metrics Timeframe metrics describe the timeframe or level of effort needed to successfully deliver core capabilities. When constructing targets, it is not enough to know how much of an objective you plan to accomplish, you may also need to know how quickly you must be able to activate that capability, and how long you need to be able to sustain it. The answers to these questions will be unique to the capability target in question. When considering timeframes, SFAs should not be constrained by their current ability to meet timeframes or other conditions of success; rather, they should identify the timeframe that they desire to achieve. The SFA should use the type of metric that is most appropriate for the given capability. For the core capability Mass Search and Rescue Operations, that might be “search (#) structures within # hours,” while for Threats and Hazards Identification, a more appropriate timeframe might be “model (#) scenarios every # years.” The SFA should work with SMEs and stakeholders to determine time-based metrics that are most appropriate for each capability. Developing Capability Targets In the THIRA, SFAs create capability targets for the core capabilities listed in the

National Preparedness Goal. The SFA should use standardized language and their own specific metrics to construct these targets. In addition to setting capability targets using the standardized target language for each of the 32 core capabilities, certain SFAs may also want to develop additional targets. These 2-12 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 additional targets can capture goals to achieve additional capabilities or critical tasks that are specific to the SFA’s needs. 2.1.9.5. Conclusion An SFA THIRA is intended to be a separate, stand-alone document, conducted on a site- wide basis, which characterizes a limited set of events that would stress the internal capabilities of the site, (i.e., most likely, worst-case incidents). The All-Hazards Survey is intended to provide a comprehensive evaluation of hazards applicable to individual facilities/activities and includes hazardous material screening. The goal of the THIRA is to provide a common operating picture to local authorities for emergency management and emergency scenarios. The THIRA may reveal scenario hazard gaps in the existing EPHA. If, based on the professional judgement of Field Element Manager (FEM), scenario hazard gaps are revealed, then they are to be added to an existing EPHA or detailed in a new EPHA. If no scenario hazard gaps are revealed, then there is no further action required by the FEM than the conduct of the THIRA. Specific guidance on how to conduct a THIRA for DOE SFAs is provided through templates located on the Enterprise Data Management System SharePoint site. 2.2. Technical Planning Basis 2.2.1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assist DOE and NNSA field elements in complying with DOE O 151.1D whenever a facility-specific quantitative assessment of the potential release of hazardous materials is required. An EPHA must be performed for an SFA when at least one hazardous material requiring quantitative analysis is identified through the hazardous material screening process conducted as part of the All-Hazards Survey. The Order requires special planning and preparedness for DOE emergency management programs that need to respond to emergency incidents or conditions involving the unplanned release of hazardous materials. The scope and extent of these programs will be based on facility-specific hazards through a commensurate with hazards approach. The first step in the implementation of this approach for hazardous materials is the quantitative analysis of potential emergencies in an EPHA. EPHAs involve the application of rigorous hazards analysis techniques that provide sufficient detail to assess a broad spectrum of postulated incidents or conditions involving the potential release of hazardous materials and to analyze the resulting consequences. The screening process and the analysis of identified hazardous materials in an SFA determine the potential for producing an OE classified as an Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), or General Emergency (GE). If the hazardous material does not screen out, is not covered by the exclusions in Attachment 3 of DOE Order 151.1D, and a potential classifiable OE associated with an SFA or onsite activity is identified, an Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program needs to be developed and maintained that DOE G 151.1-1B 2-13 7-26-22 establishes additional, more detailed emergency management program requirements than those imposed by the Emergency Management Core Program.

The EPHA performs three roles in a DOE emergency management program. 1. By summarizing the processes and systems associated with the hazardous materials, together with the nature and magnitude of the hazards, the EPHA provides the technical planning basis for establishing a graded approach that will determine the necessary plans/procedures, personnel, resources, equipment, and analyses that comprise the Emergency Management Hazardous Materials Program. 2. The documented EPHA provides an archival record of the data, assumptions, and methods used in developing the technical planning basis for the program; it also reflects the reasoning used to modify the program in response to changes in operations and hazards. The documented EPHA should enable an emergency management program to survive the inevitable turnover of hazards assessment personnel without the loss of continuity that can result from uncertainty about past analyses and decisions. 3. The EPHA performs a key readiness assurance role by providing clear evidence that facility-specific hazards are well understood by the responsible emergency management planners, and that, if used correctly, the EPHA represents a valid technical foundation for developing an emergency management program that is commensurate with hazards. Of particular importance in performing hazards assessments, especially for sites with multiple facilities, is consistency in the selection and application of analysis techniques, hazardous material release scenarios, and the assumptions and input data used in consequence calculations. A recommended approach for ensuring consistency is to standardize and document ground rules and criteria prior to performing the hazards assessment analyses. The selection and subsequent documentation of EPHA release criteria and analysis techniques, beforehand, ensures both consistency between EPHAs for common scenarios and analyses and consensus among diverse site functions. An effective method for accomplishing consistency and for ensuring consensus among diverse disciplines involved with the EPHAs is through interaction and coordination with a broad scope of interested facility or site functions, including operations, programs, Safeguards and Security (S&S), safety, fire protection, and authorization basis and emergency management analysts. Most sites, especially those with multiple facilities, can benefit from the issuance of a formal site-wide procedure for performing hazards assessments. Such a procedure should specify standard analysis methods, inputs, and criteria for performing the hazards assessment analyses, as well as a step-by-step hazards assessment approach and documentation standard that will ensure consistency among the site’s EPHAs. This documented procedure can also streamline the required DOE review and approval process for revised and updated EPHAs, which should significantly decrease the time required to implement approved changes in emergency management 2-14 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 plans and procedures and emergency response tools such as Emergency Action Levels (EALs). To the maximum extent possible, the hazards assessment process should make use of facility description and accident scenarios from SARs/SADs/DSAs/DBTs, consequence assessment methods used during emergency response, and existing hazardous materials inventories maintained for other purposes. Information available from sources such as

SARs/SADs/DSAs/DBTs, BIO documents, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), VAs, Fire Hazard Analyses (FHAs), Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), and other documents that address SFA hazards or potential consequences may be used to ensure consistency of basic input data. The analyses contained in these sources should be used with caution, however, because the assumptions and methodology applicable to their intended purposes may not be fully compatible with emergency management planning needs. When scheduling EPHA preparation, the schedules for the preparation, review, and update of other safety and regulatory compliance documents should be considered. Integrating the EPHA effort with these schedules can increase preparation efficiency and reduce cost. Where possible, the same release parameters and analysis techniques may be used to minimize the differences between the EPHAs and safety/authorization-basis analyses. In order to advance the level of understanding and the capability of performing integrated hazards analysis, a handbook was developed by DOE to emphasize the efficiencies and advantages associated with integrating the numerous hazard analysis methodologies performed under various requirements. This handbook, DOE-HDBK-1163-2003, Integration of Multiple Hazard Analysis Requirements and Activities, focuses on data exchange among the various analysis methodologies under multiple standards and requirements, where applicable. It is the intention of the handbook to promote further discussion and hands-on experience in encouraging the concept of the integration of hazards analysis. The hazards assessment process for emergency management discussed in this guide promotes this concept of analysis integration. The guidance in this section is directed at operations and emergency management staff responsible for DOE and NNSA facilities at field offices, service centers, and operating contractor organizations. It is expected that emergency management staff will obtain support from site and facility management and from a variety of scientific and technical disciplines within their respective organizations as they conduct and document the analyses described herein. 2.2.2. General Approach – Technical Planning Basis DOE Emergency Management System policy and Order 151.1 (current version) require that hazardous material emergency management programs are responsive to the full range (spectrum) of potential hazardous material release scenarios, including applicable hazardous material types, release magnitudes, and initiating incidents. The term release is DOE G 151.1-1B 2-15 7-26-22 used here to mean, primarily, an airborne release. The airborne release pathway typically represents the most time-urgent situation and requires a rapid, coordinated emergency response on the part of the facility, co-located facilities, and surrounding jurisdictions to protect workers, the public, and the environment. Releases to aquatic and ground pathways, although a matter of serious concern in terms of potential environmental and long-term public health consequences, in most instances do not have the same time urgency as the airborne release. When a release to an aquatic or ground pathway could have a near-term effect on the workers or the public, then it should be considered in the hazards assessment. For a single facility, there may be hundreds of different possible hazardous material

release scenarios. To address this range of possibilities, facilities should develop and document a technical planning basis for the facility-specific emergency management program consisting of a manageable number of systematically selected and realistically analyzed release scenarios to represent a spectrum of severity and initiators. The purpose of this chapter of the EMG is to provide guidance that will address the process for conducting and documenting the selection and quantitative analysis of potential release scenarios associated with the hazardous materials identified by the All-Hazards Survey screening process. The recommended steps in the EPHA process are the following: Step 1 Define and describe the facility and operations Step 2 Characterize the hazardous materials Step 3 Select scenarios for analysis Step 4 Analyze Scenarios – Estimate Source term – Calculate consequences – Identify recognition factors – Finalize technical planning basis scenarios Step 5 Document the results of the analysis Although the basic steps of the process should be accomplished and documented in the order presented, within any given step of the process, there is substantial leeway within which the unique features of the facility, operations, and site can be accommodated. 2-16 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 The EPHA should address factors such as: • Initiating incidents (e.g., security incidents, natural phenomena, technological hazards, etc.) • Contributing events • Accident mechanisms • Equipment, system failures, or engineered safety system failure • Source terms • Material release chemistry and characteristics • Environmental transport and diffusion • Emergency incident or condition observable indicators • Exposure considerations • Health effects Conservative consequence calculations should be performed for the purposes of incident classification, initial protective action determinations, response decision-making, and special planning (co-located facilities, special offsite populations, EPZ determination). The results of the hazards assessment are to be used to determine the EPZs for each facility and site, as well as the emergency classification and initial protective actions for each analyzed incident. The observable indicators, or recognition factors, of each analyzed incident or condition are identified for use as incident classification criteria (EALs). The EPHA should be prepared and documented in a manner that permits critical review of the analyses and results and, if necessary, reconstruction by independent analysts. However, detailed descriptions of the methods, assumptions, and models need not be included if they are documented elsewhere and referenced. 2.2.3. Step 1: Define and Describe Facility and Operations A clear, accurate, and unambiguous written and schematic description of the facility, activity, or operation that represents the scope of the EPHA should be provided. This description should provide sufficient detail to support the identification, location, and characterization of all hazards (radiological, biological agent/toxin, chemical and explosive) and their potential consequences. For many facilities, the descriptions of the facility and its operations from current SAR/SAD/DSA/DBT or environmental reports should serve this purpose and may be briefly summarized and incorporated by reference. DOE G 151.1-1B 2-17 7-26-22 In some cases, the boundaries of the facility and operations in question will have been

previously defined. Facility definitions used for SAR/SAD/DSA/DBT purposes may be applicable. However, the boundaries should be reexamined with the objectives of the EPHA in mind. Sites may group their facilities, activities, and hazards in any of several ways for hazards assessment purposes. Several structures or component units with a common or related purpose may be defined as single facility, such as a waste tank farm consisting of a number of units of approximately the same nature and purpose under common management and operational control. On the other hand, a group of dissimilar buildings, operations, and equipment, such as a research reactor with its associated cooling tower, fuel handling and waste storage buildings, laboratory, and hot machine shop may also be considered as one facility for purposes of the hazards assessment. Finally, all the hazards within a single building or structure containing several tenant activities or units, such as process lines, hot cells, or hazardous material storage may be analyzed and documented as one facility, even though the tenant activities have little in common, technically or organizationally. The written facility description should include general information related to the site mission, operations, and physical characteristics, including an assessment of the site exposure to external and natural phenomena hazards. It should include the location of the facility relative to other facilities on the same site, the site boundaries, the nearest public access locations, and transportation networks, such as highways, railroads, and rivers. Particular attention should be paid to including facility-specific information critical to understanding and reconstructing the consequence calculations and to information necessary to aid emergency planners in using the analysis results to develop other emergency management program elements. This information should include: • Descriptions and physical parameters for facility containment/confinement systems • Potential leak paths and release points • Protective/mitigative systems or features • Technical, physical, or administrative limits on use/storage of hazardous materials • Installed process monitors, alarms, or detection systems. 2.2.4. Step 2: Characterize the Hazardous Materials After the facility hazards have been screened, using the hazardous material screening process outlined in Attachment 3 of DOE O 151.1D, the characterization of both radioactive and chemical hazardous materials should include the following information: • The maximum quantity of the material in appropriate units (pounds or kilograms, curies or becquerels) and its storage or process locations. 2-18 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 • A description of the conditions under which the material is stored or used, including process systems or containers that hold the material, and barriers that may impact its release or dispersion, such as shipping containers, buildings, berms, sumps, or catch basins. Where applicable, security and access controls for the storage and use locations should be identified. • The properties of the material that are needed for determination of source term and consequence analysis, such as the physical form and chemical characteristics of the material (e.g., solid, liquid, gaseous, particle size, flammability, chemical reactivity, density, combustion and explosion byproducts, vapor pressure, boiling point, freezing

point), radiological characteristics, and the temperature and pressure conditions under which it is stored, processed, used, or transported. • A description of engineered controls, safeguards, or safety systems designed to prevent or mitigate a hazardous material release. These may include both automatic and manually activated mitigative systems, as well as passive mitigative features and engineered geometry or configuration controls for fissionable materials. Instruments and systems that would detect actual or potential emergency conditions should be identified. • A description of administrative controls that would prevent or mitigate the initiation of a hazardous material release, such as limits on the total quantity of a material in a single place or container, or restrictions on where certain materials can be used or stored. For criticality accidents, the inventory of interest is the total yield of gaseous and volatile fission products from the postulated criticality incident(s). Analyses of these postulated criticality incidents would generally be available in the facility SAR, SAD, or DSA. Where the material consists of a reactor core or irradiated fuel containing mixed fission products, the relevant factors that define the radiotoxicity of the mixture should be analyzed and the case that produces the largest impact selected. The actual isotopic composition of the mixture used for consequence calculations can then be included as an appendix and referenced. For those facilities having a documented vulnerability analysis, the identified targets may include both hazardous materials and essential parts of the system of barriers, controls, and protection features that keep them in a safe condition. The target list is a potential source of information regarding both the quantity of certain hazards and the conditions under which they are stored, handled, and used. Other materials and hazard sources, such as flammable or explosive materials, energy sources, processes containing oil, and non-toxic hazardous materials (i.e., NFPA health hazard rating ≤2 in quantities greater than a quantity that can be easily and safely manipulated by one person), should also be included in the characterization. The potential for these materials/hazards initiating releases of radioactive or chemically toxic materials contributing to the dispersal of those materials, degrading the effectiveness of safety DOE G 151.1-1B 2-19 7-26-22 systems, incapacitating workers causing a process upset, or posing an asphyxiation hazard to collocated workers, should be considered. Available information concerning the reactive properties of the hazardous materials should be assessed and the possibility of interactions between substances considered. 2.2.5. Step 3: Select Scenarios for Analysis The objective of this step in the hazards assessment process is to select potential release scenarios associated with the hazardous materials characterized in Step 2. These analysis cases will ultimately represent a spectrum of possible scenarios that will serve as the technical planning basis for the SFA emergency management program. The specific scenarios/cases to be analyzed in the EPHA should be chosen through a systematic examination of: • All the hazardous materials in the facility; • Primary barrier(s) that maintain each material in a safe condition; • Modes by which each primary barrier could fail;

• Initiating incidents or conditions that could cause barrier failure modes; and • Release conditions associated with the failure mode or the initiating incident, including pathways and mitigation devices through which the substance could be released to the environment. Applicable combinations of the hazardous materials in the facility and potential scenario characteristics will define a set of analysis cases, where each release scenario will be represented by combinations of the following four terms: • Hazardous material [Material-At-Risk (MAR)] • Failure mode • Initiating incident or condition • Release condition(s) This process of developing potential scenarios by constructing combinations of these four parameters will ultimately lead to a complete listing of the applicable cases. 2.2.5.1. Types of Incidents and Conditions to Be Considered A set of incidents and conditions should be postulated and analyzed that represents the full spectrum of possible initiators and severity levels involving releases of hazardous materials that could affect workers, the public, or the environment. A spectrum of 2-20 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 potential incidents ranging from low-consequence, high-probability incidents to high consequence, low-probability incidents, including those considered to be beyond-design basis, should be postulated and realistically analyzed. The spectrum of incidents and conditions analyzed should include those exclusively affecting onsite personnel, as well as those also affecting the offsite public. Analysis of a spectrum of incidents does not mean analysis of every imaginable incident. The goal is to create a comprehensive picture of the types of incidents and a range of associated consequences that could occur at a facility. This comprehensive picture of incidents and consequences will then serve as the basis for emergency response planning. The All-Hazards Survey described in Section 1 of this Chapter, identifies the types of emergency incidents and conditions and the potential impacts of such emergencies to be addressed by the DOE emergency management program for the facility. If facilities have sufficient quantities of hazardous materials, some of those types of emergencies will have the potential to cause the airborne release of hazardous materials with significant health and safety consequences outside the facility. Thus, the All-Hazards Survey for a facility provides an initial set of potential release incidents and initiators to be considered for analysis. Initiating incidents and failure mechanisms considered in the hazard assessment should include traditionally defined accidents, as well as incidents arising from external causes and malevolent acts. Scenarios should be included that represent both the success and the failure of control measures and engineered safety systems. A minimum set of incidents is recommended for analyzing hazardous material releases identified as candidates for a hazard assessment. The incidents that are appropriate to the specific facility should be selected from the following groups: 1. Incidents: • Fire • Explosion • Loss of confinement or containment • Process upsets • Criticality • Onsite transportation accidents Accident event initiators include failure causes such as corrosion, manufacturing defects, malfunctioning equipment or control systems, interaction of reactive materials, external impact, incapacitation of workers, and procedural or human error.

(The analysis of onsite transportation accidents is addressed in Appendix B.) DOE G 151.1-1B 2-21 7-26-22 2. Events: • Earthquakes • Tornadoes • Lightning and Hail • Floods • Wildland Fires • Winter Storms Most natural phenomena events to be analyzed can be selected from the SAR/SAD/ DSA/DBT (if available) for the facility. Typically, two events are defined for each type of natural phenomenon — DBE used to determine safety control systems, as well as an extreme, beyond-DBE, considered incredible in SAR/SAD/DSA/DBT analysis. Both events are derived from historical data. If no SAR/SAD/DSA/DBT is available, the event(s) can be obtained directly from historical data for the region. 3. External Events: • Aircraft crash • Offsite transportation accidents • Offsite commercial facility or utility accidents External events have the potential to be the initiating incident for the onsite release or loss of control of hazardous material, either directly or by disruption of operations or processes onsite. Historical data can provide information on the susceptibility of the area to wildland fires and potential aircraft sizes can be determined from experience with aircraft operating in the vicinity. A review of road, river, and railway transportation networks near the site boundary (or through the site) provides indications of potential hazardous material transport accidents. In addition, nearby commercial facilities or utilities (chemical plants, pipelines, water treatment plants) may contain hazardous materials that pose a threat to facilities onsite. Incidents originating offsite that affect the site may not meet the requirement to have an EPHA. The ERG may be used by emergency responders to analyze offsite releases of hazardous materials that impact the site. Offsite transportation accidents may involve nuclear weapons, their components, or special nuclear weapons, and require assistance from the Office of Secure Transportation (OST). Refer to DOE O 151.1D Attachment 5 for requirements regarding the OST EPHA. 2-22 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 4. Malevolent Acts: Malevolent acts, including the use of explosives or flammable material, are possible hazardous material release initiators within the scope of the emergency planning and the EPHA. More examples of potentially malevolent scenarios can be found in the current version of DOE O 470.3C, Design Basis Threat (DBT) Order. The Office of Emergency Management Policy defines the term extreme malevolent acts within the context of catastrophic incidents that can be further categorized as man-made deliberate criminal acts. Severe Incident Scenarios Low-probability, high-consequence incidents should be addressed in facility emergency management plans (and in EPHAs) because of their potential effects on workers in the affected facility and those nearby. Both malevolent acts, which are seldom analyzed in SARs/SADs/DSAs, and beyond-DBEs should also be included in the EPHA. Extreme malevolent acts and beyond-DBEs typically represent the upper end of the consequence spectrum for which prompt recognition and response may be essential to the mitigation of both the incident and its health and safety consequences. By adding these scenarios to an EPHA, planners can: • Gain perspective of the residual risk associated with the operation of the facility. • Gain additional perspectives for accident mitigation. These analyses provide valuable insights and can serve as bases for cost-benefit

evaluation of improvements, modifications, or enhanced emergency management response capabilities. 2.2.5.2. Selection of a Spectrum of Scenarios A process consisting of the following sequence of steps is an acceptable method for selecting a spectrum of scenarios related to the hazardous materials in the facility: 1. Identify MAR(s) in the facility; 2. Identify primary barrier(s); 3. Select failure mode(s); 4. Identify initiating incident(s); and 5. Identify release condition(s). This selection process is described in detail below. DOE G 151.1-1B 2-23 7-26-22 A. Identify Material-at-Risk (MARs) in Facility The selection process begins by identifying the hazardous substances at each location within the facility. Each quantity or unit of a hazardous substance is the MAR, as that term is used in DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (and discussed in Section 2.6, below), for one or more possible release scenarios. Examples of MARs include: • Nitric acid in an outdoor storage tank • Radioactive liquid in a processing system • Chlorine in a cylinder attached to a gas manifold A facility can contain one or multiple MARs. In some instances, the MAR for an incident affecting the entire facility might include all the material located in the facility. This will be addressed in the discussion of the source terms in Section 2.6. B. Identify Primary Barriers The physical or administrative features that maintain the hazardous substance in a safe condition should be identified for each MAR. The primary barrier is generally the one physically nearest to the material. In the case of gaseous or liquid materials, the tank, cylinder, process piping, or other container is usually the primary barrier. For materials that are prevented from being released by their own structure or physical form, that form or structure can be regarded as the primary barrier. C. Select Failure Modes Failure modes are the ways in which the primary barrier might lose its integrity or its ability to perform the function of controlling or confining the hazardous material. Failure modes should be selected that are applicable to the primary barrier for the MAR being addressed. The following are examples of failure modes of the primary barrier that might apply to the MAR examples given above and the types of release that might be produced: • Puncture (of the nitric acid tank, causing spill of liquid) • Fatigue crack (in the pipe carrying pressurized radioactive liquid, causing spray leak) • Impact fracture (of the chlorine cylinder stop valve, venting a pressurized gas) • Combustion (of solid radioactive waste material, releasing contaminants) For radioactive materials, identification of the failure modes is necessary to make use of the source term information from DOE-HDBK-3010-94. It also helps align the EPHA consequence calculations with authorization basis safety analyses, a key element in the integration of facility hazards analyses. See DOE-HDBK-1163-2003, Integration of Multiple Hazard Analysis Requirements and Activities, for guidance on this subject. Selecting failure modes and their size/degree is also an initial step in modeling chemical 2-24 DOE G 151.1-1B 7-26-22 releases using calculation methods such as those described in Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 550-B-99-009, Risk Management Program Guidance for Offsite Consequence Analysis. The first and most important failure mode to be identified for each MAR is the one that

produces the bounding (largest possible) source term, either in terms of total amount of material released or the rate of release to the environment. For facilities covered by authorization basis safety analyses, this case is likely to correspond to an analyzed bounding event (DBE or Beyond-DBE). Using the earlier MAR and failure mode examples, reasonable bounding source terms might correspond to the following cases: • Spill of the entire contents of the nitric acid on a flat surface at the highest average daily temperature, producing the largest expected evaporative (airborne vapor) source; • Spray from a pipe crack of the size that will produce the maximum mass release rate of respirable-size aerosol droplets, continuing for a time corresponding to the expected duration of the liquid transfer operation; • Release of the entire contents of a chlorine cylinder over a period of 15 minutes (the averaging time used for comparison with the applicable exposure criterion); and • Burning of the entire contents of a waste accumulation area, with release of the bounding fraction (from DOE-HDBK-3010-94) of the largest amount of radioactive material expected to be in the waste material. Once the bounding release is identified, one or more additional cases may be needed to adequately represent the range of possibilities. If the consequences of the bounding case are below the threshold for classification at the Alert level, there is little reason to analyze additional cases, because any smaller releases will also fall below the threshold for classification. However, this may only become evident when final consequence calculations are performed. The following represents a set of failure modes that might apply to a nitric acid tank: • Puncture (or crack) low on the tank, which would produce an evaporative source limited by the area of the confinement curb/berm • Puncture/crack at a higher level, which would produce splash/spray source of aerosols, in addition to the evaporative source • Overturning/toppling, such that all or most of the tank contents end up outside the curb, producing a larger evaporation surface and source The choice of the spectrum of sizes or degrees of failure (modes) that will apply to the MAR under consideration is the key to the selection approach. If this initial selection of the spectrum of failure modes is done carefully and methodically, based on a clear understanding of the features/characteristics of the primary barrier and the MAR, then the DOE G 151.1-1B 2-25 7-26-22 spectrum of selected scenarios that is the final product of the process will provide a solid foundation/basis for emergency planning. The results of this step include combinations of MAR and failure modes for each MAR and its associated failure modes identified in the facility. D. Identify Initiating Incident(s) The next step in the process is to identify initiating incidents/conditions that could apply to each failure mode (i.e., cause the failure). The analyst should postulate a range of initiators applicable to the specific SFA, starting with the guidance presented in Section 2.5.1 and identifying those that could produce the failure mode under consideration. In addition, the analysis should indicate whether a specific failure mode would be exclusively or most likely associated with a particular initiating incident or condition, OR, conversely, if th